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This thesis develops and advocates a feminist philosophy of myth in order to 
reformulate influential understandings of the roles and functions of myths in recent 
mythological scholarship. The initial hypothesis which the thesis establishes in Chapter 
1 is that the designation of myth qua myth is neither innocent nor organic; highly 
consequential interests are at stake when myths are narrated, and, moreover, the 
categorisation of some types of narrative as ‘myth’ and others as ‘science’, or 
‘philosophy’, for example, indicates powerful assertions about their relative level of 
validity and authority. I argue that these assertions are implicated in discursive 
strategies of containment and exclusion and allied to forms of identity construction 
characterised by an assertion of singularity. They further rely on the location of a non-
transcendable point of origin as a means of securing the stability and legitimacy of these 
constructions. I develop this argument, in Chapters 2–7, through an extended case study 
of the German search for origins from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, and 
demonstrate its relationship to the German romantic attempt to construct a noble 
German identity. I critique these forms of identity and origin construction, arguing that 
the German case is but one example of the western metaphysical theories of ontology 
which are indebted to inflected patrilinearity, the main feature of which is a 
preoccupation with monogenetic singularity. I consequently develop an alternative 
feminist model of origins and identity in Chapters 8–10 based on poststructural and 
psychoanalytical feminist theories of maternality as a site of splitting, doubling, and 
process. I acknowledge that while the identification of origins is an ontological 
convention, the assertion of patrilineal provenance creates forms of subjectivity that are 
exclusionary, dialectical, and monolithic, and are, therefore, inadequate frameworks for 
constructing ethically oriented models of identity in a post-feminist context. In contrast, 
I suggest that metaphors of maternal origin offer a considerably more promising, if 
transitional, discursive frame for articulating identities that stress multiplicity, 
connectedness, immanence, and dialogue. 
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This is a story. June 26th 1970, Nambour General Hospital, Queensland, Australia. My 
origin, from the start a divided one. An Australian mother, her parentage divided across 
class lines. An Irish father, himself a compromise (short-lived) between a Catholic 
mother and a Protestant father. My parents had met in India as Christian missionaries 
and it was there that we returned when I was six months old, to a small Muslim village 
in Kashmir, the product of Partition, where some of the first words I spoke were in 
Urdu. At the age of six I went to an English boarding school in the south of India. It was 
an utterly foreign place and I lost my mother tongue, learning to speak in the clipped 
precision of a fading colonial elite and, bewilderingly, to disdain and to separate myself 
from the only people to whom I had ever felt I belonged. My mother tongue returns to 
me sometimes in dreams, always in fragments, fleeting. It is the only time I feel 
completely at home. ‘Yes, I only have one language, yet it is not mine’—a refrain that 
repeatedly echoes throughout Jacques Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other (1998), and 
one that drew me into his work, haunts me, returns me to a memory of myself, and 
relieves me because it names an experience I still struggle to find the words for. It 
represents a moment of recognition for me, a way in which to put simply but 
profoundly the complexity of a childhood spent searching for a place I did not, could 
not, belong to. ‘You see, never will this language be mine. And truth to tell, it never was’ 
(Derrida 1998:2). Australian? Irish? Indian? British? Neither one nor the other. And this 
is the crux of what I explore in this thesis. What is it to belong and not to belong? What 
is it to be an undivided or divided self? How are place and self connected? Do origins 
secure, unequivocally, the stability and coherency of the self? Or is this always already 
impossible? Some of these questions have been asked before. They will, of course, be 
asked again. I do not offer any answers but I do suggest an opening to a way of asking 
these questions differently. Identity, as this era’s compulsion, must speak compulsively 
of a problem of difference. And it is this ‘problem’—of difference as a ground of and 
challenge to singular and whole identity—that I seek to explore in what follows. 
The process of writing this thesis has not been systematic, starting with a clear 
concept of what I intended to say, to prove, to argue, and then proceeding neatly to map 
out, unchanged, my initial set of propositions carried through to a convincing 
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conclusion. Is it a dangerous admission to say that it came to me in bits and pieces that I 
have struggled to make sense of? That in some ways it remains a collection of 
fragmented stories, beliefs, desires and that it cannot be otherwise? That it was not until 
I had almost finished that I realised what had been at stake all along and so I returned to 
the beginning—my beginning—again and again? What has been at stake, I discover 
belatedly, has been my own search for identity and origins, conducted under the cover 
of a study of another search for identity and origins. There is no immediately obvious 
reason, of course, why my own convoluted mental processes should be of any interest or 
informative value in the academic context of writing a thesis. However, because this is a 
thesis about origins and identities, and about the criss-crossing of race, gender, class, 
nationality, religion, and sexuality that constitute in complex ways the stories that can 
and may be told of identity, I begin with a small fragment of my own story as a way of 
placing myself—my own ‘origins’ and my ‘identity’—very deliberately within this text 
as part of its formative context and content. I have not mastered this text; I do not stand 
apart from or outside it. Were I not to acknowledge this from the outset, I would leave 
my account of the ‘self’ to remain uninterrogated while placing others’ accounts of their 
selves under question… 
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I. Overview  
This thesis develops and advocates a feminist philosophy of myth in order to challenge 
and reformulate some influential understandings of the roles and functions of myths in 
recent mythological scholarship. I will establish what I perceive to be a relationship of 
interdependency between what has become popularly known as the ‘politics of 
identity’, the legitimating functions of myth, and the legitimating practices of 
mythmaking within the particular rhetoric of identity that has preoccupied western 
metaphysics since the ‘Age of Enlightenment’. As such I will claim that myth and 
mythmaking are, after Michel Foucault, discursive practices insofar as they create and 
encode a circumscribed articulation of identity idealisations and aspirations. The initial 
hypothesis from which I proceed is the idea, suggested by Bruce Lincoln (1999), that the 
designation of myth qua myth is not innocent; highly consequential interests are at stake 
when myths are narrated, and, moreover, the categorisation of some types of narrative 
as ‘myth’ against other narrative forms such as ‘history’, or, more significantly 
‘philosophy’, for example, indicates forceful assertions about their ‘relative level of 
validity and authority’ (Lincoln 1999:ix). I will argue that these assertions are implicated 
in discursive strategies of containment and exclusion that are demonstrably allied to 
forms of identity construction and maintenance that are characterised by an assertion of 
the ‘self’ as singular, autonomous, and stable. Further, I will suggest that they rely on 
the location of a non-transcendable point of origin that is intimately connected to a 
patrilineal logic of continuity and causality as a means of securing the stability and 
legitimacy of these constructions.  
I test my core hypothesis via an extended case study, which occupies the bulk of 
my discussion in the thesis. It is a study of what I consider to be a ‘myth of origins’, 
namely the search for the origins of the German people during the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries. This search, which was also a search for a stable concept of 
German identity, was achieved through two types of mythmaking: firstly, vernacular 
myth and folklore traditions were ‘retrieved’ and then wielded as repositories of the 
German character, in the process creating a canonical basis for German identity that 
concealed the fragmented and manufactured nature of the sources used. Nonetheless, 
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these sources were thought to convey the complete and authentic basis of the German 
nation as rooted in shared cultural traditions—continuity—giving the nationalist project 
of the nineteenth century a solid basis for national unification. It further served to enable 
scholars and public figures to reify the origin of the German people as autochthonous, 
pure, and noble. The second form of mythmaking took the form of the narration of 
German identity itself, that is, the production of a coherent and linear narrative of 
nationhood that sought to ground itself in a glorious past and to express the hope of a 
future utopian destiny. I will show that these two forms of mythmaking operated as 
‘discourses of differentiation’ (Lincoln 1999:54) that served the interests of the German 
romantic nationalist project of the nineteenth century in establishing a vision of a unified 
nation-state against a backdrop of unprecedented social and political fragmentation. As 
such, I will argue that a concept of authentic Germanness was developed along an axis 
of oppositional and exclusionary differences—between Germany and other European 
nations, the past and the present, Semites and Aryans, and, paradigmatically, between 
men as the fathers of the nation and women as passive symbols of the national territory. 
However, paradoxically, these discourses of differentiation were used to claim and to 
distil the monogenetic singularity, and thus the prestige and autonomy, of the German 
people. I will suggest, therefore, that the construction of German identity in this period 
was thought to be contingent on the identification of a singular point of origin, and it 
was an origin conceived of in patrilineal terms, insofar as the search for origins and the 
theories of German identity that emerged from it encoded and relied upon a patrilineal 
model of descent.  
The reason why I focus on the German search for origins, rather than any other, 
is that it occurred in a context where German identity was anything but certain and 
secure, unlike many other European nations during the period under consideration. 
While myth was turned to as a source of secure identity and as an origin of innate 
character, it was only necessary because of that identity’s very uncertainty. As such, the 
history of the politics of German identity in the period in question provides an 
informative case study of how what is in fact an unstable identity can be covered over 
by means of the narration of stability. My aim in focusing on this case study is thus to 
derive a broader set of principles that can be used to understand ‘myths of origin’ more 
generally as discursive practices (rather than descriptive narratives) that are rooted in 
the appropriation of procreative metaphors that encode a patriline as they seek to 
manufacture and valorise identity as stable, primary, and singular. 
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I will critique these forms of identity and origin construction, suggesting that, 
like the German search for origins and identity, they too are indebted to models of 
inflected patrilinearity, the main feature of which is a preoccupation with monogenetic 
singularity. While I acknowledge that the identification of origins does perhaps 
constitute, at the very least, an ontological convention, if not a necessity, the assertion of 
patrilineal provenance creates forms of subjectivity that are exclusionary, dialectical, 
and monolithic. I will suggest that these are inadequate and damaging frameworks for 
discerning and constructing the possible forms and functions of identity in a post-
feminist context where difference, rather than sameness, has been shown by many 
feminist theorists to be both the basis of oppression as well as the source of creative 
resistance. In contrast to metaphors of patrilineal inheritance as the basis of ontology, I 
will suggest that metaphors and myths of maternal origin and of the maternal body 
offer a more promising—if transitional—discursive frame for developing and 
articulating identities that stress multiplicity, connectedness, immanence, and dialogue 
and which do not seek either to overcome or to marginalise difference but rather to 
embrace it. I will consequently develop an alternative feminist model of origins and 
identity—a philosophy—based on poststructural and psychoanalytical feminist theories 
of maternality and the maternal body as a site of splitting, doubling, deconstruction, and 
process that is at serious odds with a patrilineal model. I focus in particular on the 
accounts offered by poststructural and psychoanalytic theories because, in my view, 
they offer a discourse on identity that explicitly resists reading identity in dualist terms. 
Poststructural theory in particular offers a novel approach to identity which could be 
termed an alternative ‘logic’ that eschews an ‘either/or’ model in favour of a thinking 
practice of ‘both/and’. As such, as I will argue, it suggests an opening out of ontology 
that engages with and transgresses the limits placed conventionally within western 
metaphysics on knowledge, gender, subjectivity, and power in a non-authoritarian and 
process-oriented way. The model of identity that I subsequently derive will be shown to 
have some important implications for how myth might be viewed, no longer in 
opposition to philosophy—as philosophy’s other—but rather as philosophy’s future 
horizon. 
My work in this thesis is particularly in dialogue with feminist theory, and I 
derive many of my working assumptions and theoretical frameworks from the body of 
scholarship that has emerged out of the women’s movement of the twentieth century. 
Because of the contested and heterogeneous nature of the term ‘feminist’ some comment 
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is required regarding what I understand it to mean within the context of my work. As 
with most terms, defining ‘feminism’, and by implication, identifying myself as a 
feminist, presents an immediate difficulty because it suggests a homogeneity that is 
belied both by the history of its development and the diversity of its articulations and 
forms. The multiplicity of feminisms that together constitute ‘Feminism’—whether early 
suffrage campaigns, discursive analyses of gender hierarchies, or lesbian activism, for 
example—indicates subtle differences of emphasis and context. Most feminisms are 
concerned, nonetheless, with promoting political and theoretical programmes that 
address what Sherry Ortner has described as the almost ‘universal’ secondary status of 
women (1974:67–71). In this thesis I will deploy the term ‘feminism’ and its derivative 
nouns and adjectives, to refer to a broad set of common themes and concepts, however 
differently expressed, which articulate a critical analysis of gender relations at both 
metatheoretical and empirical levels. In spite of the differences between feminists, 
therefore, in my view they do share several foundational premises: that gender is a 
fundamental organising category of experience and identity; that sexual inequality is a 
cultural construct; and, that an androcentric perspective that obscures its partisan nature 
has dominated fields of knowledge, shaping their theoretical paradigms and methods. 
Feminist theory, as the intellectual conduit of a diversity of feminisms, responds to these 
premises with an array of alternative proposals, all of which reflect an accumulated 
fund of knowledge and experience that is situated in an ongoing teleological and 
etiological analysis of gender inequalities and identities in all social and cultural arenas. 
Further, the possibility of conceptual and political transformation is the raison d’être of 
feminist practices, theories, and methodologies (Hawthorne 2005:3023).  
Although not usually viewed as a feminist, Edward Said has described the task 
of ‘cultural intellectuals’ in terms that represent well what I believe the enterprise of 
feminist scholarship to be: ‘not to accept the politics of identity as given, but to show 
how all representations are constructed, for what purpose, by whom, and with what 
components’ (1994:380). As such, a feminist analysis of identity formation of the type I 
seek to undertake here necessarily enacts a deconstructive double gesture of critique 
and transformation: it seeks to assess and dismantle conventional structures of thought 
that inscribe identity within an oppositional and dualistic framework, where, amongst 
other forms of identification, masculinity is simultaneously normativised and valorised 
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at the expense of femininity, and then uses the intellectual space subsequently created to 
suggest creative and radical alternatives.1 
This is one of the reasons why my thesis gives such a central place to discourse 
as the ground of social relations, political struggle and the construction of identity. 
Symbolic representations—from origin myths to the paradigms of a scholarly 
discipline—are realised in discourse, which itself constitutes and creates the conditions 
for social action. That is, discourse helps shape visions of the world and structures roles 
and relationships in ways that need not, and frequently do not, register on a conscious 
level. In part because of the capacity of discourse to create experience, contemporary 
continental (poststructural) feminist theorists (whose work informs much of my 
thinking about gender and identity), have targeted discourse as a primary agent for the 
oppression of women (Marks and de Courtivron 1980:3). It is through discourse that 
challenges and disrupts established symbolic structures, they argue, that women may 
redirect their experience. Thus, I believe that if existing gender-based power relations 
are to be altered, the concept of gender must be viewed as socially and historically 
contingent, and politically charged.2 
My task in this thesis, therefore, is one that I consider to be both descriptive and 
prescriptive. It is descriptive to the extent that I present an account of the construction 
and narration of identity as developed in the German search for origins and 
demonstrate that it was predicated on a set dualistic assumptions that enshrined 
fatherhood as the basis of national identity, necessitating the identification of and 
potentially violent exclusion of a manufactured alterity in the figure of the Jews and, in a 
more hidden way, of women. In so suggesting I do not mean to argue, as I have already 
stated, that this process was a specifically German one; rather I believe that it stands as 
emblematic of one of the processes and forms of identification that operate within 
western metaphysics more generally and which underpin a masculinist economy of the 
self-same. 
My thesis is also prescriptive in that I seek to offer a potentially transformative 
model of identity predicated on a different ‘myth of origin’, that of the maternal function 
and the metaphor of maternal corporeality as defined within the field of psychoanalysis, 
and particularly as developed in the work of Julia Kristeva. I consequently develop an 
alternative and explicitly feminist model—a myth-as-discourse—of origins and identity 
                                                           
1 See Greene and Kahn 1985:1–2 and Kolodny 1980:7. 
2 See Jardine 1985:47. 
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based on poststructural and psychoanalytical feminist theories of maternality as a site of 
splitting, doubling, deconstruction, and process that embraces—rather than requires—
the destruction of alterity. As such, my intention is to propose just one way—not the 
only way—in which sexual organisation, and by implication other systems of 
identification that are predicated on an oppositional model of being, might be 
reimagined in such a way that difference does not inevitably result in disadvantage for 
those who are marginalised by these systems (Bem 1993). 
In the title of this thesis I indicate that my work is a move ‘towards a feminist 
philosophy of myth’. In so stating, I am implying that my project is concerned with the 
ethics of narration within a feminist frame. My guide is Julia Kristeva’s concern to 
develop representations of difference that allow individuals to express their 
individuality without being marginalised or excluded on the basis of that difference in 
society. Much of her work has explored those processes through which (subject/object) 
boundaries are both broached and maintained dialogically and relationally. As such, I 
will argue that her theories present a fruitful means not only of broadening out the ways 
in which the self might be conceived (in both senses of the term), but that they also offer 
an insight into resolving and overturning the conventional division between myth and 
philosophy, placing them in dialogue rather than in opposition. I will suggest the ways 
in which this constitutes a feminist project. 
While each chapter contains some original analysis or presentation of data, I 
consider the main academic contribution of this thesis to be as follows. Firstly, I align 
myself, although not uncritically, with a discursive approach to myth, outlined below, 
which views myth as an ideological tool for the construction of identities. However, I 
seek to demonstrate, more systematically than has hitherto been done, the discursive 
aspects of both myth and mythmaking. Secondly, I challenge the gendered lacunae of 
much of the scholarship in the field through an analysis of ‘myths of origin’ showing 
how the narration of origins is always, of necessity, a gendered affair and demonstrate 
the significance of this gendering. Thirdly, I challenge the ‘self-understanding’ of the 
field of mythology as originating with the Platonic distinction between logos and muthos, 
suggesting instead that if an origin for the field must be identified then it is the 
recuperation of myth in the seventeenth century onwards to which scholars of myth 
should turn. Fourthly, I develop a theory of patrilinearity as a dominant trope in 
western metaphysics that has been fundamental in asserting identity as singular and 
autonomous and suggest the ways in which myths of origin have assisted this process.  
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Fifthly, I argue that a theory of patrilinearity is a more contextually viable means of 
understanding the secondary status of femininity and women within the history of 
western culture than the concept of universal patriarchy that has been wielded by many 
feminists. I am thus not suggesting that patrilinearity is a universal model of identity, 
unaffected by change over time or by its place in diverse societies but am rather arguing 
that it has been a particular feature of the metaphysics that arise out of the 
Enlightenment within the western tradition of philosophy, regardless of what may be 
identified as its previous instantiations. Finally, I offer a reading of Kristeva’s theories of 
maternality and extend it to consider how myths of origin might be considered 
differently. 
II. Myth and Mythology: A Review of Literature 
This thesis is, in addition to offering a feminist philosophy of myth, a response and 
contribution to a recent, ongoing, and controversial debate within the contemporary 
field of mythology which has argued for the need to view myth and mythmaking, as 
well as scholarly analyses and theorisations of myths and mythmaking, as political 
artefacts embedded in, productive of, and in turn produced by power/knowledge 
relations.3 The emergence of the debate signals a growing—and, I believe, long 
overdue—interest in the arguments and insights of the poststructural linguistic and 
deconstructive turn that has occurred in many areas of the social sciences and 
humanities since the 1960s. This interest has, in turn, led to an accumulating scholarly 
dissatisfaction with a number of interrelated trends that have defined the study of myth 
historically, but most significantly in the twentieth century. These include, but are not 
limited to: firstly, comparative studies of bodies of myths that do not pay enough 
attention to their individual cultural and temporal contexts and differences but rather 
extract universal structures and meaning from their analysis; secondly, a lamentable, but 
nonetheless telling, lack of self-reflexivity on the part of scholars of myth in assuming 
too sharply-drawn distinctions between their own work and theories and that of the 
mythmakers and myths under analysis; thirdly, a purportedly anti-reductionist 
tendency to consider uncritically the category of ‘myth’ as a self-evident and pre-
existent a priori (that is, as a category that exists prior to any attempt to theorise and 
                                                           
3 Throughout the thesis I will be using the term ‘myth’ to indicate both a style of narrative and 
specific instances thereof, and as a discursive practice. The specific meaning I intend will be made 
clear from the context in which the term is used. I will use the term ‘mythology’ to refer solely to 
the study of myths rather than to collections of myths. 
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name its features and functions) and then to proceed from that assumption to render 
natural and universal that which is perhaps instead unnatural (constructed) and 
contingent; fourthly, a failure to recognise the discursive and dialogic qualities of 
mythmaking and myths and thus a tendency to ignore, fail to discern, or elide, the 
productive function of myth in a variety of power/knowledge matrices; and finally, the 
maintenance of a value-laden definition of myth as confined to a type of narrative genre 
that can be distinguished from other genres such as non-fiction, autobiography, history 
and so on, on the basis of its fictional content.  
Some contemporary scholars of myth and mythmaking, whose work I review 
below, have thus argued that the overly narrow categorisation of myth as ‘fictional 
story’ should be deconstructed in order to trace the political (that is, value-laden and 
partisan) interests and effects that are at work in the maintenance of generic distinctions 
between truthful and false narratives and, further, that this self-imposed definitional 
limitation on the field of mythology should itself be constituted as an object of analysis. 
As such, these scholars have sought to expand definitions of myth to include any 
narratives or discursive forms, cultural practices, or historical events that are constituted 
publicly or privately as coherent and continuous, or as foundational for assertions of 
identity or identification, whether individual or collective.  
As such, the classification of myth qua myth is seen by the scholars whose work 
informs my own, after Foucault, to constitute a discursive practice—a network of 
actions, ambitions, and narrative representations—which encode, construct, authorise, 
and reconstruct an aspirational and often didactic model of human identity whether 
communal and individual; they are stories through which individuals and groups 
narrate a network of possible relationships and forms of selfhood, in the process 
establishing the rules according to which affiliation and identification can be maintained 
and agreed upon. Myths are thus one of the primary mechanisms through which 
identity is formulated and are thus profoundly implicated in the politics of identity. 
They are, from this perspective, at once a reflection of prevailing social and personal 
identities and a powerfully coercive template for their formation. They signal moments 
of identity formation; they raise important questions about the nature of being and 
origin; they involve not necessarily claims about truth, but rather moves to assert or 
undermine discursive authority.  
A clear example of the categorisation of myth as constituting a discursive 
practice in this regard, and one that I examine in Chapter 1, is how the distinction 
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between myth and truth was tactically embedded as a tool of domination in European 
expansionism and colonialism. The portrayal of colonised people as primitive and 
uncivilised by virtue of their belief in myths enabled the justification of the civilising 
mission of colonialism insofar as a scientific worldview was promoted as being able to 
correct the erroneous beliefs of these people. As such, the categorisation of myth as 
‘superstition’ was connected to the conventional view of European writers in the 
nineteenth century that science (logos) had triumphed over myth and religion. Arguably, 
then, the classification ‘myth’ when examined in a broader context of political interests 
that determine its very classification might prove to be a far from innocuous practice. As 
McCutcheon states, myth can become ‘a master signifier that authorises and reproduces 
a specific world-view’ (2000:192). As such, the classification of myth has important 
implications for understanding the practices of mythologists. Their assessment of myth 
as a genre distinct from other forms of narratives or worldviews might well indicate the 
projection or transference of a series of value judgements and prioritisations that reflect 
their own context rather than conveying something self-evident in the data classified as 
myth (McCutcheon 2000:193). This is a point I will suggest below is a crucial aspect of 
myth, mythmaking, and mythology. 
Mythology, like many myths, is, and has been, in this view a rhetorical 
mechanism for portraying variable, competing parts as static, consensual wholes. 
Furthermore, myths and theories about myths are alike inasmuch as both explain how 
things have become the way they are through a broadly narrative account. The 
difference, however, is that in the contemporary context myths are presumed to be false 
while the scholarship about them is, or at least aspires to be, true. In telling stories about 
the stories that others have told, mythologists attempt to position themselves as 
transparent adjudicators of ‘the truth’ of and about ‘myth’. They present their theories as 
objective and authoritative, even scientific, simultaneously promoting their own 
authority and credibility. However, like myths themselves, as I argue throughout this 
thesis, theories of ‘myth’ are produced according to, and in the context of, larger 
theoretical, ideological, and cultural concerns. The assumption of objectivity—with its 
implication of reliability—obscures not only the ideological content of mythology and 
the formative role that it has played in discourses of androcentrism, secularism, 
nationalism, anti-Semitism, and colonialism, for example, but also the construction of a 
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subjectivity that is very specifically situated in the production of a progressive and 
primordial European identity at least since the Enlightenment.4  
As a ‘budding’ mythologist I am less interested in whether myths are true or 
false narratives than in what makes such a distinction both possible and necessary in the 
first place. It is here, with regard to challenging established symbolic structures, that 
Foucault’s insights on scholarly discourses are especially germane, particularly his 
suggestion that the development of a discipline necessarily entails the establishment of 
acceptable discourses, or ‘regimes of truth’. His work emphasises the need to recognise 
the historically and socially contingent—versus ontological or universal—status of 
‘truth’ as such (see Foucault 1972; 1979). I believe that no subject or category of thought 
reflects some prior reality or fundamental truth—and in so saying I recognise that this 
constitutes somewhat of a truth claim itself—but that truth and falsity are manufactured 
and distinguished from each other purposefully and contingently; ‘truth’, as science 
fiction writer (an interesting juxtaposition itself) Ursula Le Guin has aptly phrased it, ‘is 
a matter of the imagination’ (1976:1). 
A related means, therefore, through which myths function as discourses in the 
technical sense developed by Foucault is in the discursive distinction forced between 
truthful and false narratives, a process that inscribes a mutual imbrication of 
power/knowledge. Foucault’s conception of ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive practices’ opens 
a way to see the complex and productive interplay between narrative and material 
reality and the integral role of power/knowledge in producing and regulating discourse 
through generic distinctions such as that of myth. For Foucault, it is not a case of being 
able to separate out material reality from the discourses that frame it and give it shape 
and meaning. For example, he suggests that 
we must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would 
only have to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no 
prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour….We must 
conceive of discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as a 
practice which we impose on them; and it is in this practice that the events of 
discourse find the principle of their regularity. 
(1981:67) 
Of course, Foucault does not mean to imply that there is no non-discursive realm, no 
material world, but rather that the experience of, and any thinking about, that realm is 
always already, and then repeatedly, determined through discourse and the structures 
or limits it imposes on the activities of thinking and experiencing. Ernesto Laclau and 
                                                           
4 This particular aspect of the production of post-Enlightenment identity is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 1. 
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Chantal Mouffe indicate the way in which both the apprehension and the meaning of 
any ‘non-discursive’ object is filtered through discourse in such a way that accessing it 
‘outside’ of discourse is itself, literally, meaningless: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought….What is denied is not that such 
objects exist externally to thought, but rather the different assertion that they could 
constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence. 
(1985:108) 
Although discourse determines the field of the knowable, Foucault also insists on the 
complex and productive interplay between the assertion of discourse and the forms of 
resistance it produces: 
discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any 
more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable 
process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but 
also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. 
(1978:100–101) 
Foucault thus argues that discursive practices are characterised by a 
‘delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent 
of knowledge and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories’ (in 
Bouchard 1977:199). What interests Foucault in his analysis of discourse is the way that 
it is regulated: 
In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to 
ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its 
ponderous, formidable materiality. 
(1981:52) 
In tracing the regulation of discourses, he describes a particular set of procedures which 
both constrain and produce them.5 These consist of three external exclusions (that is 
external, or prior to the production of discrete discourses): taboo or prohibition; the 
distinction between the reason/sanity and madness; and the distinction between truth 
and falsity (Foucault 1981). In the context of German romantic nationalism that I explore 
in Chapters 4–7, the positing of an unequivocal division between the true and the false—
                                                           
5 Foucault (1981) also suggests two other sets of procedural practices that manage, produce, and 
constrain discourse: firstly, internal procedures of ‘rarefaction’ (a self-limiting of discourse) 
through the principles of the author (or, more specifically what Foucault refers to as the ‘author-
function’), commentary, and disciplinarity, all of which are concerned with classifying, 
distributing, and ordering discourse and function to distinguish between those who are 
authorised to speak and those who are not; secondly, determinative procedures that are neither 
internal nor external and which impose a limit on the roles a speaking subject can take up and 
which restrict access to the forms of discourse through the institutional forms like education. 
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both in the context of myth as a genre of narrative and the formulation of an ‘authentic’ 
German identity—was a fundamental feature of the retrieval of ‘national’ folklore; 
vernacular narratives were represented as the repository of authentic German identity, 
considered to contain the essential truth of Germanness and therefore were, in 
themselves, self-consciously authoritative. The cosmopolitan forms of culture that 
emerged out of the Enlightenment and against which romanticism set itself were, by 
contrast, false by virtue of their novelty, their rejection of the bounded, autochthonous, 
and primordial community, and their elevation of individual rationality over and 
against kindred feeling. 
A central assumption of this thesis, therefore, refracted through my study of 
myth in the context of its retrieval as an object of study and as a means through which to 
assert national character in the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, is the notion, 
first conceived by Friedrich Nietzsche and rearticulated by Michel Foucault, that the 
‘will to truth’ is instead the ‘will to power’ whose very authority is enabled by an 
essential dissimulation, a kind of willed, or at least willing, amnesia. As such, the will to 
power is connected to the desire to assert a stable notion of self that is only necessary 
because of the very instability of the self. Here I also follow Roland Barthes’ theorisation 
(1973) of one of the functions of myth where myths are socially constructed narratives, 
usually produced by élite groups, the manufactured provenance of which is concealed 
by an assertion of these narratives as either natural, god-given, or pre-ordained, but in 
each case authoritatively truthful. As Edward Said has suggested,  
Mythic language is discourse [that] cannot be anything but systematic; one does not 
really make discourse at will, or statements without first belonging—in some cases 
unconsciously, but at any rate involuntarily—to the ideology and the institutions 
that guarantee its existence….The principal feature of mythic discourse is that it conceals 
its own origins as well as those of what it describes. 
(1978:321) 
I thus consider the ideological practices that signify discursive mediation in the context 
of mythmaking to be not just an idealised horizon against which the social world is 
imagined, enacted, or aspired towards, but rather a sophisticated stratagem for 
disguising, mystifying, or distorting important aspects of real social processes. I will 
thus develop an approach to myth that seeks what Frederic Jameson calls ‘the 
unmasking of cultural artefacts as socially symbolic acts’ (1981:20). 
In adopting a discursive approach to myth and mythmaking I seek to derive a 
theoretical framework that both takes seriously and challenges the ideological 
assumptions that govern mythmaking as a classificatory practice and which engender 
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myths’ authority. Consequently, the story of ‘myth’ in the course of the past several 
centuries that I tell in this thesis reveals the term to be an ambiguous, unstable signifier 
that cannot be delineated in terms of a straightforward binary distinction between truth 
and falsity. In seeking to understand myths not simply as (true or false) narratives but 
rather as discursive practices I want to show that they are discursive insofar as the 
production and use of myths can, perhaps surprisingly, be granted an overdetermined 
status of truth (on the basis of their ability to legitimate predetermined questions of 
identity) in counterdistinction to other narrative genres that are at odds with the 
hegemonic accounts of a culture’s past and present.  
My implicit intention in this thesis is to test out a discursive approach to myth 
and therefore some comment regarding how the term ‘myth’ will be understood is 
necessary—albeit belatedly—and I will do this through reviewing briefly the 
mythological literature that has influenced my thinking in this thesis.6 Definitions of 
‘myth’ in mythological scholarship are as varied and broad as myths themselves. Alan 
Dundes, for example, suggests that ‘a myth is a sacred narrative explaining how the 
world and man came to be in their present form’ and that ‘the critical adjective sacred 
distinguishes myth from other forms of narrative such as folktales which are ordinarily 
secular and fictional’ (1984:1). Wendy Doniger on the other hand suggests that myth is 
‘a narrative in which a group finds, over an extended period of time, a shared meaning 
in certain questions about human life, to which the various proposed answers are 
usually unsatisfactory in one way or another’ (1996:112). In contrast, Roland Barthes, 
drawing on the structuralist linguistic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure, states that 
‘myth is a language’ (2000:11), by which he means that it is a structured system that has 
                                                           
6 I will not be reviewing the entire literature that constitutes the academic study of myth, largely 
because several thorough and lengthy surveys already exist and to repeat the data here would be 
redundant. William Doty’s Mythography: The Study of Myths and Rituals (1986) provides a fairly 
comprehensive overview of the history of the study of myth, tracing it through the various 
approaches that have been proposed, such as functionalism, psychology, literary analysis, 
structuralism, and semiotics, amongst others. However, Doty treats ‘myth’ as a distinct genre of 
stories rather than as a discursive practice and so his work is of limited value here. Alan Dundes’ 
Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth (1984) similarly offers a wideranging overview of 
theories of myth through an assembly of various influential writings but again assumes ‘myth’ as 
an unproblematic category of narrative. Robert Segal’s Theorizing Myth (1999) constructs a 
genealogy of individual myth theorists—Albert Camus, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Carl 
G. Jung, and Sigmund Freud—outlining their ideas and suggesting the ways in which they 
influenced each other and later thinkers. Because this thesis deals with several intersecting fields 
of academic knowledge—history, philosophy, feminist theory, mythology, nationalist discourse, 
and so on I am confining my review of literature simply to the field in which the thesis is most 
obviously set and to which I am responding. In the following chapters, where necessary or 
desirable, I review the relevant literature in the context I make use of it. 
 22 
its own logic with which it establishes meaning and value through relations of both 
internal and external difference. While each of these definitions may convey something 
about myth, they are also revealing about the mythologists who offer the definitions. It 
thus becomes a question of why Dundes stresses the sacred nature of myth, why 
Doniger emphasises its longevity and believes that myths serve to resolve imponderable 
human dilemmas, and why Barthes makes a structural analogy between mythological 
narratives and linguistic systems.  
By way of an answer Ivan Strenski notes that ‘there may be the word “myth”, 
but the word names numerous and conflicting “objects” of inquiry, not a “thing” with 
its name written on it. Myth names a reality that we “cut out”, not one that “stands out”’ 
(1987:1). Thus, myth, as an object of enquiry, lends itself to diffuse interpretations that 
encode the subjective viewpoint of the enquirer: the selection and the exclusion of 
meanings in pursuit of a definition serves the interest of the theoretician or mythmaker 
in providing a theory of myth. This is not, superficially speaking, a controversial point; 
after all, meaning (signification) depends on the articulation of differences and so to 
theorise about myth at all seems to necessitate its differentiation from other forms of 
narrative. However, the tendency to differentiate myth from other genres of narrative, 
and from the process of mythmaking is now contested and I will demonstrate in the first 
chapter of this thesis why this is so. 
A second and related feature of much mythology is the tendency of its scholars 
to produce universalising explanatory theories. Thus there is, for example, the 
‘Structuralist School’ which suggests that although the content, characters and events in 
myths may differ widely, similarities between myths are based on their structural 
homogeneity; or the ‘Functionalist School’ which argues that the key to understanding 
the role of myths in any given society is to notice the ritual context in which myths are 
related. The problem, as several scholars have recently noted, is that presenting a theory 
of myth that purports to be a complete explanation is inevitably reductionist and 
excludes points of view that might otherwise be illuminating about particular myths 
and particular contexts. Furthermore, such theorising is all too often undertaken without 
adequate reference to, or reflection on, competing or even complementary theories. 
Strenski, in particular, deplores this tendency when he remarks that the lack of serious 
engagement with even basic hypotheses plays ‘fast and loose with the ideas of others’ 
(1987:6). 
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Strenski was one of the first scholars in the field to suggest a discursively 
oriented approach to myth, and in so doing he effectively politicised the practice of 
mythology by deciding to take, not only the various theories of myth seriously, but the 
theorists themselves and to make them an object of study alongside that of myth. In his 
book Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth-Century History: Cassirer, Eliade, Lévi-Strauss and 
Malinowski (1987) he begins by suggesting that myths must be interpreted with reference 
to their theorists, that these theorists must in turn be understood within their historical 
contexts, and that even those contexts themselves should be placed in context. Strenski’s 
readers would be forgiven for feeling trapped in a circular discourse of contextuality 
without ever being able to approach the ostensible object of study, myth. However, 
Strenski states from the outset that he is ‘interested in context not as explaining texts, but 
as serving our understanding of them; interested not in determinant causal conditions, 
but in what gives them sense’ (1987:9). He defines ‘context’ in a broadly discursive 
sense, concerned with both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ contexts and stating that it is not ‘a 
dispensable biographical “background” note tacked onto a theoretical discussion, a 
parade of…unsubstantiated or inconsequential “influences”, or…of dubiously relevant 
social and cultural details. Context is brought in because it matters; it makes a difference 
to the shape of the theory. It does not just add “local colour”’. Rather, it serves to place 
texts and producers of text within the ideological networks through which they gain 
their coherence and form and as such aims at the ‘recovery of intentions’ (ibid.). 
In an intellectual context, therefore, in which the ‘author’ has been proclaimed 
dead, is such an approach either viable or advisable? Strenski’s meticulous 
reconstruction of the internal and external contexts of each of the theorists he examines 
largely affirms his approach although it is itself undermined by his failure to interrogate 
his own motivations, contexts, and presuppositions. In the case of Cassirer, Strenski 
argues that he was motivated internally by a loyalty to German idealism and externally 
by the looming threat of irrationalism that appeared to be sweeping Weimar Germany. 
Both contexts appear to have led Cassirer to seek preserve the inherent value of myth as 
a precursor to science and as a necessary stage in human development which Strenski  
suggests constituted a motive rather than simply conveying a presupposition. What 
Strenski does not ask is why Cassirer was determined to remain an idealist. To suggest, 
as Strenski does, that Cassirer had been brought up as an idealist, transforms the 
ostensibly identifiable motive into a presupposition. His treatment of Malinowski is 
similarly partial. In seeking to explain what led Malinowski to substitute his early 
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romantic view of myth to a later pragmatic one he argues that internally Malinowski 
was motivated to shift his approach in order to fit myth within his embryonic 
pragmatist theory of culture. However what Strenski does not explain is why 
Malinowski developed such a theory in the first place and nor does he analyse the 
consequence of the change. He takes a similar approach to both Eliade and Lévi Strauss 
and runs into the same difficulties. The value of the book, however, and by implication 
Strenski’s approach is that he enables his readers to think differently not only about the 
theorists concerned but also about the theories. However, I am left unconvinced by the 
idea that theorists’ internal motivations and presuppositions are quite as plainly 
apparent as Strenski would have it. He suggests, for example, that 
Theorists never invite us to join them in seeing myth in one way or another; they 
just tell us what it is. Theorists say ‘is’ when they should say ‘ought’….[D]espite 
appearances, current concepts and theories of ‘myth’ have been manufactured 
according to the larger theoretical professional and cultural projects assumed by the 
twentieth century’s leading myth theorists. 
(1987:2) 
However, what Strenski does himself is precisely tell his readers about the inner lives of 
these theorists. Further Strenski at no place puts the two forms of context—external and 
internal—in dialogue which suggests to me a rather simplistic assumption about the 
clear separation of the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds in which the theorist moves and thinks. 
Nonetheless, what Strenski does achieve very well is his demonstration that contexts are 
not easily separable from content, and this is a valuable concept for understanding how 
myths come to be told, retold, theorised and retheorised within a complex network of 
competing and sometimes contradictory contexts. In this thesis I suggest that the 
contexts of myth and mythmaking within the German search for origins were 
intertwined and as much of the meaning of the myths as what they relate. 
Robert Ellwood (The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and 
Joseph Campbell; 1999) follows a similar approach to Strenski’s insofar as he is interested 
in the autobiographies of the myth theorists he examines showing how and why they 
may have developed the types of theories they did, of what may have been personally at 
stake for them. Each theorist concerned has been the subject of some controversy in the 
last few years as their troubling political orientations have come to light. Ellwood’s 
intention is to link theoretical rhetoric to the political contexts in which it emerges, and 
like Strenski, he generally succeeds in demonstrating the necessity of taking seriously 
the relationship between intellectual activity and the political commitments of scholars. 
He well demonstrates the extent to which these two aspects of the myth theorists’ work 
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were intertwined. However, at the same time he clearly seeks to recuperate their 
tarnished reputations, and to preserve the core at the heart of their theories. As such he 
takes the attitude that myths and interpretations of myth have a humanistically oriented 
therapeutic value in spite of the particular politics that produce them and seems 
therefore, to adopt a very similar stance to the theories of myths that these three 
theorists promote. My own approach differs quite dramatically from that of Ellwood 
insofar as my feminist commitments—both political and personal if such a distinction 
can actually be made—define the tenor of my work, the purpose it seeks accomplish, 
and the assumptions that I operate on the basis of. I do not believe therefore that myths 
and theories about myths are innocent bystanders in the midst of the politics of the 
theorist. Rather they are directly products of and simultaneously productive of those 
very political commitments as I have outlined above and as I will argue throughout the 
thesis. As such, in this thesis I take a very deliberate, though not necessarily conscious 
stance towards my material maintaining a ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ but also seeking to 
intervene in the discourses about myth and about the politics of identity in a way 
motivated by my own feminist orientation. I therefore do see my theorisation of myth in 
this thesis to be a form of mythmaking.  
Russell T. McCutcheon and Bruce Lincoln are the theorists whose work informs 
my own approach more than any other myth theorist, largely in view of the fact that 
they take a similarly sceptical attitude to the possibility of separating out the political 
context in which theories of myths are created and the theories and myths themselves. 
McCutcheon’s article ‘Myth’ in the Guide to the Study of Religion (2000) suggests a 
determinedly and explicitly discursive approach to myth, mythmaking and mythology. 
He argues, for example, for a redescription of myth by thinking of it 
not so much as a kind of narrative identifiable by its content…as a technique or 
strategy. Let us suppose that myth is not so much a genre with relatively stable 
characteristics that allow us to distinguish myth from folk tale, saga, legend, and 
fable…as a class of social argumentation found in all human cultures. Let us entertain 
the possibility that myths are not things akin to nouns, but active processes akin to 
verbs….A shift in perspective allows us to suggest (1) myths are not special…but 
ordinary human means of fashioning and authorizing their lived-in and believed-in 
‘worlds’, (2) that myth as an ordinary rhetorical device in social construction and 
maintenance makes this rather than that social identity possible in the first place and 
(3) that a people’s use of the label ‘myth’ reflects, expresses, explores and legitimizes 
their own self-image. 
(2000:199–200) 
Lincoln (Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology and Scholarship; 1999) takes up a similar 
approach and he extends it to interrogate the ideological investments in myth by 
scholars of myth. He suggests that ‘students of myth seem particularly given to 
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producing mythic, that is, ideological, narratives, perhaps because the stories they tell 
about storytelling reflect back on them as storytellers themselves’ (1999:209). In his book 
he covers some of the same terrain I travel over in this thesis (namely the theory of the 
Urheimat) and while I found much of it illuminating and helpful, Lincoln pursues his 
course in a fairly haphazard fashion, skating over some fairly crucial episodes without 
noticing their significance for the intersection of myth and mythmaking that he does 
suggest is the ground of mythology. He only very briefly mentions the Grimm brothers 
for example, whereas in this thesis I spend some considerable time considering their 
myth-collecting efforts as profoundly embedded in their political context and in their 
politics. I believe that the benefit of doing so is that several important aspects of the 
status of myth in nineteenth-century German are shown to be profoundly implicated in 
a series of ideological—both political and gendered, and aspect that each theorist 
neglects—contexts and discourses. 
Bearing these preliminary observations in mind, it is not my intention to 
advance a singular definition of myth in this thesis. Rather, I intend both to focus on 
instances of narrative discourse where some narratives are characterised as ‘myths’ vis-
à-vis other categories of discourse. As I have indicated above, my own theoretical 
position is both poststructuralist and feminist (although I do not assume these 
perspectives a priori or uncritically) in that it emphasises the ideological and ontological 
webs of meaning that connect narratives, identities, power, and truth in a relationship of 
circulating interdependence. 
III. Structure of the Thesis 
Contemporary mythology, I think it is safe to say, has been the study of a male line of 
thought, and as such it has itself produced a patrilineal narrative that has traced the 
protean meanings of myth—its functions, forms, structures, and implications—through 
the work of male scholars, naming them either as the fathers of the field or as the male 
inheritors of a paternal legacy. The story that mythologists have conventionally told 
about the origins and development of the field has been an entirely male script, 
originating with Plato’s largely successful attempt to prioritise the truth-telling qualities 
of logos against the fantastical tale-telling of muthos as exemplified in the poetry of 
Homer and Hesiod. Interestingly, the field of philosophy which constitutes myth as its 
other also traces its origins to the same scene. Although the Platonic view of myth has 
been reproduced in the history of the field of mythology—certainly in the nineteenth 
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century—I do not want to acquiesce in the self-understanding of the field as one that 
begins with superstitious stories and ends in reasoned propositions that then serve to 
mirror and legitimate European modes of knowledge that privilege rationality. To do so 
would be to assume what I believe to be an unsustainable teleological continuity 
between the Platonic reversal of the valuations inscribed in the terms muthos and logos 
and the interest in myth as an object of scholarly interest that emerged in the aftermath 
of the Renaissance. Rather, I am interested in the conditions that made this interest not 
only possible, but also desirable, or, put another way, why it was that in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries influential intellectuals of the day made it their business to 
investigate and define myth. What was it about this particular period that made the 
study of myth necessary? In Chapter 1, therefore, I begin with an analysis of the social 
and intellectual context in which myth became a new object of scholarly discourse, 
suggesting that the roots of contemporary mythology lie not in ancient Greece but rather 
in the seventeenth-century battle between the philosophes of the Enlightenment and the 
hegemony of the Church. However much this struggle may seem to have repeated the 
struggle between Plato and the poets to establish a ‘regime of truth’ there is little 
evidence that it was undertaken entirely referentially.  
Foucault has suggested that at the heart of any unifying principle of continuous 
history lies the human subject creating and ensuring meaning for itself (Foucault 
1972:12). In agreement with Foucault, my concern in Chapter 1 is thus to demonstrate 
that the categorisation of ‘myth’ vis-à-vis other types of narrative in the Enlightenment 
rationalist and parallel romanticist paradigms was allied to attempts to assert a 
discursive authority that could present certain forms of identity as self-evident, fixed, 
and naturalised. Each paradigm will thus be shown to have provided the basis for 
narratives, metanarratives, and self-referential discourses of varied ideological 
persuasions where myths embodied and advanced the interests of those who narrated 
or studied them. The core organisational framework of the chapter is an examination, in 
both the Enlightenment and romantic paradigms, of the way in which the categorisation 
and valuation of myth played into and was in large part productive of wider 
preoccupations with the form, substance, and status of human identity. I take seriously, 
therefore, Foucault’s argument that 
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s 
to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject 
within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a 
form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, 
domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is 
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either transcendental in relation to the fields of events or runs in its empty sameness 
throughout the course of history. 
(1980:117) 
This is another reason why I am reluctant to accept the account of mythology as 
originating with Plato. To do so would be to presuppose that the attempt to assert the 
unity and autonomy of the individual subject in the Enlightenment period was simply a 
reiteration of the classical Greek conception of the self. If this were the case, then the 
Enlightenment was redundant before it even began, at least insofar as it inaugurated a 
conception of the self that was novel to the western philosophical traditions. In contrast, 
I pursue my questions regarding the form and content of the formulation of subjectivity 
and its relationship to the categorisation of myth within the context of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, precisely because it was in this period that the notion of a 
unified subject in western philosophy was produced.  
The Enlightenment view of myth was one that asserted myths’ irrational and 
untruthful or ‘primitive’ qualities which had to be discarded by the enlightened 
individual. These qualities in turn were contrasted with the truthfulness of the 
Enlightenment’s own scientific or rationalist discourse that was then allied to—and 
which to some extent justified—conceptions of the autonomous and reasoning 
individual and human progress. Moreover, this was achieved by placing myths at the 
origin of humanity’s encounter with the world, seeing them as an explanatory tool. In 
the romantic view, against the Enlightenment imposition of universal ontology, myths 
were seen nostalgically as a retrievable reservoir—an origin—of ancient wisdom and 
collective identity that could offer the hope of a return to nationally specific and thus 
authentic forms of identity. These two moments that witnessed and provoked a new 
interest in myth represent, in my view, the point at which contemporary understandings 
of myth and subjectivity emerge, not as a seamless progression, but as discontinuous 
and mutually imbricated moments of articulation.  
In addition to situating contemporary mythology historically in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, Chapter 1 also serves to provide an overview of the 
intellectual context within which Johann Gottfried Herder, an influential myth theorist 
whose work I explore in Chapter 2, formulated his organic conception of the roles and 
functions of myth. Chapter 2 thus moves to examine the mobilisation of myth—and its 
connection to notions of ethnic identity—in the work of Herder insofar as it served as a 
precursor to the romantic attitude to myth that characterised German nationalism. The 
chapter begins by outlining the context in which the assertion of a politically stable 
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sense of German national identity was considered to be an increasingly urgent task but 
one that was made difficult, if not impossible, due to the regional and religious 
fragmentation that characterised the German-speaking territories and the French 
cultural and political imperialism that espoused a doctrine of cosmopolitanism and 
denigrated indigenous forms of culture. The consequence was a renewed expression of 
anxiety about the status and identity of the German people. However, the question of 
German identity had, in fact, long been a source of debate and controversy, particularly 
when the German people were compared, as they frequently were, to those European 
societies that could more firmly locate their cultural pedigree in classical Greece and 
Rome. In the second section of the chapter, therefore, I examine how the German 
humanists of the fifteenth century turned to Tacitus’ Germania to claim a noble ancestry 
that was equal, if not superior, to those of other European nations on the basis of 
Tacitus’ description of the ancient Germans as an autochthonous race that had never 
intermarried with others. I also trace how the recovery of Tacitus as a source for what 
became a cult of Germanic heroic virtue was further traced through the story told in 
Tacitus’ Annals of the hero Arminius who defeated the Roman legions in 9 CE, and how 
it became a rallying force for cultivating German patriotism. The Germania and the story 
of Arminius, over the course of the next few centuries, were employed to render 
credible a belief in the unbroken continuity of the German people from a singular point 
of origin, an idea that was skilfully exploited by German humanists from the 
Renaissance onwards to oppose first Roman, and then French hegemony. In the third 
section of the chapter I present an overview of Herder’s theories of myth, and show 
them to be founded on the assumption, secured through recourse to Tacitus, of the 
uniqueness of the German people (Volk). Herder’s view of the history of human 
development is one in which its iterative and accumulative quality is emphasised: a 
community accrues its culture and tradition through its interaction with unique 
geographical, linguistic, and historical confluences, a process which is embedded in 
what he calls the Naturordnung (‘natural order’). It is myth, for Herder, which inscribes 
the innate characteristics of the Volk, serving as the form par excellence through which 
their cultural values and worldviews are transmitted and Herder portrays this 
transmission in patrilineal terms. Herder’s ideas, in this regard, also proved influential 
for the German romantics of the nineteenth century whose work I examine in Chapters 
4–6. 
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Before tracing Herder’s influence on the emergence of German romanticism, 
however, in Chapter 3 I examine the broader European context within which Herder 
developed many of his theories. It was a context marked by an accelerating nostalgia for 
a pure origin within Europe more generally, derived from a literal reading of Biblical 
narrative, and the support it found within eighteenth-century philology. William Jones’ 
discovery of the lexical affiliations of Sanskrit with Latin and Greek as well as many of 
the other extant European languages was a decisive event in this regard. I therefore 
examine how, in the aftermath of Jones’ work, the discursive construction of mythical 
ideas about race (in this case a belief in what were eventually designated as the ‘Aryan’ 
origins of the European race) and a conception of the Urheimat (‘original homeland’) 
were intertwined with the philological belief that both the original language (Ursprache) 
of humanity and (by implication) the original people (Urvolk) would be identifiable. 
Underlying all these hypotheses was an attempt to sever European ancestry from any 
dependent relationship to what was identified as the Semitic language group and thus 
to the Semitic religions of Judaism and Christianity. In Chapter 7 I follow up the 
significance of these debates for the claim, which was made in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, that it was the German people who were original people and that it 
was their land which was the original homeland; before I do that, however, I break off 
my narrative to examine the parallel preoccupation with origins that occurred in 
Germany during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, one which played 
into the development of a nationalist rhetoric of unity and prestigious origins promoted 
by the German romantics. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the scholarly literature on nationalism in 
order to establish what I believe to be the form that romantic German nationalism took, 
and what its significance was for the formulation of national unity on the basis of shared 
cultural and myth traditions (rather than that on the basis of the contractual 
arrangements which underpinned the French and British concepts of nationality). I also 
examine how concepts of myth and gender are developed in cultural nationalism to 
produce a triadic rhetoric of national unity where vernacular myths are wielded as 
evidence of primordial unity and a golden age that forms the basis for a future utopia, 
and where the gender of the nation and of the national citizen is expressed in patrilineal 
terms, confining women to a passive role as symbols rather than active creators of the 
nation. I then apply these theories of nationalism to the emergence of the nationalist 
rhetoric produced by the German romantics in the first half of the nineteenth century 
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against a backdrop of French occupation. As such, I provide a chronology of the German 
romantic movement, presenting an overview of the main intellectuals who were 
involved, and showing how three interrelated elements—synthesis, providence, and 
nostalgia—characterised their efforts to define both the German national character and 
the retrieval of German origins. 
Chapter 5 turns to look more systematically at the romantic nostalgia for origins 
as expressed in the recuperative efforts of scholars like the Grimm brothers who sought 
to elevate folklore to the status of a national myth tradition preserving the authentic 
nature of the ancient German character. I query the extent to which the folklore they 
collected in their Kinder- und Hausmärchen was actually a repository of authenticity, 
showing how their editorial practices involved a selective presentation of folk traditions, 
one that excluded its more bawdy elements and which promoted a bourgeois sentiment 
of respectability and a didactic attitude towards women as appropriately silent and 
passive. The implication of such a gendered division was that women had no role to 
play in the nation building effort. It further inscribed a patrilineal logic of national 
inheritance where traditions were passed from father to son.  
Chapter 6 continues this analysis of the nostalgia for origins by examining 
Wilhelm Grimm’s Deutsche Mythologie, a publication that was the most systematic and 
comprehensive contribution to the creation of a national mythology. Grimm believed 
that the meticulous analysis of textual sources following rigorous philological 
principles, supplemented by the study of folk narratives and practices, would peel back 
the layers of the past and reveal the pure source of German myth traditions and 
therefore the character of the German Urvolk. Similarly to the Kinder- und Hausmärchen, 
Grimm presented this national mythology in patrilineal terms, that is, as rooted in the 
cult of the father god Odin who had created the world. Grimm used a variety of sources 
to sketch out the contours of German mythology, none of which were more important 
than Tacitus’ Germania and the Scandinavian Prose Edda. The second section of the 
chapter discusses the outcome of Grimm’s work as the effort to construct a national 
mythology moved out from the rarefied atmosphere of academic institutions into the 
public arena through art, monument building, and national festivals of remembrance 
and where the figures of Arminius, Germania, and Odin were celebrated as 
representatives of the spirit of the German people. The landscape in this process was 
thus simultaneously ‘territorialised’ and sacralised through the nostalgic depiction of 
the German past as a golden age that would be reborn through collective acts of 
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memorialisation. More importantly, this territorialisation was defined in entirely 
masculine and patrilineal terms. 
In Chapter 7 I turn to examine the resulting production—within a German 
nationalist discourse heavily indebted to Herder’s theories of myth, to the national 
mythology of the Grimms, and to the synthesising doctrines of the Schlegel brothers in 
particular—of a reinvented model of manly, pure, blond, and bellicose German Aryan 
identity. This assertion of identity was enabled by the utilisation of indigenous myths 
and by the ‘discovery’ of ancient origins, but it was given further support by a macabre 
counterpoint imposed through what was an actively conjured image of the effeminate 
and parasitic Jew threatening the purity of the Volk. As such, I follow up the discussion 
that I begin in Chapter 3, where a distinction between a Semitic provenance and an 
Indo-Aryan origin for the European people was enforced by scholars in search of the 
original language. I will argue that in these models of German identity a discourse of 
differentiation is clearly visible, one that is indebted to a variety of mythological 
strategies of identity formation and legitimation strengthened through the location of an 
uncontaminated and thus singular origin. The chapter concludes with a theorisation of 
the pivotal role played by the longing for an origin in the politics of German identity as 
predicated on a patrilineal model of inheritance and a discourse of differentiation. 
Chapter 8 begins the task of placing all this preceding material within a more 
explicitly theoretical framework by analysing the patrilineal preoccupations of the 
German search for origins as symptomatic of a broader trend in the history of western 
thought whereby paternity is prioritised as the source of stable identity. In chapters 8–10 
I discuss a number of theoretical paradigms in some detail, rather than by way of 
summary, in view of the fact that, within the field of mythology and the broader field of 
religious studies, theories of the type I deal with are quite often unfamiliar and have 
consequently not been given much attention. In the first two sections of Chapter 8 I 
discuss the emergence of some recent theories of narrative identity, particularly that of 
Paul Ricœur. I show that although Ricoeur offers a relatively insightful account of the 
narration of identity, his analysis resembles in some important ways the triadic rhetoric 
of cultural nationalism discussed in Chapter 4. Ricœur reproduces this model insofar as 
he proposes that the narration of identity is predicated on the need to resolve the 
paradoxical relationship of two forms of temporality but adopts an attitude towards 
temporality as necessarily linear and continuous within the context of narrative; and he 
suggests that linearity is foundational to the ways in which humans grant meaning to 
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their sense of self. In my view, therefore, the usefulness of his model is limited as 
regards investigating what may in fact be the fragmentary nature of human identity that 
linear narration tries to cover over. I analyse how such a model of continuity and 
linearity may in fact be indebted to a form of inflected and obscured patriliny, drawing 
on the work of Jacques Derrida and Hélène Cixous and their respective analyses of 
logocentrism and phallogocentrism to argue my case. My discussion of Derrida and 
Cixous leads me to an analysis of the paradox of subject-formation in which the self is 
placed in an agonistic relationship to others, along a series of oppositional axes where 
similarity/difference, singularity/duality, inclusion/exclusion, autonomy/dependence, 
and self/other are set up dialectically. In contrast, Derrida’s and Cixous’ critiques reveal 
selfhood to be defined by otherness rather than vice versa and their work enables me to 
analyse, as a first step, the ways in which the self might simultaneously narrate itself 
and be narrated in a dialogic rather than dialectic process. The implications of this 
dialogic interdependence imply the instability of selfhood, against the Enlightenment 
view surveyed in Chapter 1, and also of ‘narrative’ itself. With this alternative concept of 
narrative identity in mind, the chapter concludes with an extended analysis of the 
function and forms of patrilinearity within western metaphysics as situated within a 
phallogocentric economy of self/other and I argue here that the central feature of 
patrilinearity as a model of identity is an obsessive preoccupation with singularity, 
particular insofar as a father is asserted as a primal origin. This notion of singularity is 
analysed as fragile and tenuous, on the basis that paternity itself is uncertain, but the 
prioritisation of the figure of the father-as-origin and cause against the mother works to 
stabilise identity and construe it as linearly continuous. 
In Chapter 9, I examine the work of Jacques Lacan in order to follow up the 
discussion of fragile subjectivity and patrilinearity I began in the previous chapter. 
Lacan’s (post)structuralist rereading of Freud’s psychoanalytic theories offer a means, I 
argue, of identifying the potential causes for the prioritisation of patrilinearity as a 
means of asserting the singular, autonomous, rational self. Although Lacan’s elevation 
of (phallic) subjectivity as a universal model of ontology presents difficulties for a 
feminist theory of subjectivity, his work is important, I will argue, because it brings into 
question the Cartesian model of the self (discussed in Chapter 1) by demonstrating its 
dependence on the unconscious rather than the conscious realm. His theorisation of the 
three registers of infant development—the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic—
further suggests that subjectivity is, from a very early stage in an individual’s life, 
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constituted through an irresolvable division, or what in Freudian terms is understood as 
an original cathexis. That is, the individual comes to recognise itself as a self (ego) across 
axes of self and other, subject and object, inside and outside, lack and plenitude. Far 
from being self-contained and autonomous, the self, in Lacanian terms, is 
intersubjective, depending for existence on relations with others. My discussion of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis also serves as an introduction to the technical vocabulary used 
by Julia Kristeva to theorise subjectivity as ‘in process’ which I examine in the final 
chapter.  
The final chapter I demonstrate the problems that emerge from the prioritisation 
of singularity—exclusion, oppression, and marginalisation—and point towards a 
feminist philosophy of myth, based on the work of Julia Kristeva, to posit that a ‘myth’ 
(in the sense of ‘narrative’) of maternal origin, extrapolated from a metaphor of the 
maternal body as split, in process, and oriented towards otherness with love, provides a 
preferable foundation for—and means of—construing subjectivity dialogically. I outline 
the main themes in Kristeva’s work and pay particular attention to her work on 
maternality as a being-towards-otherness. I will argue that her theorisation of a maternal 
economy implies an ethical orientation missing from patrilineal economies of identity. I 
therefore develop her work to focus in particular on the maternal body as a model for 
identity but I extend it to suggest that the maternal body may also serve as a metaphor 
for fragmented (rather than linear and continuous) myth where the tension between self 
and other, difference and sameness, truth and falsity are never mastered but always 
held in creative tension. As such, I will argue, against her critics, that Kristeva offers a 
solid and ethical framework for posing the self as multiple and transgressive, and as 
unable logically to resolve its paradoxical strands of singularity and multiplicity. I 
conclude by arguing that the maternal body as a discursively construed ‘myth of 
(multiple) origins’ inscribes a fruitful arena in which the political project of feminism, 
and indeed other liberatory projects, might find a way of challenging some of the deep 
structures of thought that have contributed to the marginalisation and exclusion of not 
only women but also of the groups of people and individuals regularly constituted as 
‘other’ to the western normatively masculinised self. I therefore propose that a feminist 
philosophy of myth, mythmaking, and mythology must necessarily be a critical and 
political subversion of singularity and patrilineal logic affirmed by ‘mainstream’ 
mythology. Identity, place, origin, belonging, and myth may consequently be 
reconfigured as a network of contingent and transgressive sites of self-constitution that 
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open a space for an ethical orientation towards otherness and for breaking down the 
divisions between philosophy and its other, myth. 
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C H A P T E R   O N E 
MYTH, HISTORY, AND IDENTITY: 




The story that mythologists have conventionally told about the origins and development 
of the field has tended to begin with Plato’s largely successful attempt to prioritise the 
truth-telling qualities of logos against the fantastical tale-telling of muthos as exemplified 
in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod. The term ‘myth’ (muthos) first appeared in the 
archaic Greek tradition meaning ‘speech’ in the works attributed to Homer and Hesiod 
(circa eighth century BCE). The role of poetry as a form of muthos was presented by 
Homer and Hesiod, who were poets themselves, to be one wholly concerned with the 
transmission of truth. Poetry as muthos, in this view was not just true; it was also 
edifying, exemplary, authoritative, and masculine. In the earliest extant narratives of the 
archaic Greek tradition, namely the epic poetry ascribed to Homer (the Iliad, Odyssey, 
and Homeric Hymns) and to Hesiod (Theogony and Works and Days), muthos refers to a 
type of speech act which is understood to be candid, blunt and aggressive, but 
nonetheless completely truthful and always associated with men—kings, priests, 
warriors, and poets. Muthos is thus a speech act that is intended to enforce the 
compliance of those to whom it is directed, and only those similar in rank or status to 
the speaker can challenge or reply to it. In contrast, when logos is used in the Homeric 
epics it denotes speech that is duplicitous, cunning, persuasive through guile, but also 
soothing and comforting. As such it marks the speech, of women, the weak and young, 
and the shrewd (Lincoln 1999:10; 1996:7–11) and provides a weapon against the strong. 
Logos is thus viewed in the epics as both unprincipled and treacherous. However, the 
meaning and value of the muthos/logos couplet shifted considerably over time, so much 
so, in fact, that by the time of Plato’s death (circa 347 BCE) its status had radically 
changed, largely as a result of Plato’s own efforts to affect a reversal and to elevate logos 
above muthos. Plato’s contribution to, and invention of, the problem of myth resided in 
his reorganisation of the vocabulary of ‘speech’ in ancient Greece (Brisson 1998:90). He 
contrasted non-agonistic muthos with the combative discourse of philosophical logos and 
negatively caricatured poets’ myths as false, childish stories that could corrupt the 
credulous. Plato essentially sought to offer an ideological justification for the demotion 
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of poetry and muthos from their central role in defining Greek identity and to promote 
his own idealisation of philosophy and logos as more truthful, more masculine, and thus 
more authoritative.  
Plato’s oppositional classification of muthos and logos has become something of a 
master trope in popular and scholarly discussions of myth. However, as McCutcheon 
suggests, one of the reasons that Plato’s reversal of the values of muthos and logos has 
been considered to be the origin of mythology, may be that it has ‘more to do with the 
modern European “imaginary” Greece—among the most often used genealogical 
authorities for sanctioning everything from our own classificatory language to our 
culture—than with the historical Greek meaning of mythos and logos’ (2000:191). As 
such, contemporary mythology does share in common with these ancient Greek poets 
and philosophers an attempt to legitimate a monopoly on the truth. Although the term 
myth is regularly used as an uncontested classificatory term to distinguish one kind of 
discourse or narrative from another, it seems, however, that the use of the category in 
contemporary scholarship is intellectually committed to an a priori clear division 
between fact and fiction, truth and falsehood, superstition and science, and, as I shall 
show, ‘us’ and ‘them’. As McCutcheon suggests, 
the power to label someone’s story as myth, and to classify our world-view as 
‘scientific’ over against their world-view as ‘mythic’ is not only to classify stories, 
but people (are they gullible or intelligent?), societies (are they uncivilized or 
civilized?) and cultures (are they primitive or advanced?). The apparently 
straightforward distinction between false and true tales (mythos vs. logos) is 
therefore loaded with social significance and consequence. 
(2000:192) 
The classification of muthos against logos in ancient Greece was certainly ‘loaded with 
social significance’ and was furthermore embedded in a broader social context where 
individuals, whether poets or philosophers, were engaged in a struggle for signifying 
supremacy, to be recognised as truth-tellers par excellence. Moreover, as I will show in 
this chapter, these distinctions have been rhetorically aligned to a series of moral, social 
and political values and I believe that this has implications for how mythology is 
practiced today. In this chapter I consider a different genealogy for mythology—the new 
interest in myth that arose in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—
which, although it inscribed a similar struggle between rival ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 
1980:109–133) to that of the poets and philosopher in ancient Greece, provides, in my 
view, a more obvious starting point for the history of contemporary mythology. This is 
primarily because the way in which contemporary mythology has come to define itself 
has been with regard to the kinds of categorisations between myth and other types of 
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narrative genre that were created during the period in question. I will, however, return 
to the relationship between myth and philosophy in the final chapter of this thesis to 
demonstrate their interdependency. 
Plato’s famous critique of myth, with its stress on the truthfulness of logos 
against the mendacity of muthos, is a pervasive and popular understanding of myth that 
is said still to operate today; his dismissal of the mythic genre as unreliable and 
untruthful has been one of its most familiar formulations in both popular parlance and 
some forms of academic mythology. In the immediate aftermath of Plato’s efforts, the 
category of myth became so thoroughly discredited that even the Romans, who 
borrowed so much else from the Greeks, did not adopt the term. Instead, they referred 
to the narratives the Greeks knew as muthoi with the term fabulae which, as Lincoln 
reminds us, ‘had no major ambiguities at its core and conveyed the lack of seriousness 
with which [mythic] tales were regarded’ (1999:x). However, the new intellectual 
concern with Greek culture from the Renaissance onwards led to a revival of interest in 
myths1 and culminated in the formation of the field of mythology in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries which took two dominant forms: that of post-Enlightenment 
rationalism—where myths were viewed in ‘Platonic’ terms as the erroneous and 
superstitious productions of the primitive mind—and that of romanticism where myths 
were celebrated as the distillation of national character.  
Any study of the recovery of the mythic genre during this period could be the 
subject of a lengthy monograph in itself. However, in this chapter I will offer a more 
attenuated account by outlining the intellectual history of concepts concerning myth in 
eighteenth-century Europe in order to provide the background for my later analysis of 
one of the most under-studied causes of the development of myth and mythology: that 
of the authorising function of the past, particularly as it asserts and exploits a point of 
origin. The utilisation of originary myths, supporting intricate imaginations of the past, 
underpinned the rhetoric of progress which dominated the ideological constellations of 
the Enlightenment, and out of which rationalist mythology emerged. This mythology 
served as a foil against which a second type of mythology was developed, which was 
the consequential romantic nostalgia for origins that fuelled the search for a set of myths 
upon which emergent nation-states could be founded. The conceptualisation of the past 
as a site of origin in both of these contexts facilitated—or manufactured—the 
authenticity and legitimacy of self-sustaining identities. Origins also acted to delineate 
                                                           
1 See Bietenholz 1994; Mali 1992:136–209; Gay 1966:236–255; Feldman and Richardson 1972:3–164. 
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an unbroken and decisively linear, and as I will show, patrilinear, connection of the past 
to the present in the service of, for example, nationalist discourse, and simultaneously 
marked a point of departure for triumphalist discourses of civilisation and progress that 
marked European colonial projects. For both romanticism and rationalism, temporality 
infused a politics of spatiality where the mythicisation of the past enabled the 
relationship to, and reorganisation and redistribution of geographical territory. The 
romantic and rationalist narratives of the past were indispensable platforms from which 
to advance hegemonic articulations of individuality that had, and still have, profound 
implications for understanding the status and function of myths within the politics of 
identity. The aim of this chapter is thus to survey the philosophical and ideological 
contexts—firstly the Enlightenment and secondly romanticism—wherein contemporary 
and common attitudes towards myth were first formulated, before moving, in the 
following chapters, to an analysis of the material conditions that formed the enunciated 
content of romanticism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany. 
I. Ideals of Identity in the Age of Reason 
Hugh Kenner sounds a cautionary note when he warns of the perils of fixing the 
Enlightenment in a historically coherent frame: ‘The Enlightenment lingers in our 
intellectual histories as a puzzling phenomenon, puzzling because it is so hard to say 
briefly what it was. It lacks chronology, it lacks locality, it lacks identity….It perhaps 
hardly knew that it was happening’ (1962:1). Nonetheless, I will tentatively propose a 
few aspects of the Enlightenment that will at least serve as a basis for the discussion of 
the features of Enlightenment thought as they concerned the definition of myth and its 
relationship to identity. My intention here is to paint a picture in broad strokes by way 
of summary rather than to offer a full survey.2 Although the discussion in this section of 
the core features of Enlightenment thought and rationalism is broad, I trace them here in 
order to demonstrate the ideologies against which romanticism, particularly in 
Germany, sought to define itself. In addition, I realise that any attempt to classify 
                                                           
2 Many excellent surveys already exist, the most notable being Hampshire 1957, Nicolson 1960, 
Harris 1964, Gay 1966, Berlin 1979, Solomon 1988, Hampson 1990, Lloyd 1993 and Outram 1995. 
Much of my thinking in this section has been guided, in particular, by Peter Gay’s The 
Enlightenment: An Interpretation (1966). He shows how the ideas and aspirations of the 
Enlightenment project were both the result and simultaneously productive of very particular and 
interpenetrating social and historical conditions. His work provides a thorough survey of the 
Enlightenment thinkers’ ideological constructs placed firmly within their cultural climate and thus 
offers a necessary corrective to the tendency, in many of the intellectual histories of the period, to 
offer contextually detached surveys of its core ideas. 
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historical events into categories like ‘The Enlightenment’, or even ‘romanticism’ are 
what Foucault has called the ‘mutation of Order into History’ (1970:220), that is, that 
these categories can only apply retrospectively and loosely to moments that, at the time, 
were not necessarily conceived of in those terms.3 
(i) Enlightenment Subjects: Reason and Being 
The Enlightenment signalled the rise of scientific knowledge and methods over the 
scriptural authority of the Church, and emerged first in Britain (Scotland and England) 
at the end of the seventeenth century, before penetrating the philosophical traditions of 
France (culminating in the French Revolution of 1789 with its rallying cry ‘Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité!’), Germany, Spain, and Italy. The philosophers and intellectuals broadly 
associated with the Enlightenment4 were by no means homogeneous in their approaches 
or philosophies and can further be understood to have contributed philosophical ideas 
that were differentiated both by geographical boundaries5 and by a generational 
evolution in ideas.6 However, together their work was a vehicle for a lengthy and wide-
ranging debate that had at its heart a moralising belief in human autonomy, freedom, 
and equality, and the universal adequacy of (scientific) knowledge for the establishment 
of a just society organised around principles of individual rights.  
A central feature of Enlightenment philosophy was its novel and influential 
elaboration of individuality. It was Descartes who, through his deductive system of 
cognition, initially posited what Jantzen refers to as the ‘founding gesture of the subject 
in modernity’ (1998:32). Jantzen is correct in situating Descartes at the effective 
beginning of modernity in the Enlightenment, particularly when considered in the light 
of Jean-François Lyotard’s analysis of modernity’s distinguishing qualities. Lyotard 
presents these qualities in terms of two ‘metanarratives’ (1984:31–37) which Frederic 
Jameson, in his foreword to Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, appropriately calls 
                                                           
3 For example, many of the thinkers considered representative of the Enlightenment paradigm did 
not consider themselves to be living in a time of Enlightenment. See Gay 1966:20. 
4 For example, Francis Bacon (1561–1626) (although he is also classed as a Renaissance thinker), 
René Descartes (1596–1650), John Locke (1632–1704), Isaac Newton (1643–1727), François-Marie 
Arouet de Voltaire (1694–1778), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam Smith (1723–1790) amongst 
others. 
5 Hence, it is common to refer to the Scottish, French, and German (Aufklärung) Enlightenments, 
for example. See Porter and Teich 1981. 
6 Gay suggests that the traditional chronology of the Enlightenment marks its beginning with the 
English Revolution (1640–1660) and its end with the French Revolution of 1789 and he argues that 
the Enlightenment ‘was the work of three overlapping, closely associated generations’ whose 
relationships he charts (1966:17). 
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‘legitimizing myths’ (1984:ix). These metanarratives can be understood as the essence of 
the modernist paradigm: that of the liberation of humanity by progress and that of the 
unity of knowledge. The first metanarrative suggests that, for intellectual élites, 
knowledge of the unfolding of history, pursued, communicated and managed by these 
élites, is capable of freeing humanity from the fetters of ignorance, as it demonstrably 
elicits and enacts progress. The second metanarrative promotes an abstract, rational 
scientific method in the service of emancipation through accumulated funds of 
knowledge. Under this formulation the particular is subordinated to the abstract; the 
past to the present; the local to the universal.  
Descartes suggested that the individual is stable, coherent, and knowable and 
that the truth of existence can consequently be conceived and established: ‘I am, I exist, 
whenever I utter or conceive it in my mind, is necessarily true’ (1969:67). Extrapolating 
from this idea, and arriving at his famous statement ‘cogito ergo sum’,7 Descartes 
proposed that the primary attribute of the individual is that it is essentially interior, 
conscious, rational, autonomous, and universal—no physical conditions or differences 
can substantially affect how it operates. It could know itself and the world through 
reason, or rationality, which, for Descartes, was the highest and only form of mental 
functioning.8  
Some of the other thinkers in the Enlightenment mode, most notably Newton 
and Francis Bacon,9 anticipated Descartes’ formulations by positing that the mode of 
knowing produced by the objective rational self was science, which in turn could 
provide universal truths about the world regardless of the individual status of the 
knower. This utopian vision suggested that the knowledge produced by science was 
truthful and eternal and could only lead toward progress and perfection, an idea well 
encapsulated by one of the architects of the French Republic, Marquis de Condorcet, 
writing while he was in prison awaiting execution in the aftermath of the Revolution: 
How consoling for the philosopher who laments the errors, the crimes, the injustices 
which still pollute the earth and of which he is often the victim, is this view of the 
                                                           
7 See Descartes 1637; 1644. 
8 Hume and Locke both objected strenuously to Descartes uncritical confidence in abstract reason 
and speculation (the cogito), suggesting instead the ability of human beings to know the world 
through, in Locke’s case, their senses, and in Hume’s case, the role of nature in providing a model 
of reasonable behaviour. Nevertheless, they assumed the central Cartesian metaphor of the 
distinction between mind and body, holding that knowledge is concerned with the examination of 
the mind (Solomon and Higgins 1996:188). 
9 Bacon is widely considered to be the founder of the modern scientific tradition—with its 
emphasis on the disinterested knower—and in particular theorised science as the ultimate realm 
of human knowledge over nature (Solomon and Higgins 1996:165–166; 177; Gay 1966:233) 
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human race, emancipated from its shackles, released from the empire of fate and 
from that of the enemies of its progress, advancing with a firm and sure step along 
the path of truth, virtue and happiness. 
(1955:35) 
Thus, a further idea was that all human institutions and practices could be 
analysed by knowledge and improved. As Descartes asserted, ‘one may reach 
conclusions of great usefulness in life, and discover a practical philosophy…and thus 
make ourselves masters and owners of nature’ (1969:46). Scientific knowledge as neutral 
and objective therefore stood for Enlightenment philosophes—particularly for Bacon and 
the intellectuals who immediately followed—as the paradigm for any and all socially 
useful forms of knowledge. 
Another important aspect of the Enlightenment formulation of identity, and its 
extended prescription for the activity of scholars concerned with the validation of 
rational epistemology10 was the definitive opposition presumed between mind and 
body, known now as Cartesian dualism. Jantzen suggests that, for Descartes, the 
‘thinking being defines itself by contrasting itself to all that can be considered not to 
think. The body and the material world become the non-thinking Other of the rational 
subject, to be brought under its strict control and mastery’ (1998:32). Distinguishing the 
mind and body in this way could ensure the priority of science as the mode of 
knowledge par excellence—as the tool with which the physical world and the laws of 
nature could be reliably comprehended—and could enable the promotion of rationality 
as transcendent and disembodied. Thus, the equation of rationality and mind with truth 
was placed beyond doubt and the body was associated with a second-order, degraded 
ontology.  
The most significant characteristic of individuality presented in this mode is its 
universal posture. As Solomon and Higgins wryly remark, ‘the subjectivity so 
celebrated was, without a doubt, a distinctively European subjectivity. The objectivity it 
claimed, however, was global’ (1996:178). Crucially, this narrative of universality 
coincided with, and was productive of, European colonial expansion. The vision of 
progress elaborated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment in fact necessarily 
depended on economic prosperity that not only could support intellectual endeavour, 
but which could enable the realisation of a ‘just’ society, that is, one where individuals 
were granted the rights of equal citizenry. The idea of the just society however was 
                                                           
10 It was Descartes, again, who established the basic principle of certainty and immunity from 
doubt for philosophical investigation in the Enlightenment. Thus in his epistemology, reason itself 
had to be ratified and could not be assumed to be self-evident (Solomon and Higgins 1996:183). 
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initially only actuated within the borders of élite and educated reaches of European 
society: only those who had achieved the appropriate level of civilisation (by virtue of 
their powers of reason and domination of nature) were able to appreciate its benefits. 
The intention was, however, that the advantages of civilisation could, and would, 
eventually be extended to both the benighted lower classes and non-European colonised 
populations once they acceded to élite European cultural superiority. However, this 
ostensibly benevolent view elided the fact that the affluence that made the 
Enlightenment model of civilisation possible came from the toil of others, through co-
opting the lower classes in the project of industrialisation, through slavery, and through 
the colonial administration of the wealth of other nations. 
(ii) Religion, Reason, and Secularism 
To a large extent, the Enlightenment’s most prominent ideas mirrored, at least 
structurally, those that had been promoted in the dominant medieval and post-
Reformation theologies of the preceding centuries, particularly insofar as they posited 
universal truths that were accessible to human consciousness. However, it was the 
Enlightenment account of ontology in terms of rational individualism that also served—
forcefully and with hostility towards a system dominated by clerical élites—to mark it 
apart, particularly in the way that it stressed the autonomy of human reasoning and 
experience—rather than divine revelation—in comprehending the nature of the cosmos, 
and the place and function of individuals within it. The hegemony of the Church was 
thus increasingly viewed as an obstacle in the way of the more modulated idea of 
human individuality articulated in Enlightenment epistemology (Gay 1966:59). Truth 
was now not to be found in the Scriptures but in the individual mind of the rational, 
autonomous person who was the only reliable source of truth. An inevitable 
consequence of this realisation was the challenge to the relationship of church and state, 
an example being the collapse of the ancien régime centred on the belief in the divine 
right of kings to rule in the aftermath of the French Revolution.  
The roots of this splenetic programme are to be found in the deist school of 
thought of the latter seventeenth century, in that it offered a prolegomenon to the 
ruthless anticlericalism prevalent amongst the philosophes of the Enlightenment (see Gay 
1966:374–382; Feldman and Richardson 1972:25–35). Deism initially emerged in England 
but quickly spread to mainland Europe and was arguably as revolutionary as the 
Enlightenment’s rejection of Christianity as a tradition mired in superstition and the 
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iniquitous imposition of hierarchical arrangements justified on the basis of divine 
sanction. The deists11 can be classed as a school of thought in the sense that, for all their 
differences, they collectively worked to reject the authoritative Christian teaching of 
divine revelation in favour of emancipated and purely rationalistic speculation 
concerning religion. Many of the English deists were broadly materialistic in their 
doctrines, while the French thinkers (for example, Voltaire), who subsequently built 
upon the foundations laid by the English deists, were almost exclusively so. Others were 
content simply to offer veiled, cautious criticism of ecclesiastical authority in teaching 
the infallible inspiration of the Scriptures, and of the belief in an external revelation of 
supernatural truth given by God to humanity. There was a considerable divergence in 
method observable in the writings of the various deists, but in terms of the substance of 
their critiques they were largely in agreement: deism, in all its forms, was uniformly 
hostile to the traditional teaching of revealed religion and the assertion of the clergy that 
they alone could act as mediators of such a revelation (see Feldman and Richardson, op. 
cit.). 
Broadly speaking then, the deists as a group suggested that religion could and 
should be reduced to what could be verified about God—‘his’ purposes, and an 
individual’s religious duty—by reason alone. Most deists held that all religion was, in its 
origins, monotheistic and a rational and natural response to the fact of God’s existence 
and benevolence as displayed in nature. Moreover, they believed that the proliferation 
of religious cults and polytheism, the invention of elaborate rituals, mysteries, and the 
imposition of priestly authority, were all corruptions of the one true, natural religion. 
Edward Herbert, for example, in his De Veritate (‘On Truth’; 1624) rejected the claims of 
revelatory religion, an infallible Church, and the authority of priests, as perversions of 
‘true religion’. True religion, for Herbert, was a wholly rational matter consisting in an 
acceptance of ‘common notions’ that all people could share: a belief in one supreme and 
good God; a conviction that God’s authority and goodness was based on the pious being 
rewarded and sinners being punished both in this world and the next; and a belief in the 
necessity of repentance for sins. There is, of course, nothing in this formulation that need 
necessarily be considered as uniquely Christian, and indeed Herbert’s comparative 
discussion of ancient religions in De Religione Gentilium (‘On the Religion of the 
                                                           
11 Gay 1966, op. cit. 
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Gentiles’; 1663) attempted to demonstrate a universal acceptance of these beliefs 
throughout history.12 
The deist movement in England was the inevitable outcome of the political and 
religious upheaval inaugurated by the Protestant Reformation’s outspoken and wide-
ranging opposition to the authority of the Catholic Church; the Reformation had 
initiated a slow revolution in which previously unassailable articles of faith were 
challenged and reconceived. Accessible vernacular translations of the Christian 
scriptures were substituted for the mediating authority of the clergy; state religion 
replaced global Catholicism and resisted Papal jurisdiction. However, although these 
revolutionary innovations provided a clearly viable discursive shift, the very spirit or 
mental disposition that proposed and then sanctioned them as substitutes in the first 
place could not logically rest content with them (see Gay 1996:207–212). The full 
implications of the principle of an individual’s autonomous judgment in matters of 
religion were not yet wholly apparent nor, indeed, rationally articulated, particularly 
when applied to the notion of the Bible as the word of God. However, it was simply a 
matter of time before this novel emphasis on human autonomy in relationship to the 
divine would have to proceed to a new examination and then a final rejection of the 
foundational veracity of the Christian faith.  
Undoubtedly the new discoveries of the sciences (in astronomy and physics by 
Newton and Boyle, for example), the stringent empiricism championed by Bacon, the 
philosophical doubt and rationalistic method of Descartes, and the political and social 
upheavals of the times, all laid the groundwork for the coherent and methodical 
criticism levelled at revealed religion in the Enlightenment. Nonetheless, these 
themselves must have been contingent upon the break with the authority of Rome 
through the assertion of individual autonomy that the Protestant Reformation 
represented. Although the early tracts of deism were fairly veiled and intentionally 
indirect in their attack upon divine revelation, alongside the English Revolution and the 
civil and religious liberties consequent upon it, and with the spread of the critical and 
empirical spirit exemplified in the philosophy of Locke, for example, the deists 
                                                           
12 Other deists, such as John Tolland in his Christianity not Mysterious (1696) and Matthew Tindal 
in his Old as the Creation (1731), attempted to show that Christianity, when approached from a 
deist point of view, was an exemplar of rational religion if stripped of its emphasis on divine 
revelation and priestly interference. They drew inspiration from the new science of Isaac Newton 
and Robert Boyle (1627–91) to argue for the existence of God through ‘an appeal to the evidence of 
his “general providence” displayed in the order of nature, and by more traditional reasoning 
based on the idea of God as a self-existent or necessary being’ (in Bell 1990:7). 
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nonetheless prepared the ground for the full rehearsal of the case against Christianity 
that was undertaken in the later stages of the Enlightenment.13 Their work was to lead to 
an explicit hostility towards revealed religion in all its shapes and forms. 
It was in the Enlightenment that the accusation was most successfully levelled 
that the Christian scriptural tradition had produced authoritarian and hierarchical social 
structures that foreclosed the autonomy of the individual now being forcefully 
articulated by the philosophes. Enlightenment thinkers looked instead to classical Greek 
and Roman texts as inspirational precursors,14 most frequently citing Cicero and 
Lucretius who questioned the existence of any deities and took what would now be 
called a ‘secular’ view of the human condition. As Gay has argued, therefore, ‘all over 
Europe and America, for all philosophes alike, the ancients were signposts to 
secularism’ (1966:44). In keeping with this ‘secularist’ agenda, many writers of the 
Enlightenment associated religious fervour with irrationality and authoritarianism. 
Instead they believed, as Hutton notes, that ‘the only sensible alternative to Christianity 
[was] either atheism or belief in some vaguely defined Supreme Being, with whom 
humans had no personal relationships’ (1999:21). Pagan religions (that is, those of the 
ancient Near East and ‘idolatrous’ undercurrents in medieval Christianity) were viewed 
as erroneous and despotic traditions which were now to be superseded by rational 
scientific methods. David Hume, for example, in tracing the origins of religion, 
postulated an evolutionary (and progressive) development from polytheism to 
monotheism, and, while he lauded the former for its tolerance, he considered it to have 
been a vulgar and absurd phase of human history that was to be corrected by scientific 
evidence and reasoning (Gay 1966:167). 
(iii) History and Myth: Enlightenment Models of the Past 
The Enlightenment thus saw a cumulative antagonism emerge between Christianity and 
rationalist thought, which in turn provoked new forms of historiography and 
mythology that were characterised by an attitude towards the past that was alternately 
pessimistic and admiring. The Enlightenment’s consideration of history was bifurcated 
and unashamedly partisan and the characterisation of history as an ongoing competition 
between two types of mentality led the philosophes to propose a novel schema of 
periodisation. It was one where the past—understood to be global, but in reality a 
                                                           
13 See Gay 1966:371–401. 
14 The interest in the texts, philosophies, and culture of what they viewed to be the Classical age 
led to its categorisation as ‘Neo-classicism’. 
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particular version of the European past—was divided roughly into four great epochs: 
the civilisations of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt; classical Greece and Rome; the 
Christian millennium; and the contemporary Age of Enlightenment where reason was 
being reasserted. As Gay suggests, these four epochs were ‘rhythmically related to each 
other: the first and third were paired off as ages of myth, belief, and superstition, while 
the second and fourth were ages of rationality, science, and enlightenment’ (1966:34).15 
Enlightenment philosophes considered themselves to be re-enacting the age-old 
struggle between reason and unreason16 that, in their view, had been fought and lost in 
the ancient world. However, it was a struggle they believed they were now destined to 
win. Those Enlightenment thinkers who concerned themselves with the past in this way 
were plainly motivated by a contemporary agenda—the final demise of Christian 
hegemony—and it gave their work political urgency and a sense of unwavering 
determination, as Gay argues: 
the philosophes divided their past into two sectors and put both to work. The 
Christian sector gave them an adversary worthy of their hostility: when the 
philosophes proclaimed that it was their mission to eradicate bigotry and 
superstition, they meant that it was a historic mission. At this point…history 
became not past, but present politics: the philosophes never tired of pointing to the 
record Christians had compiled through the ages as evidence confirming the need 
for drastic remedial action in their own time. In the same manner, the pagan sector 
[classical Greek and Rome] had its uses: it supplied them with illustrious models 
and a respectable ancestry. 
(1966:31–32) 
This division between Christianity and the ‘pagan’ past of classical Greece and Rome 
was predominantly presented in terms of a struggle between two mentalities 
(mythological or religious and critically rational or scientific) that were defined by their 
prevailing political styles, epistemological preoccupations, and intellectual institutions. 
For the Enlightenment philosophes, the age of Christianity was dominated by 
superstition, crude barbarism, and resolute ignorance; the Classical age was, in contrast, 
laudably nourished by reason, truth and humanity (see Gay 1966:59–71).  
                                                           
15 The philosophes did not, however, propose this scheme as a rigid system; they conceded that the 
Christian millennium was more rational and more civilised than earlier ages, and they certainly 
believed in the superiority of their own time over Greece and Rome. The exceptions that they 
allowed, and the caveats that they offered, however, did not invalidate, for them, their broad 
thesis; they still considered the history of philosophy to be a history of the rise of reason out of 
myth during the period of classical antiquity, its calamitous regression under Christianity, and its 
triumphant rediscovery in their own time. See Gay 1966:34–35. 
16 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) suggested, for example, characteristically invoking a 
metaphor of combat, that the ‘pure insight’, which he believed to be characteristic of the 
Enlightenment, ‘only appears in genuinely active form in so far as it enters into conflict with 
belief’ (1931:560).  
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The philosophes’ attitude towards Greek and Latin classicism, as the esteemed 
ancestor of their own commitment to reason and empirically demonstrable truth, 
functioned in three ways. Firstly, it suggested a venerable intellectual pedigree that lent 
an aura of authenticity and authority to their rationalist philosophies. This was largely 
because knowledge of classical literature was the common possession of educated men 
in the eighteenth century. Samuel Johnson, for example, remarked that ‘Classical 
quotation is the parole of literary men all over the world’ (in Boswell 1799, IV:102). 
Secondly, a strong thread of identification with the ancients was discernible and it 
served as a useful rhetorical device in establishing the nobility of the philosophes’ cause. 
Rousseau, for example, considered himself to be  
ceaselessly occupied with Rome and Athens; living one might say, with their great 
men, myself born Citizen of a Republic and son of a father whose patriotism was his 
strongest passion, I took fire from his example; I thought myself a Greek or a 
Roman. 
(1992:9) 
However, identification with the ancients was also a signal of the philosophes’ own 
advancement; they believed that they stood above classical antiquity as its masters, 
giving them a sense of the importance of their task as well as a licence to exploit Roman 
and Greek sources astutely and, sometimes, shamelessly..17 As Gay suggests, ‘Even more 
often than they intended, Enlightenment historians looked into the past as into a mirror 
and extracted from their history the past they could use’ (1966:32). They could exploit 
their sources because they approached their predecessors with the self-confidence of 
men who could demonstrate a solid command of their material and who could put it to 
work with a rigour and rationality that would ensure the success of the Enlightenment 
project. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Greek and Latin classicism also offered 
the philosophes a convincing alternative to Christianity, where the Platonic rejection of 
myth and superstition, and its elaboration by Lucretius and Cicero, were invoked as a 
beacon of hope. 
The four-period scheme dominated philosophical history during the 
Enlightenment and it was couched in a language that repeatedly drew attention to the 
regenerative and emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment project. Jean Le Rond 
d’Alembert (1717–1783), for example, wrote of the ‘revival of letters’—out of a long 
period of dark ignorance—that the Enlightenment represented, and of the ‘regeneration 
                                                           
17 The identification with one’s forefathers as a legitimating device, and the subsequent assertion 
of mastery over them, is a key theme in this thesis and is one that will be elaborated and analysed 
in Chapter 8 when I consider the ontological and epistemological mechanisms that produce and 
maintain authority and authorship in the politics of identity through recourse to paternal origins. 
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of ideas,’ the ‘return to reason and good taste’, the ‘revival of spirits’, and the ‘rebirth of 
light’ (2000:102–5). Rousseau viewed the medieval age as a step back into the worst 
excesses of antiquity (1959–1964, III:6) and Hume similarly wrote that ‘having at length 
thrown off this yoke, affairs are now returned nearly to the same situation as before, and 
EUROPE is at present a copy at large, of what GREECE was formerly a pattern in 
miniature’ (1878, III:183). The rhythmical view of history thus complemented the 
broader emancipatory agenda of the Enlightenment (Gay 1966:36). In viewing history in 
the way that they did, the philosophes simultaneously promoted their own role as the 
heroic champions of a new kind of rationality whose success was inevitable. Here the 
Enlightenment’s celebrated theory of progress revealed itself most keenly, particularly 
insofar as it conveniently articulated the belief, common amongst the philosophes, that 
the past’s oscillation between ‘Ages of Philosophy’ and ‘Ages of Religion’ was not 
endlessly iterative and that the Enlightenment thus represented a break with the past 
should its insights be acted upon.  
Both the four-epoch periodisation as the organising principle of Enlightenment 
historiography, and the theory of progress, had important implications for 
historiographical methods and subject matter. Enlightenment historiography, for all its 
zealous polemicism, was important and groundbreaking in its recognition of what are 
now commonplace notions amongst historians. Firstly, that historical epochs each have 
a dominant intellectual demeanour which informs their knowledge production, 
worldview, and behavioural norms; secondly, that history has its discontinuities and 
dramatic revolutions as well as its more gradual shifts in political and social realities; 
and finally, after Foucault, that political and religious power functions to define and 
secure the parameters of the knowable. As a result, Enlightenment philosophes imposed 
rational, critical methods of study, borrowed from the epistemological models of the 
natural sciences, on social, political and intellectual developments. Again, the intention 
was to oppose Christianity, and in particular its model of history and its methods—
where Providence and divine revelation were the guiding principles—which were 
considered to be only concerned with chronologies and genealogies, uncritical, vapid 
hagiographies of saintly figures, and vulgar and simplistic research into sacred texts 
(Gay 1966:31–38). Instead, the philosophes set out to provide an alternative, universal, and 
secular history of human thought and society, guided by the principles of reason and 
the hope of progress. For example, in his Essay on the Manners and Mind of Nations, and on 
the Principal Facts of History from Charlemagne to Louis XIII (1769), Voltaire pushed historic 
  50 
time far back beyond Genesis to primordial geological time, arguing that an immense 
amount of time was needed for mankind to develop societies, arts, and sciences. He 
began his history in the Far East (China), rather than with the creation account in the 
book of Genesis which Christian historians, or at least those influenced by Christian 
doctrine, had used as their starting point,18 and he then moved gradually westward to 
India, Persia, Arabia, to Palestine and the birth of Christianity, and then finally to Rome. 
He considered the ancient Chinese and Indians to be similar to enlightened European 
philosophes—liberal, pragmatic, and benevolent, their religious traditions preserving a 
virtually untouched naturalism. For Voltaire the East served as a much earlier model 
and source for Judaism and Christianity and, in his view, it was certainly morally 
superior. However, while his portrayal of the East is seemingly tolerant and 
unprejudiced, his intention was to denigrate Christianity and its model of history rather 
than to celebrate non-European cultures; Voltaire wished to rewrite the past so that the 
Bible was seen to have played only a minor role (Figueira 2002:11).  
The Enlightenment production of this new type of history, and the promotion of 
secularism, unsurprisingly influenced attitudes towards myth, where Plato’s conflict 
with poets and mythmakers was once thought to be being re-enacted. Broadly speaking, 
three types of mythology were prevalent: Christian, deist, and rationalist, the last of 
which was championed by the philosophes. For eighteenth-century Christian thinkers, 
such as the Abbé Fourmont (1683–1745), Samuel Shuckford (d. 1754), and Bishop 
William Warburton (1698–1779), the term ‘myth’ signified pagan fables and religion, 
particularly those of classical Greece and Rome and Egypt, which were either dismissed 
entirely or reconciled with Christian doctrine. As Feldman and Richardson note, ‘myth’ 
was considered to be ‘exactly equal to false, while gospel, meaning Christian religious 
stories, was exactly equal to true’ (1972:3). The most common understanding of myth in 
this view, therefore, was that it was a degenerate version of biblical truth; myth was 
interpreted as an invention of the devil, and the pagan gods were identified with fallen 
angels.  
                                                           
18 Voltaire intended his history to complete and correct the work of the historian Bishop Jacques-
Benigne Bossuet (1627–1704). Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History (1681) presented the 
historical past as both preparing for and culminating in Israel and Christianity, marked by God’s 
providence. He began his history with Adam before moving on to the Flood, God’s covenant with 
Abraham, then to Moses, Troy’s downfall and capture, the establishment of the Temple in 
Jerusalem, the birth of Christ, and finally to Christianity’s alliance with Rome. Voltaire brings this 
history up-to-date but he also makes clear that he rejects Bossuet’s Christian-universal history in 
favour of a new secular ‘philosophy’ of history, where providence is replaced by progress, and 
where a Hebraic origin is replaced by one situated in the Far East. 
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The deists, among them John Toland (1670–1722) and John Trenchard (1662–
1723), tended to the view that Christian religious practices and beliefs as well as pagan 
myth and custom were equally ill-considered adulterations, not of Christianity but of 
the original natural religion. Toland suggested, for example, that the polytheism found 
in so many myth traditions was a deliberate fabrication by priests who were cynically 
concerned to secure their own status as ritual specialists and mediators between the 
gods of their invention and the common people. Similarly, John Trenchard, in his The 
Natural History of Superstition (1709), offered an analysis of mythmaking as a form of 
psychopathology akin to fanatical religiosity. He suggested that the religious impulse 
tended to evolve from simple faith (in the earliest stages of natural religion) to 
unchecked fervour, and finally to an intolerant fanaticism that encouraged excessive 
proselytisation and the persecution of non-believers. Where Toland had examined myth 
as a form of primitive savagery in the past, Trenchard was clearly concerned to 
challenge contemporary forms of religiosity, in particular witchcraft and the spread of 
fanaticism in the eighteenth-century church. Myth, for Trenchard, echoing Plato, 
suggested a mentality predisposed towards zealotry because it inspired and stimulated 
emotional responses that were wholly unaffected by the application of reason.  
Rationalist philosophes, such as Bernard Fontenelle (1657–1757) and Hume, 
tended to the most extreme view, in that they viewed all myths as savage and absurd, 
only useful for providing evidence of primitive mankind’s irrational and deluded 
attempt to explain the natural world. Fontenelle’s influential essay Of the Origin of Fables 
(1724)19 maintained that myths were both the product of primitive psychology, that is, 
they were credulous attempts, arising out of fear or awe in the face of nature, to provide 
explanations of natural phenomena, and, in their more far-fetched forms, the result of an 
accumulation of exaggerations by generations of mythmakers. He sought universal 
explanations for the origin and transmission of myths, based on his assumption of a 
universal human nature, and thus situated the origin of myths in mental processes that 
he considered were ubiquitous across time and space. Hume firmly and caustically 
rejected myth as patent superstition and historical distortion, as did Voltaire on occasion 
(Gay 1966:341–342).  
                                                           
19 Both Andrew Lang (1844–1912) and Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1857–1939) considered Fontenelle’s 
work on fables to be groundbreaking. In his Myth, Ritual, and Religion (1887), for example, Lang 
included an appendix called ‘Fontenelle’s Forgotten Common Sense’. See Feldman and 
Richardson 1972:7–8. 
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In summary, then, Enlightenment attitudes towards myth were, in the main, 
disparaging. Somewhat unwittingly, but importantly nonetheless, each view was 
implicated in the politico-philosophical projects of its proponents, insofar as the 
characterisation of some narratives as ‘myths’ (with the implicit charge of falsity) 
involved a move to assert the primacy of the proponents’ own truth—discursive 
authority—against those traditions and systems they considered erroneous. Of the three 
types of attitude towards myth, the deist and rationalist views had the most enduring 
influence on the development of the field of mythology: deist attitudes informed and 
guided the romantic view of myth while the rationalist view provided the intellectual 
foundation for the nineteenth-century mythology of scholars like Edward Tylor (1832–
1917), Andrew Lang (1844–1912), and Sir James Frazer (1854–1941). The Enlightenment, 
for all its distrust of myth and mythmaking, thus saw a resurgence of interest in the 
study of myth, partially due to the availability of new data on the traditions and beliefs 
of non-European people, provided by missionaries, travellers, and merchants, as 
European societies embarked on a programme of rapid colonial expansion.  
(iv) Orienting Knowledges: Spatial Politics, Temporal Contexts  
The idea of progress and civilisation, the promotion of the rhythmic model of history, 
and the rejection of myth as evidence of the superstition and erroneous thinking that 
was the domain of the ignorant and primitive, neatly provided the ideological 
justification—the condition of possibility—for imperialist ambitions (or what became 
designated as the ‘civilising mission’). It was an idea which gathered pace in the 
following centuries until it obscured almost entirely the economic motives that 
provoked European colonial expansion. It enabled the elaboration of a discourse which 
privileged an élitist European subjectivity and produced a new formulation (with spatial 
and temporal significance)20 of abject Otherness, seen to be embodied both by the 
                                                           
20 Thomas Docherty points to the spatial and temporal opposition between the European centre 
and the colonised periphery that was established in Enlightenment thought and argues that it 
enabled the power relations of colonialism: ‘When the north-western tip of Europe designated 
itself as the centre of “Enlightenment” in the eighteenth century, it did so in the secure knowledge 
that an “unenlightened periphery” was thereby constructed; and the imperialist expansion that 
went hand in hand with the development of Enlightenment philosophy was not just a mercantile 
affair, for it also had a series of conceptual components. To be “enlightened”, by definition, is 
implicitly to construct the idea of oneself as a Subject-in-time; one has a present, characterised by 
light, which is distinguished from something dark which is necessarily prior to the moment of 
enlightenment. A specific model of historical narrative is thereby put in place’ (1993:445). He 
further argues that ‘[t]he politics of imperialism and colonialism [are]…founded not just upon 
geography but also upon a series of temporal factors, and most significantly upon a question of 
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colonised peoples—evinced by the relative ease with which they were colonised—and 
by those Europeans who were considered to be mired in the superstitions promulgated 
by the Christian Church. This was thus a dualistic framework which mirrored and 
confirmed the Cartesian view of humanity as separate from, and transcendent to, the 
natural world.  
The impact of such a bifurcated presentation of subjectivity, as Edward Said 
(1978) so famously argued, produced a self-sustaining narrative of Otherness upon 
which a colonial knowledge/power nexus was established in the eighteenth century, and 
then more finely tuned during the nineteenth century. The image of the ‘savage’ native 
as primitive other, opposed to the ‘civilised’ European, was a significant part of a 
complex system of narrative representations—of mythmaking—that was, as Russell 
McCutcheon argues, ‘taken as normative and authoritative by a community of readers 
and writers’ (1997:188). It also provided a material referent for European knowledge 
production, one that literally ‘authorised’ (made into authors) the colonisers who were 
cast as knowing subjects, while the colonised, as well as those within European societies 
who remained, in the view of the philosophes, stubbornly ignorant of the insights of 
rational philosophy, or who continued to be beguiled by superstition, religion, or myth, 
were rendered as the objects of knowledge in a way that ignored or repressed their own 
agentive identity. The knowledge production and epistemological models of 
Enlightenment philosophes and nineteenth-century European colonisers thus imposed a 
discursive and rhetorical homogeneity that, while it bore a passing resemblance to 
particular indigenous accounts (for example, those of a small native élite who were often 
complicit in colonial administrative and educational projects), marginalised and 
denounced altogether subaltern narratives. Knowledge of the savage native was 
effectively repackaged and re-presented, through a complex educational, legal, and 
political network, as knowledge for the native that would enable the progress of all 
humanity towards the European model of civilisation.  
Enlightenment knowledge production placed manifold local narratives 
(simultaneously inscribing them as inferior) in the singular context of ‘World History’ 
that served, in retrospect, both to confirm and to narrate the Enlightenment version of 
history as one of newly inevitable and irresistible progress.21 Temporality in this mode 
was reconfigured as naturally sequential and inexorable, a movement—albeit initially 
                                                                                                                                                             
“speed”: the coloniser posits herself or himself as “advanced”—in advance of a colonised, who is 
thereby stigmatised as “tardy” or “underdeveloped”’ (ibid.). 
21 See Stocking 1987:8–45. 
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oscillating—from a primitive origin in antiquity to the civilised and civilising present. 
As such, it was a selectively optimistic view of human history which was now seen as a 
move towards a condition of inevitable perfectibility. A logical corollary of this 
rationalist conception of history was the tendency of Enlightenment thinkers to demean 
or deride those cultures and peoples, past and present, which lacked consciousness of 
the principles of enlightened reason and who persisted in slavish adherence to 
superstition, myth, and religion. Such cultures tended to be seen as lower stages in the 
development of cosmopolitan rationality. Hence, in the view of Condorcet, it was the 
good fortune of the ‘barbarous, unenlightened cultures’ of his day that they could now 
acquire the rational principles of Enlightenment directly from the enlightened culture of 
European society (1955:178).  
The past and present of colonised people, and of the lower classes, provided 
both an evidential and an ontological platform—or origin—from which to make 
manifest the progression of European intellectual development from a state of 
primitivity to one of refined and rationalist superiority. Further, it fuelled an enthusiasm 
for the frenzied knowledge-gathering, the complex production of taxonomies and 
philologies, that became so characteristic of European Orientalist scholarship in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the extent that indigenous knowledge was also 
effectively colonised in the service of the European narrative of progress. However, 
there was a parallel strand of thought—romanticism—that emerged in the eighteenth 
century and which took a nostalgic attitude to the past, sentimentalising it in terms of a 
lost paradise that could only be salvaged through careful attention to the very 
peripheral narratives that were, with alarming speed, being closed down. I want to turn, 
therefore, to examine the retrieval of the past in the context of the romantic movement in 
order to provide the historical background to the transfiguration of the past into a myth 
of origins that occurred within German romantic nationalism, a process explored in 
detail throughout the remainder of the thesis.  
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II. Romancing the Origin in the Politics of Nostalgia22 
In this section I present a broad overview of the romantic movement in terms of a 
complex network of cultural undercurrents and aesthetic articulations during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which were distinct from the parallel strand of 
scientific and modern industrialisation that produced rationalism. Broadly speaking, 
romanticism was an intellectual movement that flourished in Europe between the 
middle of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with its ideological roots found in the 
work of the pre-romantic thinkers Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and Johann 
Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). It is generally agreed that the romantic movement arose 
as an antithesis to the ideals of the Enlightenment in that it posed a conscious challenge 
to the aesthetic and philosophical priorities of the Age of Reason. To some extent, 
romanticism was a counterpoint rearticulation of Enlightenment values, in radically 
different language and to different ends, particularly as far as it valorised, through 
narrative forms, the identity formulations peculiar to the Enlightenment, and, even 
more crucially, with respect to the dependence of these formulations on mythical sites of 
origin. It is perhaps clearer, therefore, if both romanticism and rationalism are seen as 
the Janus-faced expressions of the Enlightenment epistemological and ontological 
paradigm. Romanticism can be understood as an introverted and nostalgic gaze towards 
the past in search of authentic selfhood, and rationalism as an extroverted affirmation of 
universal individualism, looking towards the future of progress and derogating the past 
which served merely as a point of departure. While both conceived of subjectivity in 
dramatically divergent ways, they were, nonetheless, concerned with the location of 
origins for the legitimation of their theories of identity, whether cosmopolitan, 
                                                           
22 The phrase ‘politics of nostalgia’ was coined by Armin W. Geertz and Jeppe Sinding Jensen to 
critique Mircea Eliade’s tendency (along with other historians of religion) to isolate and celebrate 
an unchanging and unique core to all religious forms, that is, religion as sui generis. For Geertz and 
Jensen, the phrase ‘politics of nostalgia’ refers to a deliberate and sentimental turn to the past 
‘which seeks, on the basis of a universalist interpretation of religions, to restore Man as a complete 
and inherently spiritual being’ (1991:13). That this is a fundamentally political act is explored 
more fully in Chapters 5 and 6. In the context of the discussion of romanticism presented here, I 
am using the term ‘politics of nostalgia’ to refer to the way in which the romantic derogation of 
the present to the redemptive qualities of the archaic past took place against a backdrop of 
immense social upheaval and the breakdown of traditional hierarchies and in so doing reflected a 
politically-informed concern to restore social order by returning to the ‘old ways’. Romanticism 
thus ascribed a value and authority to its conceptions of the past in which, for example, the more 
inequitable qualities of social hierarchy and power were downplayed, in order to shape and judge 
the present. As Russell McCutcheon has noted, ‘The politics of nostalgia…denotes an ideological 
position in which, for example, things purportedly archaic are unilaterally prevalued as essential 
and beneficial, becoming the norm against which other social arrangements and forms or human 
behaviour are judged and found wanting (1997:33–34). 
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universalist, progressive and individualist (in the case of rationalism) or national, 
heterogeneous (in terms of differences between nations), retrogressive, and 
communitarian (in the case of romanticism). However, although both affirmed the 
autonomy of the individual, where Enlightenment thinkers assumed the essential unity 
human consciousness, romantic thinkers generally promoted the uniqueness of each 
individual as it was constituted by life experience, an important dimension of which 
was thought frequently to be national character, and proposed a more synthetic notion 
of unity, that of the individual with the community, the community with the nation, and 
the nation with other nations.  
For romantic thinkers, it was not reason but rather inner feelings, imagination, 
and the unbounded spirit that could intuit the truth of the human condition. Emotional 
and aesthetic expression was understood to be the primal motivation of human beings 
and was therefore not to be repressed by reason. Subjectivity was understood to reside 
in, and to be defined with reference to, an individual’s place within a community of 
origin. Whereas in the rationalist paradigm the subject was conceived of as relentlessly 
atomistic, the romantic recovery of vernacular traditions promoted relational identity. 
This should not be mistaken, however, as a benign view of communitarian identity: the 
value assigned to indigenous communities relied on the identification and exclusion of 
others who were defined in terms of their foreignness and seen to pose a threat to the 
unity and purity of the affinal group.  
The past few decades have seen a great deal of debate concerning definitions of 
romanticism, with very little consensus having been achieved regarding its core 
philosophies, periodisation, or even geographical location. It is not my concern here to 
revisit in any detail the main arguments in the debate, largely because they are primarily 
relevant to studies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English literature and not to 
the broader ideological movement that is the focus of discussion in this chapter.23 
Rather, of more immediate interest for my purpose is the romantic movement’s 
                                                           
23 See Ferguson 1991 and McGann 1992. The debate has focused on René Wellek’s suggestion 
(1949; 1963) that romanticism was a cohesive philosophical and aesthetic phenomenon. Jerome 
McGann (1983; 1992:735–739), following Arthur Lovejoy (1916; 1917; 1941), argues instead that 
romanticism was much more fragmented. He suggests that the term ‘Romantic Period’ (1992:740) 
be used to describe late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writings, making ‘romanticism’ 
an historical—rather than aesthetic or philosophical—category (since many romantic-era authors 
did not subscribe to the romantic ideals as defined by Wellek). It is possible, in my view, however, 
to identify a number of common philosophical and aesthetic preoccupations under the broad rubric 
of romanticism as a movement, particularly as these are distinct from, and sometimes antithetical 
to, the contemporaneous discourse of rationalism. This is especially the case in the context of 
German romanticism which will be discussed more fully in Chapters 4–6.  
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idealisation of the past and nature (in particular, the rural landscape), its fascination 
with pagan religiosity (understood here as pre-Christian as well as non-European, and 
resolutely antipathetical towards the mythologies of Greek and Rome), and its search for 
vernacular forms of sociality (myths, customs, and languages) that could provide a 
cohesive foundation for social and national unity.24 These core features should be 
viewed, I will argue below, in terms of an implicit, although occasionally explicit, 
agenda concerned with the redemptive power of origins and the past for retrieving 
authentic expressions of national and individual identity. My intention here is to survey 
these features of romanticism, particularly as they relate directly to the discussion of 
myth, race, and German nationalism in the following chapters. In the sections below, I 
will deal with two preoccupations of romantic thought, namely, the idealisation of the 
rural landscape and the rediscovery of vernacular traditions.25  
(i) The Rural Idyll 
The idealisation of the rural landscape (and its inhabitants) was prompted in large part 
by hostility to the mass industrialisation of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and provided a stark contrast to the progressive vision of civilisation that had 
led to technological advancements in the areas of manufacturing, communication, and 
transport. In England according to Hutton, ‘the shift of emotion involved can be 
attributed to a single and simple process; that in 1810 about 80 percent of English people 
lived in the countryside, and by 1910 about 80 percent lived in towns’ (Hutton 1999:117). 
Similarly, Boa and Palfreyman draw attention to a slightly later development in 
Germany when they note that in the period from 1840 to 1900 the population moved 
from being primarily rural to predominantly urban (2000:1).  Suddenly the urban centres 
that had earlier promised progress and emancipation had turned into chaotic, alienating 
conglomerations, spreading pollution, disease, and social instability. In contrast to cities, 
the shrinking and depopulated countryside was depicted as an idyll of continuity and 
social unity, where age-old feudalism was seen to be undisturbed by Enlightenment 
calls for liberty.  
                                                           
24 Hutton differs in that he singles out the fusion of three significant forces as productive of 
romanticism: in the context of the British movement ‘admiration for ancient Greece, nostalgia for a 
vanished past, and desire for an organic unity between people, culture, and nature’ (1999:21). 
German romanticism, in contrast, took a much more ambivalent attitude towards ancient Greece 
as I will show. 
25 For further discussion of pagan religiosity during the period, see Hutton’s fine survey (1999, 
especially pp. 32–51) which examines the growth of British paganism from the late seventeenth 
century onwards. 
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Jackson Lears describes, for example, a ‘feeling of over-civilization’ which, in the 
nineteenth century, expanded into ‘a sign of a broad…dissatisfaction with modern 
culture’. He notes that, ‘haltingly, half-consciously, Europeans and Americans alike 
began to recognize that the triumph of modern culture had not produced greater 
autonomy,’ but on the contrary had highlighted ‘a spreading sense of moral impotence 
and spiritual sterility—a feeling that life had become not only overcivilized but also 
curiously unreal’ (1981:4–5). The psychological impact of this rapid shift cannot be 
overestimated and is evident in the increasing nostalgia for, and sentimentalisation of, 
the rustic behaviours and practices of the peasantry, viewed through much of the 
scholarship, literature, art and music of the romantic period. Benedict Anderson (1991), 
understands this constructive nostalgia for a vanishing past to be a response to 
‘characteristic amnesias’ brought about by ‘profound changes in consciousness’: 
‘Awareness of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of 
continuity, yet of “forgetting” the experience of this continuity…engenders the need for 
a narrative of “identity”’ (1991:204–205). 
Scholars and aesthetes, emulating the aristocratic landowners of the seventeenth 
century, tended to view the countryside as a timeless place in which archaic practices 
were continued with a childlike, but nonetheless dogged, sense of tradition. It was 
credited with all the advantages of simplicity and homeliness which were lacking in the 
modern towns and cities, considered not only more beautiful and wholesome, but also 
more stable, rooted, and enduring. Its inhabitants were endowed with an unassuming 
bucolic wisdom, attributed to their close contact with nature and an arcane knowledge 
of the land that had been preserved and handed down through countless generations. 
Their organic, timeless way of life was viewed both as a reassuring bulwark against the 
rapid and unsettling changes of the period, and as a potential ground from which 
indigenous cultures and values could be resuscitated to challenge those universalising 
forces of cosmopolitanism which threatened their destruction. This romanticisation of 
the countryside was remarkable as ‘hitherto rustics had usually been portrayed by 
leaders of literary taste as the principal reservoir of ignorance, blind superstition, brutal 
manners, and political reaction, within which towns formed islands of liberalism, 
education, progress, and refinement’ (Hutton 1999:117).  
The romantic espousal of the common ‘folk’ was thus intended in part as a 
challenge against the ambivalent but nonetheless mainly critical attitude of the 
philosophes. As Robert Payne suggests, ‘a measure of fear for the future of Enlightenment 
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in the face of both the abysmal ignorance seen lurking in the lower orders and the 
violent passions which those masses came to represent in the social order’ informed the 
philosophes attitudes to the peasantry (1976:26). Although they sought to improve the 
miserable conditions in which the people lived, their condemnation of the superstitious 
nature of popular culture and traditions was a combination of an implicit alignment 
with aristocratic standards of gentility and the preoccupations of a bourgeois, utilitarian 
concern for increasing productivity and the self-discipline that it required (1976:117–
124). 
The rapid migration of the rural population to metropolitan centres had 
originally started in the seventeenth century. This was the result, at least in Britain, of 
official enclosure policies that took land out of active agricultural production and turned 
it into parklands and new woods, a novel use of the rural landscape that was prompted 
by the new gentry’s penchant for establishing country seats and rural retreats. As 
Abrahams points out, ‘there are manifest ironies involved in this process of 
sentimentalizing a way of life only after those who once practised it have been taken 
from the land’ (1993:4).26 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, countryside 
landholdings remained a powerful signal of wealth and status for the new capitalists, 
and some of the behaviours and practices of the peasants were still viewed as the 
authentic and unsullied voice of the people. Now, however, the peasants were renamed 
‘folk’ and given a different place in the symbolic economy by which society was 
constituted and conceived.27 Under the aristocratic ancien régime, peasants had been 
idealised as gentle—if superstitious and simple—and their customs, tales, and songs 
were understood to embody ‘native wisdom’. However, following, for example, the 
French Revolution of 1789, they were now regarded as embodiments of popular 
sentiment and practice, purveyors of common sense, even carriers of local and national 
character, and most importantly, as symbols of the natural liberty of humankind. As 
long as those who represented the rising commercial sector of urban life could continue 
to imagine returning to the country and adopting country ways, they could ignore the 
negative features of social stratification and enclosure, and of industrialisation and 
imperialism. Related to this shift in perception was the fact that scientific discoveries 
during the Enlightenment (and the Industrial Revolution which followed throughout 
                                                           
26 See also Lunn 1986:483.  
27 This redesignation was related, as Abrahams notes, to the attempt by bourgeois antiquarians to 
improve their status as men of letters. The field of ‘folkloristics’ was inaugurated as a result 
(1993:9). 
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Europe), had also led to the emergence of new social classes, particularly that of an 
urbanised bourgeoisie and working class. It appears most likely, therefore, that a class 
struggle was involved, especially when the attitudes to the countryside during the 
previous century are compared to those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Under conditions that called for revitalisation, the countryside was available to provide 
a perspective from which to recognise and expunge the contaminations of over-
civilisation. Furthermore, the romantics who advocated this view, in seeking out and 
nurturing the indigenous folk traditions of the countryside, actively formulated a 
challenge to the rationalist perspective of modernisation by opposing nature to culture, 
instincts to logic, and the archaic to the novel. 
The rural idealism of the romantic era was allied to the reconceptualisation of 
the past as a site of authentic origin (Abrahams 1993:19), at once more organic, more 
local, and more legitimating of nationalist, regional, and aesthetic agendas than the 
cosmopolitan view of the past. In this view the origin was a non-transcendable point, 
and thus seriously at odds with the Enlightenment view of the past. The past so 
conceived, particularly in Germany, was a very particular vision, one which was 
indebted both to a form of reconceived feudal medievalism and to an assumed 
autochthony, presumed to have enabled a profound connection of people with the land. 
It carried undertones of a past characterised by nobility, chivalry and a presumed 
‘natural’ hierarchy that ensured social harmony.28 Envisioning the past in this way thus 
usefully coincided with the articulation of nationalist discourses, grounded, as they now 
could be, in claims regarding the primordial rootedness of the folk in the land which 
they inhabited. 
This nostalgic imagination of the past was almost entirely fictional—what 
Hobsbawm and Ranger call the ‘invention of tradition’ (1983)29—and resonant initially 
only for the emergent educated bourgeoisie which was then urgently seeking an 
alternative model of history that could reply to the evident failure of the emancipatory 
doctrines of the Enlightenment. The solution to the social instability created by the 
political and cultural revolutions of the eighteenth century was seen to lie in the creation 
of a national cultural identity based on the revival of ancient vernacular traditions and 
                                                           
28 See the quotation from Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa (‘Christendom or Europe, 1799, first 
published in 1826) in Tully 1997:10, fn. 19 which stands as a clear example of this idealisation of 
medieval feudal society.  
29 Hobsbawm, in particular, argues that the ‘invention of traditions’ signals the decline or absence 
of those very traditions: ‘Where the old ways are alive, traditions need be neither revived nor 
invented’ (1983:8). 
  61 
practices, and the hierarchical social structures of feudalism. The emphasis on tradition, 
custom, and community evolved into a specific set of values that were productive of the 
socio-political theories of ethnic organicism which I will examine in the context of 
Völkisch idealism in more detail in Chapter 5. In the next section I will look more closely 
at some of the reasons for the revival of vernacular forms as found more broadly within 
the romantic paradigm. 
(ii) The Rediscovery of Vernacular Traditions: Redeeming the Present 
Confronted by the cosmopolitan assimilation of distinct ethnic entities by dominant 
cultures, (for example, in the context of the military aggression of Napoleonic France), 
the articulation and preservation of unique and authentic national identities required an 
urgent effort to define what was original and distinctive in a given culture’s history, 
practices, and cultural forms. As Anthony D. Smith rightly notes, the imagination of the 
past as a kind of ‘golden age’ became a standard ‘against which to measure the alleged 
failings of the present generation and contemporary community’ (1996:450). 
Philologists, historians, and folklorists began to search the documentary and material 
records of indigenous peasant communities in order to reconstruct a picture of native 
life in earlier times, from which the present-day community could derive a sense of 
continuity and, most importantly, dignity. In doing so they drew up the boundaries of a 
community on the basis of shared codes, often a vernacular language, or body of stories, 
to produce a strong sense of cultural identity and difference. Orvar Löfgren, describing 
the construction of national identities, outlines an inventory of the common building 
blocks of nationhood, particularly as they were formulated in the late eighteenth 
century: 
The experiences and strategies of creating national languages, heritages and 
symbolic estates, etc., are circulated among intellectual activists in different corners 
of the world and the eventual result is a kind of check-list: every nation should have 
not only a common language, a common past and destiny, but also a national folk 
culture, a national character or mentality, national values, perhaps even some 
national tastes and a national landscape…a gallery of national myths and heroes 
(and villains), a set of symbols, including flag and anthem, sacred texts and images, 
etc. 
(1989:8–9) 
Such inventorisation served to define the differences between nations in terms of their 
variegated indigenous cultural productions, but, paradoxically, their legitimacy relied 
on fulfilment of homogenous criteria. I will return in Chapter 4 to examine the scholarly 
literature on nationalism; here it should be noted that Löfgren is advocating a model of 
‘cultural nationalism’, very different from the view that sees nations as ‘civic’ formations 
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where the political state grants membership in the nation through the extension of rights 
and duties to its citizens. 
The preoccupation, in the romantic paradigm, with indigenous traditions, myths, 
and cultural forms was thus a product of the view that language and literature were key 
resources for the (re)construction of distinct and authentic national identities. Ancient 
literature, folklore, myths, and customs were looked to as the basis for cultural unity in 
the present and for the realisation of political unity in the future. New traditions were 
thus effectively invented by intellectuals and scholars, who, by consolidating and 
developing those already extant traditions which emphasised community, morality, and 
hierarchy, presented a chiliastic view of the past that was positive and unifying but 
essentially imaginative. Their aims during the romantic period, particularly those of 
folklorists and antiquarians,30 are well summarised by Hobsbawm’s three categories of 
‘systems of social management’ wherein traditions are invented in order to ‘establish 
continuity with a suitable historic past’ (1983:1–14): 
(a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, 
real or artificial communities, (b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, 
status or relations of authority, and (c) those whose main purpose was socialization, 
the inculcation of beliefs, values systems and conventions of behaviour. 
(1983:9) 
Myths in particular, in this context, offered a repertoire of imaginative vocabularies that 
contained all the necessary ingredients for illuminating authentic national character, 
offering both examples of heroic behaviour and concrete visions of an edifying and 
more glorious past that were retrieved and retold with the didactic purpose of 
promoting national cohesion.31  
Many of the nationalist mythologies that developed in Europe in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries related modern nations or people to ancient 
tribal origins, whether Celtic, Teutonic, Nordic, Gallic, or Gothic, for example. As 
Lincoln points out, it was in this period that myths were identified with ‘specific, 
ethnically, linguistically defined populations’ and that it thence became common ‘to 
speak of “Greek myths,” “Norse myths,” “Navajo myths,” and the like’, an ‘orientation 
                                                           
30 See Hustvedt 1930:13. 
31 Ironically, the romantic writers and collectors of folklore tended to adapt and rework the 
material they gathered amongst the ‘folk’ for the edification of their educated, urban middle-class 
audiences, and for the satisfaction of their ‘desire to feel more natural and instinctive’ (Lunn 
1986:484) as I will discuss in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, the new romantic populism, in a way similar 
to the rationalist emancipatory agenda, represented a potential counterweight, within the 
European intellectual élite, to courtly definitions of culture, and had, beyond that, democratic 
implications. 
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[that] takes for granted that nations [and] “cultures”…are primordial, bounded, 
unproblematic entities and that myth is the equally primordial voice, essence and 
heritage of the group’ (1999:210).  
It was the Swiss scholar Paul Henri Mallet (1730–1807), a professor of Belles-
Lettres in Copenhagen, who initiated this new interest in vernacular myths and who 
helped to counter the widespread interest in Latin and Greek classical myth. In 1755 he 
published his Introductions à l’histoire du Dannemarc où l’on traite de la religion, des loix des 
moeurs et des usages des anciens Danois,32 followed in the following year by his Monumens 
de la mythologie et de la poésie des Celtes, et particulièrement des anciens Scandinaves.33 It was 
this second book that brought the Nordic mythology of the Eddas to wider European 
attention. Mallet’s work, later expanded and re-edited (1809 and 1847), described Norse 
mythology and cosmogony, and offered a critical commentary on its origins and 
significance (Feldman and Richardson 1972:199–201).  
Mallet considered this ‘northern’ mythology to be central in the development of 
modern Europe because, in his view, the arrival in Europe of the northernmost peoples 
had been a determining factor in the historical formation of its cultures and societies. As 
Robert Richardson notes, for Mallet, ‘to know modern Europe…one needed to study, 
not the Greeks and Romans, but the Northmen, who were the source of European 
liberty and much else besides’ (in Feldman and Richardson 1972:200). Nonetheless, 
Mallet was fairly disparaging of Nordic traditions, suggesting that while the early 
Nordic religion had been in many ways similar to a prototypical form of Christianity or 
the deist vision of natural religion—pure, dignified, imaginative, and humane—and had 
celebrated the brave nobility of warriors and honour amongst men and treated women 
with respect, by the time of the writing of the Eddas it had been corrupted by an 
aggressive and macabre form of religiosity, most evident in the militant barbarism of 
Odin and the wolf Fenrir and in the frequent and bloody apocalyptic reveries of the 
myths’ narrators. This later religion had created a violent mythology that in turn could 
produce only more barbarism. However, as Feldman and Richardson suggest, ‘for all his 
disapproval of Nordic myth, Mallet took great care to present the stories themselves 
completely and colourfully; it was to prove easy for Mallet’s readers to pick up the 
myths and disregard Mallet’s own glum estimate of their potential’ (ibid.). 
                                                           
32 ‘Introduction to the History of Denmark or On the Character of the Religion, [the] Laws, 
Manners and Customs of the Ancient Danes’. 
33 ‘Monuments of the Mythology and the Poetry of the Celts, and in particular the ancient 
Scandinavians’. 
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Mallet’s influence was immediate and widespread as historians, theologians, 
philosophers, mythographers and poets became acquainted with his work. It was 
translated into Danish, German, and English in 1770 (as Northern Antiquities by Bishop 
Thomas Percy [1729–1811]). In Germany it was enthusiastically received by Johann 
Georg Hamann (1730–1788), Herder (who interpreted the Nordic myths—and in fact all 
myths—as popular peoples’ poetry as I will show in the following chapter), and Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), to name only a few. In England, Edward Gibbon 
(1737-1794) frequently cited Mallet in the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (published 
posthumously in 1796) and Bishop Percy’s Five Pieces of Runic Poetry (1763) borrowed 
three of its five texts from Mallet. In France, Voltaire read Mallet, and a good deal of the 
new Nordic material was to be found in the later volumes of the Encyclopédie (c. 1772) 
(Feldman and Richardson 1972:200). It was common in the late eighteenth century to 
consider the Celtic, Gallic, Germanic, and Scandinavian peoples as sharing a common 
ancestry (the word Celt was used to refer to all of the Northern ethnic groups), and it is 
unsurprising that Germans, French, English, and Scandinavians were all interested in 
Mallets’ material and had little difficulty in incorporating it into their individual 
nationalist programs. 
The principal consequence of Mallet’s work was the idea that Northern Europe 
had its own vernacular mythological tradition and therefore need no longer turn to 
Rome or Greece as its inspirational precursors. After the publication of Mallet’s work, 
mythology was considered a serious and legitimate area of scholarly interest, and to 
have a great deal of utility for what were then embryonic nationalist movements (as I 
will show when I examine Jakob Grimm’s Deutsche Mythologie in Chapter 6). The Norse 
myths, in spite of Mallet’s scorn, clearly nourished the popular imagination in that the 
tales could now be considered to be an authentic part of the people’s own local and 
national history and this was, as Feldman and Richardson suggests, primarily because 
of a newly discovered sense of ancient indigeneity (1972:199–201). 
The heroic histories, poetic legacies, and elevated mores of these Northern 
European ancestor peoples were enlisted not just in validation of modern claims to 
national status but also in debates over what the modern nation should be like. Such 
myths of origin provided the foundations for later nationalist historiographies, 
suggesting inspirational narratives that hinged on the conquest and dispossession, 
survival and, most importantly, revival of the original native people. These myths also 
promoted the basic notion of a historically transmitted common identity that 
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historiographies could refashion, whether or not they clung to a predominantly 
racial/ethnic understanding of national identity. Nineteenth-century nationalist 
scholarship thus located the essential strength of modern national cultures in the 
survivals of an aboriginal inheritance, whether linguistic and cultural (as in Germany, 
for example) or legal and constitutional (in England). 
Ancient cultural traditions were thus revalorised as a way of confronting and 
discarding what were seen as the intervening forms that had emerged as a result of 
either Christendom or the Enlightenment. As Abrahams recognises,  
This move to purify [was] complemented and complicated by the need to construct 
a figure who embodies the past in all its glory, a representative figure somehow left 
behind on the landscape in spite of more recent historical forces. Such a figure 
epitomizes the sad feelings that arise from the notion of lost lands and lost 
inheritances intrinsic to acts of displacement. 
(1993:9) 
Within the romantic paradigm in Germany, these ‘representative figures’ were both the 
primordial Volk (‘people’) and the hero Arminius (whose story I will tell in the following 
chapter). Viewed as naturally more cognisant of indigenous articulations of identity, 
these figures were the heroic agents of vernacular traditions, which, if tapped into, could 
provide a means of resistance to the ‘intervening forms’. They also became the bearers of 
national renaissance and served, to ‘generate moods of prophetic expectancy with a 
powerful bearing on contemporary politics’ (Cubitt1998:9); that is, moods which 
endowed nation-building imperatives with a framework in which to imagine the future 
destiny of the unified nation.34 It is here, then, that I move to examine the relationship 
between myth, nation, and identity, to tie context to content. In the following chapters I 
will analyse, within the context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany, the 
specific inscription of myths and mythmaking in a politics of identity that were built 
upon the legitimating function of a vernacular origin. I will be particularly concerned 
with the possibilities that such an origin created for the articulation of German identity 
as a myth in the form of a discourse of differentiation. 
However, before moving on to discuss the antecedents of this discourse, let me 
summarise what I have so far presented regarding the two dominant understandings of 
                                                           
34 There is also a class dimension to the articulation of the heroic folk as custodians of national 
authenticity, and it is here that some correlation with the egalitarian ideals of the Enlightenment 
can be discerned. In many ways the idea of an unsullied plebeian authenticity is a product of the 
intellectual élite; nonetheless, as Bruce King has argued, ‘Nationalism is an urban movement 
which identifies with the rural areas…. Nationalism aims at…rejection of cosmopolitan upper 
classes, intellectuals and others likely to be influenced by foreign ideas’ (1980:42). The élites, in 
singling out the rural masses as having a salvific role, placed themselves, unwittingly, in a 
precarious position. 
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myth that emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and which were 
consolidated in the nineteenth—in particular, regarding the interdependence of theories 
of myth and theories of individuality and identity. As I have shown, the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries saw the revival of intense and escalating interest in myth. This 
revival oscillated between two main attitudes, both of which were characterised by their 
concern with the function of origins as platforms from which to establish and legitimate 
divergent ontological positions. On the one hand, Enlightenment rationalism 
understood myths primarily as a product of erroneous worldviews or as corruptions of 
divinely ordained natural religion through clerical interference. This attitude both 
coincided with and was productive of philosophical speculations regarding the 
atomistic, rational individual as the arbiter of the ‘truth’, and colonial expansionist 
schemes that imposed a distinction between a superior European rationalism and the 
primitive, irrational worldviews of colonised people. Myths, if they were to be given any 
credence at all, were viewed as intentionally invented by the individual as an 
imaginative act, a point of view similar to that of Plato. Furthermore, this attitude 
inscribed a view of the past that made clear its own distance and progress. Myths were 
the residual evidence of a primitive past that had to be discarded. As such, they enabled 
the assertion of an origin that served as a point of departure for the progressive schemes 
of rational emancipation and scientific advancement. It is this viewpoint that 
characterises popular understandings of myth today, and the history of this viewpoint 
has tended to dominate mythologists’ self-understandings of their scholarship, as 
discussed in the Introduction.  
In contrast, the romantic paradigm granted myth a privileged status wherein a 
connection between nature and the subjective individual was believed to be visibly and 
actively preserved and therefore retrievable. In the context of increasing mass 
industrialisation and the material loss of large swathes of the countryside, such a 
recuperative project was deemed by many to be, at the very least, desirable. Against the 
Enlightenment paradigm, which saws myths as a point of departure, the romantics saw 
them as a point of return. The authentic, noble, and natural virtues communicated in 
myths, and believed to have been preserved particularly amongst the folk, appeared to 
offer the emerging European middle classes compellingly wholesome examples of an 
alternative way of life and a means, therefore, of resisting the destructive effects of 
modern civilisation. In the romantic view then, the mythical past was viewed 
nostalgically as an improvement on the present, and functioned as a template for an 
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idealised vision of the future. Within romanticism myths were a product, not of 
individual imaginations, but of the collective efforts of closely-knit communities to 
articulate a sense of themselves as a group, and to preserve their ancient and noble 
traditions. As such, the romantic approach to myth differed from that of rationalism by 
stressing myths’ unconscious, subjective qualities.  
A further important difference was asserted by viewing the production of myth 
as an organic process rather than as deliberately contrived or fabricated. Such an 
attitude lent itself well to emergent nationalist discourses where collections of myths 
were matched to distinct peoples, providing an accessible index of their internal and 
external characteristics. In this way, myths were the carriers of the truth of native 
character and history and an internal embodiment of a kind of national summum bonum: 
uncontrived, original, natural, and authentic. Myths might not be ‘true’ in their details 
but they were certainly to be taken seriously as vehicles and guardians of national 
characteristics and history. Such an understanding of the symbiotic relationship 
between myth and the native collective provided a counterpoint to the Enlightenment 
articulation of individual identity as atomistic. Anticipating Nietzsche’s aphorism that 
‘The Thou is older than the I’ (Das Du ist älter als das Ich) (1993:84) in the romantic 
worldview, the human individual was placed in a complementary and interdependent 
relationship to community and to nature. The individual could only derive a sense of his 
or her authentic nature by resisting the ‘intervening forms’ of the Enlightenment and by 
reasserting a natural connectedness to the land and community as found in vernacular 
narrative traditions. The romantic valorisation of myth thus entailed a consequent 
valorisation—and mythologisation—of national cultures, particularly insofar as myths 
were considered to reveal a providential and divine order as the internal teleology of 
history. This was in contrast to the rationalist emphasis on the human agent’s 
instrumental role in the achievement of progress. In fact, from the eighteenth century 
onwards, the dialectical relationship between providence and progress constituted a 
definitive chiasmus upon which the field of mythology was founded and from which 
theories of myths’ functions and meanings were consequently derived, promoted, and 
contested.  
Romantic mythology was a post-Enlightenment response to rapid social change 
and political upheaval, and it used myths to retreat from the chaotic and overwhelming 
contemporary world into a sentimental, romanticised, and idealised past. One of the 
clearest examples of this tendency is found in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-
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century Germany, where myth theorists, beginning with Johann Gottfried Herder, set 
the stage for the recovery of a myth of the autochthonous, pure German Volk, one that 
was to prove decisive in the struggle to assert a distinct German identity. It is to a 
discussion of this use of myth that I will now turn. 
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C H A P T E R   T W O 
THE QUEST FOR GERMAN IDENTITY: 




In the previous chapter I examined the broad intellectual and ideological contexts in 
which ‘myth’ was reactivated as a category for investigating human development and 
identity and for establishing human autonomy or a basis for national collectivity in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. The aim of the following chapters is to 
build on that contextualisation in order to investigate the content—that is, the meaning, 
status, and function—of myths of origin in the narration and authorisation of identities. 
These chapters are thus concerned with analysing a significant and yet understudied 
‘moment’ of mythmaking and mythology within the romantic paradigm when the status 
of myth was inscribed within the rubric of German identity politics, the result being the 
production of a ‘discourse of differentiation’ that proceeded from a nationalist search for 
origins. I thus consider the role of mythmaking in the reinvented traditionalism of 
German nationalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in particular its 
nostalgic search for origins. In so doing I aim to build on the previous chapter’s survey 
of the romantic ideological paradigm in seeking to relate the emergence of ideas about, 
and uses of, myth within eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany to broader socio-
political and intellectual struggles.  
This chapter is divided into three main sections: the first two plot what 
amounted to a crisis of identity in Germany from the seventeenth century onwards as 
well as its earlier antecedents, in order to establish the specific context in which myths of 
origin for the German nation had a resonance and urgency that led towards an 
increasingly finely-tuned discourse of differentiation. Myth in this context employed 
images of differentiation and served a productive role in the legitimation of identity by 
positing the incommensurability of people groups founded on an increasingly elaborate 
myth of origin. The third section examines the mobilisation of myth—and its connection 
to notions of national identity—in the work of the most influential German mythologist 
of the eighteenth century, Johann Gottfried von Herder. For Herder myths were an 
essential resource for rediscovering the unique traits of any given ethnic group, and his 
demotic theories of the Volk (‘the common people’) as revealed within vernacular 
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folklore were important for the formulation of the German nationalist projects of the 
following centuries.  
I. Origin and Legitimacy: The Search for German Identity 
The historical context and political conditions that framed a new interest in the origin 
and history of the German people were those where the unity of German culture and 
identity was threatened by a variety of interrelated factors, some of which have been 
touched on in the previous chapter. In 1766 the Imperial Privy Councillor Friedrich Carl 
von Moser (1701-1785) asked despairingly, ‘What are the Germans?’ His own bleak 
reply was: 
What we are then, we have been for centuries; that is, a puzzle of a political 
constitution, a prey of our neighbours, an object of their scorn outstanding in the 
history of the world, disunited among ourselves, weak from our divisions, strong 
enough to harm ourselves, powerless to save ourselves, insensitive to the honour of 
our name, indifferent to the glory of our laws, envious of our rulers, distrusting one 
another, inconsistent about principles, coercive about enforcing them, a great but 
also a despised people, a potentially happy but actually a very lamentable people. 
(in Schulze 1991:43) 
The ‘lamentable’ status of the German people was in part the result of internal divisions 
within Germanic-speaking territories, reinforced by the two wars in Silesia (1740–1742 
and 1744–1775) and the Seven Years War (1756–1763) where the imperial hegemony of 
Hapsburg Austria—firmly Catholic—was challenged by the anti-imperial, Protestant 
power in Prussia. The previously impoverished state of Brandenburg-Prussia had been 
transformed by King Frederick II (1712–1786), through a series of reforms, into a 
powerful modern state which contrasted favourably with those later attempted by the 
Austrian and Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II (1741–1790). The Holy Roman Empire, 
which had offered an ostensibly unifying political structure for the multitude of German 
regions, was, by the late-eighteenth century, hopelessly divided (Bendix 1978:379). 
Furthermore, regional divisions within the territories of Germany1 meant that economic 
                                                           
1 ‘Germany’ was not, of course, a fully realised nation state in the sense most commonly 
understood today—after all, German unification was only, at least initially, achieved through the 
efforts of Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) in 1871. I am using the term ‘Germany’ as a matter of 
convenience, to indicate the collection of principalities that identified themselves explicitly as 
Germanic, either in terms of race, or of culture and language. It should be remembered, however, 
that even these means of measuring one’s ‘nationality’ were thoroughly contested and ambiguous 
during this period, and it is one of the tasks of the following chapters to demonstrate the ways in 
which race, culture, and language were being furnished with specific hermeneutic significance as 
the search for German identity gathered momentum. Schulze argues that this search was largely a 
preoccupation of an emergent bourgeoisie, created as a result of the transition between the 
feudalism of ancien regimes and the emancipatory doctrines of the Enlightenment. However, even 
amongst this class any sense of ‘Germanness’ was vague, and this for Schulze is one of the 
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unity was virtually impossible, particularly as each territory imposed its own customs 
restrictions, monetary and measurement systems, and legislative frameworks. As a 
result, Germany was economically backward compared, for example, to France, 
England, and the Netherlands, all of which had relatively stable and unified political 
systems by the end of the eighteenth century. German disunity was further exacerbated 
by ideological tensions between regions, in many ways replicating the tensions between 
Protestant Prussia and Catholic Austria, caused, as Schulze remarks, by ‘the conflict 
between Reformation and Counter Reformation [which] had not been resolved in 
Germany, unlike most of the other European states, but had been petrified by the 
principle of “cuius regio, eius religio” (whose the region, his the religion)’2 (1991:43).  
The insecurity of any politically stable sense of German identity was also 
reinforced on the cultural front by Enlightenment cosmopolitanism which had led to a 
devaluing of national and ethnic traditions, literatures, and beliefs throughout Europe 
and by the promotion of French as a utilitarian lingua franca most suited to the 
application of reasoned thought and ideals of liberty. In addition, as Martin Thom 
argues, one of the discursive vehicles for German inferiority inscribed within 
Enlightenment reckonings was that the Germanic peoples were ‘marked negatively’ as 
the ‘ethnic edge to early cities’ (1995:203); that is, cities were prioritised as sites of 
cosmopolitan civilisation in contrast to a ‘memory’ of the threatening ‘tribal’ 
organisation of the ancient Germans. Here the strong subtext was the recollection of the 
Sack of Rome by the Goths in 410 CE, gloomily viewed by Renaissance humanists and 
Enlightenment philosophes as having inaugurated the Dark Ages.  
Within the context of French ideological imperialism this idea was revived to 
assert a correspondence between the Roman Empire and France—and between Latin 
and French—as ‘bearer[s] of perfectibility’ and further, by reemploying the ancient 
Roman appellation of the Germans as barbarian tribes (Thom 2003:205). Such a parallel 
also recalled the necessity of guarding against the potential degeneration of civilised 
                                                                                                                                                             
explanations for why Germany never succumbed to the revolutionary impetus that transformed 
France: ‘The existing territorial state was seldom questioned by educated people; they felt, 
whether Prussians, Bavarians, Saxon-Goths, [etc.], thoroughly “Teutsch”….[W]hen they referred 
to such concepts as “nation”, “fatherland”, or “patriotism” they could be thinking of any sort of 
vaguely defined Germany as much as of the actual state in which they lived; they could also mean 
both of these at once’ (1991:47). 
2 The principle of cuius region eius religio was juridically established at the Peace of Augsburg in 
1555, extended to include the Calvinists slightly later, and then reasserted at the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. It proved to be a long-lived dictum, informing political and sectarian 
interactions in the German territories until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1803. 
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mores within an expansive (French) empire should it fail to combat outside influences as 
Rome had. The French intellectual Antoine de Rivarol (1753–1801) could thus write, 
‘Greece gave its laws to the barbarians who surrounded it; and Italy, which failed to 
follow its example and to constitute itself as a federal republic, was invaded in turn by 
the Germans, the Spanish and the French’ (in Thom 2003:189). Preserving French 
ideological hegemony—and thus heeding the failure of Rome to guard its empire 
against the barbarians—was seen to depend upon the promotion of the French language 
as a universally superior tool for communication across national boundaries, as it 
simultaneously enshrined Enlightenment values. As Rivarol announced, ‘The time 
would now seem to be ripe to speak of the French world, just as formerly one spoke of 
the Roman world’ (in Thom 1995:188). As a result, even French patois forms were treated 
as perversions of refined, city French, and were confined to rural provinces. German, as 
‘at once too rich and too harsh, marred by its guttural pronunciation and its Gothic 
script’, was deemed by Rivarol to be ‘an unfit vehicle to serve as an instrument of 
universal communication between the peoples’ (in Thom 1995:189).  
The promotion of French in this way and the designation of the German 
language as ‘barbaric’ were certainly felt within Germany. Thom observes, for example, 
that Frederick II had been ‘aggressively francophone’ in his promotion of French 
culture, despite attempts by Herder, the German poet Friedrich Gottfried Klopstock 
(1724—1803), Goethe, and the Duchess Anna Amalia (1739–1807) to promote German as 
the language of the Prussian court at Weimar (Thom 1995:190).3 In 1786 the French 
ambassador to the Prussian court, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau (1749–
1791), asked the King why he had become a German Caesar but never a German 
Augustus, and Frederick replied: ‘But what more could I have done for German culture 
than I did do, by having nothing to do with it?’ (in Schulze 1991:45).  
The favour shown to French by the King contributed to the belief amongst the 
population in Germany that their own language, ‘then lacking a classical literature, was 
inferior to French’ (Thom 1995:188).4 Moreover, in an effort to implement the egalitarian 
vision of the Enlightenment, in 1774 Frederick II reformed the German political system, 
ostensibly empowering individuals through education and the centralisation of power 
away from local rulers, but in reality preserving the monarchical system that was then 
threatened by the spread of republicanism. This led, as Carol Tully suggests, to ‘a 
                                                           
3 See also Schulze 1991:44 
4 This was not just a problem for Germans. See Thom 1995:187–201. 
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fundamental weakening of the essentially group-based feudalistic society which had 
existed since the Middle Ages’ (1997:3). However, although many German (and other) 
intellectuals had been initially enthusiastic towards the fraternal and egalitarian ideals 
of the French Revolution, the Reign of Terror (1793–1794) that followed quickly 
disillusioned them; the original allure of the Enlightenment doctrine of individualism 
was now replaced by an acknowledgement of the horrifying consequences of jettisoning 
old values and authorities.5  
In addition, however, to the immediate context of German social fragmentation 
and French ideological, political, and military imperialism, the status and identity of the 
German people had long been a source of debate and controversy, particularly when 
compared, as it frequently was, to those European societies that could more firmly 
locate their cultural pedigree in classical Greece and Rome.6 To understand better what 
amounted to a German identity crisis, therefore, I need to turn to a much earlier time. 
II. The Ancient Origins of German Identity: Tacitus and the Germania 
The story is a complex one, and begins with the discovery of two Latin texts, both 
written by the Roman historian Tacitus (c. 54–117 CE). The first was his ethnography of 
the German people, De Origine et Situ Germanorum (‘On the Origin and Geography of 
Germany’; c. 98 CE), more commonly known as the Germania (henceforth Tac. Ger) and 
written during the second consulship of the Emperor Trajan. The second was his 
account, written approximately twenty years later, of the defeat of three Roman legions 
in 9 CE by the Germanic prince of the Cherusci tribe, Arminius, which was narrated in 
the first three books of the Annals (henceforth Tac. Ann.).7 Both texts became the 
founding documents of German nationalism from the Middle Ages onwards.  
After the fall of the Roman Empire the Germania had been lost from view until 
its recovery c. 1456. Poggio Bracciolini, a Renaissance scholar with Florentine 
connections, was obsessed with finding the lost works of classical antiquity and he had 
learned of the existence of a number of minor writings by Tacitus held by the ancient 
imperial Benedictine monastery in Hersfeld (situated in the province of Hesse-Nassau, 
                                                           
5 Carol Tully (1997:4) suggests that it was disillusionment with the French Enlightenment that led 
to the rejection of Enlightenment certainties found, for example, in the reactionary work of 
Edmund Burke (1729–97), Louis de Bonald (1754–1840), and Joseph de Maistre (1754–1821). 
6 See James 1989:19–30 for a discussion of the continuing idealisation of ancient Greek culture 
amongst some German intellectuals, particularly Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), in the 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. See also Harold 1989:19–20. 
7 The Annals as a whole provides an account of the history of Rome from the death of Augustus in 
14 CE to the end of the rule of the Emperor Domitian in 96 CE. 
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Prussia). In 1427, he attempted unsuccessfully, along with a number of other competing 
manuscript hunters, to persuade the monks in Hersfeld to sell them to him. Some years 
later, in 1451, Enoch of Ascoli (c. 1400–1457) was commissioned by Pope Nicholas V 
(1397–1455) to acquire the manuscripts. His first attempt was also unsuccessful but a 
return trip to Hersfeld in 1456 saw him in possession of the manuscripts, the rumour 
being that he had acquired them through devious means. He returned to Italy with the 
Agricola, the Germania, and the Dialogus de Oratoribus, to find that Nicholas V had died 
and, when Enoch himself died in the following year, the manuscripts passed into the 
custody of Stefano de Nardini of Ancona (n.d.). Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (1405–1464), 
who was later to become Pope Pius II, purchased them from Nardini and it was through 
him that the Germania first came to the attention of the German people. (See Schellhase 
1976—especially Chapters 2 and 3—and Mendell 1935 for a fuller account of the 
recovery of the manuscripts.) 
The Germania must have seemed to Piccolomini to be a timely acquisition 
indeed. Martin Mair, the Chancellor to the Archbishop of Mainz (n.d.), had written a 
strident letter to Piccolomini in 1457, detailing German grievances against the papacy. 
These consisted of the ‘constant stream of taxes, offerings, fees and annates’ that were 
demanded of Germany by the Holy See (Thoms 1995:215; Holborn 1935:5–6), as well as 
the ruthless simony of papal benefices, a decline in the quality of priests and bishops 
(who were accused of acting like secular lords rather than servants of the Church), the 
widespread abuse of indulgences, and the summary transfer of legal cases beyond their 
proper German courts to Rome (thus bypassing the normal judiciary proceedings of the 
Holy Roman Empire). Piccolomini was well positioned to reply to these complaints, 
familiar as he was with early German history, and due to his earlier involvement in 
disputes between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy (Thoms 1995:214–215). In his 
response to Mair (De Ritu, Situ, Moribus et Condicione Germaniae Descriptio; 1458), 
Piccolomini drew heavily—but selectively—on Germania XVI–XXVI to argue that, 
according to Tacitus, the German tribes had been a primitive, uncultured, and barbaric 
people. He thus unfavourably compared the condition of the Germans as described by 
Tacitus, to the prosperous state of fifteenth-century Germany’s cities, arguing that the 
Germans demonstrably owed their prosperity to the ecclesiastical interventions of Rome 
(Thoms 1995:215).  
What Piccolomini could not have anticipated was the German response to these 
excerpts of the Germania. Despite Piccolomini’s forceful refutation of German autonomy, 
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resistance to the Papacy increased8 and the Germania subsequently became more widely 
known.9 It became the first of Tacitus’ works to be printed (Schama 2004:77). The 
Germania taken as a whole painted a more complimentary picture of the ancient 
Germans than Piccolomini’s selective reading would have it. For example, despite his 
criticisms of the German tribes’ crude agricultural practices, disordered settlements, and 
brawling and drunkenness (Chapters XXI to XXIII), Tacitus also praised their bravery, 
generous hospitality, physical strength, social institutions, and lack of interest in money 
or precious metals. It was two of Tacitus’ observations in particular, however, found in 
Chapters II and IV, that fuelled what Thom refers to as ‘the cult of primitive Germanic 
virtue’ (1995:214). Chapter II begins: ‘As to the Germans themselves, I think it probable 
that they are indigenous and that very little foreign blood has been introduced either by 
invasions or by friendly dealings with neighbouring peoples’ (Tac. Ger. II.1). Tacitus 
continues this theme in Chapter VI when he states that  
For myself, I accept the view that the peoples of Germany have never contaminated 
themselves by intermarriage with foreigners but remain of pure blood, distinct and 
unlike any other nation. One result of this is that their physical characteristics, in so 
far as one can generalize about such a large population, are always the same: fierce-
looking blue eyes, reddish hair, and big frames—which, however, can exert strength 
only by means of violent effort. 
(Tac. Ger. IV.1–2) 
It was primarily on the basis of these two chapters that the Germania was hailed as 
evidence for the ancient autochthony, as well as the primitive nobility, of the German 
people, a claim that was to reverberate with sinister effect in the twentieth century.  
The first three books of the Annals narrate the attempt by the Roman emperors 
Augustus (c. 27 BCE–14 CE) and Tiberias (14–37 CE) to subdue the German tribes. Tacitus 
                                                           
8 Martin Luther’s (1483–1546) polemic against papal abuses and the sale of ‘indulgences’ by 
church officials (the Ninety-Five Theses nailed to the door of the Schlosskirche in Wittenberg, 
1517) stands as an exemplar of a nascent German resistance to the hegemony of the Roman 
papacy during this period and indicates that Mair’s earlier complaints still rankled with the 
Germans over half a century later. Although Luther’s intervention was couched in terms that 
seemed to argue for a return to the basic principles of the gospel that had been corrupted by 
ecclesiastical excesses, it was also arguably an attempt to assert the superiority and nobility of 
indigenous German values. He contrasted, for example, the papacy (and the pope, whom he 
equated with the Anti-Christ) with the German nation ‘the constancy, loyalty and noble nature of 
which is praised by all historians’ (in Poliakov 1974:82–83), a statement which seems to be an 
oblique reference to the Germania. Martin Luther is also believed to have been the first to change 
the hero Arminius’ name, whose exploits against the Romans I will review shortly, into the 
German name Hermann (the name ‘Arminius’ is a Latinised variant of the German name Armin 
or Hermann which is roughly equivalent to ‘warrior’ or ‘soldier’). See Benario 2004:87; Schellhase 
1976:47; Schama 2004:95.  
9 Stefano de Nardini had kept a version of the Germania copied in his own hand and arranged, in 
1470, for the Germania to be published in Venice. Three years later it was published in Nuremberg, 
and the first (German) vernacular translation was published in Leipzig in 1496.  
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takes up the tale where the Roman historian Velleius Paterculus (c. 19 BCE–30 CE)10 left 
off—the spectacular defeat at the Teutoburger Wald11 in 9 CE of the Roman governor of 
Germania, Publius Quintilius Varus (n.d), by the Cheruscan prince Arminius (c.18 BCE–
21 CE)—and describes the eventually successful attempt by Germanicus, the grandson of 
Augustus and the nephew of Tiberius, to restore the honour of Rome by defeating the 
Cheruscans. In order to contextualise Tacitus’ account, it is necessary briefly to review 
Paterculus’ chronicle of the Roman defeat.  
By 9 CE the Romans had built a series of fortifications on the Danube, the Rhine, 
the Elbe, and the Weser. Tiberius Nero (the successor to Augustus) had twice attempted 
to gain control of the interior of Germania (Vell. Pat. ii.105–109) and on the Emperor 
Augustus’ instructions had appointed Quintilius Varus governor of the dominion, 
providing him with three legions in order to complete the acquisition of the territory 
and transform it into a Roman province. However, according to Paterculus, Varus was 
ill-suited to the task: 
Varus Quintilius, descended from a famous rather than a high-born family, was a 
man of mild character and of a quiet disposition, somewhat slow in mind as he was 
in body, and more accustomed to the leisure of the camp than to actual service in 
war. That he was no despiser of money is demonstrated by his governorship of 
Syria: he entered the rich province a poor man, but left it a rich man and the 
province poor. When placed in charge of the army in Germany, he entertained the 
notion that the Germans were a people who were men only in limbs and voice, and 
that they, who could not be subdued by the sword, could be soothed by the law. 
With this purpose in mind he entered the heart of Germany as though he were 
going among a people enjoying the blessings of peace, and sitting on his tribunal he 
wasted the time of a summer campaign in holding court and observing the proper 
details of legal procedure.  
But the Germans, who with their great ferocity combine great craft, to an extent 
scarcely credible to one who has had no experience with them, and are a race to 
lying born, by trumping up a series of fictitious lawsuits, now provoking one 
another to disputes, and now expressing their gratitude that Roman justice was 
settling these disputes, that their own barbarous nature was being softened down 
by this new and hitherto unknown method, and that quarrels which were usually 
settled by arms were now being ended by law, brought Quintilius to such a 
complete degree of negligence, that he came to look upon himself as a city praetor 
                                                           
10 Velleius Paterculus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, Book II, Chpts. 117–125, henceforth cited as Vell. 
Pat.  
11 The Teutoburger Wald is located to the north of the central European uplands, extending 
eastward toward the Weser river, southward from the town of Osnabrück and southeastwards to 
Paderborn (Schama 2004:88). Pliny the Elder (23–79 CE) wrote what was widely considered to be 
the definitive account of the conflict in the Teutoburger Wald (the Bella Germaniae) although it is 
no longer extant (ibid.), and it is likely that this work was a major source for Tacitus (Gudeman 
1900:100–105). A very brief account of the Roman defeat at the hands of Arminius is also found in 
Caius Suetonius Tranquillus’ De Vita Caesarum, Chpts. XVII and XXV (see bibliographic entry 
under Suetonius—the Loeb Classical Library titles his work Suetonius).  
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administering justice in the forum, and not a general in command of an army in the 
heart of Germany. 
(Vell. Pat. XI.117.2–118.1) 
Varus’ practice of levying excessive taxes on the German tribes soon proved intolerable 
and Arminius, now chief of the Cheruscans, persuaded the chiefs of other Germanic 
tribes to join with him in revolt. Paterculus states that although Varus was warned of the 
plot he refused to take any action against the conspirators but ‘insisted upon judging the 
apparent friendship of the Germans toward him by the standard of his merit’ (Vell. Pat. 
II.118.4). 
Arminius, both Paterculus and Tacitus tell us, was trained as a military 
commander by the Romans, achieving the rank of equestrian, and from approximately 4 
CE onwards he commanded a Cheruscan detachment of Roman auxiliary forces in 
Germany (Vell. Pat. II.118.2; Tac. Ann. II.10). Having gained the support of his fellow 
chiefs, Arminius and his army lured Varus and the Roman troops (comprising in total 
approximately 25-30,000 men) to the Teutoburger Wald where they launched a ferocious 
attack, almost totally annihilating the Romans. Varus, certain of defeat, fell on his sword; 
his head was sent to Caesar Augustus in Rome (Vell. Pat. II.118). The news of the defeat 
threw Rome into consternation (Sue. Aug. XXIII). 
When Tacitus resumes the tale, it is 14 CE and Germanicus has been given 
command of the legions stationed in Germania. By this time, on the strength of his 
victory, Arminius’ forces have increased in number and his army is, if anything, an even 
more formidable force than that faced by Varus. Germanicus is ordered to restore the 
honour of Rome by defeating Arminius and sets about the task with 80,000 troops at his 
disposal. Tacitus portrays Germanicus as consumed with avenging Varus’ ghost and 
honouring the fallen soldiers with a proper burial, almost, as Schama suggests, ‘to the 
point of vicariously reliving the trauma’ (2004:89). After a series of disastrous encounters 
with the Germans that seem to augur a repeat of Varus’ debacle (Tac. Ann. I.162–169), 
Germanicus finally subdues Rome’s enemies, but is then summoned back to Rome by a 
jealous Tiberias before the Roman position can be consolidated. Arminius survives, only 
to be betrayed and killed by his kinsmen in 19 CE (Tac. Ann. II.88). At the end of the 
second book of the Annals, in an obituary of Arminius, Tacitus hails him, claiming that, 
‘Assuredly he was the deliverer of Germany, one too who had defied Rome, not in her 
early rise, as other kings and generals, but in the height of her empire's glory, had 
fought, indeed, indecisive battles, yet in war remained unconquered (Ann. II.88). 
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The efficacy of the Germania’s and Annals’ appearance for cultivating German 
patriotism cannot be exaggerated. As a form of proto-nationalism began to emerge in 
fifteenth-century Germany Arminius was recovered as the hero of Germany. For the 
German humanists of the time, the victories of Arminius were a powerful symbol of a 
divinely ordained German autonomy particularly against a scene in which a 
condescending Roman Papacy continued to assert its cultural and historical superiority. 
In 1471, a year after the Germania was first published in Venice, Pope Paul’s legate, 
Giovannantonia Campano (1429–1477), spent several months in Regensburg as 
representative of the Holy See to the Imperial Diet. Campano was trying to win the 
support of German cities and princes, and, in particular, the Holy Roman Emperor 
Frederick III, to undertake a crusade against the Turks who had conquered 
Constantinople in 1453. Campano, drawing from Tacitus, flattered his hosts by 
eulogising the ancient Germans’ military valour and nobility. However, his personal 
view of the Germans was unfortunately—for the Papal cause at any rate—revealed in 
private letters to friends in which he derided the Germans, their unproductive land, 
inclement climate, rough speech, simple way of life, and intellectual barbarism, drawing 
unfavourable contrasts with Rome. The letters were circulated widely shortly after they 
were written (Spitz 1957:94) and published in 1495 as Opera Omnia (Rowlands 1994:318, 
n. 25). Not only did the letters drastically dampen German support for efforts against 
the Turks, they generated increasing patriotic fervour and provoked indignant 
responses from many learned Germans, not least that of the poet laureate, scholar, and 
orator Conrad Celtis (1459–1508). As Schama suggests, Celtis was responsible ‘more 
than any other Renaissance humanist…for reclaiming the Germania for the Germans’ 
and he ‘played a decisive role in pushing Germany away from the domination of papal 
Rome’ (2004:92; 93).12  
In an oration delivered in 1492 at the University of Ingolstadt, where he had 
been appointed a regular professor of the humanities, Celtis sought to inspire in his 
German audience an awareness of their renown in antiquity and purportedly natural 
nobility. Eight years later, when he had moved to Vienna, he presented the first series of 
lectures on the Germania urging his countrymen to  
assume, O men of Germany, that ancient spirit of yours with which you so often 
confounded and terrified the Romans and turn your eyes to the frontiers of 
Germany; collect her torn and broken territories. Let us be ashamed…I say, to have 
placed upon our nation the yoke of slavery....O free and powerful people, O noble 
                                                           
12 See also Spitz 1957:93–105; Borchardt 1971:106–109; Schellhase 1976:35–40; Benario 2004:84–85. 
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and valiant race....To such an extent are we corrupted by Italian sensuality and by 
fierce cruelty in extracting filthy lucre that it would have been far more holy and 
reverent for us to practice that rude and rustic life of old, living within the bounds 
of self-control, than to have imported the paraphernalia of sensuality and greed 
which are never sated, and to have adopted foreign customs. 
(in Forster 1948:47, 53) 
Celtis’ reliance on Tacitus is unambiguous, both in his allusion to Arminius’ victory over 
the Roman legions and in his evocation of the wholesome and simple way of life in 
ancient Germany.  
In 1515 Tacitus’ Annales I–VI were published and parallels were quickly drawn 
between the ancient enmity of Rome and Germany, and the current resistance by the 
Holy Roman Empire against papal dominance, a highlight of which was Martin Luther’s 
ninety-five theses. The literary work which established Arminius as a German hero 
within sixteenth-century Germany was Ulrich von Hutten’s Arminius: Dialogus 
Huttenicus quo hom patriae amantissimus patriae laudem celebravit, written in 1519–1520 and 
published posthumously in 1538.13 Hutten (1481–1523), who was an indignant opponent 
of the papacy and champion of Luther’s Reformation and German patriotism, had spent 
some time in Italy in 1515 where he became acquainted with Tacitus’ Annales. His 
Arminius was motivated by the desire to win political liberty and independence from 
Rome. In 1517 he was made poet laureate by the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I 
(1459–1519). Arminius, his best known work, is in the collection Gesprachsbüchlein (1521). 
The figure of Arminius, as ‘Hermann der Cherusca’, was resurrected at the height of 
nineteenth-century German romantic nationalism (along with a celebration of Hutten as 
the ‘father’ of German patriotism) as I will show in Chapter 6. 
The Germania served, as Lincoln suggests, to ‘[break] the Mediterranean 
monopoly on antiquity, giving Germans…their first taste of the prestige derived from a 
deep and noble past’ (1999:48). Moreover, the Germania was employed to render credible 
a belief in the unbroken continuity of the German people from a singular point of origin, 
an idea that was skilfully exploited by German humanists from the Renaissance 
onwards to oppose first Roman, and then French hegemony (see Reynolds 1955:29–37).14 
The rise of German identity politics from the fifteenth century onwards—indebted to the 
discovery of a credible German hero and autochthonous roots—and the emergence of an 
                                                           
13 The first German translation did not appear until 1815. 
14 See Schellhase 1976:31–65 for a detailed survey of the popularity of the Germania amongst 
German patriots—particularly Conrad Celtis—in the centuries that followed. See also Thom 
1995:215–216.  
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ideal German type set the stage for the later romantic theorisation—or exploitation—of 
the content and aesthetic contours of ‘Germanness’.  
An echo of this burgeoning interest in German origins was also provided by the 
Ossianic poetry of James Macpherson (1736–1796), which, in addition to the data 
provided by Tacitus, helped to enable German writers from the late seventeenth century 
onwards to theorise the noble character of Germanic ancestry gleaned from vernacular 
folklore.15 Macpherson’s Ossian had reached the intellectuals of eighteenth-century 
Germany, and in particular Herder, whom Schama (2004:102) aptly considers to be the 
heir of Celtis. Herder was a major influence on the Sturm und Drang (‘Storm and Stress’) 
literary movement16 which preceded German romanticism, and I will explore his 
mythology and theories of organic human development in the next section. Herder had 
first become acquainted with the Ossian poems in 1769 when he wrote a review of 
Michael Denis’ translation of the poems into German (Die Gedichte Ossians eines alten 
                                                           
15 Macpherson, a Scottish poet and teacher, born in the central Highlands of Scotland, compiled a 
considerable collection of Gaelic poetry in the aftermath of the defeat of the Scottish Jacobites at 
Culloden in 1746. The impact of the defeat and the imposition of English on the vernacular 
traditions of the Highlands was devastating as not only was use of the indigenous Gaelic 
language discouraged, but the customs and storytelling traditions were effectively wiped out, 
serving to underscore the political disenfranchisement of the population. In 1760 Macpherson 
published Fragments of Ancient Poetry, Collected in the Highlands of Scotland, and translated from the 
Galic or Erse Language which purported to be a translation of the poetry of an ancient Scottish blind 
bard called Ossian. The publication of the poems was an immediate sensation as their depictions 
of ancient noble warriors and the Highlands’ humane, civilised society provided a means with 
which to reply to the charge of ‘savagery’ with which the English regularly taunted the Scottish 
people. See Dwyer 1991:169. Unfortunately for Macpherson, however, the provenance of the 
poems was soon challenged and he quickly found himself embroiled in a controversy regarding 
their authenticity.  
16 The Sturm und Drang movement which took its name from F. M. von Klinger’s play about the 
American Revolution, Wirrwarr; oder, Sturm und Drang (1776), included Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe (1749–1832) and Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805). It generated many of the central ideas 
of German romanticism and was characterised by its emphasis on the unease of the individual in 
contemporary society, particularly in view of the upheavals wrought by the Industrial, American, 
and French Revolutions. Its most distinctive feature was a belief in the original unity of humanity, 
one that had been discarded by Enlightenment’s bifurcation of human experience into the 
oppositional categories of reason and emotion, humanity and nature. The Sturm und Drang 
thinkers (Sturmer) idealised the integral unity of humans—particularly their ‘spiritual’ natures—
with the natural world, suggesting that it constituted a prerequisite for human spiritual self-
expression as the core component of authentic being. Moreover, as Whitton suggests, ‘it was 
language and the cultural creations generated by human linguistic activity that were identified as 
the essential medium through which this creative, expressive unity achieved its actualisation. In 
the natural creations of human language, the Sturmer believed, one could discern the aesthetic 
expression of the harmonious community of people with the greater spiritual whole which 
constituted their world’ (1988:159). It was during the Sturm und Drang period in Germany that 
calls for the revival of a national identity became a serious matter for intellectual consideration. 
While it was to be many years before these calls were actualised, many of the writers of the 
movement, Herder included, worked hard to ensure the revival of a truly authentic German 
tradition. See Pascal 1967 and Taylor 1975:Ch. 1. 
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Celtischen Dichters, aus dem Englischen übersetzt von M Denis aus der G. J. [‘The Poems of 
the old Celtic poet Ossian, from the English Language, translated by M. Denis’], 
1768/9).17 Seeing Ossian as a symbol of authentic native expression, opposed to the 
cosmopolitan literature of neo-classicism, he wrote Auszug aus einem Briefwechsel über 
Ossian und die Lieder alter Völker (‘Extract from a Correspondence about Ossian and the 
Songs of Ancient Peoples’) in 1773, suggesting that the lyrical expression of the Ossian 
poems was characteristic of all peoples whose traditions were hermetically contained. 
For Herder, accepting that Macpherson was sincere, Ossian’s poems were ‘songs of the 
people, songs of an uncultivated, sense-perceptive people’ (in Clark 1955:147), and he 
believed that the survival of the Ossian fragments held out hope for a similar recovery 
of German traditions which were being lost through the imposition of French formalist 
literary conventions. Macpherson’s work—or at least, the Ossianic corpus—was, 
therefore, in Herder’s eyes, an especially useful model for the reconstruction of 
Germanic traditions and identity. It is in the context of the retrieval of German origins 
through Tacitus, as well as the latter threat posed to the autonomy of the German 
culture by French ideological imperialism, that Herder’s interest in Macpherson’s 
Ossian as a prototype of the nobility of tribal origins is understandable. It also helps to 
make sense of the valorisation of the German Volk found in his organicist theories of 
history, to which I will now turn. 
III. Herder’s Organicism and the Importance of the Volk 
Herder was born in East Prussia in 1744. He studied philosophy at the University of 
Königsberg under Immanuel Kant and the ‘irrationalist’ philosopher Johann Georg 
Hamann (1730–1788). He soon became an established philosopher in his own right. In 
1774 he published his first essay in the philosophy of history, ‘Auch eine Philosophie 
der Geschicte zur Bildung der Menscheit’ (‘Yet Another Philosophy of History for the 
Formation of Humanity’), which was followed by Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie (‘On 
the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry’, 1782–3), and his major work Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschicte der Menschheit (‘Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity’, 1784–91), 
amongst numerous other writings. It was in the Ideen that Herder most comprehensively 
developed his philosophy of social organicism and elaborated a theory of history as the 
differentiated development of discrete Volk.18 His main aim in doing so was to critique 
                                                           
17 See Gaskill 2001:212–213. 
18 I will define what I mean by the terms ‘social organicism’ and ‘Volk’ shortly. 
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the basic assumptions of the Enlightenment conception of history and human nature. As 
Brian Whitton notes, Herder’s hostility towards Enlightenment rationalism and 
cosmopolitanism was directed at its tendency to abstract history and ethnic identities 
‘from their connection with the contingent elements of human historical, linguistic, and 
cultural practices’ (1988:150; see also Herder 1969:197).  
Herder’s problem with expansive cosmopolitanism was that it threatened to 
erase unique and valuable differences between cultures under a slogan of universalism 
by imposing what was, instead, a narrow ideological paradigm whose application was 
only appropriate to the distinct context of European society in the eighteenth century. In 
the Ideen, Herder took exception to the Enlightenment notion that the eighteenth century 
was the apogee of human civilisation: ‘It would be the most stupid vanity to imagine 
that all the inhabitants of the world must be Europeans to live happily’ (1803, I:393). He 
also warned of the danger inherent in the imposition of generalised ideals like equality 
and liberty, although importantly not fraternity, suggesting that they could be used to 
justify the domination of one culture over others (1969:320). Against the Enlightenment 
view of sociality, Herder developed an organic theory of human evolution organised 
around three core principles which he believed characterised the uniqueness of 
individual Volk which I will now discuss: climate, language, and Nationalbildung (the 
transmission of traditions). 
(i) Climate, Language, and Nationalbildung: The Volk in History 
This section will only deal with the philosophy of organicism as it pertains to Herder’s 
theories of the history of the Volk. By referring to Herder’s thought as organicist I mean 
to indicate that he considered society to be an organic structure, on the model of a 
biological organism, where values and social forms evolved according to natural law 
rather than through deliberate human intervention. Herder’s notion of what constitutes 
the ‘natural’ will be discussed below when I present his theory of Naturordnung. 
Herder’s theories of social organicism owed much to the earlier work of Giambattista 
Vico (1668–1744) as well as that of Charles de Montesquieu (1689–1755). Vico’s 
historicist and Montesquieu’s holistic theories both focused on discrete ethnic 
communities as the foundation of social development and they welcomed the diversity 
of nations.  
Isaiah Berlin identifies three concepts that encapsulate Herder’s organicism, 
summarising them as ‘populism’, ‘expressionism’, and ‘pluralism’ (1976:153). He 
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suggests that they explain both Herder’s organicism and his enduring influence on the 
German intellectuals who followed. For Berlin, Herder’s concept of populism consists of 
a ‘belief in the value of belonging to a group or a culture, which…is not political, and is 
indeed, to some degree, anti-political, different from, and even opposed to, nationalism’ 
(ibid.). Expressionism is the idea that all human activities, especially artistic expression, 
‘express the entire personality of the individual or group, and are intelligible only to the 
degree to which they do so’. Moreover, these expressions are ‘voices speaking’, in that 
they are ‘part of a living process of communication between persons and not 
independently existing entities’ (1976:165). Berlin interprets Herder’s notion of 
expressionism, therefore, as a ‘network of belief and behaviours which binds men to one 
another’19 within that community, a network that is then articulated through ‘common, 
public symbolism’, or language (ibid.). This pronounced individualism may hinder 
intercultural ties, however, and in this sense, Herder’s notion of pluralism posits the 
incommensurability of the values of different cultures and societies (1976:153).  
Herder’s view of history, informed as it was by his organicist orientation, was 
one where its iterative and accumulative quality was emphasised: a community accrues 
its culture and tradition through its interaction with unique geographical, linguistic, and 
historical confluences, a process which is embedded in what he calls the Naturordnung 
(‘natural order’). Herder viewed the development of the Volk within this order as ‘a 
chain of sociability and educational tradition’ (‘eine Kette der Geselligkeit und bildende 
Tradition’; 1841:337), thus emphasising the importance of a cohesion and stability of 
values upon which future generations can build. It is difficult to offer a satisfactory 
English translation of the term Volk as found in Herder’s work. As Lincoln notes, ‘it is a 
term whose full denotative and affective significance is lost in its lame English 
equivalents (e.g., “folk,” “people,” “ethnicity,” or “nation”)’ (1999:53). However, Rudolf 
Große’s inventory of its constituent aspects helps to clarify its range and resonance: 
‘community of people; common ancestry; shared lifestyles; shared ways of thinking; 
common culture; same language’ (in Tully 1997:6, fn. 9). Kenneth Minogue’s definition 
is also helpful: ‘not simply the people of a country, but a metaphysical entity defined 
relationally as that which produces a particular language, art, culture, set of great men, 
religion and collection of customs. All of these things are taken, not as products of 
                                                           
19 While Berlin’s use of the term ‘men’ here is clearly intended, however deplorably, as generic 
noun to indicate humanity, to read it as gendered is not altogether mistaken. As I will show 
shortly, Herder did in fact view a community’s traditions to be passed down the male line. 
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individual men but as manifestations of the spirit of the people, or volksgeist’ (1967:57). 
Ernst Dick provides a more politically-nuanced definition when he states that ‘Volk can 
stand for a number of meanings…the people as a nation (L. populus, natio)…the people 
belonging to a historical subdivision of a nation, or to a tribal society (L. gens, G. Stamm); 
and…the people of the lower classes, the governed class, the uneducated, who, 
depending on the point of view, may be regarded as the common people (L. vulgus) or 
as rabble (L. plebs)’ (1990:18–19). 
Among the influences that affect the organic socialisation of the Volk, Herder 
identified three key factors: climate, or geographical location, language, and 
Nationalbildung.20 The distinctiveness of a community first evolves through its 
interaction with the climate of the regions that it inhabits. This interaction produces, in 
turn, both the customs and physical characteristics of the community: 
As the mineral water derives its component parts, its operative power, and its 
flavour from the soil through which it flows, so the ancient character of peoples 
arose from the family features, the climate, the way of life and education, the early 
reactions and employments, that were peculiar to them. The manners of the fathers 
took deep root and became the internal prototype of the descendants. 
(1993, XIV:84) 
More important than climate for marking the distinctiveness of a community, however, 
is language, which was seen by Herder as the primary expression of reflexive 
consciousness (Whitton 1988:151). In this sense, language is the medium through which 
individuals formulate and articulate their experiences of the external world and so, as 
Lincoln observes, for Herder it both ‘reflect[ed] a Volk’s environs and historic experience 
and structures its thought and social relations’ (1999:53). According to Herder, this 
process of conscious and continuous linguistic development was fundamentally a social 
process and facilitated the inclusion of individuals within a broader linguistic 
community. Isaiah Berlin describes Herder’s promotion of this organic and continuous 
socialisation in terms of ‘belonging’, suggesting that 
The notion of belonging is at the heart of all Herder’s ideas. His doctrine of the 
unity of theory and practice, like that of his populism, is intelligible only in terms of 
it. To belong is not a passive condition, but active co-operation, social labour. 
(1976:195). 
For Herder, then, the function of language was to integrate individuals into the 
community by enabling them to acquire a sense of shared identity and endeavour, an 
                                                           
20 Herder was not the first to note the influence of climate and environment on the development of 
human societies. Jean Bodin (1530-1596) had renewed the medieval theory of climates and had 
given it a pseudo-scientific application to history, and Montesquieu (1689–1755) had also 
developed a conception of the influence of climate upon the state. See Spitz 1955:461. 
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operation that he called Nationalbildung. He saw culture as essentially national and his 
theory of Nationalbildung suggested that it was the mode through which the community 
could labour collectively to articulate—and guard—its unique cultural consciousness 
embodied in its language. In the course of assimilating the language of their community, 
individuals incorporated their cultural heritage, a process that ensured the continuity of 
the community’s history, traditions, and unique worldview. The transmission of 
tradition, for Herder, was through education (bildung) particularly insofar as the 
iterative quality of education lent itself well to the dissemination and preservation of the 
values and ancient practices of a Volk (1803:227). 
Herder’s vision of education was certainly distinct from that of mainstream 
Enlightenment thought which conceived of education as a fundamentally progressive 
tool, enabling individuals to acquire uniform knowledge through the application of 
reason and to discern truth. Tradition was accordingly devalued and subordinated to 
reason as the key to progressive social change. Conversely, Herder felt that change—if it 
was to be beneficial—had to be gradual and implemented with reference to tradition 
and cultural specificity.21 Herder’s view of education as tradition was, in the main, 
geared toward upholding the existing social order as it had been forged over time. 
Jennifer Fox notes the patriarchal subtext to this view of tradition as maintaining the 
social order, suggesting that for Herder, ‘the very essence of tradition is masculine. 
Whereas the maternal province is to provide physical nourishment by the breast, the 
paternal role is to provide spiritual nourishment by instilling tradition’ (1987:567). 
Herder provided a clear example of his differentiation between paternal and maternal 
roles that helps to support Fox’s claim: 
Paternal love…is best displayed by a manly education. The father early inures his 
son to his own mode of life: teaches him his art, awakens in him the sense of fame, 
and in him loves himself, when he shall grow old, or be no more. This feeling is the 
basis of all hereditary honour and virtue: it renders education a public, an external 
work: it has been the instrument of transmitting to posterity all the excellencies and 
prejudices of the human species. 
(1803:216) 
The model of paternal transmission as the most natural and legitimate idiom for the 
preservation of tradition is a common and powerful one, and is demonstrably a 
foundational myth of patriarchy. Along with myths of male parthenogenesis, its 
implications for a feminist politics of identity and philosophy of myth are considered in 
                                                           
21 Herder promoted radical reform of elementary German education and during his tenure in 
Weimar (1776–1803) where he was the minister of education, he revised the school curriculum in 
order to ensure pupils’ immersion in German culture, language, and history (Hayes 1927:732). 
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detail in Chapters 8 and 9. However, here I would note that the model of patrilineal 
dissemination contained in Herder’s notions of Nationalbildung became a central—if 
tacitly assumed—aspect of the German nostalgia for origins and the formulation of 
German models of indigenous identity. 
The patriarchal family unit, for Herder, thus played a crucial role in 
transmitting values and traditions from one generation to the next. The parent, Herder 
argued, is the natural instructor of the child. ‘Each individual is son or daughter….He or 
she receives from the earliest moments of life part of the cultural treasures of the 
ancestral heritage…[which he or she] in turn passes on’ (1969:312–313). Education 
supervised by family, teachers, and friends established a ‘chain of unity and continuity 
in which each link…[receives and transmits] the cultural heritage of the Volk [in a 
process which entails] language and its continuous growth’ (1969:170). Importantly, this 
model of genetic transmission served to enhance the specificity and uniqueness of a 
Volk, untainted as it was assumed to be by outside influences; traditions were literally 
kept ‘in the family’. He explicitly invoked Tacitus’ Germania, urging his fellow Germans 
to read it in order to gain a picture of the original German character: 
Read Tacitus, because there you will find our character; the German tribes who 
themselves have not degenerated through intermixture with others, they are a 
distinct, unadulterated original nation which is the archetype of itself. 
(1877, I:367) 
He further argued that ‘These barbarians are our fathers, their language the source of 
our language, and their unrefined songs the mirror of the ancient German soul 
[reflected] in the simplicity of our character’ (1877, II:246) Thus, Herder’s model of 
transmission was, in effect, a genealogical fiction that aimed to sustain the collectivity of 
the group and, further, contained a strong subtext of racial purity (see Schöpflin 
1997:34).22  
                                                           
22 Herder’s exclusivist model will be discussed in the context of German nationalism and its 
consequent anti-Semitism in Chapter 7, but in the interim some comment is required here 
regarding Herder’s attitude towards Jewish people, particularly in view of the fact that his 
theories of the Volk were later resurrected in the service of German anti-Semitism. Lincoln, who is 
one of the few scholars to draw attention to Herder’s frequent use of anti-Semitic stereotypes, 
argues that for Herder, the Jews in diaspora ‘were a Volk radically detached from their homeland’ 
and as a result posed a threat to the unique collective identity of the Völker in whose lands they 
had settled (1999:56). By way of example, Lincoln cites Herder on the subject of the Jews: ‘God’s 
Volk, to whom Heaven itself once gave their Vaterland, for millennia—indeed, almost since their 
beginning—have been a parasitical plant on the trunks of other nations; a race of crafty brokers 
throughout almost the whole World, who, in spite of all oppression, have nowhere longed for 
their own honour and dwelling, nowhere longed for a Vaterland of their own’ (ibid. [Ideen 3.12.3]). 
It is easy to see how Herder’s organicist theories could lead him to such a view. By exalting the 
uniqueness of each Volk through its primordial connection to the land and its language, it was 
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In spite of Herder’s emphasis on cultural diversity, he situated his account of 
the historical development of the Volk within a broader notion of providential 
Humanität, a divinely sanctioned human essence that was the bedrock of the 
heterogeneous traditions of every community.23 He suggested that, while human 
cultural expression was immensely variegated, ‘within this ever changing husk the 
kernel of human substance remains…the same’ (1969:215). For Herder, each Volk was a 
distinctive entity that held within itself what Whitton calls ‘a unique variation on the 
theme of humanity and a corresponding tendency to develop this variant to its fullest 
extent’ (1988:156). Within Herder’s cultural organicism, then, the exponential 
development of heterogeneous cultural forms was conceived as an infinite, unfolding 
narrative. The historical generation of diversity, from the singular or monogenetic 
ground of Humanität was, ‘God’s epic through all the centuries…a fable with a thousand 
variations full of meaning’ (1969:283). The notion of Humanität, however, should not be 
confused with the universalism of Enlightenment formulations. For Herder, Humanität 
was only visible and intelligible through close attention to cultural difference.  
(ii) Herder on Myth and the Volk 
The carefully balanced tension between the one and the many was reflected in Herder’s 
understanding of the role and place of myths in the development and continuity of the 
Volk. He argued for the need to examine myths in their indigenous context, and called 
for communities to retrieve their own myths in order to nourish their authentic 
communal identity. He opposed the Enlightenment dismissal of myth as superstitious 
and irrational, insisting instead that myths were only comprehensible through an 
empathetic recognition24 of their truth for the people who created and believe in them. 
                                                                                                                                                             
somewhat inevitable that ‘alien’ elements would need to be isolated and that the Jews would be 
represented as an exemplar of a lack of rootedness. This is not to say that Herder was 
unsympathetic to the Jews’ long estrangement from their land. He advocated, after all, that the 
Jewish people should be granted a homeland, a stance which has, ironically, led some to read him 
as philo-Semitic (ibid.). 
23 Berlin suggests that the ‘notoriously vague’ concept of Humanität denotes the ‘harmonious 
development of all immortal souls towards universally valid goals: reason, freedom, toleration, 
mutual love and respect between individuals and societies, as well as physical and spiritual 
health, finer perceptions, dominion over the earth, the harmonious realization of all that God has 
implanted in His noblest work and made in His own image’ (1976:193). Herder’s notion of 
Humanität is clearly indebted to the formulations of the deists, particularly in its invocation of an 
original natural religion in which all ancient people had purportedly participated in the earliest 
stages of their development. 
24 Feldman and Richardson suggest that Herder may have coined the German word Einfühlung or 
‘empathy’ to refer to this way of approaching other people’s myths (1972:226). 
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Thus, as Feldman and Richardson argue, according to Herder, ‘Myth…is never simply 
false, but only relatively so; that is, false to those who have other myths, other world-
views….In short, all myth not only seems alive and true to its believers, but indeed is 
true’ (1972:226). This equivocal view of myth’s veracity strongly foreshadowed the later 
romantic view of myths: rather than being materially true in any simplistic sense, they 
conveyed deeper ‘spiritual’ truths that revealed both the spirit of the Volk and their 
particular expression of the universally inscribed divine will. As Feldman and 
Richardson suggest, Herder was ‘the first really influential thinker to emancipate myth 
from rationalist or Christian context and strictures, opening it to world horizons, the 
dimension of historical time and cultural relativism, and deepening its meaning as a 
profound mode of truth’ (1972:225).  
In the poems of Ossian (and Bishop Percy’s Reliques of Ancient English Poetry, 1765) 
Herder saw great promise for his own quest to recover the ancient German past through 
the recovery of vernacular folklore and myth and to build a sense of German 
community. He wanted, therefore, to stimulate a deeper study of national, social and 
cultural history, of folk songs, ballads, traditional lore, and language, and he reproached 
his more cosmopolitan contemporaries for their neglect of these genres. Of course, the 
problem for Herder was that the Germany of his day could hardly be called a nation at 
all, for all the reasons discussed above. Under these circumstances, Herder’s main 
concern was to discover the sources of a distinctly German literary tradition and 
therefore to nurture a feeling of German unity amongst his compatriots. It was 
necessary, however, for Herder first to gain recognition for the German language as an 
umbrella under which to create a sense of cultural unity. For Herder, a nationality and 
literature without a language of its own was inconceivable and he urged Germans to 
‘know your own language…and develop it for poetry, philosophy, and prose. For then 
you are building the foundation which will hold a building’ (in Ergang 1931:155).25 
For Herder the reasons for the lack of a distinctive German tradition in literature 
were immediately obvious. He placed the blame firmly on the impact of the Renaissance 
and the Enlightenment and the subsequent domination of Latin and French over the 
German language. Further, he deplored the intellectual and stylistic debt of German 
                                                           
25 His near contemporary Justus Möser (1720–1794) held similar views and he too called for a 
literature that was specifically German in its content and form, one that would provide an 
effective challenge to French hegemony. Möser was also instrumental in establishing a movement 
for the purification and development of High German which he thought could rival French and 
which had the added benefit of being the language of the common people. See Ergang 1933:182. 
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writers to French literary traditions, suggesting that Germany had as a result been 
prevented from taking pride in its own culture and history. Herder argued against the 
slavish imitation of non-vernacular idioms by suggesting that it was in fact the 
particular idioms within a language that established its unique ability to express a Volk’s 
own genius and character (1877, XIII:369–370). 
His argument for the use of the German language arguably foreshadowed his 
view that a people’s sense of themselves as a nation was derived from its folklore and it 
was after he had read Percy and the Ossian poems that he was persuaded that the way 
to recover and safeguard Germany’s language and narrative traditions was to follow the 
English and Scottish examples and collect the folksongs among the peasantry.26 Herder 
firmly believed that the German folk tradition was at least the equal of the English and 
Scottish revival and was the means by which Germany could produce a unique and 
definable high literature of its own, one that would, in turn, aid the development of 
national sentiment and a reciprocal sense of belonging to an ancient and heroic Volk 
(1877, IX:528–529). 
Herder’s view of myth and folklore was remarkably radical when, for the 
aristocracy of the time as well as Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth century, the 
idea that a sophisticated literary tradition could be derived from the folklore of the 
lowest orders of society, or from a German vernacular was virtually unthinkable. One of 
the Enlightenment projects was to raise the educational level of the peasants until, 
through the acquisition and application of rational thought, they would be ready to join 
those who had already been ‘liberated’ from ancient myth and superstition. Herder was 
strongly opposed to this idea, believing that the peasants were in no need of 
improvement but rather that their simple lifestyle, customs, and narrative traditions 
were to be emulated. The folk traditions of every native Volk, for Herder, were valuable 
                                                           
26 It is possible that Herder was influenced by Rousseau’s proto-romantic notion of the noble 
savage (le bon sauvage) which Rousseau discussed in his essay ‘Discourse on the Arts and Sciences’ 
(1750) and later elaborated in his Discourse on Equality (1754), although, it is the poet John Dryden 
(1631–1700) who is credited with coining the term in his comedy Marriage A-la-Mode (1672). 
Rousseau contended that the individual was good by nature, a ‘noble savage’ when in the state of 
nature but corrupted by the development of civilisation and society. As Barnard suggests, ‘When 
Rousseau, Herder, or the Romantics invoked nature, they did so in order to oppose the contrived 
and artificial to the authentic and spontaneous. They wished to remind men that natural growth 
could be stunted, human capacities and human development warped, that, in short, ‘progress’ 
could mean decay and alienation’ (1983:233). Herder insisted that the natural simplicity of the 
‘savage’ was a firm foundation for nurturing national sentiment: ‘The savage who loves his wife 
and child with quiet joy and glows with natural ardour for his tribe as for his own life, is in my 
opinion a more real being than that cultivated ghost who is enraptured with the shadow of his 
whole species’ (1877, XIII. 339). 
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in their own terms, without regard to the progress of human civilisation or its 
achievements at any given time.  
For Herder, myth represented both a principle of equality which united all of 
human experience, and a principle of diversity which allowed for unique expression of 
Völkisch experience; although each nation created a distinct literature from its own folk 
heritage, folk poetry was valuable ‘because of its constant and international elements’ 
(Clark 1955:431). Herder thus set about collecting folksongs and narratives from a wide 
range of sources, publishing his Volkslieder (‘Folksongs’, a term he coined in 1771). The 
first volume included not only German folksongs but also examples from Italian, 
Estonian, Lithuanian, Danish, Spanish, Inca, Eskimo, Latin, Greek, and Old Norse. The 
work stands as an instance of Herder’s remarkable insight into the relationship between 
indigenous and universal values.  
In Herder’s work, therefore, it is clear that he considered myths to be a primary 
resource for the collective identity of the Volk, particularly in terms of their absorption 
and transmission, in narrative form, of the effects of climate and language, and their role 
in Nationalbildung.27 His interpretation of the role and status of myth corresponded to his 
theories of social organicism, and in particular to the identity of the Volk within the 
broader frame of Humanität. Myth, for Herder, was an organic historical process and the 
major motifs he employed in his copious reflections on myth reflected this attitude: 
myths demonstrated the original organic unity of all human experience as well as the 
independence of different cultures; they corresponded without mediation to particular 
Volk; they attested to divine ordination in history; and they cemented a Volk’s self-
understanding and traditions. Furthermore, for Herder, myths mobilised and expressed 
the three factors that affected the organic socialisation of the Volk—climate and 
environment, language, and Nationalbildung. As Lincoln suggests, in Herder’s 
understanding, ‘the environment impresses itself directly on the bodies of a Volk, it 
impresses itself on their customs and mores through the medium of myths, which the 
Volk use to reflect on their surroundings and history and to transmit ancestral traditions 
from one generation to another’ (Lincoln 1999:53). As such, myths were the means 
through which a Volk produced, recollected, and ensured the continuity of its distinctive 
identity.  
                                                           
27 Ironically, however, as Poliakov notes, ‘German mythology was only preserved outside 
Germany in Scandinavian sagas or in the writings of Roman historians and the only myths of 
origin preserved by direct transmission are those of the expatriate, more or less de-Germanized, 
Stämme [tribes]—the Goths, Lombards, Burgundians, Angles and Saxons’ (1974:74). 
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Myths, for Herder were the authentic markers of the differences in, and 
incommensurability of national narratives (1841:2). However, Herder, in classic deist 
mode, also maintained that myths serve as a medium through which the common 
origins of humanity—the site of the original creation of Humanität—could be recovered. 
He outlined his recuperative project in Book X of the first volume of the Ideen, further 
elaborating it in the second volume (published in 1785) and concluding that the site of 
origin, the homeland (Urheimat) of humanity was in Central Asia or Tibet (1803:518). 
The notion of an Urheimat accumulated enormous significance in the formulation of 
German identity, particularly as a way of resisting the cosmopolitanism of 
Enlightenment philosophy and of rivalling the asserted Graeco-Roman pedigree of other 
European nations. I will return to Herder’s impact on German nationalism in Chapters 
4–7, but I first want to consider the early genealogy of the idea of the Urheimat in order 
to explain why it gained particular resonance for the German people in the nineteenth 
century, and to explore further why it played such a strong role in their imaginings of 
nation. 
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C H A P T E R   T H R E E 
’LANGUAGES OF PARADISE’: 




I. William Jones and the ‘Discovery’ of Sanskrit  
In a now famous statement to the Asiatic Society of Calcutta in 1786, the linguist and 
colonial administrator Sir William Jones (1746–1794) announced his discovery of the 
lexical and structural affinities between Sanskrit, Latin and Greek which he argued 
suggested a common origin for the language group, along with Gothic and Celtic (1807, 
III:34–35). Three years later, similarly to Herder, he extended his theory to suggest that 
the original homeland of this primordial linguistic community was Central Asia. In 
contrast to Herder, however, Jones’ theory of linguistic affiliations posited Asian origins 
not for all humankind, but for one large and important language family, of which 
German was a part. Nonetheless, and very importantly, for both Herder and Jones, 
common linguistic origins indicated common ethnic unity. Their location of the original 
people in Central Asia was largely influenced by a literal reading of the Biblical 
narrative of Noah, derived from Genesis 8:4 which relates how Noah’s ark came to rest 
on Mount Ararat, believed by biblical scholars of the time to be located in Armenia. 
Jones differed slightly in that he considered that the location for Noah’s story and the 
events of the Tower of Babel which followed the Flood (Genesis 11) were 
described as having happened between the Oxus and Euphrates, the mountains of 
the Caucus and the borders of India, that is within the limits of Iran…it is no longer 
probable only, but absolutely certain, that the whole race of man proceeded from 
Iran, whence they migrated at first in three great colonies; and that those three 
branches grew from a common stock. 
(1792:486–487) 
There is no evidence to suggest that Herder’s and Jones’ theories of origin were 
influenced by each other or that they conferred with each other. For Lincoln, the 
concurrence of their strikingly similar conclusions is explained by their ‘common 
preconceptions based on their reading of the Bible’ (1999:54).1 Thomas Trautmann, who 
                                                           
1 See Lincoln 1999:76–100; 2002, and Bryant 2001:14–18 for a full summary of Jones’ discovery and 
its relationship to common scriptural understandings of the history of races. See also David 1996 
for an analysis of Jones’ Indian scholarship and its relationship to ‘Biblical Orientalism’. S. N. 
Mukherjee 1968 is also helpful for an overview of Jones’ Indological scholarship within the context 
of British colonial rule. 
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prioritises the ethnological character of Jones work against his contributions to 
Orientalist philology, also suggests that Jones’ ‘entire project’ offers a ‘rational defense 
of the Bible out of the materials collected by Orientalist scholarship, more specifically a 
defense of the Mosaic account of human history in its earliest times’ (1999:42; see also 
Bryant 2001:14–18). Herder was similarly committed to the Biblical account and admired 
Hebraic narratives, as his Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie demonstrated. Jones—all the 
while claiming loyalty to methodological disinterestedness and a commitment to the 
scholarly principles of objectivity2—was concerned that his work should not be used as 
a weapon by those who doubted the authenticity of the Biblical account of origins, 
stating that ‘either the first eleven chapters of Genesis…are true, or the whole fabrick of 
our national religion is false, a conclusion which none of us, I trust, would wish to be 
drawn’ (1788:225).3 
                                                           
2 For example, when taking up the challenge to investigate Hindu chronologies that hinted at the 
world’s immense antiquity, all of which were at considerable variance with that formulated by 
Bishop Ussher (1581–1656) who had suggested a creation date of 4004 BCE with Noah’s flood 
occurring in 2349 BCE, Jones stated that his intention was to ‘lay before you a concise history of 
Indian chronology extracted from Sanskrit books, attached to no system, and as much disposed to 
reject Mosaik history, if it be proved erroneous, as to believe it, if it be confirmed by sound reason 
from indubitable evidence’ (1790:111). However, an earlier statement revealed that he regarded 
biblical veracity as unassailable: ‘I…am obliged of course to believe the sanctity of the venerable 
books [of the Bible]’ (1788:225). He concluded his research into Indian chronologies by tracing the 
founding of its civilisation to c. 2000 BCE (1790:145), that is, well within Ussher’s creation date. 
However, as Trautmann notes, this was only achieved by ignoring the many Indian chronologies 
that indicated huge time spans offered by the yuga, kalpa, and manvantara systems (1997:58). The 
impetus to reassert the historicity of the Old Testament chronology was the direct result of 
European colonial expansion and the consequent discovery that many non-European cultures 
possessed genealogical lists and creation accounts that pointed to the vast antiquity of the earth. 
Moreover, the proliferation of ‘hard’ archaeological and geological evidence had joined with the 
scepticism of the Enlightenment iconoclasts to generate a radical reappraisal of biblical veracity in 
matters of chronology and creation. Bryant maintains that issues such as ‘the monogenic descent 
from Adam, the evolution of language from the monolingual descendants of Noah, and the brief 
period that seemed to be allotted to the dispersion of the human race after the Flood became the 
subjects of intense debates’. He further suggests that as the early British scholars in India began to 
unearth Sanskrit texts the origins of the world ‘became the cause of both great anticipation and 
epistemological anxiety’ (2001:14). These concerns are discussed below. 
3 Trautmann suggests, therefore, that one of the main reasons why Jones, and British scholars 
more generally (at least up until the early nineteenth century), were so interested in Sanskrit was 
that it provided independent verification of Biblical narrative, for example, the flood myth as 
related in the Padma Purāa and Bhāgavata Purāa. Jones connected Noah with the sage Manu in 
the story in the Bhāgavata Purāa where Manu is warned by Viu (in his incarnation as a fish) of 
an impending world flood. Manu and seven sages embark on a boat which is fastened to a horn 
on the fish, and they are towed to safety on top of a mountain. When the flood subsides the world 
is created anew. While the parallels between the two narratives are indeed striking, Jones used 
them to affirm the primacy of the Biblical account (1799a:241–2). In other words, Jones saw the 
Bhāgavata Purāa’s account to be derived from the Mosaic account and to be, furthermore, a 
distorted version (recalling the deist view of mythology during the Enlightenment) a fact reflected 
in his belief that in Hindu mythology ‘[h]istorical
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The idea of a common source for all languages—initially considered to be 
Hebrew—which was regularly associated with a common people, was taken for granted 
by most scholars in Europe until well after the Enlightenment. The basic point of 
departure for reflections on the origins of mankind, again owing much to the biblical 
version of history, was the belief that the human races descended from the three sons of 
the Biblical patriarch Noah as narrated in Genesis 9 and 10: Ham, Shem, and Japheth, to 
whom there was occasionally added a fourth brother, Jenithon or Manithon (Poliakov 
1974:7).4 As such it was an account which clearly implied patrilineal descent. This theme 
(that of a posited origin for humanity from a common source), even when stripped of its 
biblical trappings, was to remain thoroughly imprinted in European scholarship until 
well into the twentieth century. The dominant tendency (despite numerous variations), 
from which Jones departed, was to attribute the parentage of the European people to the 
children of Japheth, the Asians to those of Shem, and the Africans to those of Ham. Jones 
was particularly interested in the genealogy of the people of Asia, dividing them into 
five principal ethnic groupings: Indians, Chinese, Tartars, Arabs, and Persians 
(Trautmann 1997:41).5 Jones argued, on the basis of linguistic evidence, that the Persians 
                                                                                                                                                             
perverted into fable by ignorance, imagination, flattery, or stupidity’ (1799a:230). Intriguingly, 
following Jones’ death in 1794, an impressive statue of him was installed in the central vestibule of 
St. Paul’s Cathedral. It depicts him, toga-clad, resting his arm on a book which is titled after his 
translation of the Mānava Dharmaśāstra (Translation of the Institutes of Menu [sic.]). Beneath the 
pedestal is a pivotal scene from the Hindu myth of the churning of the ocean, depicting a 
pantheon of Indian divinities, and showing the retrieval of a rainbow from the ocean. As 
Trautmann remarks, ‘It is all quite astonishing to find this scene from Hindu scriptures, not to 
speak of graven images of Viu and other gods, in a Christian church’ (1997:79–80). While those 
who commissioned the statue surely intended simply to acknowledge Jones’ role in discovering 
proof for the veracity of the Christian scriptures, in that the rainbow is symbolic of God’s promise 
to Noah never again to flood the earth, the result is quite the reverse. The Hindu ‘other’ has 
penetrated the sacred space of the colonising subject, and while it seemingly provides the 
(evidential) platform upon which Europeans could construct their self-sustaining narratives as 
guardians of the ‘truth’, it rather undermines it.  
4 See Genesis 9:19–27; 10:32. Josephus interpreted these injunctions to indicate that the 
descendants of Shem populated ‘Asia to the Indian Ocean’ and that the sons of Japheth advanced 
‘in Asia to the river Tanaïs [the Don] and in Europe to Gadeïra [Cadiz]’ (1998, VI:1–4, 36–43). The 
Church Fathers, who had read Josephus, attributed the peopling of Africa to Ham. Shem, marked 
in Genesis by his privileged link to the eternal Elohim, received Asia. Japheth, whose Hebraic 
name evokes ‘beauty’ as well as ‘openness’, the ‘wide space’ of a legacy capable of ‘dilation’ and 
‘expansion’, was the father of Europe. For the readers of the Septuagint the etymological fiction of 
a ‘Euru-opa’, meaning ‘wide vision’ served to confirm the providential ambition of this continent 
which ‘sees far’ (eurus, ops). See Olender 1994:10. 
5 The potential consequences of Jones’ promotion of this schema are themselves worth reflecting 
on. Lincoln points to some of the problematic undercurrents present in Jones’ racial taxonomy, 
suggesting that ‘the overarching project of [Jones’] “Anniversary Discourses” was to reduce the 
degree to which the Hebrews were privileged above all others….For all that there is something 
liberating, humane, and admirable in Jones’ having championed the peoples of Asia, one also 
perceives troubling aspects to his project, one motive of which was ressentiment of the privilege 
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and the Chinese were probably branches of the Indian race and concluded, therefore, 
that the Indians, Arabs, and Tartars were most likely to be original stock. He then 
identified each of these with one of the sons of Noah: the Indians with Ham, the Arabs 
with Shem, and the Tartars with Japheth.6  
Jones was not the first to suggest a common origin for the languages of Sanskrit, 
Greek, Latin and other European languages, and for the related people groups. From the 
sixteenth century onwards something approaching a systematic comparison of the 
languages of India, Greek, and Latin had developed, aided by contact with native 
populations through the spice trade and the proselytising mission of the Jesuits (see 
Schwab 1984:26–33). The Jesuit missionary Père Gaston Coeurdoux (1691–1779) 
suggested in a memoir written in 1767, known to the members of the Académie Royale des 
Inscriptions et Belles Lettres but not published until 1808,7 that 
Japheth…bringing with him a third of humanity…headed toward the West….His 
seven children no doubt became the heads of as many great families, each one of 
which must have spoken one of the new original languages, such as Latin, Greek, 
Slavonic, etc. May I be permitted to add to these Sanskrit (samskroutam); it is as 
deserving as any other language, given its extensive reach, to be numbered among 
the primitive languages. 
(in Anquetil-Duperron 1808:664)8 
Furthermore, he made a clear connection with ‘Mosaic ethnology’ (see Trautmann 
1997:9) when he argued that 
the Saskroutam language is that of the ancient Brahmes; they came to India from 
the north of that country, from Caucasia, from Tartary …. Of the sons of Japhet, 
some spoke Saskroutam. Before their total separation, their languages were 
somewhat mixed because of the communication they had among each other; and 
there remain vestiges of that ancient intercourse, in the common words which still 
exist. 
                                                                                                                                                             
accorded to Israelite history, religion, and Scripture. Particularly dangerous was his reduction of 
human diversity to three primal categories and the scholarly cum mythic narrative through which 
he sought to redistribute privilege from one racialized group to another….For just as Jones 
renamed the sons of Shem and Ham the “Arabian” and “Hindu” races and then crafted a 
narrative that made them nearly equal, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, others would 
rename the same groups “Aryans” (or Indo-Europeans) and “Semites” in narratives that 
trumpeted ever more shrilly the racial superiority of the conquering state-founders over the 
authors of the Bible’ (2002:16–17). That this indeed occurred in the context of the rise of German 
nationalism and the articulation of the German people’s belief in their Aryan identity is a point I 
will return to Chapter 7. 
6 Jones here went against the traditional way of distributing humankind’s ancestry amongst the 
three sons of Noah. Trautmann suggests that a potential reason for this is that Jones derived the 
basis of his speculations from the conclusions of Jacob Bryant (1715–1804) and he also sets out the 
details of Jones’ scheme (2004:42–47). 
7 The text was published by Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731–1805) as Mémoires de 
Littérature, tires des registres de l’Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. See Schwab 1934 
and 1984:26–27 for an overview of Anquetil’s role in establishing ‘oriental’ studies. 
8 See also Olender 1994:20. 
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(in Trautmann 1997:54).9 
For Coeurdoux, therefore, rather than being descendants of Ham (as Jones was later to 
suggest), the Indian race was derived from Magog, son of Japheth. Coeurdoux, in 
investigating the structural correspondences between Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit, 
therefore proposed a ‘Japhethic solution’ which brought together Europe and a newly 
mobilised East (Olender 1994:20).  
The affinities between Sanskrit and ancient European languages were also 
suspected by a number of British scholars prior to Jones’ announcement, for example, 
John Zephaniah Holwell (1711–1798), Nathaniel Halhed (1751-1830), Alexander Dow (c. 
1710–1779),
 
and James Parsons (1705–1770).10 Jones was also not unique in suggesting an 
extinct original language from which the languages of Latin, Greek, et al. were derived. 
In 1688, prior to the ‘discovery’ of Sanskrit, Andreas Jäger (d. 1731) had speculated that  
An ancient language, once spoken in the distant past in the area of the Caucasus 
mountains and spreading by waves of migration throughout Europe and 
Asia…ceased to be spoken and…left no linguistic monuments behind, but…as a 
“mother” generated a host of “daughter languages…[D]escendants of the ancestral 
language include Persian, Greek, Italic,…the Slavonic languages, Celtic, and finally 
Gothic. 
(in Metcalf 1974:233).  
However, it was ‘Jones’ status and reputation…[that] ensured that news of this 
language connection reverberated through the academic halls of Europe’ (Bryant 
2001:16; see also Muller 1986 and Metcalf 1974). In addition to theories of an original 
language, the theory of a common origin for all humankind was one that had long been 
a topic of speculation amongst European scholars and theologians, certainly for some 
centuries before the eighteenth century, and it was, once more, derived from a literal 
reading of the Bible. Prior to the building of the Tower of Babel as detailed in Genesis 
11:1–9, in the Garden of Eden the human race was believed to have spoken the same 
language, a direct correlation being made between a unified common language—
assumed to be Hebrew11 —and a unified common race of people. 
                                                           
9 See also Godfrey 1967 and Arlotto 1969. 
10 See Bryant 2001:14–16; Trautmann 1997:30–31; Schwab 1984:33–34; 149–51. Despite the varied 
conclusions of these earlier scholars, Jones largely succeeded, at least initially, in staving off 
challenges to biblical truth, effectively ensuring, as Trautmann notes, that ‘the new admiration for 
Hinduism would reinforce Christianity and not work for its overthrow’ (1997:74). 
11 Augustine (354–430), for example, had favoured the idea that Hebrew was the original human 
language in his City of God (XVI:11, 1, 222) although Gregory of Nyssa (c. 330–394) disagreed, as 
did Theoderet of Cyrrhus (c. 393–466), insisting instead that it was more likely to have been Syriac 
(Olender 1992:1). The subsequent diversification of languages was seen to have lead to the 
scattering of people throughout the world. See also Bryant 2001:16; Schwab 1984:168–170. 
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II. The Sons of Noah and Biblical Ethnology 
It was during the Renaissance that the debate regarding the original ‘paradisiacal’ or 
‘Edenic’ language had first become a matter of intense scholarly interest, with 
numerous, and quite far-fetched claims being made by people who wished to assert 
their own ancestors’ language as the language of Eden, although these attempts were 
often met with scepticism and derision. For example, in 1688 the Swedish scholar 
Andreas Kempe (1622–1689) published his satirical tract, The Languages of Paradise, in 
Hamburg in which he noted the farcical aspects of the contest to populate Eden with a 
variety of native tongues. After discussing the learned works of his compatriots Georg 
Stiernhielm (1598–1672) and Olaus Rudbeck (1630–1702), Kempe told how ‘the 
voluptuous Eve’ conspired with a beguiling satanic serpent speaking French. Maurice 
Olender amusingly describes Kempe’s caricature as featuring, ‘besides the francophone 
serpent, a Danish-speaking Adam and a Swedish-speaking God’ (1992:2).  
An exemplary case of this widespread European tendency towards partisan 
linguistic speculation is clear in the writings of the Flemish physician Jan van Gorp or 
Geropius Becanus (1518–1572), published as Origines Antwerpianae in 1569 (see Metcalf 
1974:233–257 and Grafton 1991:99–101). As Olender argues, for Becanus, working in a 
context of tensions between Catholics and Protestants as well as one where the 
languages of French and Spanish were privileged over Flemish and Dutch in the Low 
Countries, his promotion of early Flemish as the original language was intended as a 
form of resistance. Becanus affirmed ‘Cimbrian’, the ancestor of Dutch, as ‘the 
primordial language from which Hebrew derived’ through a tortuous series of 
speculative etymologies, associating Gomer, Japheth’s first son with Cimbri and the 
Cimmerians (1994:13).12 Here Becanus draws a relationship between Flemish and Mosaic 
ethnology and linguistic speculation, and he used it to secure a place for Flemish as the 
primogenia with the concomitant demotion of Hebrew as a later, less transparent 
language.  
After Becanus, the use of etymological proofs became a standard mode of 
argumentation for establishing the non-oriental, that is, non-Semitic, dimensions of the 
origins of Europe.13 Later linguistic scholars generally dismissed Becanus’ clearly 
                                                           
12 See Olender 1994:13–17 for a discussion of Becanus’ etymological logic.  
13 It is instructive to reflect on the term ‘etymology’, the study of word-origins, in order to 
understand how it is and was considered, most certainly during the Renaissance, to be the most 
straightforward and reliable method for tracing the origins of words, and therefore to offer insight 
into their ‘true’ or at least essential, meaning: origin signified essence which signified truth. The 
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partisan position, retaining Hebrew as the source of biblical revelation and as the first 
language of human thought, but they began to insist, by deriving European ancestry 
from Japheth, on a unique and important role for European languages (Olender 
1994:16). As Olender contends, ‘by playing with words, Becanus contributed to the 
formation of a mode of lexical manipulation which gave rise to new forms of linguistic 
comparativism’ (ibid.); this was to prove influential on a number of later linguists and 
philosophers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716).  
One further example of speculative linguistic bias is that of Adriaen van Scrieck 
(fl. 1614), a Belgian scholar, who argued that while Hebrew was in all likelihood the 
original language, the lingua Iaphetica was a ‘neighbor language’, emerging swiftly after 
the Babelian dispersion with the same transparent features as ‘Adamic speech’ and was 
therefore a ‘second’ mother tongue, grouped as ‘Scythian, Celtic, Teutonic, Belgian, 
Danish, and northern’ (Olender 1994:16). He proposed that the people (the Scythians) 
who spoke this language had occupied all of Europe as a result of their migratory 
excursions and he derived what was a patently fabricated etymology for the word 
‘Europe’ from his creative imagining of their migratory ‘cries’: over, op, an (‘over, on, 
toward’) which he translated as ‘oultre, plus oultre’ (‘farther, farther still’). These calls 
mutate, in van Scrieck’s work, to become euver-op, uber-op, over-op and finally, europ. 
Thus he is able to conclude that ‘Europe is a Belgian and virile name’ (1994:17). 
                                                                                                                                                             
English term ‘etymology’ is derived from the French étymologie which is a borrowing of the Latin 
etymologia, which in turn is borrowed from the Greek etumologia, a compound of etumos meaning 
‘true’ or ‘real’ and logos meaning ‘word’ or ‘speech act’. In this way ‘etymology’ (as a term, but 
also as a practice) refers to its own origin, thus its truthful nature: its rhetorical circularity is 
revealed in the promotion of etymology as the original truth of a term which can then be wielded 
to derive an origin which in its very nature as an origin (as essence) is considered to be more 
truthful than later variations. According to Marian Rothstein, during the Renaissance ‘the 
identifiable (or identified) source of a thing was generally taken as a principle defining the way it 
was to be understood and classified. Sources, origins, were thus perceived as guides to how a 
thing was to be regarded and how it could be expected to perform’ (1990:333). She further 
suggests that the prevalence of writings on the moment of Creation (within a biblical frame) 
within a large number of Renaissance texts, along with a broader preoccupation with the origins 
of things, peoples, languages, and so on, indicates a concern for retrieving a ‘principle of 
coherence without, for all that, being a limiting force pulling backward toward an authorizing 
source or imposing a closed system….Inasmuch as they remain active, origins are a potential 
source of energy available to texts, institutions, things, or people; inasmuch as they are 
transmissable, origins are empowering’ (1990:346). Another important aspect of etymology 
therefore is the sense in which it purports to retrieve and preserve the source, securing it for the 
present, and thus appropriating its quality of truth and its authority, one that has important 
implications for the qualities of truth and legitimacy that origins in general are believed to offer. It 
is ironic, of course, to seek an etymology for ‘etymology’ in order to demonstrate its essential 
meaning. The search for the essential truth through recourse to an origin is a theme to which I will 
return in detail Chapters 8 and 9, and one which is a central preoccupation of this thesis. See also 
Slaughter 1992. 
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The ‘Scythian hypothesis’ in its assertion of an original linguistic community for 
Europe on a par with Hebrew held sway for several generations of scholars,14 but after 
Jones’ announcement of the lexicographical affiliations between the languages of Greek, 
Latin, and Sanskrit, the focus shifted to the theorisation of what became known as the 
‘Indo-European hypothesis’.15 The hypothesis was thought to provide a scientifically 
authoritative means—given the promotion of philology as a ‘science’, predicated on its 
forms of analysis, ability to provide objective ‘proofs’ of linguistic interrelationship, and 
appropriation of botanical metaphors—for explaining the origins and evolution of 
European languages without recourse to Hebrew. Before I discuss in more detail the 
development of the Indo-European hypothesis I would note here that, in spite of Jones’ 
dedication to the truth of biblical narratives, deist ideas and the anti-clericalism of the 
Enlightenment received new impetus from Jones’ work. The ancient religion of the 
Sanskrit Vedas seemed to suggest religious and ritual forms that conformed to a pure 
and untainted natural religion, on a par with, if not better than, Hebraic monotheism. In 
the light of Jones’ discovery it therefore seemed increasingly implausible—and 
undesirable—that the European languages were derived from Hebrew or that the 
Jewish religion was unique in its divine provenance. Thus, as Olender has suggested, 
‘[b]y the eighteenth century…all the preconditions were present for a discovery that the 
ancestors of the Europeans, like the common ancestor of their languages, had been 
independent of Semitic influence’ (1994:5). 
As I have shown, the prerequisites for the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
enthusiasm for linguistic and racial origins (and the consequent conflation of race and 
language) were being set in place for a long time prior to Jones’ discovery, and the 
further combination of deist musings on natural religion and the Enlightenment 
                                                           
14 There were a few detractors who tried to demonstrate the fundamental kinship of French and 
Hebrew. See Olender 1994:18–19. 
15 Although the term ‘Indo-European’ was only coined in 1816 by the linguist Thomas Young 
(1773–1829), the debate regarding what to call the original language raged from the date of Jones’ 
announcement onwards (Bryant 2001:20). A number of nomenclatures were suggested, among 
them ‘European’, ‘Sarmatian’ and—unsurprisingly—‘Japhetic’, but it was ‘Indo-European’ that 
eventually won the day. In Germany, the preference was for ‘Indo-German’, first suggested by the 
Danish geographer Conrad Malte-Brun (1755–1826) in 1810 and then promoted on a larger scale 
by the German orientalist Julius Klaproth (1783–1835) in 1823. Justification for the adoption of the 
term ‘Indo-German’ was offered, as Bryant notes, ‘on the grounds that these two languages 
encapsulated the entire Indo-European-speaking area—the farthest language to the east being 
Indic, and to the west, Germanic’ (Bryant 2001:20). Although the adoption of ‘Indo-German’ was 
resisted by non-German scholars and Franz Bopp also objected to its use on the grounds that 
‘Indo-European’ was more politically neutral and less partisan, it still continues to be used 
amongst some scholars in Germany today (ibid.). I will trace the popularity of the term ‘Indo-
German’ in Chapter 7. 
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rejection of biblical veracity—in spite of Jones’ insistence on the Sanskritic confirmation 
of key biblical narratives—ensured an eventually definitive break with both biblical 
chronology and the consequent need to assert any direct line of inheritance with the 
Jewish tradition. The Indo-European theories of linguistic origins nonetheless took a 
common source for granted because it confirmed theories of natural religion.  
Two connected discourses of differentiation are apparent here: firstly, the desire 
of earlier philosophes such as Voltaire was to draw a clear-cut and final distinction 
between history (as formulated in his Enlightenment vision of the origin of universal 
history in the Far East or India) and myth (as represented by the erroneous version of 
providential history provided by the Bible, particularly as it pertained to Edenic 
origins), and Jones’ discovery reinforced this difference; secondly, a growing distinction 
emerged between the European races, who could now source their Japhethic origins as 
Asiatic or ‘Indo-European’, and those of Semitic origin. The displacement of Semitic 
origins from their previously privileged position served as a prerequisite for the 
proposal and valorisation of Indo-European origins as well as the reassertion of 
Enlightenment scepticism towards mythical narratives such as those found in the Bible. 
In both cases, however, as I have shown this drive to determine the identity and nature 
of the first language of humanity—the origin—was nonetheless rooted in the biblical or 
‘Semitic’ tradition of Edenic origins. While the situation was contradictory, as Olender 
observes, it nonetheless 
represented the culmination of a historiographical effort of aiming to discover for 
itself splendid ancestors in an East purged of all Semitism; [philologists] favored the 
idea of a West superior to all other civilizations, but were nonetheless able to 
identify themselves with the actors of a providential history whose rules were 
decreed, once and for all, by biblical revelation. 
(1974:22) 
III. Language and Homeland: The Indo-European Hypothesis 
Progress in Indo-European linguistics, post-Jones, was so rapid that nineteenth-century 
comparative philologists increasingly believed that the identification of the source of the 
Indo-European family of languages (Ursprache: ‘original’ or ‘first language’ which was 
designated as ‘Proto-Indo-European’) would be possible, unlike the more cautious Jones 
who had refrained from asserting its identity with too much certainty, (1807:34). The 
optimism of these comparativists was sanctioned initially by an unquestioning appeal to 
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a family tree model (Stammbaum),16 which assumed monogenetic origin, through the 
assertion of a direct analogy with the taxonomic schema of botanists and, after the mid-
nineteenth century, with Charles Darwin’s theories of the evolution of species. 
Trautmann suggests, correctly in my view, that the adoption of the Stammbaum analogy 
was a way for linguists to sidestep the biblical basis of their concern with linguistic 
origins (1997:57). 
Foucault’s concept of the épistèmé is useful here for understanding the recourse 
to botanical metaphor as a familiar and frequently employed trope for tracing the ‘order 
of things’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Didier Eribon describes Foucault’s 
notion of épistèmé as follows: 
every period is characterised by an underground configuration that delineates its 
culture, a grid of knowledge making possible every scientific discourse, every 
production of statements….Each science develops within the framework of an 
épistèmé, and therefore is linked in part with other sciences contemporary with it. 
(1991:158) 
Thus, for Foucault, the conceptual frameworks, assumptions, and methods within 
certain fields of knowledge during the Classical period, which he defines roughly from 
the mid-seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century (1970:xxii), shared ways of 
thinking and organised their knowledge relations around a series of ‘similitudes’ 
(convenentia, aemulatio, analogy, and sympathy; 1970:17–25): 
it was resemblance that largely guided exegesis and the interpretation of texts; it 
was resemblance that organised the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of 
things visible and invisible and controlled the art of representing them. The 
universe was folded in upon itself: the earth echoing the sky, faces seeing 
themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding within their stems secrets that 
were of use to man. Painting imitated space. And representation…was positioned 
as a form of repetition; the theatre of life or the mirror of nature, that was the claim 
made of all languages, its manner of declaring its existence and of formulating its 
right of speech.  
(1970:17) 
                                                           
16 August Schleicher (1821–1868) formalised this tree model in 1861, tracing family relationships 
between the Iranian languages, Greek, Albanian, and the Celtic, Italic, Balto-Slavic, and Germanic 
languages. As Trautmann notes, ‘Relations of near and far are calibrated by the branching 
structures of the family tree, and the whole expresses a conception of the progressive 
differentiation and radiation across Eurasia of languages from a common ancestral language 
[Proto-Indo-European]’ (1997:6–7). The Indo-European language group was contrasted to other 
language groups, nominated as Semitic (including Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and Amharic) and 
Hamitic (the languages of North Africa). It was suggested that these language groups once had a 
remote common source, and that Proto-Indo-European was merely the origin for all subsequent 
variants within the Indo-European language group. Friedrich Schlegel, whose philological work I 
will discuss in Chapter 7, also used a botanical metaphor, to distinguish between inflected and 
agglutinative languages. See Trautmann 1997:7–11 for an important discussion regarding the 
significance of the adoption of this model, not just for linguistic comparativism, but also for 
ethnology and biology in the nineteenth century.  
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While Foucault refers here to a period prior to that which is my concern in this chapter, 
he does offer a way of understanding the dispersal of the botanical metaphor 
throughout apparently disparate knowledge productions as rooted in a shared épistèmé; 
certain shared presuppositions and models serve not only to organise thought, 
representation, and categorisation, but also delineate what it is possible to think and 
how. Foucault is at pains, however, to stress the absence of conscious intentionality in 
this process: ‘unknown to themselves, the naturalists, economists and grammarians, 
employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study’ (1970:xi). 
Further, he does not want to establish his concept of the épistèmé as marking a 
teleological, unified framework such as might be understood from the term Zeitgeist 
(‘spirit of the age’): ‘I do not seek to detect, starting from diverse signs, the unitary spirit 
of an epoch…a kind of Weltanshauung….[Rather] I have collated different discourses 
and described their clusters and relations’ (1991a:55).  
Thus, Foucault’s concept of an épistèmé does not describe a unified body of 
ideas—or hegemonic worldview—but a set of conflicting discursive frameworks and 
pressures which operate and interact with each other across a social body, and which 
condition how people think, know, and write. The particular selection of the family tree 
model as a reigning metaphor, however, is worth reflecting on further because it was 
used with such striking regularity to establish systemic knowledge about disparate 
phenomena like languages, plant species, people groups, and economic units and 
processes. My own view is that it simultaneously represented a seemingly natural 
confirmation (with an implication, therefore, of truthfulness) of the obscured 
genealogical presuppositions of biblical ethnology and, perhaps more opaquely, 
produced those very presuppositions. The tree model offered a consoling, or at least 
logically derived, depiction of unity, a single point of origin. It seemed that the very order 
of nature confirmed the monologic origin of everything under scrutiny. Here I would 
also like to note the patriarchal utility—and texture—of the model. As I will argue in 
Chapter 8, the assertion of a singular origin is the fundamental cornerstone of patrilineal 
ontology within the history of Western metaphysics. 
Nevertheless, the linguists’ appropriation of the natural sciences to support their 
linguistic comparativism was also based on the reasonable theory that carefully 
measured resemblances and differences between the various Indo-European languages 
could indicate incidents of separation from their common origin. Comparative 
philologists were convinced that the identification of cognate terms in a significant 
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number of branches of the Indo-European family, and the consequent extrapolation, 
following the laws of sound change, of a standard form, could generate a protolexicon.17 
Moreover, underlying this claim was the highly speculative assertion that the growth of 
each ‘branch’ (each separate language) out of the ‘trunk’ (the lost Ursprache) signified the 
movement of a people group into a new territory. Linked to the widespread curiosity 
about the original language of the first humans, therefore, was a related preoccupation 
with the geographical location of the Urheimat. Thus with the consolidation of the notion 
of a Proto-Indo-European language—the Ursprache—the hunt was on, not just for the 
Urheimat, but also for the first people, or Urvolk, who spoke this ancestral tongue. Shared 
language groupings were correlated with shared geography,18 which in turn, as I will 
show in Chapter 7, was correlated with race. 
As I observed earlier, Jones had initially suggested that the events detailed in 
Genesis 11—the building of the Tower of Babel and subsequent dispersal of humankind 
into many different language groupings—had taken place between the Caucasus and 
Persia. Jones did so on the basis of his belief, discussed above, that ‘the Hebrew 
narrative is more than human in its origin and consequently true in every substantial 
part of it’ and it was therefore ‘…no longer probable only, but absolutely certain, that 
the whole race of man proceeded from Iran whence they migrated at first in three great 
colonies [those of Ham, Shem, and Japheth];…those three branches grew from a 
common stock’ (1792:468–487). What is notable about these statements is the way in 
which Jones, in detailing his ethnological panorama, establishes what became basic 
philological principles (those of root and branch).  
In any case the quest for the original homeland soon became a central 
preoccupation for scholars throughout Europe, particularly those influenced by the 
romantic formula of the past as a golden age and its coincidence with nascent nationalist 
movements (as I will discuss in the next chapter). Jones’ discovery provoked a surge of 
interest in the culture of India, leading, in Britain, to a short period of what Trautmann 
                                                           
17 It was this idea that was taken up later by the philologist Adolphe Pictet (1799–1875) who 
developed a methodology for ‘linguistic palaeontology’ that could derive such a protolexicon. The 
essence of Pictet’s approach was to identify shared cognate words found in all branches of a 
language family that specified elements of material or social culture, such as ‘wheel’ or ‘horse’, 
which could be used as lexicographical evidence to prove that these items existed in the 
protoculture of that family. It was thus considered possible not only to establish the rough 
outlines of the original language, but also to identify the geographical location of the people who 
used this language. Pictet himself suggested that his mode of analysis pointed to an original 
homeland in Bactria (present-day Afghanistan). See Bryant 2001:34. 
18 Inevitably these geographical speculations also replicated the Mosaic narrative of the dispersion 
of humankind after Noah, generated from his three sons, and from the Tower of Babel.  
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refers to as ‘Indomania’ (1997:62–98; see below). India soon displaced modern-day Iran 
(or Armenia) as the location of choice for the original homeland of the Indo-European 
race in large part due to Jones’ discovery, alongside the consequent assumption of racial 
consanguinity. It was not a particularly new idea: Voltaire had earlier posited India as 
the cradle of civilisation, supported by Jean-Sylvain Bailly (1736–1793) who had 
suggested as early as 1777 that the earliest humans had come from the banks of the river 
Ganges: ‘the Brahmans are the teachers of Pythagoras, the instructors of Greece, and 
through her of the whole of Europe (1777:51). It consequently became the fashion 
amongst some European intellectuals (see Bryant 2001:18–19) to assert India as the site 
of the first human race and, in the aftermath of Jones’ discovery, it was a position that 
initially appeared to have a strong foundation.19 It seemed reasonable at the time to 
locate the original homeland in the area that had originated what was considered the 
oldest language of the group of related languages.  
Trautmann shows how, until the early part of the nineteenth century, British 
Orientalists were generally very enthusiastic about the discovery of the kinship between 
Sanskrit and English (via Latin and Greek) for a number of reasons: the translation of 
Sanskrit texts seemed to indicate independent verification of biblical historiography as I 
have already shown; the Indian religious complex as represented in its earliest texts 
appeared to have preserved the primitive truth of natural religion from which the 
paganism of Rome and Greece seemed to have been derived; and this kinship between 
Sanskrit and European languages displaced Semitic religion from its previously 
hegemonic status, thus relieving Europeans from having to derive their traditions from 
what was now apparently an alien culture (1997:64). A further reason was related to the 
means through which the governance of the Indian territories could be best achieved 
(Trautmann 1997:17). Henry Sumner Maine, for example, suggested ‘that the 
                                                           
19 This was largely because early philologists, unlike Jones, tended to treat Vedic Sanskrit as 
almost identical to, if not actually the same as, the original Proto-Indo-European due to the 
antiquity of its textual sources, cultural references, the structure of its grammar, and the extent of 
its vocabulary. Linguists of the late eighteenth century believed that Sanskrit showed more 
structural regularity than its cognate languages which, in keeping with the romantic view of 
cultural degeneration from an original point of perfection, indicated that it was more original 
than, for example, Greek and the other cognate languages. It was a view lent some support by the 
developmental view of language theorised in 1689 by John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1975:433). According to Locke, ‘civilised’ languages were regular in structure and 
possessed a sophisticated and extensive vocabulary. This was one of the reasons why Jones could 
assert that Sanskrit was a civilised language (1807, III:34). Friedrich Schlegel, whose work I will 
examine in this regard in Chapter 7, also suggested, on similar grounds, that ‘the Indian language 
is older, the others younger and derived from it’ (in Bryant 2001:19). See also Trautmann 
1992a:210–211. 
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government of India by the English has been rendered appreciably easier by the 
discoveries which have brought home to the educated of both races the 
common…parentage of Englishman and Hindoo’ (in Trautmann 1997:18–19). The 
assertion of racial kinship through shared linguistic origins was certainly one way of 
justifying colonial expansion while pretending that it was a matter of mutual exchange: 
where India had once apparently bequeathed Europe its cultural richness, Britain was 
now repaying its debt by a triumphant return to the homeland, bringing with it the 
benefits of European civilisation to its distant kin (Bryant 2001:26). Trautmann warns, 
therefore, against seeing the promotion of Indo-British kinship as having any material 
substance: ‘British Orientalists devised a theory of their own activities…that involved 
claims about promoting affection between ruler and ruled and a political rhetoric of love’ 
(1997:18). 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the tide turned and in the 
place of British enthusiasm for India a virulent ‘Indophobia’ emerged (Trautmann 
1997:99–130), again connected to colonial exigencies and related to the events of the 
Indian Mutiny (1857). In 1858, as a direct result of the Mutiny, the British sent the last 
Mughal Emperor into exile in Burma, thus bringing to an end just over three centuries of 
Mughal rule, and at the same time abolished the British East India Company, replacing 
it with the direct rule, under the British Crown, of India. As Dilip Chakrabarti, suggests 
‘With the Raj firmly established it was the time to begin to visualize the history and 
cultural process of India as a series of invasions and foreign rules’ (1976:67). This meant 
that the notion of India as the cradle of civilisation was rejected in favour of an origin 
elsewhere, probably Central Asia, and that Sanskritic traditions were now considered to 
be depraved corruptions of an original natural religion which they had previously been 
held to embody. Trautmann lays the blame for this shift on Charles Grant (1746–1823), 
whose influential ‘Observations on the Asiatic subjects of Great Britain’ (1796) dismissed 
any notion of Indian civilisation and made a case for an aggressive policy of 
Anglicisation in the service of colonial governance. In the aftermath of the Mutiny the 
idea gained popularity and a good deal of literature depicted contemporary Indians as 
degenerate, corrupt, and inferior to the British in every respect.20  
                                                           
20 See Leopold 1974 for a survey of the literature in this period. She suggests that British 
colonialists oscillated between progressive and cyclical theories of Indo-European consanguinity 
both of which provided justifications for the extension and formalisation of British colonial rule in 
the period following the Mutiny. While both theories acknowledged Indo-European ancestry for 
the British and the northern Indians—Brahmins in particular—progressive ideology, drawing on 
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This was in marked contrast to the policy of respect and—albeit limited—
mutuality cultivated by the earlier British orientalists. A more ‘romantic’ orientalist view 
did persist amongst some scholars but they were in the minority, most notably Max 
Müller (1823–1900), a German scholar resident in England, who suggested a common 
descent for Indians and the British drawn from philological evidence, and who 
characterised this commonality in terms of racial equality while acknowledging British 
resistance to the idea (1854a:29–30). It was a view that was treated with a great deal of 
distaste by some nineteenth-century British scholars and Müller was excoriated for his 
insistence on racial consanguinity between the British and Indians (see, for example, 
Legge 1902:710). As Bryant notes, ‘colonial sensibilities made [the British] reluctant to 
acknowledge any potential cultural indebtedness to the forefathers of the rickshaw 
pullers of Calcutta and…[they] preferred to hang on to the biblical Adam for longer 
than their European contemporaries’ (2001:22). Trautmann (1997:165–189) attributes the 
downfall of an Indian Urheimat to the rise of race science,21 particularly insofar as it 
offered a welcome resolution to the dilemma posed by Jones’ discovery (see also Bryant 
2001:24–29). The challenge by race science to the notion that India was the original 
homeland was assisted by the discovery that South Indian languages, referred to as 
‘Dravidian’, were not derived from Sanskrit (Bryant 2001:25), and led to the emergence 
of what became known as the ‘Aryan invasion theory’.22  
                                                                                                                                                             
evolutionary theories of both a Lamarckian and Darwinian tenor, stressed the idea that the 
condition of contemporary Indians was one of arrested development, and that the early Indian 
Aryans had ceased to evolve to the extent that Europeans had for a variety of reasons. It was the 
responsibility of the British, therefore, to ensure that India received ‘not only new Aryan legal, 
administrative, social and commercial institutions but also a new religion and the Aryan idea of 
“progress” and of “history”, which…it had not developed by itself’ (Leopold 1974:599). The 
cyclical view, characterised by scholars like Max Müller, promoted colonial rule as a kind of 
‘family reunion’. An advocate of this point of view was Frederic William Farrar (1831–1903), who 
suggested that ‘After a separation of 4,000 years, after having traversed an immense circle of the 
globe, the younger Aryan returns…not solely to rule over the elder…but to teach him…the 
lessons of a superior wisdom, a purer justice, and a loftier morality—above all, to teach 
him…Christianity fostered by the Western Aryan peoples’ (1870:144). See also Laing 1862:21. 
21 Trautmann argues that the development of comparative philology and ethnology or race science 
in the nineteenth century ran along parallel and then divergent tracks, although ethnology was 
initially reliant on philology for its organisational schema, particularly its principles of linguistic 
categorisation (1997:133–134). See also Stepan (1982) who coined the term ‘race science’ to account 
for the relationship of ethnology to comparative philology. I will discuss shortly the conflation of 
the Indo-European hypothesis with notions of the consanguinity of the ‘Aryan’ race.  
22 Max Müller is credited with coining the term ‘Aryan’ to refer to the Indo-European family of 
languages and to its related people groups and with popularising the Aryan invasion theory, 
although it was in fact the ethnologist James Cowles Prichard (1786–1848) who was one of the first 
to use it to refer to the racial origins of the Indo-European tribes who were thought by this time to 
have invaded not only Iran and North India but also Europe (see Prichard 1843). See Trautmann 
1997:172–178 for a discussion of Müller’s career as a comparative philologist and proponent of the 
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In broad outline, as formulated in the nineteenth century, the theory postulated 
that a race of nomadic warriors known as the Aryans, originating in the Caucasus 
mountains in Southeastern Europe, invaded Iran and northern India roughly between 
2000 and 1500 BCE, the latter being the date favoured by Müller.23 These invaders were 
thought to have entered the Indian subcontinent from the mountain passes of the Hindu 
Kush, bringing with them the domesticated horse and the Vedic religion. This Aryan 
race either displaced or assimilated the indigenous pre-Aryan peoples, many of whom 
migrated to the south, with those remaining being relegated to the lower castes of post-
Vedic society. The victory of the Aryans was believed to have been rapid and total, 
resulting in the dominance of Aryan culture and language over the northern part of the 
subcontinent and in the extension of considerable influence to parts of the south. The 
initial theory was assembled primarily on linguistic grounds, although these grounds 
themselves were based on a questionable reading of excerpts from the Vedic corpus and 
concerned the translation of the term ‘ārya’24 and its apparent opposites ‘an-ārya’, ‘dasyu’, 
and ‘dāsa’. The anglicised term ‘Aryan’, erroneously derived from ‘ārya’ to indicate racial 
origins, was used interchangeably with ‘Indo-European’ or ‘Indo-Germanic’ particularly 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. I will return to discuss the use of the term 
‘Aryan’ to indicate racial affiliation in Chapter 7. 
Within the Vedic texts there is no mention of an actual invasion or migration 
into India, nor is there any reference to a homeland outside of India or any clear 
references to race or racial appearance. Nonetheless, in nineteenth-century Europe the 
term ‘Aryan’ was widely employed to produce images of the Indo-Europeans as fair-
skinned and dolichocephalic. ‘Dolichocephalic’ was a term invented by the German race 
scientist Andreas Retzius (1796–1860) to denote long and narrow skulls as opposed to 
those which are brachycephalic, or broad and short. Dolichocephaly, according to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Aryan invasion theory. This controversial theory is still debated in Indological circles today; see 
Bryant 1999; Bryant and Patton 2005; Sethna 1992; Schaffer 1984. See Thapar 2000:1108–1140; Guha 
1998:430–433 for discussions of the contemporary Indian nationalist challenge to the Aryan 
invasion theory. 
23 Navaratna Rajaram (1995:91–96) argues that Müller arrived at this dating due to a literal reading 
of the Bible, particularly as it concerned ethnology.  
24 The entry for ārya in Monier Williams’ Sanskrit-English Dictionary (1899) appears thus: ‘a 
respectable or honourable or faithful man and inhabitant of Aryavarta; one who is faithful to the 
religion of that country; name of the race that immigrated from Central Asia into Aryavarta; 
…someone behaving like an Aryan, worthy of one, honourable, respectable, noble, of a good 
family; excellent; wise; suitable….’. (Aryavarta here refers to northern India; see Manu 2005, II.21–
22. However, early European readers of the Vedas assumed that terms ‘ārya’ and ‘dāsa’ referred to 
races of people rather than being simply markers of relative status. See also Trautmann 1997:12–
13. 
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Retzius, was the distinctive feature of the earliest inhabitants of Europe.25 The 
importance of craniology for proponents of the Aryan invasion theory was that because 
the skulls of Europeans were different from those of the Asian Indo-Europeans, it was 
possible that Europeans were either indigenous to Europe or had migrated there from a 
central location (probably Central Asia) and that it had thus been they who had taken 
Indo-European civilisation to India. As Bryant argues, 
What the racial theorists succeeded in doing…was to uncouple the common 
language bond from the need to identify with the Hindus on any level whatsoever. 
The Europeans, as a race, were now not required to acknowledge any common 
racial or even cultural bond with the Hindus….Even the common Indo-European 
language was presented as being a gift to India from the West….The racial theorists 
paved the way for the postulate that the Aryans were an autonomous white race 
who brought civilization and the Sanskrit language to the different races of India.  
(2001:25–26) 
This reversal of the Indo-European hypothesis provided succour to those who 
wished to deny an Indian homeland for the European Aryan race. The usefulness of the 
idea for supporting the ideology of British colonialism as a civilising mission is obvious: 
not only did it relieve the British of having to accept kinship with native Indians, it 
enabled them to represent themselves, in Bryant’s words, as ‘a second wave of Aryans, 
again bringing a superior language and civilization to the racial descendants of the same 
natives their forefathers had attempted to elevate so many centuries earlier’ (2001:26),26 
and further, to justify their presence in the subcontinent by building up a picture of the 
Indians as degenerate and corrupt (see Bryant 2001:26–27). Racial science provided an 
easy explanation for Aryan Indian regression by suggesting it was a result of 
miscegenation with the darker race of dāsas. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
therefore, few British scholars were willing to consider India to be the homeland of the 
Indo-Europeans, or to tolerate claims regarding any kind of kinship (see Müller 1895, 
I:63–64, 66; II:20; 1847:348; Trautmann 1997:174–175). Bryant argues that this was one of 
the reasons why Indology was generally neglected in Britain compared to Germany and 
France (2001:28–29), although Sheldon Pollock suggests that many of the preoccupations 
                                                           
25 The classification of crania was an aspect of nineteenth-century phrenology, a pseudo-science 
concerned with character analysis based on the theory that the human mind could be divided into 
thirty-seven faculties each with a distinct location in the brain. Although initially framed as a key 
to understanding individual psychology, the phrenological system soon became applied as a 
theory of racial difference. See Gould 1981, Cooter 1985, and Egerton 1995. 
26 Max Müller certainly cast the British ‘civilising mission’ in these terms when he suggested that 
‘it is curious to see how the [English] descendants of the same race, to which the first conquerors 
and masters of India belonged, return, after having followed the northern development of the 
Japhetic race to their primordial soil, to accomplish the glorious work of civilization, which had 
been left unfinished by their Arian brethren’(1847:349) 
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of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century German discourse on Indo-European racial 
and linguistic origins were possibly bequeathed by the earlier eighteenth-century 
‘sympathetic’ British orientalism (1993:83), a point to which I will return in Chapter 7.  
Although race science quickly achieved a position of pre-eminence in the 
European preoccupation with its origins, comparative philology continued to make its 
mark in the debate. The German philologist Franz Bopp (1791–1867) demonstrated that 
Sanskrit itself was derived from an earlier tongue and he stated that he did not  
believe that Greek, Latin, and other European languages are to be considered as 
derived from the Sanskrit….I feel rather inclined to consider them altogether as 
subsequent variations of one original tongue, which, however, the Sanskrit has 
preserved more perfect than its kindred dialects. 
(in Bryant 2001:19) 
Bopp’s proposal thus further contributed to what became the wholesale rejection, at 
least initially outside of Germany, of India as the Urheimat. By the end of the nineteenth 
century the notion that India had been the original homeland was almost entirely 
discredited and a European homeland was, in some circles, established in its place, a 
development I discuss in Chapter 7. 
Regardless of the competing claims over the location of the original homeland, 
the concept of the Urheimat as articulated by Herder, Jones, and others gave a sense of 
urgency to German speculations regarding the Urvolk and the Ursprache in a way that 
was markedly different to other European countries, particularly Britain. It fuelled a 
nostalgia for origins that became enmeshed in the politics of German identity and 
nationalism from the early nineteenth century onwards. Furthermore, it provided fertile 
ground for a renewed articulation of anti-Semitism built upon a discourse of 
differentiation that separated the European Aryans from the Semitic Jews. I will 
examine the consolidation of this particular discourse of differentiation in the context of 
German romanticism and nationalism in Chapter 7. However, the roots of this discourse 
lie in the nascent nationalism of nineteenth-century Germany which is my concern in 
the following chapter and it is there that all the narrative threads of the search for 
German identity and the wider preoccupation with origins in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Europe, presented so far, will begin to come together. The German 
discovery of, and enthusiasm for, Tacitus’ portrayal of the ancient Germanic tribes and 
their hero Arminius, Herder’s promotion of Völkisch narrative as an authentic source for 
securing national identity, the broader European theorisation of the original language 
and homeland, the consequent break with Hebraic genealogy, and the deist influence on 
notions of natural religion and the original state of humanity all combined, in the 
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German context of romantic and nationalist discourse, to produce a definitive discursive 
differentiation between Aryans and Semites upon which Germanic cultural—if not 
immediately political—unification could be conceived and enacted. 
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C H A P T E R  F O U R 
THEORIES OF NATIONALISM  
AND THE BACKGROUND TO  




In the historical context of the derogation of German identity outlined earlier in Chapter 
2, there could hardly have been a more timely argument for the primacy of German 
language and culture than Jones’ Indo-European hypothesis. I earlier argued that the 
formulation of a stable and unified German identity in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries was a matter of increasing urgency, precipitated by the 
Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) and an expansive French ideological imperialism, but 
with much longer antecedents in the context of the Holy Roman Empire’s resistance to 
papal hegemony. The fifteenth-century discovery of Tacitus’ writings on the ancient 
Germans by the German humanists provided a primary source for asserting a noble 
pedigree in parity with the Graeco-Roman legacy of other European nations. Moreover, 
it served as a template of autochthonous Germanic virtues and racial purity; when 
affiliated with the Indo-European hypothesis it gained additional legitimacy as I will 
return to show in Chapter 7. The assertion of this ancient pedigree was given further 
support by Herder’s theories regarding the function of indigenous languages and myths 
in forming and preserving the essential and authentic characteristics of the Volk: 
Germany was thus charged, by Herder, with seeking its past—and future—in its 
vernacular literary and oral traditions and in its landscape in order to cultivate a sense 
of its own prestige and nobility. It was in the nineteenth century that a concerted effort 
of retrieval began and it was one that was closely tied to an emergent nationalist 
project—the result of French aggression—that sought the unification of the diverse 
German territories on the basis of shared cultural traditions and to romanticism as an 
ideology of cultural regeneration.  
In this chapter, therefore, I am mainly concerned with examining the emergence 
of nationalist sentiment in nineteenth-century Germany and its very close relationship 
to the work of scholars within the German romantic movement. I begin the chapter in 
section I by surveying a variety of frameworks suggested by contemporary scholars of 
nationalism in order to derive a model in which to understand German nationalism as a 
predominantly cultural phenomenon and to examine the ways in which ideas about 
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gender, race, and class were connected to its vision of the form that the unified nation 
was to take. I then discuss in section II how German nationalism in this period was 
oriented towards the retrieval of Germany’s noble origins—characterised as a golden 
age of German achievement—as a means of ameliorating the turmoil that resulted from 
aggressive French expansion into the German territories in the early years of the 
nineteenth century. The growth of German nationalism during this period, and its 
questions regarding the intrinsic characteristics of Germanic identity, assumed a 
heuristic cogency when combined with German nationalist resistance against French 
imperialism in the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasions (1803–1812), surveyed briefly 
below, and with a nascent romantic programme of cultural regeneration. In section III of 
this chapter, therefore, I will sketch the romantic movement as it developed in Germany 
during the same period and trace its decisive role in shaping the direction of the 
growing nationalist movement towards an initially aesthetic, and then political 
formulation of German identity. In section IV I examine an important early strand of 
romantic thought—synthesis—that prompted a call for a national mythology based on 
aesthetic principles of fusion. This ‘new mythology’ was part of a nationalist agenda 
concerned with uniting the German people under a banner of shared cultural traditions. 
Myth in this context was seen to be the unificatory medium through which the Germans 
would be recalled to their glorious past and which would ensure an equally glorious 
future. The purpose of the chapter is thus twofold: (1) to situate German nationalism 
within a theoretical framework that can explain its emergence and form; and (2) to 
provide a historical background to the revival of folklore and myth that characterised 
German romantic nationalism throughout the nineteenth century which I then explore 
in the following two chapters. 
I. Models of Nationalism 
The origins and character of nationalism, and conceptions of what constitutes a nation 
state, have been characterised by scholars as having two main forms: civic/political or 
ethnic/cultural nationalism.1 Civic nationalism has been associated with the constitution 
                                                           
1 Anthony D. Smith and Hutchinson are the main theorists of ethnic nationalism and Gellner and 
Breuilly represent the civic view. David Brown prefers the term ‘cultural’ nationalism over ‘ethnic’ 
nationalism in order to avoid the ‘biological connotations’ that have been attached to the term 
‘ethnic’ (1999:282) and Kearney uses the term ‘ethno-cultural’ for similar reasons (1997:1–22). 
Hutchinson distinguishes the two forms of nationalism as ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ (1994b:122). In 
my view his terminology is preferable as it demonstrates a broad appreciation of the ways in 
which ‘ethnic’ nationalism also invoked other forms of cultural unity either alongside or in 
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of the nation state on the basis of the social contract2 where the possession of political 
and legal rights and duties both define individuals’ membership of the nation and 
establish them as citizens of the state. Examples of the civic form of nationalism are 
Britain and France, both of which conceived of the nation as inevitably connected to 
concepts of state and government. Cultural nationalism, on the other hand, bases its 
nation-building efforts on the assumption of shared cultural traditions, a common 
inheritance from the past, and is essentially backward-looking, leading Nairn to 
characterise these two forms of nationalism as ‘Janus-faced’ (1997:67, 71–72).  
Civic and cultural nationalisms are most obviously differentiated in terms of the 
way membership of a nation is construed and in the relationship of nation and state. 
Membership of a civic nation is achieved through political processes of assimilation 
whereas the cultural nation is conceived by its members as having a prior existence to 
the state where membership is unconditional and exclusive (Nieguth 1999:157–158; see 
also Guibernau 1996:3). According to Hutchinson, civic nationalists have as their ideal ‘a 
civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws and mores like the polis of 
classical antiquity’ whereas cultural nationalists ‘reject the ideal of universal citizenship 
rights of political nationalism’ and ‘demand that the natural divisions within the 
nation—sexual, occupational, religious and regional—be respected, for the impulse to 
differentiation is the dynamo of national creativity’ (1994:122). The most obvious 
example of cultural nationalism is the case of Germany in the nineteenth century, 
particularly as articulated by romantic intellectuals, which I will explore in more detail 
shortly. Here, Herder’s conception of the Volk proved influential in suggesting that a 
nation was not a socio-political construct but was rather an organic concept that 
articulated the homogeneity and unity of the Volk connected through shared traditions, 
language, culture, religion, and myths.3 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
                                                                                                                                                             
contrast to the racial basis of collective unity in order to sanction its conception of the nation state. 
Civic and ethnic forms of nationalism have also been described as functionalist/modernist, where 
nations are seen to be the product, rather than the cause, of state-formation along civic lines (see 
Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1985; Nairn 1981), and primordialist/essentialist where nations are 
viewed as natural phenomena defined through an organic bond between people and territory (see 
Anthony D. Smith 1998). A third way that nationalisms have been distinguished is as either 
‘individualist’ or ‘collectivist’, both of which mirror the distinction between civic and 
ethnic/cultural nationalisms (see Kohn 1960 and Greenfeld 1992). 
2 As such, the civic model is derived from Rousseau’s notion of the ‘social contract’ (1947 [1762]) 
which ascribes primacy to the state with regard to the formation of nations: ‘It is certain that 
nations are in the long run what the government makes them to be’ (in Grimsley 1972:14). 
3 The function of the state, in a Herderian frame, therefore, is to aid the natural evolution of the 
fundamental units of humanity—nations—without outside interference. Accordingly, primacy is 
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shared race was also included as a marker of national unity as I will discuss in Chapter 
7.  
However, the distinction between these two forms of nationalism are often less 
clear when examining individual nation-building efforts, at least in terms of their aims, 
and serves more to describe types of nationalism than to explain its appeal and success 
(or otherwise). There have thus been attempts either to circumvent the cultural/civic 
divide by extending the typology of nationalisms beyond these two models, or to seek a 
compromise where they coincide in the nation-building effort. Thus, Layoun proposes 
that all nationalism ‘constructs and proffers a narrative of the “nation” and of its relation 
to an already or potential state’ (1991:410–411). As such, nationalism is both a goal to 
achieve statehood (the civic model) and a belief in collective organic commonality (the 
cultural model). Nieguth, on the other hand, has found the terms ‘civic’ and ‘cultural’ 
too nebulous and has proposed instead their substitution with four ‘irreducible 
organising principles’ of nation states which he defines as territory, race, culture, and 
ancestry (1999:161, 169).4 Nonetheless, he merely ends up invoking, whilst albeit 
expanding, the vocabulary of civic and ethnic nationalisms. The narrative component of 
nation-building that Layoun identifies has led to a series of influential arguments 
regarding the operations of nationalism, suggesting that it involves ‘imagining’ a 
national past and present (Anderson 1991), inventing traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 
1983), and symbolically constructing community (Cohen 1985), and that it invokes 
essential myths to establish the legitimacy of the nation-state (A. Smith 1986; 1999b), 
suggesting, as Gellner argues, that ‘it is nationalism that engenders nations, and not the 
other way round’ (1983:49).  
                                                                                                                                                             
accorded to the nation over the state, where the geographical distribution of the nation defines the 
boundaries of the state. 
4 Nieguth also draws attention to a tendency amongst some scholars of nationalism to privilege its 
civic form, seeing it as liberal and advanced and ethnic/cultural nationalism as retrogressive, 
illiberal, and conservative. One of the problems with the association of civic nationalism with 
liberalism and ethnic nationalism with illiberalism is that it has been wielded to differentiate 
between postcolonial nationalisms as ethnic and therefore retrogressive and belligerent, and 
European nationalism as civic and liberal, thus betraying a potentially orientalist attitude. 
Moreover, as Cusack points out, ‘ethno-cultural nationalisms are pervasive and widespread, even 
at the heart of Western nations that consider themselves to be liberal democracies’ (2000:543). See 
also Kearney 1997 and Sluga 1998. On the tendency amongst western scholars to distinguish 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms, see David Brown 1999 and Nieguth 1999. 
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(i) Primordialism, Instrumentalism, and Constructivism 
Despite the apparent similarity of the ‘imaginative’ components of nationalist projects 
and the tenuous consensus regarding the typology of nationalism just described, there is 
a great deal of disagreement amongst scholars regarding the mechanisms through 
which it achieves its goals and cultivates nationalist sentiment. Scholarship in this area 
can be divided into three dominant approaches: instrumentalist, constructivist, and 
primordialist (Levinger and Lytle 2001:176; Dawisha 2002:3). Primordialism views 
national identity as immutable; it cannot be created or altered through social 
construction or through purposeful manipulation, but is rather a spiritual communion 
born out of a complex web of social structures that constitute a people’s inherited 
perceptions, identities, and interests. Primordialists thus view the appeal of nationalism 
to be the result of already existing social and cultural connections which nationalism 
simply affirms. Anthony D. Smith’s work has displayed primordialist tendencies, and 
he has suggested, against instrumentalism, for example, that the failed nation-building 
efforts of communist élites in Russia were an example of a cultural and primordial 
limitation on instrumentalist efforts to construct a new national referent (1992:47–48).  
Instrumentalists, such as Gellner, Breuilly, Greenfeld, and Brass,5 in contrast, 
depict nationalism primarily as an instrument of social élites in the service of socio-
economic development or state-building, and they emphasise the ways in which these 
élites manipulate the national idea in order to fulfil other objectives, such as the 
maintenance of their own position in a class hierarchy. For Gellner, therefore, 
nationalism emerged as a necessary tool for the creation of modern, industrialised 
nations. For him, nationalism is concerned with the ‘organization of human groups into 
large, centrally educated, culturally homogenous units’ which are a feature of the 
modern industrialist need for a large, literate, and mobile workforce with a built-in 
capacity for ‘precise communication between strangers’ (1983:33–5, 40). Breuilly 
presents a similar argument, defining nationalism as a ‘form of politics’ that is useful for 
the ‘objective of obtaining and using state power’. Thus political movements which hope 
to gain control of the state require ‘coordination, mobilisation, and legitimacy’ and 
nationalism thus is a powerful tool for those purposes (1985:1–2). Paul Brass’ 
instrumentalism leads him to claim that the study of ethnicity and nationality is ‘in large 
part the study of politically-induced cultural change’ that is, the analysis of a process ‘by 
                                                           
5 Other scholars who follow an instrumentalist approach include Charles Tilly (1975; 1990), Eric 
Hobsbawm (1990), and Michael Mann (1995). 
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which élites and counterélites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, 
attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilise the group, 
to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups’ (1991:75). Élites in the 
instrumentalist view emphasise or invent particular traditions that they then endow as 
national in order to create the appearance of a people’s historical continuity and to 
cement their collective identity (Greenfeld 1992:13). Gellner similarly argues that 
‘Nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or 
cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them 
radically. Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine 
purities restored’ (1983:55–56). However, the instrumentalist approach fails to account 
for why nationalist sentiment appeals so strongly to the non-élite audiences of this 
rhetoric (Levinger and Lytle 2001:176) and it further creates the impression that the 
lower classes lack any agentive identity and are unable to create their own forms of 
collectivity.  
Constructivists, on the other hand, explain the powerful attraction of nationalist 
ideology by linking it to the definition of communal identity in response to the 
attenuation of traditional allegiances, for example the breakdown of traditional social 
structures that result from modernisation and industrialisation. This approach is 
exemplified by Anderson (1991; see also Babha 1990a; Greenfeld 1992; Said 1993) who 
emphasises the inventive and temporal quality of national identity, as well as its 
versatility in multiple political and social contexts. By rooting nationalism in operations 
of communal imagination, constructivists resist the primordialist assertion of the 
material basis of the nation in race, language, culture, or geography, supply a 
convincing narrative of the logic by which nationalism emerged in the modern period, 
and offer a useful corrective to the essentialist claims of nationalists themselves. 
Nonetheless, constructivism pays less attention to the specific vectors of nationalist 
action. Rather than presenting nuanced analyses of the techniques of national 
mobilisation, constructivist theorists have often been content merely to develop 
typologies of nationalism, contrasting its benevolent forms with those that are more 
pernicious. In practice, however, instrumentalism and constructivism are closely related: 
both emphasise the malleability of nations and nation-building, both accept that social 
structures, rather than essentialist biological or ethnic givens, create the bonds that 
connect people within a nation together, and both agree that nations are not pre-
determined entities but are rather constructed. They differ only in their views of how 
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these social connections are created and maintained, leading Dawisha to characterise the 
instrumentalist approach as one that sees nation building as ‘purposeful construction’ 
(2001:6; my emphasis) as opposed to construction that does not carry a subtext of élite 
intervention.6  
In my view, each approach has merit. Although the primordialist view has been 
convincingly challenged by scholars who take a constructivist or instrumentalist 
approach, it is helpful insofar as it offers a primarily descriptive account of at least 
cultural nationalists’ self-understanding; despite the modernity of nationalism, many 
nationalists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries consistently identified their 
histories as extending into the primordial past. The instrumentalist and constructivist 
accounts provide a useful analytical framework for understanding the discursive 
formation of national sentiment which Calhoun has described as providing ‘a common 
rhetoric to diverse movements and policies’ (1997:7). 
My own approach in looking at German nationalism as cultural form is to 
combine the constructivist and instrumentalist frameworks while at the same time 
maintaining that most nationalists do not create nationalist sentiment ex nihilo. Thus, I 
do not want to deny the constructive efforts of nationalists but rather to insist that these 
efforts were undertaken with reference to pre-existing traditions, territories, and 
symbols, however they were re-employed by élites or, equally, by non-élites. In seeking 
to merge these perspectives I wish both to acknowledge the primordialist pretensions of 
the German nationalists of the nineteenth century and to assess the degree of 
construction they undertook in the process of mobilising the general populace. These 
nationalists diagnosed the causes of a perceived national degeneration, specified the 
efforts required to redeem the German nation, and thus prescribed the appropriate 
forms of political action that would secure the establishment of a unified nation state. 
They did so through the juxtaposition of idealised images of the nation's past and 
projected future with a degraded present. 
                                                           
6 Because of the close relationship of constructivism and instrumentalism, several scholars have 
sought to bridge the gap between them by examining the élite deployment of national narratives 
in order to mobilise their followers and tracking the disseminatory mechanisms that are used to 
achieve national loyalty amongst the broader populace. See, for example, Kedourie 1993; 
Brubacker 1996; Hechter 1987a; 1987b; Calhoun 1997. Anthony Smith, despite being frequently 
described as a primordialist, has also employed constructivist and instrumentalist approaches. See 
Smith 1971; 1986; 1988; 1991.  
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(ii) The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric 
Levinger and Lytle define this nationalist preoccupation with the past, present, and 
future as the ‘triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric’ (2001) and argue that virtually all 
rhetoric of national mobilisation contains these three juxtaposed elements, which they 
define as follows: 
1. The glorious past. The original nation once existed as a pure, unified and 
harmonious community. 
2. The degraded present. The shattering of this corporate unity through some 
agency or traumatic series of events undermined the integrity of the national 
community. A key dimension of this rhetoric is the identification of the sources 
of the nation’s decay. 
3. The utopian future. Through collective action, the nation will reverse the 
conditions that have caused its present degradation and recover its original 
harmonious essence. 
(2001:178) 
These three temporal frames are thus placed in an oppositional relationship where the 
past and future are contrasted with the derogated present and the establishment of a 
nation becomes both an inversion of the current turbulent condition and a reconstitution 
of the ideal primordial community.  
Levinger and Lytle argue that the nationalist discourse that employs this triadic 
structure invokes a ‘highly effective rhetorical strategy for mobilisation’ where 
nationalist movements ‘proceed from the realm of political imagination to the realm of 
action’ (ibid.). Nationalists who encode the national project in this way therefore seek to 
(re)create an idealised community and to mobilise support for the nationalist project 
through harnessing the archaic force of the past. This mediation of historical 
consciousness through recourse to the glorious past is one way of mastering what 
Anderson (1991) calls ‘contingency’, of making national allegiances appear to be not 
random and fleeting, but rather providential, consecrated, and immutable. It also lends 
gravity and authority to the national cause in terms of granting a high pedigree of 
inheritance, and, as Levinger and Lytle note, ‘delineate[s] specific sets of virtues that the 
nation must recapture in order to emulate its original greatness’ (2001:179). Moreover, 
where territory is contested, the communal past may be used to provide prior title for 
one or other ethnic community or nation. Finally, the communal—but distant past—is 
malleable and as such lends itself well to the constructive projects of nationalists insofar 
as they seek to promote a particular version of nationalist history. As I will show in the 
following chapter, each of these elements characterised the German nationalist effort as 
implemented by the romantic nationalists. The juxtaposition of highly stylised and 
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selective images of the community’s past, present and future thus served two critical 
rhetorical purposes: first, it motivated its audiences to join the collective struggle, to 
claim their share of the nation’s glorious past; and secondly, it defined the appropriate 
vectors—that is, the alignment of the national community with an inventory of retrieved 
virtues—for nationalist action and thus cultivated a sense of belonging.  
Much of this rhetoric depended on a nostalgic image of a nation’s golden age 
which was used to transform the meanings of the past and the future so that they 
became one and the same, and could thereby persuade a population to align themselves 
with the national project. Anthony Smith has reflected insightfully on the way in which 
nationalists seek a ‘usable past’ constructed as a ‘golden age’, suggesting that the 
‘greater, more glorious that antiquity appears, the easier it becomes to mobilise people 
around a common culture, to unify the various groups of which they are composed and 
to identify a shared national identity’ and that, in the nineteenth century, ‘“antiquity” 
became almost synonymous with ethnic liberation and efflorescence’ (1997a:39; 41). 
Smith identifies five functions that the concept of a golden age played in the 
emergent nationalist projects of the modern era (1997a:48–52), showing the ways in 
which ‘politics and religion are frequently fused to generate powerful concepts of an 
ethnic past that can fire the imaginations of the members of a community’ (1997:48). 
Firstly, it satisfies the ‘quest for authenticity’ (ibid.) that hinges on two types of identity 
formation: one of origin where ‘“who we are” is determined by “whence we came”’ and 
one of difference where ‘who we are’ is determined through mythic schemes of alterity 
(1997:49). Thus, the golden age is used to establish and delineate the nature of the ‘true 
self’, the authentic character, of the community. The primordial existence of the nation 
guarantees its authenticity, its original and unadulterated nature. Secondly, the golden 
age concept functions to ‘locate and re-root the community in its own historic and fertile 
space’ (ibid.). As such it invokes a discourse of territoriality that connects temporality 
with spatiality and legitimates as well as ‘nationalises’ an attachment to a particular 
landscape (see also Penrose 2002). Thirdly, it consolidates a sense of ‘continuity between 
the generations’ (Smith 1997a:50), and thus prioritises a teleological model of history 
that renders the national community as a ‘lineal descendant through linkages of name, 
place, language and symbol’ (ibid.) In this function, the ‘meaning’ of the present is 
determined by the past where cultural and ethnic affinity with prior generations is 
established through recourse to a model of genealogical descent. As Smith suggests, 
…the task of nationalists is essentially one of political archaeology: to rediscover 
and reconstruct the life of each period of the community’s history, to establish the 
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linkages and layerings between each period, and hence to demonstrate the 
continuity of ‘the nation’, which is assumed to persist as a discrete, slowly changing 
identity of collective values, myths, symbols, and memories. 
(ibid.) 
The fourth function is essentially mnemonic: it serves to recollect the dignity and 
nobility of a community and affords a standard of comparison and evaluation in 
relation to both the past of the community and that of its neighbours. Further, 
remembrance in this form proclaims an impending status reversal where those 
communities that are currently oppressed may be restored to their former greatness: 
‘Memories of the golden age proclaim the hope of restoration of the community to its 
former high estate and true mission, thereby revealing the community’s true worth and 
its ancient and noble pedigree’ (1997:51). Finally, it functions to invoke a myth of divine 
election that imbues a community with a persistent sense of its providential destiny. As 
such, the noble past of a nation is used to prepare it for a pre-ordained destiny and to 
reveal a ‘hidden direction and goal beneath the obscuring present’ (ibid.; see also 
Cauthen 2004 and Guibernau and Hutchinson 2004). 
Taken together, the functions of the concept of a golden age all seem to rely on 
an assumption of linear inheritance for the community from a singular point of origin. 
In fact, singularity is the primary characteristic of the origin in this context. Further, the 
concept also serves continually to derogate the present in favour of the past and the 
future and to offer an analysis of the present as a ‘diagnosis of loss’ (Levinger and Lytle 
2001:181) with heavily nostalgic overtones. Within the rhetoric of nationalism that 
employs a concept of a golden age, there are various genres of loss: loss of language, of 
cultural integrity, of territory, of racial purity, of original unity, and so on. The 
significance of the diagnosis is that it enables the nation as community to be identified 
and demarcated through the attribution of its causes either to an internal agency—for 
example, moral degeneration—or an external factor such as military defeat. Thus the 
loss of linguistic, cultural, or racial purity is attributed to the intervention of another 
nation and serves as a marker for more consequential traumas, such as the loss of actual 
territory. In the context of German nationalism, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778–1852), an 
important figure in the cultivation of German patriotism, pointed to both internal and 
external factors leading to the nation’s current decline. For Jahn, the German people had 
never overcome the ‘wretched, shameful Peace of Westphalia’ of 1648 imposed by other 
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nations.7 Internally, for Jahn, the loss of racial purity through Germany’s failure to heed 
Tacitus’ claim that the Germans were a people who had not mixed with others groups, 
endangered the inherent vigour of the German people (see Kluckhorn 1934:160). 
The nostalgic valorisation of the past and the consequent derogation of the 
present also implies a utopian subtext where the future is elevated to a myth of destiny, 
characterised by the reunification of the national community and an inversion of the 
present through the assertion of a rhetoric of commonality (Levinger and Lytle 
2001:185). An example of this expectant form of nationalism is well represented by Ernst 
Moritz Arndt (1769–1860) who was one of the most influential nationalists in Germany 
during the Napoleonic era. During the French occupation of the German territories 
(1806–1813) Arndt offered a vision of German unity, urging his compatriots to unite 
together on the basis of their singular unity in the past: 
From the North Sea to the Carpathians, from the Baltic to the Alps, from the Vistula 
to the Schelde, one belief, one love, one spirit, and one passion must again bring 
together the whole German Volk in brotherly union. They must learn to feel how 
great, powerful, and fortunate their fathers were in obedience to one German 
emperor and one Reich, when the many feuds had not yet incited them against one 
another. 
(in Kluckhorn 1934:141) 
Moreover, in the absence of a powerful and unified nation-state, Arndt argued that 
collective unity had to be established from below—from the people themselves—rather 
than through entrusting the future to political leaders and monarchs. Thus the idyllic 
past was mirrored by a projected and redemptive image of German solidarity.  
Underlying this type nationalist rhetoric, therefore, is a concern to mobilise the 
general populace to act in accordance with the kind of loss that has been diagnosed. One 
of the main mechanisms of mobilisation is myth. Myth as a ‘narration of nation’ (Babha 
1990a) acts as a central force in the creation of the kind of nationalist rhetoric that 
advocates the triadic structure of past-present-future as well as an inspirational guide 
for collective action. In general terms the nationalist rhetoric that employs an image of a 
                                                           
7 The Peace of Westphalia refers to the treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) which 
granted official recognition to the Dutch Republic and Swiss Confederation. The treaty was 
essentially an agreement between the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III, the other German 
princes, representatives from the Dutch republic, France, and Sweden. Its effect was that the 
power of the Holy Roman Emperor was radically curtailed and the rulers of the German states 
were again able to determine the religion of their lands. Thus, all parties were called upon to 
recognise the Peace of Augsburg (1555), by which each prince in the German territories would 
have the right to determine the religion of his own state, the options being Lutheranism or 
Catholicism (on the principle of cuius regio, eius religio discussed in Chapter 2). The treaty 
essentially laid to rest the idea of the Holy Roman Empire as having secular dominion over the 
entire Christian world. The terms of the treaty decreed that the nation-state would be the highest 
level of government, subservient to no others. 
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golden age and a future utopia is itself a form of mythmaking—of creating a heroic 
narrative of the nation by tracking its progress from the past to the present and through 
to a projected future as an iterable reflection of the past. As such it represents a fusion of 
diagnostic and prescriptive discourses (see Levinger and Lytle 2001:186) in that it 
identifies agentive culpability through a narration of the cause of national degeneration 
and simultaneously prescribes the forms of collective action required to restore the 
original status quo. A more specific analysis of myth and mythmaking in the context of 
German nationalism reveals a second type of employment of the genre, where existing 
vernacular narratives were retrieved as reservoirs of national character and served as 
manuals of Germanic virtues. This activity was founded upon the assumptions of loss 
and plans for redemption. Narratives of loss and redemption were a crucial tool for 
defining the collective identity of the national people; membership in the national 
community was predicated upon one’s participation in the collective struggle, and on 
sharing this narrative framework. Nationalist myth, as such, acted as a kind of collective 
and familiar shorthand to invoke nationalist sentiment and was, moreover, thoroughly 
selective in the events it narrated as specifically national. This selectivity expressed the 
essence of national identification both in the past and in the projected future. However, 
the articulation of the imagined history that was articulated in this way should not be 
understood as a simply true or false account, but rather as a narrative that expressed the 
central concerns of the national movement’s core vision and sense of its own identity 
whether through a broader narration of nation or through the subsidiary retrieval of 
vernacular myth traditions, and this is an aspect I will follow up in the next chapter.  
(iii) Nationalism and Gender 
Along with class, race, ethnicity, and linguistic vectors, gender was a central element in 
the process of national definition. As McClintock has suggests, ‘All nations depend on 
powerful constructions of gender. Despite nationalism’s ideological investment in the 
idea of popular unity, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned 
institutionalisation of gender difference’ (1993:61). Thus, the construction of nationalist 
identity within both cultural and civic nationalisms which purported to reconstitute an 
original unity was undermined by an underlying discourse of gender difference. Most 
of the debates I have outlined above, particularly regarding the distinctions drawn 
between the forms of nationalism, have either been gender-blind, or have enumerated 
gender as merely one element amongst others in the struggle to define the national 
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community. There is, however, a growing body of scholarship that has demonstrated 
that in the history of identity formation within the context of nationalism, bifurcated 
notions of gender were crucial to the conception of the modern nation and the definition 
of membership.8  
Much of the feminist scholarship that has addressed the relationship between 
gender and nationalism has tended to focus exclusively on women.9 As a result, it has 
failed to examine systematically what might be uniquely masculine, in a structural, 
cultural, or social sense, about the gendered trajectories of nationalism. Joane Nagel is 
one exception arguing that nationalist politics are an expressly masculinist enterprise, 
and suggesting that the ‘modern form of Western masculinity emerged at about the 
same time and place as modern nationalism’ (1998:249). Here she follows Mosse who 
has noted that nationalism was ‘a movement which began and evolved parallel to 
modern masculinity’ and who has described masculinity as a centrepiece of all forms of 
nationalist activity: ‘The masculine stereotype was not bound to any one of the powerful 
political ideologies of the previous century….Modern masculinity from the very first 
was co-opted by the new nationalist movements of the nineteenth century’ (Mosse 
1996:7). I will show in the following chapters that the attempt to define national identity 
was absolutely intertwined with an effort to define masculine identity through recourse 
to patrilineal models of inheritance, through the appropriation of reproductive 
metaphors to explain and legitimise male nationalist activity, and through a sharp 
differentiation between appropriate male and female behaviour. Cynthia Enloe has also 
made a link between masculinity and nationalism, arguing that ‘nationalism has 
typically sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and 
masculinised hope’ (1990:45). She suggests that within much nationalist discourse, 
women are relegated to minor, often symbolic, roles either as icons of nationhood, to be 
elevated and defended, or as the spoils of war, to be denigrated or marginalised. In 
                                                           
8 See, for example, Mosse 1985; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Hall 1993; Einhorn 1996; Eisenstein 
1985; Mackinnon 1989; Walby 1989; Enloe 1990, 1993; Davis, Leijenaar, and Oldersma 1991; 
Wendy Brown 1992. 
9 However, as Anne McClintock has noted ‘if male theorists are typically indifferent to the 
gendering of nations, feminist analyses of nationalism have been lamentably few and far between. 
White feminists, in particular, have been slow to recognise nationalism as a feminist issue’ 
(1995:356–357). McClintock raises an important point here, that is, that the connections between 
gender and nationalism have been long recognised by postcolonial feminists who have pioneered 
research in the area and in so doing have drawn attention to a further relationship between 
colonialism and nationalism and the differentiated, agonistic experience that many non-western 
women have to feminism as a result. See, for example, Jayawardena 1986; De Mel 2001; Kim and 
Choi 1998; Moghadam 1994; Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991; Sarkar 2001; Sunder Rajan 1993; 
Yuval-Davis 1997. 
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either case the appropriate agents of nationalist effort are considered to be men who 
characterise their activities as the defence of freedom, honour, the homeland, and 
women (see also Brodbeck 2006). Thus, as Nagel argues, ‘Terms like honour, patriotism, 
cowardice, bravery and duty are hard to distinguish as either nationalistic or 
masculinist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manliness’ 
(1998:252). Constructions of gender identity—whether masculine or feminine—seem, 
therefore, to be central to efforts to determine the ideal form of the nation and the basis 
of membership, and further, are closely related to a patrilineal model of family within 
which most nationalists determine the relationships of a community’s members.  
Cultural nationalism invariably invoked a traditional or ‘natural’ domestic role 
for women and a public role for men. Women in particular tended to be viewed as 
having a role prior to the establishment of the nation state, acting as ‘mothers’ of the 
people. As O’Brien suggests, within the symbolic economy of nationalism, woman-as-
mother serves a unificatory purpose where the ‘maternal image…allows a particular 
group to identify itself in terms of an organic unit: the family’ (O’Brien 1996–7:18). 
Consequently, women’s place in the national community becomes symbolically 
representative of the origin of the putatively historical, quasi-organic primordial 
community in the glorious past (Kandiyoti 1991:434). However, simultaneously, women 
can be seen as threatening to the traditional order in the derogated present because the 
emancipatory discourses of modernisation that ostensibly offer women full citizenship 
are deemed to be a contributory factor in the breakdown of social order. The burden of 
national ‘parenthood’ is only symbolically associated with women if they behave in 
conformity with a conservatively construed femininity, enabling men to represent 
themselves on the model of the patriarchal family as the legitimate heads of the national 
‘family’.  
Yuval-Davis and Anthias have identified five modes in which women have 
participated in nationalism: (i) as biological producers of members of ethnic 
collectivities; (ii) as reproducers of the normative boundaries of ethnic/national groups 
by conforming to ‘appropriate’ forms of feminine behaviour; (iii) as participating 
centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its 
culture; (iv) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and (v) as participants in 
national, economic, political and military struggles (1989:7–8). Women’s active 
participation in these ‘struggles’ however is very often limited in a male-dominated 
public sphere. Thus Yuval-Davis and Anthias note that a good deal of pressure is often 
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exerted on women by male nationalists to remain in supportive, symbolic, and 
traditional roles. Nagel suggests that this is partially due to the tendency of nationalists 
to be ‘retraditionalisers’ (1996:193), one that is explicable if the form of nationalism that 
is promoted invokes a concept of the past as a golden age of stable social arrangements. 
It seems, therefore, that the concept of a ‘golden age’ often inscribes patriarchal values. 
Civic nationalism was similarly conceived and practised in gendered rather 
than universalist terms, at least insofar as political activity was viewed as a solely male 
prerogative prior to the twentieth century, and because, at least since the eighteenth 
century, men have been considered to be paradigmatic citizens. Glenda Sluga, for 
example, whose work examines post-revolutionary and nineteenth-century France, has 
shown how civic nationalism has a history of excluding women from the rights of 
citizenship, and that this exclusion was ‘increasingly premised on the identification of 
“femininity” with the private sphere’ (1998:90). Moreover, as Thomas Lacquer (1992) has 
shown, the earlier sixteenth- and seventeenth-century notion that women’s bodies were 
inversions of men’s was displaced from the late eighteenth-century onwards, as a 
specific outcome of the Enlightenment prioritisation of a mind/body dualism, by the 
idea of two oppositionally differentiated bodies. The subsequent grounding of gender 
difference in sexual difference had two effects: firstly, the masculine body was construed 
as both the social and the anatomical norm, and, secondly, this justified the exclusion of 
women from the now abstracted rhetoric of universal rights. 
Within civic nationalism, as within cultural nationalism, the patriarchal family 
was portrayed as a microcosm of the social, economic and political order. Women’s 
motherly role was emphasised as an essential contribution to the cultivation of 
children’s nationalist loyalty in the domestic, private setting—the mother had 
responsibility for training her children to be good citizens—while the familial model of 
the nation-state endowed men with public political authority through an analogy drawn 
with their role as the head of the family. Any activity by women in the public sphere of 
politics defied this naturalised gender order and could therefore be represented as 
‘nationally subversive’ (Sluga 1998:91).10 Thus, even though women were considered to 
have a central role in the creation of nation and served as symbols of the primordial 
community, beliefs regarding women’s inherent ‘disorderliness’ on the model of their 
fluid and unmanageable corporeality meant that they could simultaneously be 
                                                           
10 Sluga shows how the excesses of the French Revolution were blamed on women’s emancipation 
and the consequent blurring of gender hierarchies (1998:89–98). See also Harrison 2001. 
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represented as a threat to the nation, justifying the curtailment of their participation in 
the public sphere. As Sluga suggests, the logical corollary of the French Revolution’s 
emancipatory discourse of universal rights should have been the extension of 
citizenship to women, but that even so ‘the structural and discursive enforcement of a 
sexually differentiated public/private divide meant that the constitutional formalisation 
of citizenship was also the basis of women’s legal exclusion from the nationally defined 
bourgeois public sphere’ (1998:93).  
The discourse that insisted on the gendered distinction between the public and 
the private, and which defined appropriate femininity as domestic, was certainly 
predominantly a bourgeois affair, closely related to attempts by the middle classes to 
expand their social and political power through the assertion of traditional family values 
and the development of a discourse of respectability.11 As Sluga suggests, women’s own 
patriotic efforts were confined to the ‘the active reassertion of women’s definitive 
“domesticity”, or in some cases “maternity”’. She further notes that this did not, 
however, guarantee their citizenship, an aspect that reveals ‘the limits of the political 
inclusiveness of early-nineteenth-century patriotism (and political nationalism)’ 
(1998:100). It is no surprise to find, therefore, that in nineteenth-century Germany, many 
bourgeois women expressed their national sentiment in terms of their duties in the 
home and the creation of domestic order, contrasting their housekeeping habits with 
those of women in other European nations and colonial contexts. Nancy Reagin argues, 
for example, in seeking to understand how German women understood their own 
national identity, that the community of German bourgeois Hausfrauen was an 
‘imagined community’ along the lines suggested by Anderson (1991).12 For her, 
                                                           
11 Mosse argues that the cultivation of bourgeois respectability was definitive of German 
nationality and that German resistance to French occupation was ‘waged on behalf of patriotism 
and morality, both of which determined the direction of the new national self-consciousness’ 
(1985:6). See also Mosse 1982 where he further links the gendering of respectability to the control 
of sexuality and suggests that ‘the history of sexuality became part of the history of nationalism’ 
because it ‘not only helped to control sexuality, to reinforce what society considered normal, but it 
also provided the means through which changing sexual attitudes could be absorbed and tamed 
into respectability’ (1982:222).  
12 See also Chickering 1988 who examines the marginalised role of women in nationalist 
associations in nineteenth-century Germany, suggesting that their presence in these organisations 
undermined the separation between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ spheres. However, the actual 
number of women involved was very small and their primary role was deemed, by the male 
leaders of these associations, to be the raising of ‘German’ children. Hagemann provides further 
evidence for the view that women’s patriotic activities were confined to their domestic role and 
related to what was considered to be traditional feminine behaviour. She analyses a pamphlet 
published in 1913 to commemorate the centenary of German resistance to the French occupation 
entitled ‘Heroic Maidens and Women of a Great Era’ which portrays women as ‘consciously 
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although ‘most of its members would never meet each other’ they nonetheless saw 
themselves as belonging to a common group and that sense of belonging ‘helped define 
the national identity’ of these women (2001:54–55). Reagin analyses housewives’ 
magazines and other advice literature to show how the creation of ‘collective norms 
regarding household management, housekeeping practices, and the specific symbols of 
domesticity that arose out of housework’ assisted in the creation of a collective, national 
identity for bourgeois German women. For Reagin, ‘the idealized standards promoted 
in German advice literature were important as yardsticks for the organization of 
identity, both on an individual basis (in helping to determine a woman’s reputation) 
and in the context of national comparisons’ (2001:58). In the following chapter I will 
discuss how the concept of separate gendered spheres was further reinforced in 
collections of vernacular folklore of the kind undertaken by the Grimm brothers. 
Women’s and men’s relations to the modern nation thus had different 
trajectories. As McClintock observes, ‘Women are represented as the atavistic and 
authentic “body” of national tradition….Men, by contrast, represent the progressive 
agent of national modernity’ (1993:66). The role of women, then, was strongly identified 
with the nation’s backward gaze to its putative origins and traditions, although sons, in 
taking on this knowledge, could use it to push the nation forward to a utopian future. 
But if women were the passive guardians of national traditions and morals, the modern 
state located its masculine forebears as fathers and leaders of the nation and as the fount 
of the nation’s native skills and genius: the patriot’s patrimony. As such there was some 
ambiguity in the claim that women were the mothers of the nation. It would seem, 
rather, that they occupied a purely symbolic role, or were figured as a site of projected 
nationalist desire, rendering them passive and interring them in the private sphere. Men 
were consequently able to appropriate a reproductive metaphor—one where they were 
cast in the role of fathers of the nation—to characterise their nation-building efforts and 
to grant legitimacy to the conception of the nation as a matter for the public sphere.  
Sluga has also examined the close association of fatherhood with nationalism, 
going so far as to claim that nationality, at least in the context of post-revolutionary 
France under the Code Napoléon,13 was conceived in patrilinear terms insofar as it 
                                                                                                                                                             
rejecting all French influences in culture, language and dress and by performing their female 
“duties” in household and family in keeping with “German manners”’ (2004:398). 
13 The original Code Napoléon was the French civil code, established at the behest of Napoléon I in 
March 1804. It was based both on earlier French laws and Roman law, and followed Justinian's 
Corpus Juris Civilis (‘Body of Civil Law’, which was issued from 529 to 534 by order of Justinian I, 
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articulated a ‘preference which incurred particular paternal responsibilities’ (1998:94). 
Thus an emphasis was placed on the father’s role in securing the nationality of his 
progeny and fathers were legally required under the Code to bear witness to the birth of 
their children. Sluga further suggests that this responsibility was translated into a 
symbol of masculine responsibility for the birth of the nation and as such is indicative of 
a male fear of women’s reproductive ability and a tendency to appropriate reproduction 
as a male domain, further ensuring the marginalisation of women from the political 
process of nation building. Although this was the situation in France, nationalist 
responsibilities were conceived in very similar terms in Germany. In terms that echo 
Herder’s recommendation that fathers should be responsible for passing national 
traditions and values on to their children, Fichte, in his tenth ‘Address to the German 
Nation’ (1807), invoked an image of the father as the parent best placed to cultivate a 
sense of identity and—through an analogical association—nationalist sentiment in his 
child due the child’s instinctive concern to emulate ‘his’ father: 
In the child this instinct appears first of all as the desire to be respected by those 
who inspire in him the highest respect….[L]ove…is directed as a rule far more 
strongly and decisively toward the sterner parent, the father, who is more often 
absent, and who does not appear directly as a benefactor, than toward the mother, 
who with her beneficence is ever present. The child wants to be noticed by him, 
wants to have his approval; only insofar as the father is satisfied with him is he 
satisfied with himself. This is the natural love of the child for the father, not as the 
guardian of his sensuous well-being, but as the mirror, from which his own worth 
or worthlessness is reflected for him. 
(1968:147) 
In its nationalist context, Fichte’s statement implies that as the child relates to the father 
as a ‘mirror of his worth’, so does the individual relate to the nation. Thus the father 
stands as a discursive metaphor: he becomes the ‘creator god’ of the nation, an ideal 
horizon of national identity.14  
                                                                                                                                                             
Byzantine Emperor) in dividing civil law into personal status, property, and the acquisition of 
property. The intention behind the Code was to reform the French legal system in accordance with 
the principles of the French Revolution. During the Revolution, vestiges of feudalism were 
abolished, and the many different legal systems used in different parts of France were to be 
replaced by a single legal code. With regards to family, the Code established the supremacy of the 
husband with respect to the wife and children. It was adopted in many countries occupied by the 
French during the Napoleonic Wars and thus formed the basis of the private law systems also of 
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and their former colonies. In the German regions 
on the left bank of the Rhine the Napoleonic Code was in use until the introduction of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch in 1900 as the first common civil code for the entire German empire. 
14 Marilyn Lake has identified this appropriation of procreation in nationalist rhetoric that figured 
in nation-building efforts following the collapse of the ancien régime: ‘The king, or father, comes 
under attack: his monopoly of politically creative power is seized and shared equally among men. 
In civil society all men, not just fathers, can generate political life and political right. Political right 
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Gendered corporeal differentiation also served to delineate national, and thus 
territorial, boundaries. Moira Gatens (1991:Ch. 2; 1995) has suggested that gendered 
depictions of corporeal difference are directly related to national membership and 
citizenship rights. She argues that through the imagining of the body politic as 
masculine, women are placed at a social and political disadvantage and are 
consequently more easily excluded from imaginings of nationhood. Thus, in the context 
of nationalism, because men’s bodies were represented as naturally equipped to be both 
defenders of the nation and invaders of other nations, women were portrayed as having 
no ‘natural’ affinity with the nation. The representation of their bodies as unbounded, 
defenceless territory reinforced the analogy between the vulnerable corporeality of 
women and that of the national territory, and legitimised and naturalised the vigilant, 
protective male role. This vulnerability was reflected in the reluctance of many 
European nations to grant women full citizenship rights—Germany granted women the 
vote in 1918, the United Kingdom in 1928, and France in 1944. As Sluga notes, ‘In terms 
of the concept of “cultural” nationalism, masculine individuals embodied nationality’ 
(1998:104). In terms of civic nationalism the Enlightenment emphasis on male autonomy 
was translated, again through a corporeal image, into the sovereignty of the nation state 
or citizens.  
Significantly, territory itself is often referred to in nationalist rhetoric as 
explicitly gendered, either as a motherland or fatherland, and as such, it figures as a 
trope for the nation’s origins. The nature of these origins express a dualistic discourse of 
sexual differentiation. The gendering of the homeland (‘Heimat’) in the case of German 
nationalism presents an interesting and ambivalent case. The nation in Germany was 
invariably referred to as the Vaterland (‘Fatherland’) but obvious anxieties around the 
permeability of its borders in the aftermath of the French occupation indicated a 
contradictory notion of territory figured as explicitly female. The national mythology 
that emerged out of German romanticism, an aspect I explore in the following two 
chapters, was a clear attempt to resolve this ambiguity through the imposition (within 
myth traditions and on the landscape) of characters and monuments that 
simultaneously celebrated and constructed an inspirational form of archaic masculinity 
that appropriated territory as male and, therefore, impenetrable.  
                                                                                                                                                             
is defined in terms of sex-right. Political creativity belongs not to paternity, but masculinity. Men 
give birth to nations’ (1992:312). 
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In addition to the patrilineal overlay of the nationalist rhetoric, metaphors of 
fraternal relationships also played an important and related role in creating, developing, 
and maintaining the bonds of the national community. Carole Pateman (1988) has 
suggested that the French Revolution marked a transition from the principle of paternity 
to that of fraternity—a brotherhood which depended once more on the exclusion of 
women—in the work of social contract theorists from the seventeenth century onwards. 
Marilyn Lake (1992) builds on Pateman’s work to link the fraternity of the pubic sphere 
to the ‘birthing’ of nations, noting a shift in nationalist rhetoric from a paternal to a 
fraternal model of sovereignty. However, in my view, paternity was still the underlying 
metaphor upon which fraternal bonds were established between men, particularly with 
regard to the national role of ‘fathers’ in establishing the nation state outlined above: in 
this context brothers are brothers because they share the same father, that is, the nation 
or homeland. The character of fraternal bonds and the fraternal basis of national unity 
were predicated on an emergent essentialist discourse of masculinity determined 
through the definition of particular virtues as ‘manly’. Mosse (1996) has described these 
as markers of ‘normative masculinity’; they included willpower, honour, courage, 
discipline, competitiveness, strength, stoicism, independence, sexual virility tempered 
with restraint, and dignity, all of which were thought to be reflected in masculine ideals 
as liberty, equality, and fraternity. 15 Thus the culture of nationalism, whether cultural or 
civic, provided a venue in which men could ‘accomplish’ their masculinity (Connell 
1987). It was constructed to emphasise and resonate with the construction of masculine 
culture but also to provide a patriarchal familial framework in which to understand the 
seemingly natural foundation of national unity. Unity and fraternalism were 
interchangeable concepts. Fichte, for example, argued in his tenth ‘Address to the 
German Nation’ that the German people needed to be educated nationally in order to 
develop the strength of character required for the nation-building effort, and that this 
would bond them together as ‘men of one mind’ (1968:148). Martina Kessel argues that 
in the German-speaking regions of the nineteenth century, while the construction of 
masculinity by the educated élite always included a relational reference to femininity, 
                                                           
15 See Connell 1990. These ‘manly virtues’ were attempts to establish a normative definition of 
masculinity which excluded many men who did not fit the ideal model. Thus masculinity in the 
context of nineteenth-century nationalism articulated the meaning of manhood in terms of what it 
was not: feminine, homosexual, and black, Jewish, Indian, and so on. Connell suggests the term 
‘hegemonic masculinity’ to understand the appeal of this model in that it sets an aspirational ideal 
for male behaviour, actions, and demeanour. 
  131 
in the model of the ganzer Mann (the whole, well-rounded, but also “real” or 
“proper” man), it ignored this relational character. It thus became possible to 
imagine a purely male world without the dependence upon femininity that the 
relational model necessarily implied. 
(2003:2) 
This exclusively male—one might say, homosocial—fraternal world thus 
enabled the definition of the public sphere as masculine. Moreover, it aided the military 
discipline and comradeship that was necessary for resisting the French occupation. 
Hoffmann, who examines the striking increase in Masonic lodges in nineteenth-century 
Germany, suggests that ‘While, both in public and private spheres, men increasingly 
sought to accord with the ideal of a man ruled by reason, emotional relations between 
men attained increasing significance in locations which were removed from the family 
and from the public’ (2001:225). He cites a speech given at a Masonic lodge in 1858 in 
Stuttgart to demonstrate how comradeship between men was seen to be the basis of civil 
society (2001:226). As such, the creation of homosocial spaces carried with it a subtext of 
male purity where male friendship was related to moral improvement and to a strong 
sense of unity upon which the nationalist project was contingent. The advocacy and 
idealisation of male friendship will be further explored in Chapter 6. 
Imaginings of national territory either as female or male but defined and 
defended by both individually and collectively imagined male bodies, the father’s 
education of his sons into national citizenship and soldiery, the consequent valorisation 
of a fraternal bond between men, and the figuring of the nation as a patriarchal family 
were all recurring motifs in nineteenth-century formulations of national identity. 
Further, they coincided with the masculine identification of the public sphere and of 
active citizenship that was characteristic of civic nationalism, and aided the valorisation 
of the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric that was a particular feature of cultural 
nationalism. In my view, the significance of the alignment of hegemonic models of 
masculinity with concepts of the nation in the nineteenth century is that it points to an 
underlying anxiety regarding the stability and feasibility of both male identity and 
national identity. Nationalist movements arose in response to unprecedented social and 
political changes and were an attempt both to ameliorate and to accommodate their 
effects through recourse to concepts of the unified nation state, whether cultural or civic. 
The construction of normative masculinity appears to have been a corresponding 
response to seismic shifts in hierarchical gender arrangements as the implications of the 
emancipatory discourse of the Enlightenment ordained a principle of universal equality 
that might grant women full participation in the political sphere. The logical corollary of 
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this principle was the potential erasure of sexual and gender difference as parity 
between men and women was, at least conceptually, established. As such the basis on 
which masculinity could be definitively asserted was destabilised if not removed. It was 
thus necessary to reassert a solid and seemingly naturalised logic of sexual difference 
that privileged masculinity in the public sphere and secured its impenetrable 
boundaries while women were derogated to the private sphere. At the same time the 
construction of the nation state was enacted in similarly stabilising terms. Rejecting the 
fragility of masculinity and that of the nation went hand in hand.  
I have examined the relationship between gender and nationalism in detail here 
because of the centrality of gender to conceptions of (national) identity that this thesis 
seeks to establish and in the following two chapters the connection between masculinity 
and nationalism will be explored and exemplified further. In the following section my 
purpose is to examine the extent to which nineteenth-century German nationalism 
emulated the cultural model described earlier. I will return in the following chapter to 
an application of the triadic model of national rhetoric in respect of the retrieval of 
vernacular folklore. 
II. German Cultural Nationalism 
The emergence of German nationalism as a cultural form was very closely related to, if 
not provoked by, the philosophical and aesthetic concerns of the German romantics who 
mounted an intellectual challenge—informed by a commitment to Herderian cultural 
organicism—to Enlightenment rationalism and atomistic individualism. Against a 
background of what at least seemed to be unprecedented social and political turmoil, 
German romanticism and nationalism were marked by a politics of nostalgia:16 they 
were concerned to retrieve from the rapidly receding past a redemptive narrative of 
collective identity by asserting the primacy of archaic traditions and literature in 
opposition to the cosmopolitan and rationalist disdain for indigeneity, the past, and 
myth. As the historian Reinhold Aris has observed, the German reaction to French 
aggression prompted leading romantic figures ‘to find a refuge in the historic past and a 
belief that Germany could only be saved if it trusted to tradition and the law of historic 
continuity rather than to rational experiments’ (1965:219). German romanticism in this 
mode, in setting itself against Enlightenment doctrines of cosmopolitanism that had 
contributed to the destruction of traditional social structures, thus sought to offer a more 
                                                           
16 See Chapter 1, section II above.  
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concrete and essentialised formulation of German identity in order to aid a cultural 
nationalistic agenda that could derive its rationale from the archaic past and assert its 
legitimate existence.  
In Chapter 1 I surveyed two of the defining features of the romantic movement 
within eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Europe—that is, the revival of 
vernacular traditions, whether linguistic or literary, and the idealisation of the rural 
landscape and its inhabitants—and examined how, in the context of rapid political and 
social change, romantic thinkers were ultimately concerned with providing a cohesive 
foundation upon which both social stability and national unity could be achieved. In 
particular, it was the rediscovery—and, frequently, invention—of vernacular traditions, 
whether literary, linguistic, or mythological, which furnished nationalist movements 
with a template for defining the contours of nationhood. I thus showed how it was 
common for European societies seeking to constitute themselves as nations to turn not 
only to the assertion of a common language, history and destiny, to shared folk and 
literary traditions, values and national character, but also to ancient heroic figures and 
the claim of a primordial relationship to the landscape, all of which provided a set of 
recognisable symbols under which a people could unite. Nowhere in Europe was this 
preoccupation with indigeneity more pronounced than in the German territories. In the 
following chapters I will show how it was the German romantics, more than any others, 
who exemplified the concern with cultivating nationalist sentiment through the 
promotion of the redemptive force of the past, the recovery of folk traditions and ancient 
heroes, the sacralisation of the German landscape, and the providential mission of a 
greater Germany. Their aesthetic and philosophical speculations proved enormously 
influential in determining the qualities of German nationalism as a cultural unity rather 
than an exclusively political force.  
In nineteenth-century Germany, debates concerning the form of the nation—
whether to assert a Kleindeutsch or Großdeutsch framework—were concerned with 
delineating an essential German character that would resolve the difficulties of 
achieving national unification in a context of confessional and regional differences. At 
each stage of the debate regarding the nature of the German character and its 
relationship to the formation of a unified nation state, the German romantics’ influence 
proved decisive in establishing the contours within which both German identity and the 
desire for such a state could be articulated as I will discuss below.  
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The rise of national consciousness in Germany had at least two main roots. 
Firstly, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards Herder, Goethe, and Justus Möser 
(1720–1794)  reacted against the cosmopolitanising influence of the French in the areas of 
language, literature, etiquette, social customs, education, and political reform as I 
discussed in Chapter 2. Their efforts in turn exercised a strong influence on the organic 
and idealist philosophies of the German romantics who based their theories on an 
assumption of the cultural unity of the Volk, and who were able consequently to idealise 
the German character, to recall a golden age of the German people, and to stress a 
providential view of Germany’s destiny. Secondly, there was the more immediately 
pressing need to fight for national self-preservation against French military aggression, a 
task in which many of the German romantics were wholeheartedly involved. In both 
cases the triadic model of nationalist rhetoric surveyed above provided a framework 
that reinforced the cultural aspects of German nationalism.  
The scholarly literature on the rise of German nationalism17 in the nineteenth 
century has tended to emphasise its cultural or Völkisch roots, understanding these as a 
consequence of the absence in Germany (as I suggested in Chapter 2) of a unified 
political system, when contrasted to the political and economic origins of nationalism in 
western Europe, particularly that of France and Britain. Robert Berdahl (1972:65–68) 
attributes the German historian Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954), whose pioneering work 
Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat (1908; trans. 1970) charted the rise of German national 
consciousness in the nineteenth century, with an important influence in this regard. 
Meinecke presented German nationalism as a unique product of Germany’s common 
cultural and ethnic heritage—its political fragmentation notwithstanding—where 
national sentiment or spirit (geist) preceded the formation of a unified state in contrast to 
the western European nations where the state (built upon monarchical absolutism) had 
preceded the nation. He asserted an organic, idealist notion of German nationalism, 
echoing Herder’s own conception of the nation and its Völkisch quality: 
The state is not and does not become national through the will of the people or 
those who govern it but through the same means that language, customs, and faith 
are national and become national—through the quiet workings of the national 
spirit. 
(Meinecke 1970:18) 
                                                           
17 The literature is vast. The main sources I have consulted are: Mosse 1975, 1981; Snyder 1978; 
Harold James 1989; Schulze 1991, 1996; Hermand 1992; Townson 1992; Helmut Walser Smith 1995; 
Hermand and Steakley 1996; Geiss 1997; Herminghouse and Mueller 1997; Giesen 1998; Oergel 
1998; Hewitson 2000; Jan-Werner Müller 2000; Vanchena 2000; Green 2001; Blickle 2002.  
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Berdahl argues, therefore, that from Meinecke onwards, ‘historians of German 
nationalism have been largely preoccupied with the fact that it had origins different 
from those of Western Europe, that it sprang from German culture, and that it can be 
studied primarily in the ideas of its writers’ (1972:68).  
Berdahl believes that this has led, mistakenly, to a historiographical tendency to 
trace German nationalism through intellectual histories—that is, the articulation of 
cultural nationalism in the work of the German nationalist poets and thinkers—at the 
expense of the material realities of German unification. He argues, for example, and I 
agree, that the efforts of Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) to establish the Deutsche Reich 
under the Prussian King Wilhelm I in 1870–1871 were not obviously determined by 
romantic conceptions of a German polity, but by more immediate concerns to secure 
Prussian political dominance against the Austrian Habsburg Empire. Moreover, 
although he acknowledges that resistance to French aggression and the subsequent 
Wars of Liberation (1813–1814) were important in providing a stimulus for German 
nationalism, for Berdahl they do not 
fully explain why the cultural idea of the nation was gradually transformed into the 
demand for closer political unity, nor why, once the external provocation of French 
occupation was removed, nationalism continued to capture the imagination of 
important groups in Germany. 
(1972:69) 
He goes on to assess the weaknesses of the ‘intellectual history’ approach by suggesting 
that it does not adequately explain the interrelationship between the ideas of 
national/cultural unity and political reality, and nor does it account for the increased 
appeal of nationalism as a political movement in the period between 1800 and 1848 
(1972:69). Furthermore, for Berdahl, it obscures the process of translation of what were 
predominantly the preoccupations of a few intellectuals into broader popular sentiment 
(1972:68–71).  
Berdahl suggests instead, therefore, that an analysis of the economic basis of 
German nationalism presents a more fruitful arena for investigation in that it explains 
the generation of national sentiment against a background of growing awareness of 
Germany’s relative economic backwardness and desire to achieve the material gains 
witnessed in other European countries. Focusing on the economic basis of German 
nationalism  shows that the quest in Germany for economic modernisation resulted both 
in the ‘destruction of traditional allegiances and a degree of social disintegration’ and in 
the production of a ‘psychological need for the creation of the consciousness of a 
broader community, the nation’ (Berdahl 1972:75, 74) that could then capitalise on 
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economic advancement. He also draws attention to the demographic shifts in Germany 
after 1815—particularly the expansion of urban centres and the massive shift of 
population from the countryside to cities—which he argues contributed to the 
functional aspect of German nationalism (1972:76). Such an instrumentalist idea leads 
him to ask rhetorically whether ‘the ideology of nationalism [was] used by the urban 
élites to command the loyalty and obedience of the new urban masses for whom the 
traditional loyalties of kinship and tradition no longer existed’ (1972:77).18 
Berdahl’s argument is well made and I do not wish to discount the important 
role that economic developments (and the related issue of class mobility) played in the 
political formulation of the German nation state. However, nor do I want to underplay 
the crucial support given by the idea of cultural or Völkisch nationalism to the political 
arena in which nationalist sentiment was harnessed, instrumentally, for material or 
territorial gain; in other words, I believe that the romantic cultural ideology combined 
mythical and deliberately manufactured symbols of Germanness into a grammar of 
aspirations in order to ensure the material actualisation of the culturally defined nation 
it envisioned. Thus a significant aspect of the elaboration of theories of nationhood in 
nineteenth-century Germany lay in defining a specific set of attributes as the ’national 
character’ of the German people. As Harold James has suggested, ‘Describing [national] 
character invariably involves idealization and a substantial amount of myth-making’ 
and that this tends to occur where there is ‘no institutional context for nation-building’ 
for the reason that ‘[i]f national identity lies in political and institutional arrangements, 
there is no need to be preoccupied with the search for an elusive national character’ 
(1989:9). 
The fragmented and unstable state of Germany’s political institutions in the 
early years of the nineteenth century thus meant that character building had both to 
precede and to enable nation building and that mythmaking was an essential aspect of 
both. In the absence of institutions which might determine the patterns and properties of 
their national character, the German people had to manufacture their own concept or 
discourse of nationality; they needed to formulate and imagine a glorious national past, 
                                                           
18 This view is similar to the instrumentalist perspective of Gellner (1983) who argues that the 
close identification of culture with the state, which he considers to be the defining quality of 
nationalism, was absent in pre-industrial, agrarian societies. He suggests instead that nationalism 
could only emerge as industrialisation and advanced technology brought with them an 
unavoidable commitment to economic growth and occupational mobility which combined 
steadily to erode feudal hierarchies and, consequently, forced peoples’ cultural identities to be 
much more closely bound up with the state and an over-arching national identity. 
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to reassert territorial belonging, and to prescribe an idealised—and hopefully, 
materialised—future.19 They did so through three determinants of national unity: 
language, archaic culture/tradition, and the nationalisation of landscape. These were 
further related to, and legitimated by, three sub-discourses: that of ethnic election which 
inscribed a sense of destiny regarding the providential mission of the German people; of 
national archetypes epitomised by both a conception of the German Urvolk and heroes 
like Arminius; and of the primordial or medieval past as a golden age, drawing on the 
ethnography of Tacitus, on vernacular folklore, and on the myths found in texts such as 
the Nibelungenlieder and the Prose Edda. In each case the gendered and class dialectic 
discussed previously determined the form and content of German nationalism 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
By tracing the elaboration of theories of nationhood in the work of key romantic 
intellectuals and those whom they influenced, I want to show how, in the absence of a 
strong institutional and political basis for the construction of national identity, the 
mythical and malleable quality of the German romantics’ narration of identity provided 
one of the main ways through which national sentiment could be manufactured and 
exploited.20 This narration owed much to Herder’s theories of the Volk, and furthermore, 
sustained the national project in the wake of the failure of the Deutschreich to secure full 
and longstanding unification. Somewhat paradoxically, however, it also served as the 
basis for the eventual shift in formulations of German identity away from an emphasis 
on cultural unity (derived from a common language and from cultural forms such as 
literature, shared history and protestant forms of religiosity) towards that of race and 
blood, and in so doing it provided fertile ground for the anti-Semitic discourse of 
differentiation that I will explore in Chapter 7. The German romantics were thus 
influential in two important ways: they worked determinedly to define a Germanic 
archetype through recourse to the past, to vernacular traditions, and to idealist and 
organicist philosophy, and they also laid the groundwork for the success of race science 
                                                           
19 Berdahl has also recognised the relationship of these imaginative acts to the national building 
effort, but suggests that ‘culture did not “form” the German national state, it legitimised it’ 
(1972:70). 
20 Harold James has wisely noted that ‘There are always, in any society, not one but several 
storytellers in the invention of nationality, who usually cannot agree even about the general 
structure of the narrative’ (1989:8). Bearing this in mind I am not proposing that the narration of 
German identity and its connection to the nation state was monolithic and single-voiced. Rather, it 
is my intention in this chapter to tell just one story about some of the stories that were told—and 
retrieved—by an important set of storytellers as they sought to narrate the German nation into 
existence.  
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in securing the notion that the German people alone, defined against the ‘parasitic’ Jews, 
were the true Aryans, the original people, and therefore the most prestigious amongst 
the European nations. 
I want to argue, therefore, that rather than seeing cultural production or 
mythmaking as unconnected to political reality, in the context of the politics of German 
identity it is important to remain alert to the enabling, generative power of cultural 
ideologies or discourses as they were negotiated and imposed upon public spaces and 
polities. I believe, moreover, that by understanding the role of intellectuals in 
formulating the properties of Germanness and then in disseminating these formulas 
through, for example, the collection and publication of folklore and myths, educational 
reform, the establishment of societies and student movements, the building of 
monuments, and the setting up of memorial festivals, the integral relationship between 
ideas (discourse), class, gender, and ethnicity might be made clearer. Thus, the 
bourgeois intellectuals and public figures of the time, recognising the need to garner 
public support in the nation-building effort, made a concerted effort to ensure that their 
prescriptive ideas of nationhood received wide circulation, and one of the ways this was 
achieved was through aligning themselves with the class interests of the aristocracy and 
appropriating the cultural practices, customs, and folklore of the lower classes, as I will 
discuss in the following chapter. Thus, in the case of the German romantic project there 
was certainly a concerted effort to use cultural nationalist discourse to enhance the 
status of the emergent bourgeoisie, but by deriving models of German identity from the 
peasantry/proletariat, the lower classes were invested with a form of stable identity that 
contrasted favourably with the sense of fragmentation and uncertainty felt by the urban 
middle classes. However, what the bourgeois romantics were successful in achieving 
was the imposition of limits upon what could be spoken of—that is, produced—
regarding broader notions German identity, in ways echo Foucault’s analysis of 
discursive mediation. 
By paying attention to their work, the romantic writers’ and their audiences’ 
cognitive relationship to their own historical moment can be better understood and a 
sense can be gained of how their desires regarding German identity were conceived, 
articulated, and then realised, at least in part. Also, as noted above, the triadic model of 
nationalist rhetoric that I am using establishes how the nationalist rhetoric of élite 
groups was translated into potential ‘trajectories for action’ that then mobilised large 
sections of the general populace. As Levinger and Lytle have argued, ‘Action is 
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prefigured in the realm of imagination, and thus it is in the realm of political 
imagination that an analysis of nationalist action must begin (2001:190). In the following 
chapter, therefore, I will examine the imaginative efforts of the German romantics both 
to formulate and prescribe national characteristics and behaviour, all of which were 
intertwined with a call to establish a national mythology. 
It was, as Hagen Schulze suggests, the humiliating defeat of Prussia and the 
subsequent French occupation in the first decade of the nineteenth century which set 
German nationalism alight and produced a new form of patriotism that began to create 
a sense of German identity built around shared language, history, and traditions, 
indicating that nationalism in Germany took a cultural, rather than civic, form: 
Enlightened persons…had previously understood the concept of nationalism in 
terms of a state, which along the lines of even the French Revolution at its 
beginning, would effect the greatest number of its citizens. However, when this 
concept was confronted with an aggressive French nationalism,…Herder’s idea 
about the fundamental social individuality of the Volkstum [‘national people’ in 
Herder’s use] based on language now grew virulent. 
(1991:50) 
This emphasis on the cultural and linguistic basis of a German nation against more civil 
or contractually-based conceptions, however, contributed to the difficulties with which 
German unification was achieved and to the range of debates over the best grounds 
upon which to build the nation. The demise of the Holy Roman Empire (December 1805) 
and the vacuum that it left behind, as well as the impotence of Prussia in the face of 
French aggression during the Napoleonic Wars (roughly 1799–1815), together provoked 
the need to assert a new and stronger idea of German national identity. Two other 
related elements also proved influential in this regard: on the one hand, the call of the 
French Revolution for the value of a ‘nation une et indivisible’ was compelling for 
educated Germans who had experienced the full extent of the Empire’s impotence as 
well as that of the other German states, most notably Prussia, during the Revolutionary 
Wars (1792–1802); on the other hand French imperialist ambitions, following French 
success in these wars, made a form of German national unity an urgent necessity if 
French aggression was to be successfully resisted (Schulze 1991:48).  
The course of nationalism in nineteenth-century Germany was organised 
around debates concerning both the basis and form the nation state was to take, and the 
attempt to reach a consensus regarding what national unity might mean given the 
regional and religious divisions between the German territories. The establishment of 
the German Confederation of thirty-nine states under the leadership of Prussia and 
Austria following the defeat of Napoleon and the subsequent Congress of Vienna (1814–
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1815) provided a fragile form of unification. Led by the Austrian statesman, Prince von 
Metternich (1773–1859), the Confederation attempted to emulate the now deceased Holy 
Roman Empire, but Metternich’s extreme conservatism and strong advocacy of the 
absolute right of kings led to the liberal revolutions of 1848 which saw the collapse of 
the Confederation and the creation of the Frankfurt Parliament in the same year. It was 
in the Parliament that debates regarding the possibility of the establishment of a unified 
nation state, and the delineation of its geographical boundaries were first raised in a 
serious way, whereas prior to this unification had been called for through recourse to 
the apparently ‘natural’ affinity of the German-speaking people with each other. 
However, delegates to the Assembly faced a number of problems that were particular to 
the German territories and which constituted stumbling blocks to the realisation of a 
nation state modelled on the Enlightenment ideal of contractual nationhood represented 
by the likes of Britain and France. As Laurence Birken suggests, 
The existence of two rival centres of power in Berlin and Vienna, the division 
between a Protestant North and a Catholic South, the lack of natural boundaries, as 
well as the diaspora-like pattern of German settlement in the East all stood in the 
way of the consolidation of [a unified nation state]. 
(1994:135) 
Within this context, a number of solutions were suggested, all of which were in 
some way unsatisfactory. The first option was what became known as the 
Großdeutschland (‘greater Germany’) solution which proposed the amalgamation of all 
the German-speaking areas of Austria along with the German territories which had been 
part of the German Confederation, but this would have meant that both the Habsburg 
Empire of Austria and the Hohenzollern dynasty in Prussia would have had to 
subordinate dynastic interests to the idea of national interest, which neither were 
prepared to do. The second option was the Kleindeutsch solution which would exclude 
all the Austrian territories but include all the states of the Confederation and come 
under the leadership of Prussia, thus maintaining the monarchical balance of power 
between the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns and denying the precedence of national 
considerations. The third option, under what became known as the Mitteleuropa scheme, 
was to construct a federation of relatively independent states which would include the 
entire Austrian empire, Prussia, and all the small German states, but again this had the 
disadvantage of preserving the status quo that had led to the uprisings of 1848 in the first 
place (Carr 1992:88–89). The fourth option was either to establish a hereditary or elected 
monarchy or to found a republic following the French model. The Assembly finally 
decided on March 28, 1849 that Germany should be a 
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office of head of state (‘Emperor of the Germans’) was to be hereditary and held by the 
King of Prussia. This solution, however, was only recognised by twenty-nine smaller 
states and it failed to gain the support of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, and 
Saxony. Undeterred, delegates from the Assembly approached King Frederick Wilhelm 
IV of Prussia and offered him the crown under a new constitution. He refused on the 
grounds that he could only accept with the agreement of the other sovereign monarchs 
in the German territories, which would, of course, be denied. It is also clear, however, 
that to have accepted the crown from the National Assembly would have been to 
acknowledge the priority of democratic ideals over the dynastic principle of the divine 
right of kings (Birken 1994:135). The dynastic powers of Austria and Prussia withdrew 
their delegates from the Assembly and the lower class groups who had led the uprisings 
and who had initially invested such hope in its emancipatory potential abandoned the 
Assembly, leading to its dissolution in 1849 (Carr 1979:50). 
The German Confederation was resumed by 1851 and Austrian leadership was 
temporarily restored, but the Austro-Prussian War (1866)21 led to the dissolution of the 
Confederation and the establishment of the North German Confederation of twenty-two 
states under Prussian leadership in 1867—clearly in the mould of Kleindeutschland.22 
Under Bismarck’s guidance the Confederation was eventually superseded by the 
German Empire (referred to at the time as the Second Reich—with the Holy Roman 
                                                           
21 The Austro-Prussian War was a result of Bismarck’s Kleindeutsch policy. Having traded on the 
increase in German national consciousness by convincing Austria to join him in the Second War of 
Schleswig (1864) where the combined forces of Prussia and Austria fought against Denmark for 
control of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, he then provoked a conflict with Austria over 
the administration of the conquered duchies. Austria declared war and called for the armies of the 
minor German states to join them. The Austrian alliance was defeated by the Prussians in a series 
of battles and in order to forestall intervention by France or Russia, that Austria was pushing for, 
Bismarck persuaded the King of Prussia, Kaiser Wilhelm I, to sue for peace rather than continue 
the war in hopes of further territorial gain. With the assistance of the French emperor Napoleon 
III, the Treaty of Prague was signed on August 23, 1866 resulting in the dissolution of the German 
Confederation, Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and 
Frankfurt, and the permanent exclusion of Austria from German affairs. This left Prussia free to 
form the North German Confederation the following year. The war left Prussia dominant in 
Germany, and as a result the remaining independent states allied with Prussia in the Franco-
Prussian War in 1870, and then acceded to the crowning of King Wilhelm as German Emperor.  
22 Birken rightly argues that Bismarck’s main concern was to preserve Prussian ‘monarchical 
absolutism’ and that it was only the Kleindeutsch solution that offered any hope in this regard. He 
suggests that a Großdeutsch option (dependent on the destruction of the Habsburgs) would have 
‘made Prussia too big by drowning it in a sea of Germans held together not by allegiance to an 
alien dynasty by only by their common nationality’ (1994:136). The South German states, notably 
Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and the grand duchy of Hesse, though excluded from the 
Confederation, were nevertheless closely bound to it through their membership in the Zollverein 
which was a customs union established to eliminate tariff barriers throughout the German 
territories. 
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Empire considered to be the first—Deutschreich, or Kaiserreich) in 1871 which ostensibly 
united the majority of German states under Kaiser Wilhelm I, but which excluded 
Austria. John Breuilly argues, therefore, that Bismarck’s ‘achievements of 1866–7 could, 
from a “national” perspective, better be described as a division rather than a unification’ 
and that the establishment of the Kaiserreich was just as problematic as the preceding 
state of affairs (1992:12). Rather, what Bismarck accomplished was the impression that in 
1871 something called ‘Germany’ was unified. As Birken suggests, what was in effect a 
‘counterfeit Reich’ (when compared to the much broader unifying power of the Holy 
Roman Empire) was made possible because ‘Bismarck had the tactical sense to dress up 
ancient institutions [the dynastic principle of monarchical government] in modern form’ 
(1994:137). The appearance rather than the actuality of unification was certainly enabled 
by the belief in the cultural bonds—the unifying nature of Völkisch traditions—between 
the German people that had been advocated first by Herder, and then by the romantic 
intellectuals who followed in the first part of the nineteenth century. In the light of 
Bismarck’s Kleindeutsch solution it was the Völkisch nationalism promoted by the 
romantics that sustained a vision of national unity which, as Birken argues, ‘was not so 
much a result of as a stand-in for German unification’ (1994:138).  
The course of the project of German unification in the nineteenth century 
essentially revealed the poverty and ineffectiveness of the German territories’ political 
institutions in cultivating patriotic loyalty to a unified nation-state. If national identity 
could be found within stable political and institutional arrangements—the contractual 
model of the nation-state—there would have been no need to be preoccupied with the 
search for national character and identity that was the central feature of German 
nationalism. Thus, the promotion of national sentiment based on assumptions of the 
long-standing cultural and linguistic homogeneity of the German people ran alongside, 
rather than being part of, the more obviously political attempts to achieve territorial 
unification. The problem that confronted German nationalists was how to establish what 
the blueprint for national life should be given the diversity of regions and confessional 
divisions (James 1989:9).  
The primary means for bringing together these ‘diverse regions’ was established 
through the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric. Schulze points to a shift in 
consciousness with regard to the past, present, and future amongst the European 
nations that had its roots on the Enlightenment division between Church and state and 
the subsequent breakdown of traditional social hierarchies: ‘people felt that the present 
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had speeded up furiously, giddily, dangerously; they felt deafened by the onslaught of 
new and unprecedented things which contrasted sharply with the earlier peacefulness 
of the unalterable and all-embracing sphere of ancient custom’ (1991:39). The national 
past was thus a signifier of unity and the basis for the retrieval of the German character 
for many of the nationalists of the first part of the nineteenth century; because political 
unity was a distant hope, particularly in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, 
German intellectuals had to seek national unity through cultural and spiritual means 
It was the German romantics who were important in establishing shared 
culture, language and traditions and then (after the middle of the century) shared race 
as the foundations for national unity as I will discuss in Chapter 7. Their vision proved 
enthralling and its persistence can be attributed to the cultural idealism of the German 
romantics and those whom they influenced. In the political geography of nineteenth-
century Germany the national sentiment that began to seek a unified Germany was 
largely the creation of middle-class intellectuals (Bildungsbürgertum) amongst whom the 
German romantics were numbered. As Greenfeld and Chirot remark, the 
Bildungsbürgertum were a product of German universities who were ‘supposed to enjoy 
higher status than the uneducated bourgeoisie’ on the basis of their high level of 
education (1994:98). However, German societies at the time were structured along 
broadly feudal lines, and social mobility was therefore difficult, contributing to the sense 
of marginalisation felt by these intellectuals. Greenfeld and Chirot rightly attribute this 
feeling to the legacy of the Enlightenment which ‘placed intellect high in the value 
hierarchy, boosted the self-esteem of intellectuals and encouraged their aspirations for 
an exalted place in society’ (ibid.) and this was given further substance in the promise of 
the French Revolution to overthrow inequitable social arrangements. However, the 
Enlightenment emphasis on rational enquiry also contributed to a surplus of 
intellectuals and a consequent decline in opportunities, leading some of the 
Bildungsbürger to reject the promise of rational individualism and to turn instead to what 
became the romantic insistence on the Völkisch community as the repository of cultural 
and social value and as the main means of integrating individuals into cooperative 
society bound together by shared traditions and history (See Schulz 1991:46–48).  
During the French occupation of the German territories during the Napoleonic 
Wars (1803–1812) the turn to romanticism was given further impetus as a number of key 
intellectuals—faced with the social upheavals wrought by French military aggression 
and influenced in both their social and aesthetic philosophies by Herderian organicism 
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and the awakening national consciousness fostered by the Sturm und Drang 
movement—expressed the need to re-establish hierarchical authority and stability based 
on the revival of tradition and ancient culture. The efforts of these native intellectuals 
were naturally welcomed by the rulers of the German territories who allied themselves 
with the rising nationalist sentiment expressed by the romantics, using their thought as 
a tool to cultivate popular resistance to the French menace prior to and during the 
German Wars of Liberation and in turn granting the romantic intellectuals an 
opportunity to identify with the ruling élite. As a result, as Greenfeld and Chirot note, 
The Romantics presented the cause of the ruling élite as the “German cause”, and 
virtually overnight turned into German nationalists….[T]he Romantics were left in 
charge of shaping the German national consciousness and were able to define it in 
terms of the Romantic philosophy. 
(1994:100) 
In order to understand the relationship between nationalism and German romanticism it 
will be helpful briefly to summarise the broad chronology of the romantic movement 
and to list its main participants.  
III. Romanticism and Nationalism: The Politics of Aesthetics 
German romanticism is conventionally divided into the three phases of Früh-, Hoch-, and 
Spätromantik (early, high, and late romanticism),23 although the distinctions between 
them are somewhat ambiguous, generally being marked by regional location rather than 
by any definitive shifts in philosophy, at least chronologically speaking. There were two 
areas, however, where significant differences in attitudes and approaches, particularly 
to the past, are discernable. The first concerned a confessional divide between those 
romantics who valorised a form of reconstructed medievalism, viewing the Roman 
Catholic Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages as the heyday of the German people, 
and those who sought to retrieve an altogether more ancient past, rooted in the ancestral 
paganism hinted at by Tacitus in the Germania, but nonetheless dependent on a 
Protestant belief that the German Reformation instigated by Martin Luther, amongst 
others, represented the triumph of the original and indigenous spirit of the German 
people. The second area of distinction was marked by divergences in approach to the 
form, content, and purpose of a national mythology. On the one hand, the literary-
aesthetic rhetoric of the Frühromantik scholars sought to overcome the Kantian division 
between the ideal and material realms (discussed below) by advocating an abstracted 
                                                           
23 This survey of the development of romantic thought in Germany is primarily derived from the 
following sources: Brown 1979; Beiser 1996; 2003; Williamson 2004; Seyhan 1992. 
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synthesis between both philosophy and mythology; on the other hand, the scholarly 
concerns of the nascent field of German philology, represented by the members of the 
Hochromantik school, suggested that the creation of a national mythology had to be 
much more pragmatically concerned with demonstrating and retrieving the original 
unity of the German people through close attention to the forgotten texts of German 
history and the scattered remnants of custom and oral traditions that survived amongst 
the peasant classes. Both of these differences will be discussed more fully in the 
following chapter.  
Initially an aesthetic movement with moral and broadly sociological 
dimensions, the Frühromantik philosophy flourished in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century and the early years of the nineteenth century predominantly among university 
students who gathered together in small groups in order to philosophise and write 
poetry together.24 The most influential of these groups, the Jenenser Romantische Schule 
(‘Jena Romantic School’) which flourished during the period between 1797 and 1802, 
was led by Friedrich Schlegel in Jena and then later in Berlin, and included his brother 
August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) in whose house the circle of romantic thinkers 
met, the poet and novelist Novalis (1772-1801), the philosopher Friedrich Schelling 
(1775-1854), the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), the writer and critic 
Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder25 (1773–1801), and the poet and novelist Ludwig Tieck 
(1773-1853). In the period between 1799 and 1801 the Schlegel brothers along with 
Novalis produced what were the first truly systematic definitions and programmes of 
romantic poetry in their periodical Athenaeum (1798-1800). Opposed to what he saw as 
the static nature of rationalist classicism which, after Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der 
Urteilskraft (‘Critique of Judgment’; 1790), viewed the artist purely as a medium of the 
expression of objective beauty and imposed rigid rules on literary composition and 
form, Schlegel recommended that romantic poetry should instead foster and express the 
authentic, unbounded, and above all unique imagination of the poet, undeterred by any 
universal ideal of beauty. Schlegel’s emphasis on the particularity of the poetic vision, 
and his attempt to theorise an aesthetic synthesis between different literary genres—
poetry and prose, novels and literary criticism, and poetry and philosophy—was a clear 
echo of Herder’s emphasis on the uniqueness of vernacular expression and his the 
fusion of the concepts of the Volk and Humanität. The synthesising nature of Schlegel’s 
                                                           
24 On romanticism during the Frühromantik period see Beiser 2003; 1996. 
25 Wackenroder was not a member of the Jena School but was an influential romantic thinker 
nonetheless particularly through his connection with Tieck. 
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literary theory became a defining feature of both early and late German romanticism as I 
will discuss in more detail below, and I will argue that it was emblematic of the 
romantic nationalist concern to achieve a unity between the particular (as represented 
by the various and diverse German territories) and the whole (the longed-for unified 
nation).  
The Frühromantik preoccupation with aesthetic and literary theory has led some 
commentators26 to downplay its political agenda, but, as Beiser suggests, the thinkers 
associated with the movement ‘subordinated the aesthetic and religious to ethical and 
political ends. They defined the highest good not as aesthetic contemplation but as 
human self-realization, the development of humanity’, and suggested that ‘this ideal is 
realizable only within society and the state’ (2003:xi). In other words, their ethical and 
political values regarding civil society and social topography informed their aesthetic 
philosophy rather than vice versa. Beiser, in my view, is thus correct to resist the attempt 
to see the Frühromantik as a purely aesthetic movement without any political 
implications or interest. As I will show in the Chapter 7, Schlegel’s extensive writing on 
the origins and structure of Sanskrit and its connection to social arrangements and 
human development indicated a strong investment in, or at the very least an argument 
for, the intimate relationship between aesthetic expression, sociality, and political 
identity. Moreover, his aesthetic theories regarding the desirability of a synthesis of 
genres were reflected in his idealistic conception of nationhood: 
The concept of nation signifies that its members symbolically form an individual; 
unity in diversity and many differences; the state thus becomes a whole with rich 
divisions and guilds, resting in the nation which in itself is a unity through common 
origin, speech, customs and religion, while the peoples are combined in a 
hierarchically organized humanity like the states of Europe. 
(in Szaz 1963:926) 
The second phase of German romanticism, often referred to as Heidelberger 
Hochromantik (Heidelberg high romanticism) lasted roughly between 1803 and 1815 
Although Heidelberg was initially the centre of this new stage of romantic effort, other 
groups were also active in Berlin, Dresden, Vienna (where the Schlegel brothers were 
teaching at the University following their departure from Jena in 1802), and in the 
Swabian city of Tübingen. In Heidelberg and then Berlin, the group was led by Ludwig 
Achim von Arnim (1781–1831), Clemens Brentano (1778–1842), who both left Heidelberg 
for Berlin after 1806, Joseph Görres (1776–1848), Joseph von Eichendorff (1788–1857), 
and Friedrich de la Motte Fouqué (1777-1843), amongst others. In Dresden, Adam 
                                                           
26 See Lovejoy 1916, 1917; Behler 1980; Simpson 1989. 
  147 
Müller (1779-1829), Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840), and Heinrich von Kleist (1777-
1811) were active and in Tübingen the group of romantic poets known as the 
Schwäbischer Dichterkreis consisted of Ludwig Uhland (1787–1862), Justinus Kerner 
(1786–1862), and Gustav Schwab (1792–1850). As a movement it arose as a direct 
response to French occupation of the German territories. Where the earlier Frühromantik 
period had been concerned—at least initially—with theorising a romantic aesthetic to 
counter the cosmopolitan influence of France on vernacular cultural forms, albeit with a 
broadly political motivation, the Hochromantik thinkers directed their work towards 
active political resistance by harnessing aesthetic theories towards nationalistic ends. As 
Eugene Anderson has remarked  
…the young German Romanticists felt the danger to German culture from the 
French Revolution and Napoleon to be less political than intellectual and spiritual, 
and they endeavoured to oppose it by ideas….In the succeeding years the danger 
became acutely political, and the German Romanticists were compelled to 
subordinate their preoccupation with the widening of art and the enrichment of 
individual experience to social and political ideas and actions, particularly as 
formulated in nationalism and conservatism. 
(1941:301) 
Thus, in the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasions a number of key romantic thinkers 
gathered in Berlin, which fast became the most influential centre of the Hochromantik 
movement, where they actively participated in political mobilisation against French 
occupation, publishing reactionary periodicals and pamphlets, and establishing 
nationalist societies that sought to cultivate national sentiment amongst the general 
public. An important intellectual leader, previously admired as a philosopher by the 
Jena Romantics, was Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) who fired up the spirit of 
patriotism among the Berlin group with his Reden an die deutsche Nation [Speeches to the 
German Nation; 1807-08] touched on briefly in the previous chapter, delivered to an 
enthusiastic audience in occupied Berlin.  
Fichte argued that the path to German unification had to start with the 
definition of national character: ‘We must, to put it in one word, find character: for to 
have character and to be German is without doubt the same thing (in James 1989:47). For 
Fichte, national education (Bildung) was the best means to produce German character, 
reflecting his belief that cultural values and traditions were not the product of 
institutions but rather of their transmission from one generation to another in a long 
chain of continuity (Kohn 1949a:335). Nationalism was thus conceived by Fichte as an 
educational enterprise and he believed that the transmission of national character 
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should be pursued hermetically, uninfluenced by foreign cultures (Kohn 1949a:331).27 In 
so proposing, he continued the logic of Herder’s arguments regarding the legacy of the 
Volk. The predominant characteristic of German identity for Fichte was its autochthony 
and originality, and he suggested in his famous eighth ‘Address to the German Nation’ 
that this placed the German people in a unique position amongst the European nations: 
the German alone—the original, not the institutionalized withered man [der 
ursprüngliche und nicht in einer willkürlichen Satzung erstorbene Mensch]28 has truly a 
nation, and…he alone is titled to count upon one, and…he alone is capable of 
loving his nation in the true way according to reason. 
(in Kohn 1949a:326) 
For Fichte, it was in the ancient past that the Germans would rediscover themselves and, 
further, he claimed that this indigenous character retrieved from the past would be 
foundational to the creation of the nation-state against the contractual view that saw the 
nation-state as the crucible in which national character was produced (Kohn 1949a:324).  
It was the lessons of the past that revealed the German people’s providential 
mission in the present, in particular the idea that Germany would lead the other 
European nations in establishing the perfect state based on a unity of language, culture 
and spirit. As Kohn suggests, for Fichte, ‘only the Germans could have a true culture, 
only they could bring the great historical movements to fruition’ (1949a:334). Fichte 
provided proof for his thesis by recalling the achievements of Luther in the Reformation, 
suggesting that he transformed Christianity into a religion that accorded with the 
indigenous spirit of the people and attested to their vitality and continuous stability. He 
also poured scorn on the state-building efforts of the French in the aftermath of the 
Revolution suggesting that they were not a nation by nature but rather by the 
vicissitudes of history (Kohn 1949a:340). Against this apparently manufactured and 
therefore novel form of nationalism, Fichte conjured up an image of the ancient 
Germans led by Arminius who had resisted Roman imperialism in conformity to their 
natural and indigenous desire for freedom: 
Freedom meant to them just this: remaining Germans and continuing to settle their 
own affairs, independent and in accordance with the original spirit of their race, 
going on with their development in accordance with the same spirit, and 
propagating this independence in their posterity. 
(in Kohn 1949a:341) 
                                                           
27 See also Kaufmann 1942:465–466. 
28 I would instead translate this phrase as ‘the original and not any arbitrarily constitutionalised 
and dying man’, which conveys better Fichte’s disdain for contractual nationalism represented by 
the French against whom he contrasted the ‘natural’ national spirit of the Germans. 
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An important marker of the Germans’ natural autochthony, for Fichte, was the purity of 
their language. His Addresses to the German Nation were written in an antiquated 
Lutheran style and actively avoided the use of loan words from other languages (see 
Martyn 1997), indicating that his call for Germans to resist foreign influence in their 
customs was mirrored and exemplified in his obvious concern to resist foreign 
influences on the German language. He frequently warned his compatriots against 
falling prey to the false seductiveness of foreign words, and believed that the failure to 
preserve the purity of the German language would result in the loss of the nation’s 
uniqueness, the ‘decimation’ of its culture and sense of the world (1967:114–115). Thus, 
Fichte followed the Herderian concept that a people’s language carried with it their 
specificity and ensured the continuity of their values and their unique understanding of 
the world. German, for Fichte, had developed continually from ‘the original starting 
point of language as a natural force’ and it had been spoken ‘without interruption’ by 
the same people. Moreover, he believed that ‘no element has ever come into it that did 
not express an actual perception that had been made by this people’ (in Martyn 
1997:311). He was able, therefore, to invoke the uniqueness of the German language to 
prove the uniqueness of the people who spoke it. Because the Germans had ‘continually 
form[ed] their language in continuous communication with one another’ they were ‘an 
original people [Urvolk], one that has the right to call itself the quintessential people [das 
Volk schlechtweg] as opposed to other tribes that broke off from it’ (ibid.). In summary 
then, for Fichte, the core features of the German national character were its natural 
affinity with ideals of freedom, its ability to transmit itself unchanged across the 
generations, and the unique purity of its language and as a race. The way to retrieve the 
German character was to seek it in ancient narrative traditions, to educate the 
population in Germany’s glorious history, and to preserve the purity of the German 
language. 
Fichte’s patriotism and the Jena romantics’ call for a national mythology (which 
I will examine in more detail below), was reflected in a number of simultaneous efforts 
to collect and anthologise traditional folklore and myths of the German peoples to 
stimulate national sentiment at a time of crisis. Arnim and Brentano published 
traditional songs in Des Knaben Wunderhorn (The Youth’s Magic Horn; 1805–1808) with the 
express purpose of propagating Volkspoesie (folk poetry). The Grimm brothers (Jakob, 
1785–1863 and Wilhelm, 1786–1859) joined this trend with their collection of Kinder- und 
Hausmärchen (Children’s- and Home Fairy-Tales; first published 1812-1815); and Görres, 
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the first university professor to lecture on German literature, rounded out these cultural 
endeavours with his landmark essay Die Teutschen Volksbücher (On German Chapbooks; 
1807). However, the chief activities took place in Heidelberg, where a couple of famous 
romantic teams embarked on the collection and emendation of the German people’s oral 
traditions. I will discuss these efforts in the following chapter.  
The late romantic phase (Spätromantik) began after the Congress of Vienna 
(1814–1815) and ended with the rise of Junges Deutschland (Young Germany, c. 1835) 
movement, led by Turnvater Jahn (1778–1852), which was a radical protest movement 
against all things romantic, but one that was, nonetheless, indebted to the vision of 
Germany that the earlier romantics had promoted. This late phase, led by Franz Bäder 
(1765–1841), E. T. A. Hoffman (1776–1822), Johann von Eichendorff (1788–1857), Görres, 
and the ageing Friedrich Schlegel, is generally characterised as marking a turn to 
conservatism and a return to religion, particularly Roman Catholicism. Frederick Beiser 
explains this development in terms of a continuity in some of the romantics’ interest in 
medieval religion that had certainly been a feature in the writings of the Frühromantik 
phase: 
If we carefully examine the chief documents regarding the romantics’ early 
flirtation with the medieval church…then we find many reasons for their sympathy 
with it. The medieval church gave people a sense of community; it represented the 
highest spiritual values; it taught, and to some extent even practised, an ethic of 
love, the noblest moral philosophy; and, above all, it inspired and gave pride of 
place to art….The early romantics’ sympathy for the Catholic Church was primarily 
a love for a medieval ideal, not an approval of, still less a conversion to, the actual 
historical institution. 
(1996:xxii) 
Despite the political upheavals that marked this period, the ageing romantics 
still managed to promote a mostly homogeneous agenda centred around Friedrich 
Schlegel in Vienna and Görres in Munich. After his conversion to Catholicism (1808), 
Schlegel served in the Metternich administration and, with the support of his Catholic 
friends, developed a conservative program for political restoration in Germany in his 
journal Concordia (1820–1823). Catholicising tendencies were also the mark of his 
lectures during this period (for example, Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur [History 
of Ancient and Modern Literature, 1815]). Görres too changed from a young rebel to a 
conservative Catholic, supporting Germany’s return to a quasi-medieval society from 
his professorship in Munich. His colleagues Franz von Bäder and Friedrich Schelling 
similarly lauded the emotional authenticity of German medievalism. 
Although German romanticism was a dispersed and somewhat amorphous 
movement, in my view three core, intertwined themes are nonetheless discernable, each 
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of which illuminates the connectedness of romantic theories of aesthetic production to 
the cultivation of nationalist sentiment, and the relationship of the formulation of a 
united German identity to a myth of origins built upon patrilinear models of community 
that will be further explored in the following chapters. These were, firstly, a promotion 
of synthesising idealism as a solution to the atomistic individualism of Enlightenment 
cosmopolitanism; secondly, a strong belief in the providential purpose of the German 
peoples derived from the recuperation of their mythic narratives and heroes; and 
thirdly, a nostalgic preoccupation with the retrieval of a golden age of German unity 
and strength. In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the synthesising imperative 
of the Jena romantics, the resulting call for a ‘new mythology’, and its relationship to the 
unificatory idealism of early nationalists. The next two chapters will then examine the 
nostalgic recovery of ancient vernacular folklore and myth traced through its survival in 
contemporary folklore undertaken by the Heidelberg romantics, and the consequent 
glorification of the German past through the sacralisation of the landscape. 
IV. Synthesis: Philosophy and the ‘New Mythology’ 
I showed in Chapter 2 how the creative tension between Herder’s notion of the 
specificity of the Volk and his underlying belief in the synthetic unity of Humanität 
informed his theories of cultural organicism. Herder’s work exercised a profound 
influence on the way nationalist sentiment in Germany was organised around a 
principle of cultural (rather than political) unity, enabling romantic thinkers to oppose 
Enlightenment cosmopolitanism with a particularly Germanic notion of synthesis, 
where diversity and unity were finely balanced and directed towards a distinct 
conception of nationhood. Friedrich Schlegel, in the process of developing a romantic 
aesthetics for literature, was the amongst the first of the romantics—along with the 
German Idealist29 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854), and Georg 
                                                           
29 Idealism, while related to romanticism and its resistance to Enlightenment pure rationalism, is 
quite distinct from it, as Bowie carefully shows. He places Schelling as the paradigmatic Idealist, 
along with the early Fichte, suggesting that the Idealist response to the divisions in modernity that 
are rooted in Enlightenment rationalism is to seek new philosophical foundations on the basis of 
the Cartesian and Kantian conception of the founding role of self-consciousness. For Idealism, 
what philosophy can analyse in the activity of consciousness is a higher form of the intelligibility 
present in nature, so that the task of philosophy is to show how thinking is the key to the inherent 
intelligibility of things (Bowie 2003a:63). The difference that marks out romantic thought, as 
represented by Friedrich Schlegel, is ‘a realisation that, while it must play a vital role in a modern 
conception of philosophy, the activity of consciousness is never fully transparent to itself. It can 
therefore never be finally incorporated into a philosophical system because what we can 
consciously know of ourselves does not exhaust what we are’ (ibid.). Although Schelling wrote 
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Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), at least in the early years of his scholarship—to 
call for modern German literature to have a mythological basis derived from Herder’s 
organicist trajectory, and he advocated the need for a ‘neue Mythologie’ (‘new 
mythology’; 1798–1800, III:96) in his Gesprache über die Poesie (1800): 
Our poetry, I claim, is missing a centre in the way that mythology was, for the 
ancients, completely necessary, so much so that modern poetry is inferior to that of 
the ancient, and can be summarised in the words: We do not have a mythology.  
(1800:95) 
The term ‘new mythology’ seems first to have appeared in a two-page manuscript in the 
young Hegel’s handwriting called ‘Oldest System Program of German Idealism’, first 
published in 1917 by Franz Rosenzweig and probably written around 1796. Rosenzweig 
initially attributed it to Schelling, but a recent consensus amongst scholars of German 
Idealism30 has suggested that its author was in all likelihood Hegel, as between 1796 and 
1797, unlike Schelling who did not write on mythology until after 1800, he wrote a good 
deal on the issues of religion, mythology, and, influenced by Herder, called for the 
revival of a national mythology (Williamson 2004:57).  
The ‘System Program’ is something of a manifesto for a new type of philosophy 
that is an implicit response to Kant’s critique of metaphysics, wherein the concepts of 
understanding and reason, and reason and the senses were separated. The new 
philosophy of the ‘Program’ seeks to reunite these two metaphysical aspects of human 
being-in-the-world while at the same time affirming Kant’s insistence on the human 
capacity for self-determination. The author begins by outlining a new ethics founded on 
the a priori supposition concerning the self as a conscious and ‘an absolutely free being’ 
(in Bowie 2003b:334) from which relating to the world through understanding becomes 
the task of rational individuals. The text then moves abruptly to a call for a ‘new 
                                                                                                                                                             
extensively on mythology and maintained strong links with the Jena romantics, my concern in this 
chapter is to trace the connections between mythology or myth and the cultivation of German 
national identity at a more prosaic level than that represented by Schelling’s philosophical work. 
For summaries of Schelling’s interest in myth and his relationship to German romanticism see 
Bowie 2003a:49–68, 102–139; Williamson 2004:59–71. 
30 I am referring to it as German Idealism in order to distinguish it from the earlier idealist 
philosophy of George Berkeley (1685–1753). German Idealism was premised on the idea that 
although objectivity depends upon a subject which constitutes an object as an object of truth in a 
judgement, the subject does not create the material which is judged to be the object at issue. The 
central question of German Idealism, therefore, was how what the subject does relates to the 
nature of which it is a part. This lead to questions both about whether there is subjectivity at all, 
rather than there just being a world which does not come to know itself, and about the status of 
the forms of thinking in relation to forms in the rest of nature. Schelling developed these ideas 
most explicitly in his work on Naturphilosophie, most notably in Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur 
als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft (‘Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: As Introduction 
to the Study of this Science’; 1797). See Dancy 1987; Pappas 2000. 
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physics’ to which ethics must be connected. It turns next to the state as a ‘mechanical’ 
organism which denies the freedom of people by treating them as a ‘piece of machinery’ 
and which therefore must be superseded and deals with the ‘Ideas of a moral world, 
divinity, immortality’, rejecting the mediating function of the priesthood ‘which has 
recently been feigning reason, by reason itself’ (ibid.). Finally, towards the end of the 
section, it introduces the ‘idea that unites all ideas, the idea of Beauty, taken in the higher 
Platonic sense’ (ibid.), which, as Bowie suggests, is intended ‘to overcome the gap 
between laws of nature constituted via the understanding and what reason is to do with 
this endless diversity of particular laws’ (2003a:57)—that is, to achieve a synthesis of all 
other ideas, of the individual, the state, morality, and the laws of nature. Thus, 
according to the ‘System Program’ the  
philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet 
[Dichter]….Poetry thereby gains a higher dignity, at the end it again becomes what 
it was at the beginning—teacher of (History) Mankind; for there is no philosophy, no 
history any more, poetry alone will survive all the remaining sciences and arts. 
(in Bowie 2003b:334) 
It is at this point that the ‘new mythology’ is announced, one that will fuse 
philosophy and poetry, monotheism and polytheism, art and science, and the individual 
with others into a great work of synthesis that will herald the ‘greatest work of 
mankind’: 
First I shall speak here of an Idea which, as far as I know, has never occurred to 
anyone—we must have a new mythology, but this mythology must be in the service 
of the Ideas, it must become a mythology of reason. Before we make the Ideas 
aesthetic, i.e. mythological, they are of no interest to the people and on the other 
hand before mythology is reasonable the philosopher must be ashamed of it. Thus 
enlightened and unenlightened must finally shake hands, mythology must become 
philosophical and the people reasonable, and philosophy must become 
mythological in order to make the philosophers sensuous. Then eternal unity will 
reign among us. 
(in Bowie 2003b:335) 
What is interesting about this statement is its repudiation and reversal, in barely 
veiled terms, of the Platonic division of logos as rationalism and muthos as superstition 
and whimsy.  Instead it calls for a union of logos as practiced by rational philosophers, 
that is, reason, and muthos as represented by poetry and the imagination—sensibility—
held in trust by the common people. Again, this is an implicit response to Kant, 
particularly with regard to his distinction between the beautiful and the sublime 
mentioned in section III above. The ‘System Program’ is concerned to connect general 
aesthetic rules to the meaning those rules have for human ontology against Kant’s 
approval of abstraction in the figure of the sublime. Thus, a key undercurrent in the 
‘System Program’ is an argument that philosophy without an aesthetic sensibility and 
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instead founded on understanding’s quantitative, rule-bound determination of objects, 
disregards the sensuous specificity of objects and the ways in which they may 
meaningfully concur with each other (Bowie 2003a:58). Against philosophical 
abstraction, the ‘System Program’ suggests a demotic means of uniting ‘the masses’ with 
philosophers. 
For the author of the ‘System Program’, works of art which articulate and reflect 
collective concerns, and which also retain something of the status of cult objects, are 
accordingly regarded as having the potential to reunite a world which the abstractions 
that govern the modern era have begun to pull apart. As such, the ‘System Program’ 
presents a challenge to the atomising premises of Enlightenment individualism, but 
rather than seeking to overthrow the rational basis of human ontology inscribed in 
Enlightenment thought, it seeks to unite it with sensuality, with a kind of natural being-
in/towards-the-world. As Peter Szondi states, ‘One could say crudely that the 
philosophy of German Idealism tried to win back via the path of speculation what 
Kant’s criticism had to renounce: the unity of subject and object, of mind and nature’ 
(1974:221). This notion of a ‘new mythology’ as articulated in the ‘System Program’ 
appears to have oriented Friedrich Schlegel’s own aesthetic theories of literature and art 
towards the Idealist retrieval of myth as philosophy. However, he moved away from the 
agenda of the ‘System Program’ by loosening the connection between aesthetics and 
ethics, and stressing instead the centrality of the new mythology as a purely aesthetic 
phenomenon. Although he believed that this new mythology would be derived from the 
mythologies of Greece and India, and would also be built upon the exemplary works of 
Goethe, Dante, and Shakespeare, and although he made no specific mention of 
Germanic myth at this stage, he had earlier suggested that old German literature might 
well provide a valuable mythological foundation for modern literature when he urged 
his contemporaries to 
…follow the example which Goethe constructed, to investigate the forms of art as 
far as their origin in order to be able to revive or connect them, and [to] trace back to 
the sources of their own language and literature, [in order] to set the ancient vitality 
and high spirit free again which currently slumbers unrecognised in the ancient 
national documents from the Nibelungenlieder [Song of the Nibelungen] up to 
Flamming and Weckherlin. 
(in Williamson 2004:86) 
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August Schlegel developed Friedrich’s theories regarding this mythological 
foundation for German literature and he recommended German chapbook31 and 
medieval European epic as the ‘chivalric and Christian mythology’ (1884, III:17) upon 
which modern German literature should be modelled. August Schlegel believed that the 
medieval ethic of chivalry was essentially German in character, being for him, ‘nothing 
other than the primordial German manliness (bravery, courage) tamed by Christendom’ 
(ibid.). I will return to August Schlegel’s penchant for chivalric medievalism as a marker 
of Germanic virtue in the following chapter.  
Although initially both the Schlegels were concerned with defining an aesthetic 
agenda for the development of contemporary German literature that would, 
nonetheless, have implications for national cohesion in the political arena, during the 
French occupation of the German territories they began to champion the revival of 
Germanic mythology for patriotic reasons, seeing it as the repository of the German 
national spirit and a means to unite the divided German states.32 Their work in this 
regard laid the foundation for the activities of influential romantic folklorists which I 
will discuss in the following chapter. The broader implications of the notion of synthesis 
found within the ‘System Program’ and in Schlegel’s own call for a new mythology had 
striking parallels in debates about the form and parameters of the German nation. While 
I have found no literature that makes explicit the link between German idealism’s 
advocacy of synthesis and broader debates about the unity of the German people along 
the model of Herder’s cultural organicism, it seems to me that there are grounds for 
some speculation regarding their connection.  
The abstract synthesising imperative of the Jena romantics certainly found a 
more pragmatic voice in the work of Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769–1860), an influential 
nationalist during the Napoleonic era. He linked national identity to the mobilisation of 
a common German spirit, regardless of regional or religious differences, particularly in 
his treatise The Spirit of the Age (1807–1818) where he declared that ‘The whole German 
Volk in brotherly union…must learn to feel how great, powerful, and fortunate their 
fathers were in obedience to one German emperor and one Reich, when the many feuds 
had not yet incited them against one another’ (in Levinger and Lytle 2001:184). In the 
                                                           
31 Chapbooks were cheap, pocket-sized texts that included a variety of ephemera: pamphlets, 
political and religious tracts, nursery rhymes, folktales, children's literature and almanacs. They 
were an important medium for the dissemination of popular culture to the common people, 
especially in rural areas, providing entertainment, information and (generally unreliable) history. 
32 See A. Schlegel 1846, VI:433; VIII:145–149. 
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absence of a powerful central state, the collective cultural and spiritual unity that 
characterised his conception of the nation had to be established from and through the 
common people who alone could provide the vernacular foundation for natural unity. 
Arndt synthesising tendencies sought to bring into balance the competing interests of 
the individual and the nation that characterised and, in his view, weakened 
cosmopolitanism (see Kohn 1949b:801).  
As in the work of Fichte, the basis of natural unity, and by implication the true 
German character, was to be found in the purity of its language and racial descent. The 
conception of a natural unity bore the hallmark of the German Idealist concern, as 
articulated in the ‘System Program’, to unite ‘philosophers’ and the ‘masses’ and to 
bring together emotion and reason into a holistic vision of aesthetic and cultural unity. It 
was thus language and race that formed the uniting bond among all Germans and 
constituted them as a nation, an ambition that was reflected in the aims of the proposal 
for a ‘neue mythologie’. Moreover, for Arndt, the Germans stood above all other nations; 
the purity of their language and race guaranteed their creative superiority: 
The Germans are not bastardized by alien peoples, they have not become mongrels, 
they have remained more than many other peoples in their original purity and have 
been able to develop slowly and quietly from this purity of their kind and nature 
according to the lasting laws of time; the fortunate Germans are an original people. 
For our ancestors we have a great piece of evidence from one of the greatest men 
who ever lived, from the Roman Tacitus. This extraordinary man who with his 
prophetic eyes penetrated the depth of the human heart and the depths of nature, 
the present time and the future, clearly saw the worth of our fathers, and 
prophesied their splendid future; and so far history has not contradicted him. But of 
all the things he saw most clearly how important it was for the future greatness and 
majesty of the German people that they were pure and resembled only themselves, 
that they were no mongrels. 
(in Kohn 1949b:791–792) 
Arndt makes a clear connection between the glorious past of the German people and 
their ‘splendid future’, and clearly believed that original purity equated to unity, that it 
was both the guarantor and the evidence for German homogeneity. As such, language 
and race were synthetically intertwined as the basis of German unity (see Kohn 
1949b:792–793).  
Arndt used his conception of language as a unifying force to establish the basis 
upon which the different regions of Germany could be brought together. His poem ‘Was 
ist der Deutsche Vaterland’ (‘Where is the German Fatherland?’), which became the 
anthem of German nationalist resistance during the French occupation and later of the 
German youth movement established by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778–1852), called 
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upon the Germans to create one fatherland out of all the lands where German was 
spoken: 
Where is the German’s fatherland? 
Then name, oh, name the mighty land! 
Wherever is heard the German tongue, 
And German hymns to God are sung! 
This is the land, thy Hermann’s land; 
This, German, is thy fatherland. 
(in Tappan 1914, VII:277) 
The earlier sections of the poem list the various regions of Germany and states that the 
fatherland is not to be found in any one of them (the ‘fatherland is not bounded so’). 
However, Arndt did root his patriotism in the German soil, valorising the peasant 
classes as the soul of Germany but equally lauding the cultural achievements of the 
middle classes. As such he sought to encourage a fraternal bond between the classes, 
urging his fellow Germans to identify with the Volk in order that divisions between 
them would be dissolved in the service of a higher purpose, and he did so in terms that 
invoked a strong motif of patrilinearity in that they naturalised paternal descent and 
associated it with fraternal feeling for the nation: 
German man, feel again God, hear and fear the eternal, and you hear and fear also 
your Volk; you feel again in God the honor and dignity of your fathers, their 
glorious history rejuvenates itself again in you, their firm and gallant virtue re-
blossoms in you, the whole German fatherland stands again before you in the 
august halo of past centuries!….[T]he whole German folk in brotherly 
community…must learn to feel how great, mighty, and happy their fathers were in 
obedience to one German emperor and one Reich, at a time when the many 
discords had not yet turned one against the other…above the ruins and ashes of 
their destroyed fatherland they must weepingly join hands and pray and swear all 
to stand like one man and to fight until the sacred land will be free. 
(in Kohn 1949b:798) 
Zoltan Szaz suggests that Arndt forms a bridge between the ‘cultural concept of 
the German nation in the Goethe era and the new age, which demanded the creation of a 
German nation-state by military and political as well as by cultural means’ (1963:927). 
However, in my view his contribution was rather to bring the two ideas into harmony, 
to suggest that cultural unity could and should lead to political unity. Arndt’s ideas 
were shared by his contemporary Jahn, whose activities I will return to briefly in 
Chapter 6. He argued for national unity—the synthesis of regional differences into 
national cultural unity—through a programme of ‘national education’ and the 
reestablishment of the racial purity of the German people as recorded by Tacitus, and 
through the cultivation of Volkstum (‘national traditions’) a term he is thought to have 
coined (Szaz 1963:928). Jahn defined the Volkstum as ‘that which the Volk has in common, 
its inner existence, its dynamism, its ability to propagate. Because of it their [sic.] courses 
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through the veins of the people a völkisch feeling and thought, love and hatred, intuition 
and faith’ (ibid.). Like Arndt, Jahn also advocated linguistic and racial purity as the basis 
of national unity, and helped to establish the first ‘Language Purification Society’ (ibid.). 
As such, both Arndt’s and Jahn’s efforts fit Levinger’s and Lytle’s triadic model of 
nationalist discourse. As they suggest, ‘Arndt’s rhetoric is paradigmatic in this 
respect….The goal of being “German” is accomplished by overcoming the divisions of 
the population into Catholics and Protestants, Prussians and Austrians and so forth’ 
(2001:185).  
The significance of the synthesising effort of the early German romantics, 
whether pursued as an aesthetic programme or as a politically directed attempt to 
describe the natural unity of the German people, is that it was almost entirely 
imaginative. The divisions between the German people on the basis of religion and 
region remained a political reality, even after the unification of 1871. Consequently, it 
was left to the romantics to create an aesthetic basis upon which German unity could be 
manufactured and this took the form of a nostalgic attitude towards the German past, as 
I will now explore in the next two chapters. 
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C H A P T E R   F I V E 
NOSTALGIA, AUTHENTICITY, AND ROMANTIC NATIONALISM: 




In this chapter my concern is to trace, in the context of the early- to middle-nineteenth-
century German romantic nationalism surveyed in the previous chapter, the particular 
set of characteristics and consequences that were a specific example of the broader 
European preoccupation with ancient origins that I examined in Chapter 3. I will show 
how the politics of German identity during this period were built upon a nostalgia for a 
golden age of German achievement and were epitomised by the romantic effort to 
recover vernacular myths as repositories of ancient German character and values. In the 
next chapter I will examine how these myths were transferred into national symbols 
within the German landscape. Thus, this chapter examines the nostalgic recuperation of 
folklore in early nineteenth-century Germany and I pay particular attention to the work 
of the Grimm brothers and those of their circle, analysing how the rhetoric of 
authenticity they employed in their reconstruction of the German past—aided by the 
interpretative tools developed in the new fields of philology and ethnography—
functioned in partnership with a conservative view of gender hierarchy to bolster the 
fusion of folklore and myth with the project of German nationalism.  
I. Nostalgia and the Collection of Folklore 
I showed in Chapter 1 the degree to which nostalgic imaginings of the past underpinned 
the romantic worldview, one which provided nationalist yearnings throughout Europe 
with specific content, form, and future vision. In the context of German romantic 
nationalism, this nostalgia took a number of forms, most notably the recovery of 
vernacular literature and oral folklore traditions with a concomitant valorisation of the 
Volk; monumental, artistic, and festive celebrations of the story of Arminius as told in 
Tacitus’ Germania; and a programme of revisionist history that stressed the unique 
history of the German people by eulogising the Reformation and Germany’s particular 
brand of medieval Christianity, fuelling the belief in Germany’s providential role in 
world history. Each of these endeavours served to provide the German people with a 
positive image of themselves as unique, noble, and ancient, and, furthermore, offered a 
  160 
foundation upon which a fundamental bond with their landscape and with each other 
could be asserted. In this and the following chapter I will focus particularly on the 
recovery of vernacular folklore and the celebrations of the figure of Arminius as 
exemplars of German nationalist/romantic nostalgia, and examine the way in which this 
nostalgic retrieval of myth provided the building blocks for a revived German national 
identity. 
Feldman and Richardson suggest that the renewed romantic interest in myth 
and folklore (a distinction that was, for the romantics, by no means clear cut as I will 
show when I discuss Jakob Grimm’s Deutsche Mythologie in the following chapter) was a 
result of ‘a growing sense of the loss of tradition and belief, of deepening division within 
the self and between the self and the world, and of political and national pressures’ 
(1972:303). Vernacular myths and folklore (Märchen)1 were seen to offer a mnemonic 
device that would recall to the German people their ancient pedigree and would 
provide a unifying source that would ease the sense of fragmentation and instability 
confronting the German territories in the early years of the nineteenth century. This was 
in part because the romantics believed that these narrative forms were uniquely placed 
to convey the authentic and ancient voice of the German people. Moreover, at the more 
abstract level of romantic philosophy as exemplified in the work of Friedrich Schlegel, 
Hölderlin, and Schelling, myth was seen as a redemptive mode for restoring to 
humanity its lost primal unity; myth, as Feldman and Richardson argue, for these 
German romantics offered a synthesising 
key to reconciling the intensely felt dualities of necessity and freedom, finitude and 
infinity, sensuousness and divinity….The final goal of myth [was] often described 
as striving to make wholly conscious, universalised and free what in the original 
myths was only unconscious, instinctual, blindly necessary, or partial.  
(1972:304)  
A huge amount of effort went into collecting, editing, and preserving traditional 
tales, proverbs, and songs. Their retrieval fed into a broader programme initiated by the 
                                                           
1 Stith Thompson defines Märchen as ‘tale[s] of some length involving a succession of motifs or 
episodes. [They move] in an unreal world without definite locality or definite characters and [are] 
filled with the marvellous. In this never-never land humble heroes kill adversaries, succeed to 
kingdoms and marry princesses’ (1977:8). See also Luke 1982:9–20. Tully draws attention to a 
subdivision in the genre of Märchen: Volksmärchen (‘folktales’) which ‘claims to originate from the 
“people” itself’ and Kunstmärchen (‘literary fairytale’) which she defines as a ‘specifically literary 
branch of the Märchen genre inspired by traditional oral narrative’ and which is thus a simulation 
of folktales (1997:28). See also Ziolkowski 1992. The romantic compilers of German folktales did 
not refer to their work as Kunstmärchen, preferring Märchen instead, but, as I will show, the term 
Kunstmärchen is an accurate designation, both in terms of their articulated purpose and the editing 
and forms of retelling undertaken.  
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romantic thinkers amongst the Bildungsbürgertum of manufacturing a sense of social 
cohesion against the backdrop of the political upheaval caused by the Napoleonic 
invasions and the wider revolutionary sentiment that was threatening absolute 
monarchism in Central Europe in the early nineteenth century. The Märchen genre was 
traditionally associated with the domestic arena, and its oral transmission within the 
family home, usually by an elder, was intended to impart specific moral lessons that 
would foster a sense of shared community values (Tully 1997:28). Thus its collection was 
an implicitly didactic strategy for social management (Hobsbawm 1994:9) in that many 
of the collectors believed that the establishment of vernacular literary canons and 
traditions would enable a German audience to recognise and associate itself with a 
specifically German paradigm ostensibly based upon long-established ‘national’ values 
and modes of behaviour that advocated community and social stability. As Tully 
suggests,  
The means to express the Romantic paradigm…required the development of genres 
which would both impact upon and inform the reader without being overtly 
political. In order to bolster traditional values, the implicit didactic message…must 
not be seen to step outside that tradition but should instead make use of it as a 
vehicle for moderate reform. 
(1997:26) 
As such, the romantics sought to elevate their native storytelling traditions in order both 
to champion indigenous democratic values amongst the German people, and to 
cultivate nationalist sentiment, pride, and cohesion.  
Tully points to a well-established, and familiarly rationalist attitude towards the 
didactic role of Märchen in Germany when she suggests that  
The Enlightenment in Germany, whilst disapproving of irrationality per se, found a 
use for the ‘marvellous’ as a means to transmit a didactic message, the intention of 
which, in the words of Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–66), was ‘bey der 
Beulustigun zu bessern und zu lehren’ [to improve and educate whilst 
entertaining]. 
(1997:27) 
The romantic bourgeois idealisation of folktales thus drew on a common German 
understanding of the role of vernacular narrative genres in maintaining social cohesion 
but in contrast to the Enlightenment attitude, viewed them as the authentic and 
authoritative containers of national character.2  
                                                           
2 Uli Linke (1990:119–124) points to an alternative and opposing attitude to the romantic view of 
folklore in nineteenth-century Germany, represented in the work of Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl 
(1823–1897) amongst others. Riehl argued against the romantic compilers’ ideological use and 
appropriation of folklore in their quest for national unification as well as their view that folklore 
was an authentic and homogenous repository of an abstracted Germanic spirit. Instead, he 
advocated closer scholarly attention to the actual social conditions and contexts in which folklore 
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One of the possible reasons these genres were viewed as a reservoir of national 
values and as models of social cohesion was because, as Susan Stewart has noted, the 
voices of tradition as found in folklore could speak through pronouns that seemed to 
emerge from ‘everyone and yet no one’: ‘As everyone, [these voices bear] upon the 
situation with the weight of tradition and traditional authority; as no one [they escape] 
the limitations and contingencies of biography and historical context’ (1991:83). As such, 
therefore, along with the implicit didacticism that strove to counter the ill effects of 
modernisation, folklore offered an immediate means of articulating what was already 
assumed to be, after Herder, the essential and timeless unity of the German people. 
Folklore was conceived of as monological, monovocal, and authentic. Nonetheless, 
despite its promotion as a unificatory medium, such a view served, perhaps 
unintentionally, to subordinate other voices, or, at the very least to appropriate them in 
the service of bourgeois visions of the national character, thus sublimating the threat 
posed by the contemporary reality of a class-ridden society by means of an appeal to 
unchanged tradition and a markedly non-specific past. 
The recovery and collection of vernacular folktales and myth was viewed as an 
increasingly urgent task within the broader context of European romanticism. As the 
literary historian Anne Janowitz has noted, a feature of English romantic poetry was a 
melancholic preoccupation with crumbling ruins within the nation’s landscapes and this 
tended allegorically to indicate the loss of a nation’s sense of its past glory and the 
pressing need to preserve, if not restore, the fragile presence of archaic cultural forms: 
(1990:62–63). Like this allegorical representation of ruins, and the poetry about them 
                                                                                                                                                             
was produced and disseminated in order to ensure better government of populations, a practice 
generally styled as Volkskunde (‘population science’ or, more literally, ‘knowledge of the common 
folk’) as opposed to the romantic collection of Volksmärchen. For Riehl, a more contextualised, 
ethnographic understanding of folklore would enable the formulation of properly targeted 
cultural and administrative policies and folklore could thus be a tool of the state. Riehl’s approach 
owed much to earlier, mid-eighteenth-century German views regarding the art of governance, 
represented by thinkers such as Joseph Mader (1754–1815) and Gottfried von Achenwall (1719–
1772) (Linke 1990:124–125). Linke makes the useful point, drawing on Foucault’s notions of the 
emergence of state surveillance and population control (1980), that ‘[s]tatistical folklore, as a 
human science, came into being at the moment when the procedures of surveillance and the 
taking of records were being established in an effort to secure the much-needed productivity of 
the populace in the service of economic development and military defence’ (1990:127). Linke, in 
my view however, draws too clear a distinction between ideological and political uses of folklore 
in this context. Both the romantic collectors and those who insisted on a more ethnographic model 
were motivated by a desire to inculcate particular virtues and modes of behaviour—conceived as 
authentically rooted in the common people—in the wider population for pragmatic political ends. 
Any difference between their views lay, rather, in their methods, the form their collection took, 
and whether they stressed generalised inspirational aspects of folklore (the romantics) or its 
particular informational quality (the ethnographers and administrators). 
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within the English scene, the recovery of vernacular folklore, conceived as a buried 
stratum of Germanic values, served in Germany to sacralise the nation even as this 
purported repository of the past appeared to be fast disappearing with the advent of 
modernity, industrialisation, and increasing urbanisation. As Abrahams has suggested, 
making the analogy between the symbolism of ruins and folklore explicit, 
Recorded traditional songs and stories, proverbs, riddles, and other such 
genres….are epitomized, like the ruin in the landscape, as emptied history, 
experienced in terms of both the discovery of continuity in the tradition and the 
continuing loss of its bearers. 
(1993:15) 
Stewart agrees, suggesting that the renewed interest in folklore (during the late 
eighteenth century) was distinguished by its tendency to ‘rescue forms that seem to be 
disappearing—that is, to effect a kind of archaeology of speech forms…[and] to place 
such specimens as curiosities, characterized by fragmentation and exoticism, against the 
contemporary’ (1991:103). 
Thus, folklore achieved rhetorical power through its ability to appear to touch 
the past, to preserve it, even as it encountered a present that was threatening its 
survival, and to provide solutions and models for a contemporary and future nation. 
The diagnosis of loss with its implicit aspiration towards a future restoration thus 
occupied a central place in the romantics’ nationalist thinking on myth and folklore and 
enabled them to map a direction for action by delineating the salient dimensions of the 
national community. By retrieving what they believed to be the essential qualities of the 
original German community as conveyed by folklore and myth, the romantics were also 
able to identify what actually needed to be recovered from the past. Thus the 
construction of an original identity through recourse to narrative defined the boundaries 
of the nation-building effort. 
II. Folklore as a Cult of Authenticity 
The Schlegel’s patriotic agenda surveyed in the previous chapter was both echoed and 
extended in the work of their contemporaries Brentano, Arnim, and the Grimm 
brothers, who believed, after Herder, that all traditional lore was the fragmented 
remains of an authentic body of German mythology that was in urgent need of 
restoration. They differed, however from the Schlegels with regard to the form of the 
past that mythology was thought to retrieve, an area of disagreement that, as I have 
mentioned, was indicative of a confessional divide between the Catholicism of the 
Schlegels and the Protestantism of, amongst others, the Grimm brothers (see Williamson 
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2004:77–78, 98–112). August Schlegel favoured a return to the heavily feudal 
medievalism of the Holy Roman Empire, which he believed contained a distilled and 
particularly Germanic3 form of Christianity. Jakob Grimm, in contrast, advocated the 
retrieval of a pre-Christian German primitivism and believed that what were 
exceptional or laudable practices or beliefs in medieval Christianity, at least as they were 
practised in Germany, were in fact survivals of a submerged pre-Christian paganism 
rather than being products of Roman Catholic Christianity or courtly chivalric customs.  
As I suggested in Chapter 2, Herder had been one of the first scholars in 
Germany to encourage the collection of vernacular folktales and literature during the 
eighteenth century as a way of identifying and celebrating the indigenous character of 
any given Volk. Thus, during the eighteenth century a number of important collections 
had been undertaken by German scholars (see Tully (1997:27, fn. 66). However, it was a 
number of figures central to romanticism in nineteenth-century Germany—Novalis, 
Brentano and von Arnim, Ludwig Uhland, and the Brothers Grimm, amongst others—
who undertook the most systematised and nationalistically motivated compilation of 
folktales.4  
Two of the leading figures involved in the development of this early form of 
folkloristics were members of the Hochromantik school, Ludwig Achim von Arnim and 
Clemens Brentano, who took an explicitly nostalgic attitude to folklore. They saw it as a 
crucial resource for achieving German cultural unification, contrasting its ‘authentic 
tone’ [wahrer Ton] to that of the artificiality of purportedly more civilised forms of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature which Arnim saw as ‘nothing but illness 
and annihilation [Krankheit und Vernichtung]’ (in Pfau 2003:56). He characterised their 
efforts to collect folk traditions as rescuing and mediating a heritage preserved—but 
dangerously imperilled—amongst the folk, using a familiar botanical analogy: ‘Where 
are the old trees under which even yesterday we found rest, the ancient signs of firm 
                                                           
3 For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘Germanic’ is used to denote the broad group of 
peoples, languages, and cultures (within the German speaking territories of Central Europe and 
Scandinavia) whose linguistic history Jakob Grimm, in particular, charted in the Deutsche 
Grammatik (1819) and Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache (1848) and whose religion he sought to 
describe in the Deutsche Mythologie. Thus Danish mythology and folklore were popularly 
considered to be Teutonic (Germanic), as was Norse material. 
4 In the last decade of the eighteenth century, Ludwig Tieck, a member of the Jena circle, had 
cultivated a renewed interest in folk- and fairytales, although without specifically emphasising 
their nationalistic potential and instead, similarly to the early work of the Schlegels, had focused 
on folklore’s aesthetic qualities in such a way that its utility for evoking a broadly romantic 
sentiment was obvious. Tieck produced a hybrid literary form—the Kunstmärchen—where 
traditional tales were recrafted as high literature. Tieck’s reworkings reflected a broader attitude 
that the simplicity and authenticity of native folklore lacked literary or aesthetic value in itself.  
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borders: what has happened, is happening to them? Almost forgotten by the people, we 
make contact with their roots’ (in Pfau 2003:57). Arnim and Brentano’s concern to rescue 
German folk traditions from an oblivion that was increasingly threatened by 
encroaching modernisation led them to publish their compilation and reworking of 
folksongs and poetry Des Knaben Wunderhorn (1806–1808) (Pfau 2003:59).  
Arnim and Brentano advocated a need to rework folktales in order to enhance 
their aesthetic value for a modern audience. However, they confronted an uneasy 
tension between their belief in the redemptive resources that the ‘timeless’ past offered 
and the aesthetic requirements of a modern—albeit apparently alienated—audience. 
Their careful recrafting of traditional tales sought to transform the crude, simplistic, and 
often morally ambiguous language of folklore into literary works of art that would 
appeal to an educated reading public. They wanted to provide a didactic resource where 
moral ambiguities were resolved in starkly conservative, but aesthetically pleasing 
terms. They therefore portrayed folklore as the preeminent form of cultural memory and 
dressed their literary product up as tradition, creating—rather than retrieving—an 
appearance of authenticity that effectively endowed them with a strong hermeneutic role 
where they interpreted the form, function, and meaning of the past for their bourgeois 
audience. As such, their efforts exemplified the dialectical relationship between 
vernacular traditions and post-Enlightenment modernity, and between cohesive 
indigeneity and cosmopolitan fragmentation, which they sought to resolve through a 
nostalgic and patriotic programme of literary retrieval and synthesis. 
III. Folklore and Nationalism: The Grimms’ Kinder- und Hausmärchen 
The clearest example of the use of folklore and myth for cultivating patriotic sentiment 
and evoking the cultural unity of the German people is to be found in the work of the 
Brothers Grimm. Best known for their collection of folktales, the Kinder- und 
Hausmärchen (1812–1815; henceforth KHM) discussed below, Wilhelm Grimm’s 
Altdänische Heldenlieder, Balladen, und Märchen (‘Ancient Danish Hero Songs, Ballads, and 
Fairytales’; 1811) was the first work that signalled what was to become for both brothers 
a lifelong commitment to their native folklore. Throughout their careers they published 
numerous other volumes on myth and folklore including their Deutsche Sagen (‘German 
Legends’; 1816–1818), and produced a well-received edition of the Prose Edda (1815). 
Wilhelm Grimm’s career centred on publishing folk literature and German myth, 
particularly his Die deutsche Heldensage (The German Hero Myths’; 1829) and Über 
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deutsche Runen (‘On German Runes’; 1835); Jakob pursued two careers simultaneously: 
he was one of the great early German philologists as exemplified by his Deutsche 
Grammatik (‘German Grammar’) in four volumes (1819–1837) and the Geschichte der 
deutschen Sprache (‘The History of the German Language’; 1848)5 while at the same time 
maintaining a keen interest in German mythology and early legal customs. As Feldman 
and Richardson remark, Jakob’s ‘philological studies began in and always remained 
complementary to his writings on myth’ (1972:408). He published his Deutsche Rechts-
Älterhümer (‘Antiquities of German Law’) in 1828, and more significantly, his massive 
four-volume collection Deutsche Mythologie in 1835, which I will discuss in the next 
chapter, followed by an extended second edition with an important preface in 1844 in 
which he advocated a comparative method for studying myth as a means of sifting out 
what was not natively Germanic. A fourth edition, with posthumous additions was 
published between 1875 and 1878.6 
The Grimm brothers described their own efforts to retrieve vernacular folklore 
as an urgent salvage operation, stating in the preface to the KHM (1812) that  
It is perhaps the right time to collect these fairy tales since those who have been 
preserving them are becoming invariably rarer…for the custom of telling tales is 
ever more on the wane, just as all the homely places in dwellings and gardens are 
yielding to empty splendour.  
(1812:ixx) 
The brothers started collecting folktales around 1806 at the behest of Brentano and 
Arnim, who were at the time collecting material for their Des Knaben Wunderhorn. The 
Grimms compiled a manuscript of forty-nine tales and sent it to Brentano towards the 
end of 1810. However, they first had a copy made because they were concerned that 
Brentano would substantially alter the tales in order to craft them into Kunstmärchen, 
whereas the brothers, according to Jack Zipes, ‘were intent on using the tales to ground 
their notions about German customs and wanted to preserve their originality’ (1987:68). 
It is certainly fortunate that they did so, as most of the Grimms’ own papers did not 
survive (Tully 1997:136) and Brentano never made use of the tales, abandoning the 
manuscript in the Ölenberg monastery in Alsace, where it was rediscovered in 1924, 
1927, and then again in 1974 by Heinz Rölleke who published it, alongside the text and 
notes in the Grimms’ own copy of the 1812 edition of the Kinder- und Hausmärchen (Zipes 
1987:68; Tully 1997:138).  
                                                           
5 He also published the very influential Deutsche Wörterbuch with his brother Wilhelm in 1852 
(Luke 1982:22). 
6 The four volumes of the Deutsche Mythologie were published in English as Teutonic Mythology, 
translated by James Stallybrass between 1883 and 1888. 
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The reworking of folklore into a more literary style represented by Brentano and 
Arnim and the Grimms’ apparent commitment to accurate and unadulterated 
transcription of folktales has suggested, for some scholars (see Luke 1982:24 and Tatar 
1987:33), two distinct attitudes to vernacular traditions amongst the romantics. The 
Grimm brothers, unlike Brentano and Arnim, wanted to preserve the narrative heritage 
of Germany contained in folktales by transcribing them as unchanged as possible. 
However, the comparison of the various editions of the KHM with the surviving 
manuscript has shown that they too made numerous changes to the tales they 
published, and this has enabled scholars to chart the degree of alteration that the 
Grimms engaged in over the course of several editions of the tales (see Rölleke 1975; 
Ginschel 1967; Zipes 1987:68–70; Tully 1997:136–169) particularly, as Jack Zipes notes, 
with regard to  
the endeavour to make the tales stylistically smoother, the concern for the 
sequential structure of the story, the dramatization of the tales to make them more 
pictorial, the reinforcement of the motives in the plots, the infusion of psychological 
elements, and the elimination of features that might detract from a fairy-tale tone 
that recalled miraculous events as though they were ordinary.  
(1987:68) 
Nonetheless, Jakob Grimm frequently stated his strong commitment to what were 
newly emerging philological principles of transcription and fidelity to sources, and 
because he believed that folktales and customs were the remnants of an original 
Germanic mythology, he argued that they should be recorded without too much 
alteration in form. The question of the degree to which the Grimms maintained this 
faithfulness to their sources, and the nature of the changes they made over the various 
editions, will be discussed below.  
There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the Grimms were motivated by 
nationalist sentiment. They were clearly affected by the upheavals of the Napoleonic 
invasions and, at least in the case of Jakob Grimm, wanted to be actively involved in 
resisting the French occupation (Wilhelm suffered poor health which hindered his 
participation although he was certainly aggrieved by the French invasions; see Tully 
1997:142–149). Although the Grimms’ patriotism seems first to have been centred 
around loyalty to their native Hessen which had been annexed to the newly created 
kingdom of Westphalia in 1807, the wider French occupation of the German territories 
resulted in an extension of their loyalties towards a form of pan-Germanic nationalism 
(Tully 1997:147–148). The brothers were representative of the particular character of 
German nationalism during this time, at least insofar as regional plurality was not seen 
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to be at odds with pan-German national unity but rather as dependent upon it. The 
Grimms thus believed that the basis for balancing provincial diversity with national 
unity was to be found in the cultivation of pan-Germanic literary and folk traditions, 
which would, in turn, promote social stability and strength. In the early years after the 
end of the occupation Jakob contrasted the stability of old German ways with the 
turmoil that the French had brought when he wrote, in terms that evoked the rural idyll 
of the past, 
I think, however, if all goes well, God willing, then reading and writing in Germany 
will become gradually less political and so forth—instead, pious work, sowing and 
ploughing will once again be satisfyingly calm, which is indubitably better suited to 
us than the shrieking, irascible manner that the cursed French brought us.  
(in Leitzmann 1923:134)7 
Both brothers found a good deal of solace in their studies of German literature 
and customs. As Wilhelm later recalled: 
The eagerness with which studies of old German culture were pursued also helped 
to overcome the oppressiveness of those times. Without doubt, world events and 
the need to withdraw into the peace of scholarship had contributed to the 
reawakening of that long forgotten literature; one sought in the past not only 
consolation but also the hope was natural that this direction would contribute to the 
return of another time.  
(in Denecke 1985:172) 
Jakob Grimm frequently stated his opposition to the French occupation and his dislike 
of the French people more generally (see Tully 1997:143–145), which he recalled in a 
letter to Johann Schmid, Mayor of Bremen in April 1837, where he too expressed his 
hope of a brighter future for a unified Germany: 
Distrust and antipathy towards the French will remain firmly impressed upon those 
of us who belong to this generation, although we see things much more mildly than 
we did in 1813-15. As far as I am concerned, the feeling[s] will pass and proceed to 
the strengthened and secure awareness of our own German virtue without any 
resentment; then we [will] have nothing to fear. Such an awareness depends upon 
political unity which one day must again be achieved and there are many paths to 
this end, even though things appear gloomy.  
(in Leitzmann 1923:49) 
Jakob combined his scholarly activities with political involvement and was an important 
member of the National Assembly established in 1848. Through their studies the 
Grimms were able to articulate a vision of unity and stability for the Fatherland, the 
essence of which, as Tully suggests, was intended to be clearly visible in their Märchen 
collection (1997:149).  
Against the background of the turmoil caused by the French occupation, the 
publication of the 1812 edition of the KHM was an immediate success, confirming the 
                                                           
7 See also Denecke 1985:181. 
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Grimms’ hopes for the volume that it would introduce the general populace to the 
unifying aspects of old German customs. The popularity of the volume also brought an 
unanticipated benefit as readers in large numbers throughout Germany, Austria, 
Bohemia, and Switzerland began to send alternative versions of the published tales as 
well as new material to the Grimms (Luke 1982:27). They immediately set about putting 
together a second edition, published in 1815, and the two volumes together brought the 
number of tales to 156. A slightly revised edition, in two volumes, was published in 1819 
with a third volume added in 1822 that contained the Grimms’ elaborate notes listing 
their sources, as well German or foreign variants and parallels of the tales (Luke 
1982:28). A further five editions appeared between 1837 and 1857 bringing the number 
of tales up to the ‘canonical count’ of 200 (Luke 1982:27–28, but see Zipes 1987:68); and 
Wilhelm Grimm, who had increasingly assumed responsibility for the KHM from 1815 
onwards, was working on an eighth edition at the time of his death in 1859. In addition 
to the seven complete editions, from 1825 onwards, the Grimms also published a 
separate volume for children (Kleine Ausgabe, ‘Shorter Edition’) of what they considered 
to be the fifty most popular tales illustrated by the Grimms’ brother Ludwig Emil (1790–
1863).  
The Grimms obtained many of their most popular tales from women (see 
Blackwell 1987:163, 172–173, fn. 11), reflecting, as Luke suggests, that ‘Among their 
many sources, women rather than men seem to have been the most rewarding’ 
(1982:27). In the first volume of the KHM Dorothea (‘Dortchen’) Wild, who later became 
Wilhelm’s wife, was one of the main contributors. Her sisters and mother also 
contributed some tales, as did their old housekeeper Marie Müller (known as ‘Alte 
Marie’). The collection of stories in the second volume was considerably aided by Frau 
Katharina Dorothea Viehmann (1755–1815), the most famous of the Grimms’ sources. 
Viehmann was an innkeeper’s daughter of Huguenot descent, who later married a tailor 
and who worked as an itinerant seller of household supplies which is how she came to 
the attention of the Grimm brothers. She had told her stories to the daughters of a 
Huguenot pastor in Kassel, where the Grimms where based, who in turn introduced her 
to the circle of romantic thinkers that included Brentano and the poet Annette von 
Droste-Hülshoff (1797–1848). It was Droste-Hülshoff, who herself collected stories for 
the brother, who recommended Viehmann to them, probably around 1812. Viehmann 
henceforward visited the Grimms in their study in Kassel and they came to enjoy her 
visits, affectionately referring to her as ‘die Märchenfrau’ (Luke 1982:27–28 and Warner 
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1994:188–189). Ludwig Grimm sketched a portrait of her as a frontispiece that appeared 
in many popular editions of the KHM and which Marina Warner portrays as suggesting 
‘an identity rooted in a particular soil’ where her wistful, dreamy expression ‘confirms 
Wilhelm’s express wish that the tales represented “the reawakening of the long 
forgotten literature”’ (1994:192).8 
Altogether, Viehmann contributed nineteen of the brothers’ best tales (Luke 
1982:27). In their preface to the second edition the Grimms gratefully acknowledged her 
input and praised her talents in terms that were indicative both of how they viewed 
their project and of their concern to stress the authenticity of their collection: 
She has retained these old tales firmly in her memory…she told them carefully, 
confidently, and with great vividness, clearly enjoying them herself; at first she 
would be quite fluent, but if asked to she would then repeat them slowly, so that 
with a little practice one could write them down as she spoke. We have thus been 
able to preserve a great deal word for word…Anyone who supposes that tradition 
is easy to falsify should have heard how exactly she repeated each narrative and 
how she insisted on the correct version. She never altered anything during a 
retelling, and if she made a slip she correct it at once in mid-sentence. 
(in Luke 1982:27) 
IV. Authenticity, Invention, and Orality 
Scholars of the Grimms’ tales have long debated the question of their authenticity, the 
related issues of the motives of the Grimm brothers in compiling their collection, and the 
nature of alterations they undertook (for an overview see Tully 1997:137–142). John Ellis 
and Alan Dundes have tended to the most negative view. Ellis has suggested that the 
Grimms and later scholars who followed them colluded in a thoroughly fraudulent 
exercise to uphold the brothers’ untarnished reputation. The tone of Ellis’ critique is 
worth some comment as it is indicative of the sharp division between the authenticity 
and the fabrication of folktales that is maintained in the contemporary field of 
folkloristics. He accuses the brothers of ‘deliberate deception’ (1983:26), of creating ‘an 
enormous discrepancy’ between the Ölenberg manuscript and the first edition (1983:38–
39), claiming that the Grimms were ‘both lazier and much less scientifically 
conscientious’ in their collection practices than they led others to believe (1983:27). Ellis 
is at pains to show that they inflicted ‘damage’ on the tales (1983:62) through their 
                                                           
8 Marina Warner also describes another portrait produced of Viehmann by the artist Ludwig 
Katzenstein in 1892 that shows her in ‘her domestic setting surround by her children and 
grandchildren as the two scholars listen attentively’ (1994:191). The arrangement of the painting is 
clearly designed to emphasise the rustic, homely provenance of Viehmann’s tales which clearly 
chimed with the Grimm’s insistence on the Völkisch origin of their tales. Viehmann, however, as I 
have noted above, was neither a member of the peasant class nor did she relate her tales to the 
brothers in the domestic setting that Katzenstein’ painting suggests.  
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editing practices and frames his critique in overtly moralising terms: ‘the Grimms 
appear to have been guilty of a pervasive habit of tinkering idly and uninhibitedly with 
the language of the texts’ (1983:85; my emphasis). What is so interesting about Ellis’ 
attack on the Grimms is that he seems to assume a direct correlation between orality and 
authenticity and thus implies that the type of textualisation the Grimms undertook was 
a deliberate corruption of a once accessible original purity. In my view, the same 
rhetoric of authenticity that engaged the Grimms is thus here repeated in Ellis’ work. At 
a more general level, assertions that a particular text directly springs from a folk source 
and criticisms that it does not both seem to me to constitute implicit claims that printed 
texts not only can or should invoke the presence of the folk, but that this presence is a 
prerequisite to establishing the authority and the authenticity of those texts. Precedence 
is thus given to narratives that exist prior to their reproduction in print indicating a 
temporal prioritisation of the past over the present as well as a narrative hierarchisation 
based on constructions of truth and authenticity after the fact. Based on the justifications 
offered by the Grimms regarding their editorial decisions, I do not doubt that, at the 
very least, they believed they were being faithful to the tone and import of their sources. 
It seems to me, therefore, that Ellis’ critique is more indicative of the programmatic 
mission of the contemporary field of folklore that he is so clearly invested in than of the 
Grimms’ own calculated duplicity. 
Alan Dundes, one of the few to support Ellis’ rather excessive and in places 
factually flawed critique, sees in the tales a manifestation of what became known, after 
Richard Dorson coined the term, as ‘Fakelore’ (1959). Dundes has claimed that the 
Grimms’ Märchen was made up of ‘spurious and synthetic writings’ which purported to 
be genuine folklore (1984:155–171). Other commentators have been less critical, seeking 
instead to find a less polemical explanation for the Grimms’ alterations, usually 
attributing them to a variety of external social factors (bourgeois social mores, for 
instance, which meant that the brothers had to downplay the more vulgar elements) (see 
Bottigheimer 1988 and Dégh 1990). Linda Dégh (1984), for example, has pointed out that 
the standards set by contemporary notions of folkloric authenticity have only been in 
circulation since the 1940s and that it is therefore anachronistic to apply them 
retrospectively to the Grimms’ practices. Her argument receives support from Zipes 
(1979:15–16) who similarly suggests that the rewriting of tales was a common practice in 
nineteenth-century folkloristics. However, in the preface to the first edition of the KHM 
the brothers stated that ‘We have tried to write down these tales as purely as 
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possible….No circumstance has been added through poetic efforts or embellished or 
changed, for we should have shied from augmenting tales that were so rich in 
themselves with their own analogy and reference. They cannot be invented’ (in Zipes 
1988:37). In the second edition a similar claim is made, although the brothers here do 
acknowledge some editorial intervention: 
In regard to the way in which we collected the tales, it must be noted that first of all 
we were concerned with loyalty and truth, for we did not add anything on our own 
account, but did not beautify (idealise) the circumstances or traits of the tale. Rather, 
we have related the contents just as we had received them; it is self evident that the 
expression [exact wording] and the individual details stem from us, yet we have 
tried to preserve every unique element that we have observed.  
(in Kamenetsky 1992:165) 
Given the Grimms’ repeated claims to be passing on tales in their original, authentic, 
and therefore purely Germanic form, and the role that the collection played in defining 
the German character, the extent to which they can be borne out needs to be assessed. 
The question of what constitutes authenticity in the context of the early 
nineteenth-century collection of German folklore, particularly as practised by the 
Grimms, is important to understand here. Several criteria signified the basis for any 
argument in favour of a tale’s genuineness: it had to be a faithful replication of both the 
tone and rustic concerns of the common people, unadulterated by élite ideas, and thus 
signifying autochthony, purity, and an unbroken transmission of earlier, but extant, oral 
traditions. As Marina Warner suggests, the German romantics generally, and the 
Grimms in particular, identified fairy tales ‘with the spontaneous, innocent, untutored 
mind—with children and with ordinary, unsophisticated people. Both were pure, not-
adult—literally unadulterated’ (1994:188). 
This emphasis on the childlike quality of folklore perhaps reflects a patronising 
attitude towards the ‘common people’, but it also symbolised the romantic concern both 
with retrieving the uncorrupted childhood of culture itself, and with the suitability of 
ancient lore for teaching children about their noble heritage. Jakob Grimm, in his review 
of a speech by Karl Besselt praising Das Nibelungenlied, certainly advocated old German 
poetry as a pedagogical tool firmly based in the domestic arena: 
National history and poetry must be cultivated with the mother’s milk, as it were, 
recounted and discussed before the child enters school and when he returns 
home….Children in so-called educational institutions are to be pitied, for when they 
spend the whole day earnestly learning they cannot hear the tales in the evening; 
nothing in the world can be substituted for homely parental familiarity.  
(in Denecke 1985:142–3) 
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Such a view is a clear echo of Herder’s theories regarding the role of the patriarchal 
family in maintaining tradition and, consequently, the natural order (Naturordnung) as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
The analogy drawn between childish innocence and folklore, and its importance 
for educating children and the general public in their national history and poetry, also 
enabled the prioritisation of orality over literacy, given that literacy was, if somewhat 
erroneously, connected to cosmopolitan modernisation and therefore the end of 
humankind’s ‘childhood’ in a post-Enlightenment context. The broader cultural 
precedence granted to oral forms of storytelling emerged in the eighteenth century, in 
Germany at least, as one way of resisting French cosmopolitanism and, as Susan Stewart 
has noted, ‘in order to imagine folklore, the literary community of the eighteenth 
century had to invent a folk, singing and dancing “below the level” of “conscious 
literary art”’ (1991:102–103). This beguiling image of an uncorrupted, unchanging 
peasant community telling stories unaffected by the contamination of print and literacy, 
is, in other words, not only a late-eighteenth-century invention: it is a necessary one. 
Jochen Schulte-Sasse links this invention to the exigencies of eighteenth-century life 
when he argues that ‘the mental structures of eighteenth-century thinking…share a 
cognitive feature that juxtaposes alienation, isolation, and the division of labor in 
modernity with an absent and longed-for state of communal solidarity or moral 
sensibility’ (1985:102).  
The Grimms thus continued the invention—indeed, romanticisation—of oral 
storytelling amongst the folk in the early nineteenth century and to do so they had to 
posit a rupture or separation not only between the presence of the folk and the absence 
of their own editorial interventions, but also between literate and oral culture, between 
modern, self-conscious writing and older, supposedly natural, spontaneous storytelling. 
However, Margaret Spufford has shown that, from as early as the late sixteenth century, 
‘illiteracy was everywhere face to face with literacy, and the oral with the printed word’ 
(1991:32). Rudolf Schenda has suggested, thoroughly against the grain of most 
contemporary folklore scholarship but persuasively nonetheless, that the precedence 
given to orality both by the nineteenth-century collectors, and by contemporary 
folklorists is mistaken. He argues instead that ‘it is first and foremost the spread of 
literacy and the act of reading that promotes storytelling in the lower social classes’ 
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(1993:46).9 In other words, the direction of transmission, rather than moving from the 
folk to the élite, may well have travelled from writing to oral tale-telling.  
Schenda’s account recalls Jacques Derrida’s well-known deconstruction of 
phonocentrism (the prioritisation of the spoken word [phone] over writing) in Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s linguistic system, presented in his Course in General Linguistics (1916). Here 
Saussure presents speech as authentic, spontaneous, and unmediated language, and 
writing as dependent on it, and thus as secondary (both chronologically and 
synchronically). Saussure claims, for example, that  
Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the 
sole purpose of representing the first. The linguistic object is not both the written 
and the spoken forms of words; the spoken forms alone constitute the object. 
(1959:23) 
Derrida analyses Saussure’s claims to show that the metaphysics of presence 
(logocentrism) is a determinative factor in this phonocentric theory of language and 
communication where the stability of language is considered to be best represented by 
speech. That is, speech confers being as presence in the moment of its enunciation, thus 
seemingly securing the presence/being of the speaker: ‘…phonocentrism merges with 
the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as presence…’ (1976:12). 
Thus writing, defined as absence (the absence of a speaker), is seen as a deficit of 
presence, or, at the very most, as an indirect, secondary, and then only fleeting 
restoration of the author’s presence.  
Derrida argues that speech—the moment of utterance—can play this kind of 
ontological role because it seems to be the one instant in which signification (meaning) 
and form (object/signified) are concurrently present. At the moment of a spoken 
utterance, words appear to be transparent signifiers coextensive with an individual’s 
thought; at the point of enunciation consciousness seems present to itself and concepts 
present themselves, directly and seemingly without mediation, as stable signifieds 
directly accessible by other individuals (Derrida 1981:20). Written words are, by 
contrast, physical marks (graphemes) which a reader has to decipher, providing 
meanings which she or he infers as congruent with the author’s intended sense but 
which do not seem to be supplied in the words themselves. Writing thus offers either 
                                                           
9 The invention of the rapid (steam powered) printing press between 1810 and 1812 and 
inexpensive newsprint from about 1840 onwards certainly contributed in the nineteenth century 
to the easy availability of reading material. Literacy amongst the general populace improved 
rapidly in nineteenth-century Germany and Schenda offers an educated estimate that the potential 
literate audience was ‘twenty-five percent of the population [around 1800], forty percent by 1830, 
seventy-five percent by 1879, and ninety percent by 1900’ (1970:44). 
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only equivocal admittance to the thought of the writer or is wholly anonymous, 
unconnected with any speaker or author. It thus seems that writing, for Saussure, is not 
merely a mechanical apparatus for representing speech but more significantly a 
deformation or distortion of speech. Voice/speech is privileged by Saussure, Derrida 
claims, so that language can be treated in terms of presence. But, for Derrida, this 
posited presence is always already inhabited by différance—marked by absence (deferral) 
and by fluidity (difference), rather than by the fixity of meaning.10 This is because 
writing, which, as Saussure claims, is not the first object of linguistic enquiry, is 
constructed on the very same principles as speech. Derrida shows that writing returns at 
a crucial point in Saussure’s work when he has to explain the nature of linguistic units 
as purely differential and therefore arbitrary in nature.11 In order to make his case 
Saussure turns to writing as the clearest example of language as a system of differences 
having previously rejected its possible status as pure language, unlike speech (1959:119–
120). Derrida shows that there is at work in Saussure’s text, therefore, an operation of 
‘self-deconstruction’, in which the text unmasks its own construction and reveals itself 
as a rhetorical operation rather than as having a solid empirical foundation. Having 
established a hierarchy that makes writing a derivative form of speech, Saussure’s own 
argument shows, unintentionally, that this relationship can be reversed and that speech 
is a manifestation of the principles that are at work in writing. Therefore, for Derrida, 
Saussure demonstrates against his own argument that speech is a species of writing 
rather than vice versa. Here the logic of the supplement is displayed in the working of 
Saussure’s own text: the marginal (writing) in its very marginality turns out to 
characterise the central object of discussion (speech).12  
The Grimms’ own prioritisation of orality over literature itself encodes a similar 
metaphysics of presence. As I have already suggested, the Grimms certainly believed 
that their own collection of fairy tales was a faithful facsimile of oral storytelling and 
was, furthermore, an important contribution to the preservation of the German past—
the restoration of its presence—given that oral storytelling was on the wane. In the view 
                                                           
10 I take up this discussion in Chapter 8 and provide there a more detailed overview of the terms 
that Derrida employs. 
11 Saussure refers to this principle as ‘the absolutely final law of language’ which is ‘that there is 
nothing that can ever reside in one term…a is powerless to designate anything without the aid of b, 
and the same thing is true of b without the aid of a….[B]oth have no value except through their 
reciprocal difference….[N]either has any value…other than through this same plexus of eternally 
negative differences’ (1959:65–67). 
12 See Derrida 1976:27–73 for his discussion of Saussure’s phonocentrism. I discuss more fully 
Derrida’s concepts of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ and the logic of supplementarity in Chapter 8. 
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of the brothers, its traces could best be secured for future generations in print. Their 
concern with the priority of the oral over the written explains, at the very least, the 
Grimms’ suspicion of the Kunstmärchen genre which privileged literariness at the 
expense of the unsullied voice—the retrieved presence—of the Volk. Oral transmission 
of tales, for the Grimms, represented the primal scene of folklore—the origin of the 
Volk—and, therefore, of German cultural unity, evoking a memory of the original 
community gathered together, perhaps around a campfire, reciting the tales and 
traditions that bound them together as a people with shared values and history. The 
presentation of their collection as a faithful reproduction of orally transmitted tales did 
of course reflect their own ambivalence regarding the relationship of ‘high art’ to 
popular culture and the unsettling interplay of the written and the oral. However, it also 
attempted to legitimate the idea that the preservation of orality secured contiguity with 
the origin of the German people: orality signalled originality, and hence a restoration of 
the presence of the primordial community which was, in the romantic rhetoric of 
authenticity, the firm foundation of Germanic identity and noble pedigree. As Zipes 
contends, ‘it is apparent that [the Grimms] wanted to stress the relationship of each tale 
to an ideal Urvolk and Ursprache, while at the same time they focused on the specific 
German tradition with the express purpose of discovering something new about the 
origins of German customs and laws (1987:67). 
The Grimms’ strategy of underplaying their editorial role in shaping the 
narratives—of, in effect, insisting on their own absence from the texts—thus relied on a 
notion that that the tales preserved intact the transparent voice of the Volk—their 
continuing and uncorrupted presence—which was wholly natural, original, and thus 
authentic. However, the purported presence of the folk in the KHM was as much an 
invention of the brothers’ editorial efforts as was their own absence. As such, the tales 
produced in the Grimms’ collection were what Stewart calls a ‘distressed genre’ 
(1991:103), one that was given all the appearance of age but which was, in fact, a 
relatively recent invention (see also Gaster 1887:339–340). Whatever the cause, the 
promotion of orality in the work of nineteenth-century scholars like the Grimm brothers 
signalled a growing nostalgia for a past that had, perhaps, never existed, but one upon 
which they nonetheless sought to ground the certainty of the German character and 
presence.13 
                                                           
13 Stewart has summarised the concept of nostalgia in a way that well conveys the nature of the 
Grimms’ attitude towards the past when she suggests that ‘Nostalgia is a sadness without an 
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Not only was the priority granted to orality possibly mistaken or illusory, the 
Germanic authenticity of the Grimms’ sources is itself questionable. Significantly, as 
Elizabeth Harries contends, most of the tales that the Grimms collected or transcribed 
‘had their roots in earlier European written literature’ rather than in ancient Germanic 
traditions (2001:77–79). One obvious source, which the Grimms did acknowledge, was 
Charles Perrault (1628–1703),14 a French author and poet who was influential in 
developing the genre of written fairytales, and whose best known tales were published 
in 1697. Most of these stories were themselves adapted from earlier folktale collections, 
in particular those published by the Italian poet Giambattista Basile (1566 or 1575–1632). 
Nor were the Grimms’ sources entirely transmitted to them orally, or even derived 
originally from oral traditions: in the first edition, as Luke notes, they ‘occasionally used 
literary sources, if they judged them…to have something of a folktale character’ and 
further, that ‘such sources were not even always German: a medieval Latin poem…was 
the basis of one of the tales in the 1812 volume’ (Luke 1982:29). Jeannine Blackwell 
(1987:163) shows that the Grimms obtained many of their stories from over twenty 
literary sources, in addition to those already noted.  
Moreover, even many of their main informants were not quite as German as the 
Grimms wanted to suggest. Viehmann, for example, was of French Huguenot descent 
and, as Warner suggests, ‘her culture was much more mixed and rather less rootedly 
Hessian than the Grimm brothers wanted to suggest’ (1994:192). In addition, the 
connections and kinship of other Grimm informants were more permeated with literary 
French influence than it would seem from the Grimms’ presentation of their collection 
as determinedly indigenous, an aspect which Warner claims has been neglected by 
folklorists ‘in favour of the mythical dream of autochthonous purity’ (ibid.). Nor were 
                                                                                                                                                             
object, a sadness which creates a longing that of necessity is inauthentic because it does not take 
part in lived experience….Nostalgia, like any form of narrative, is always ideological: the past it 
seeks has never existed except as a narrative, and hence, always absent, that past continually 
threatens to reproduce itself as a felt lack’ (1993:23). 
14 In the preface to the 1812 edition of the KHM the Grimms acknowledged Perrault’s work as a 
important precursor to their own: ‘France has certainly yet more tales currently than those which 
Charles Perrault gave us, who alone still treated them as children’s tales (not so his inferior 
imitators, Aulnoi, Murat)’ (in Harries 2001:22). Harries draws attention to the Grimms’ 
disparagement in parentheses of Marie-Catherine le Jumel de Barnville, barrone d’Aulnoy 
(1650/1651–1705) and Henriette-Julie de Castelnau, comtesse de Murat (1670–1716), showing that 
they, rather than Perrault, were probably amongst the first to write down fairy tales in France 
towards the end of the seventeenth century, and explains the Grimms’ dismissal of their work as 
‘imitators’ of Perrault in light of the fact that these women were from the aristocratic classes and 
therefore their contributions did not chime well with the Grimms’ interest in retrieving a 
‘supposedly simpler “folk culture”’ (2001:23–24). 
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the Grimms sources entirely derived from the Volk. As Warner again suggests, ‘Though 
the stories are unquestionably traditional, they are not quite as homespun—or as 
rustically lowborn—as the brothers claimed’ (ibid.), largely in view of the fact that many 
of the tales were gathered from immediate family members and friends such as Droste-
Hülshoff who were very familiar with French fairytale traditions and who were by no 
means from the lower classes. 
Another aspect that calls into question the extent to which the Grimms were 
faithful to their stated intentions regarding the fidelity of their sources and 
unadulterated transmission is the nature of the editing that they undertook. Even in the 
first edition, some of the stories were amalgamations of variant versions of the tales, and 
in successive editions an increasing number of tales were selective combinations of 
variants from quite different parts of Germany. As Luke suggests, ‘Comparison of the 
Oelenberg manuscript with the first edition confirms that from the outset the material 
was being not only selected but tied and smoothed out, clarified and harmonised’ (Luke 
1982:29). Luke places the responsibility for these editorial decisions with Wilhelm 
Grimm, arguing that his intentions differed from those of his brother in that he was 
more concerned to convey a ‘“pure” Volkstümlichkeit [‘popular provenance’], and “ideal” 
folktale tone’ than to ‘a scrupulously exact historical record of raw folk-utterance’ 
(1982:29–30).15 To this end Wilhelm, who was the primary editor of the collection after 
1815, sought to reproduce, or at least to accentuate and intensify, the unsophisticated 
manner of oral narrative by using simple sentences and a commonplace lexicon, 
interspersed with popular sayings and idioms, occasional asides to the imagined 
audience of listening children, and rhyming formulae for ends of stories. Despite the 
Grimms’ concern to emphasise the Völkisch tone of their tales, very few were presented 
in local dialects but instead in High German. Moreover, as Luke shows, attempts were 
made in successive editions to purify the language of foreign influences (1982:30).  
In addition to the developments and changes discussed thus far, the most 
significant editorial changes operated, however, at the level of narrative itself. Tully 
attributes these alterations to the fact that the Grimms intended their collection to be an 
Erziehungsbuch (an educational guide), an ambition that is stated in their foreword to the 
second edition (1987:137). At the very least, the changes made provide evidence for the 
Grimms’ concerns to promote specific bourgeois values based on the moral codes of an 
                                                           
15 Zipes disagrees with Luke on this point, arguing instead that the comparison—such as that 
carried out by Gunhild Ginschel (1967)—of the texts that Jakob Grimm collated for the first edition 
with Wilhelm’s, confirms that ‘their work shares the exact same tendencies’ (1987:68). 
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idealised bygone era, to recreate a ‘national aesthetic’ (Rebel 1988:2), and, as Tully 
argues, to produce ‘a voice of patriarchal authority for the German nation’ (1997:151): 
explicitly sexual elements were removed; violent scenes were heightened; supernatural 
events were explained in terms of characters’ moral transgressions or conformity; the 
narratorial voice was increasingly audible, functioning to explain the thoughts of 
characters and to reinforce moral judgements; the indirect speech of the manuscript and 
first edition was frequently changed to direct speech in the second edition further 
enhancing the sense of accessibility to characters’ motivations and thought; and 
characterisation was narrowed into an unambiguous division between good and evil 
actors. 
V. Gender, Class, and Nation:  
The Kinder- und Hausmärchen as an Erziehungsbuch 
Several scholars have argued that a gendered dialectic directs these editorial 
interventions and functions to strengthen the bourgeois value system that the Grimms 
wanted to place at the heart of their national aesthetic. Moreover, in my view, it is one 
that offers an insight into the patrilineal assumptions that guided the construction of 
German national identity as it was pursued by the romantics, working to structure the 
vocabulary of nationalism based on the assumption that the patriarchal family was the 
basic unit of the social order.16 There is thus an accumulating body of feminist literature 
on the patriarchal dimensions of the Grimms’ tales and on the social function of 
                                                           
16 The bourgeois basis of romantic nationalism was very clearly anti-individualist, collective, 
hierarchical, and inegalitarian in its evocation of the past and in its vision of the ideal national 
community. As such it lent itself well to the theorisation of the patriarchal family as the basic 
social unit upon which all other forms of civil life could be modelled. This view was helpfully 
discussed by Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), the founder of German sociology, who, writing 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, distinguished between two types of social grouping: 
Gemeinschaft (usually translated as ‘community’) which refers to groupings based on a feeling of 
togetherness, and Gesellschaft (society) which, on the other hand, refers to groups that are 
sustained by an instrumental goal. According to Tönnies, the Gemeinschaft (community) was 
opposed to the Gesellschaft which was based on the liberal principles that emerged out of the 
French Revolution and the notion of nations established on the basis of the social contract. Tönnies 
notion of the Gemeinschaft captures the type of social order the romantics were advocating when 
he suggests that ‘Family life is the general basis of life in the Gemeinschaft. It subsists in village and 
town life. The village community and the town themselves can be considered as large families, the 
various clans and houses representing the elementary organisms of its body; guilds, corporations, 
and offices, the tissues and organs of the town. Here original kinship and inherited status remain 
an essential, or at least the most important, condition of participating fully in common property 
and other rights’. He further suggested that the idea of civil authority is, ‘within the Gemeinschaft, 
most adequately represented by fatherhood, or paternity’ (1957:39). Thus, in this system, the 
political or social order rested upon the procreative order, and individuals’ submission to nature’s 
unadulterated laws was seen to be necessary and moral.  
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fairytales more generally.17 Many of the analyses are concerned with the way in which 
the tales, through the course of several editions, increasingly came to promote restrictive 
archetypes of femininity, such as passivity, voicelessness, and self-abnegation, thus 
conforming to conservative and heterosexual models of gender, or to inscribe 
misogynist portrayals of females—in particular, maternal violence, cruelty, and 
wickedness—often creating an equivalence between vindictive mothers (or, in later 
editions, step-mothers) and the malevolent figure of the witch. Ruth Bottigheimer has 
analysed why the fairytales were such a suitable format for what were in effect didactic 
manoeuvres along gendered lines, showing how gender-coded themes and motifs in the 
collection frequently expressed a normative (and normalising) view of women, 
rendering them mute, confined, and, in some cases—Snow White and Sleeping Beauty—
literally comatose: 
One must concede that fairy tales offered an apparently innocent and peculiarly 
suitable medium for both transmitting and enforcing the norm of the silent woman. 
To the extent that these tales corroborated and codified the values of the society in 
which they appear, they reinforced them powerfully, symbolising and codifying the 
status quo and serving as paradigms for powerlessness. 
(1986a:130) 
The Grimms’ tales were thus tools for the dissemination of appropriate, normative 
gendered behaviour where femininity was aligned with silence, powerlessness, and the 
private sphere, and, in line with the brother’s intention that the KHM should serve as an 
educational manual for children, served to reinforce these norms in the domestic setting. 
What one learns about women from the Grimms tales, therefore, is that silence, 
like patience, is a particularly female virtue. The figure of the silent or silenced woman 
in many of the Grimms tales often served as a sign of their piety and submissiveness to 
the paternal family. For example, in the tale of ‘The Twelve Brothers’ the sister of the 
brothers takes a vow of silence for seven years almost at the cost of her own life in order 
to reverse a spell that has turned them into ravens (see Luke 1982:111–115, 119–123). 
Enforced silence is used as a punishment for women (Blackwell 1987:164). Those female 
characters who do speak directly are usually witches or wicked step-mothers. 
Bottigheimer (1986b:115–131) shows that the words of ‘good’ female characters are more 
frequently expressed in indirect speech while men and ‘evil’ female characters use direct 
speech. In fact, witches and males speak more frequently than any of the other 
characters that populate the Grimms’ tales.  
                                                           
17 See Lieberman 1972; Franz 1972; Stone 1975; Kolbenschlag 1979; Dowling 1981; Johnson Phelps 
1981; Bottigheimer 1986b, 1987; 1988; Tatar 1987; Warner 1994; Harries 2001. 
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Women’s silence is depicted in many different ways, but all point to appropriate 
femininity as passive, compliant, supine, and dependent on men for the restoration of 
their voice once their virtue has been proved. As Maureen Thum suggests, in a large 
number of tales contributed by Marie Hassenpflug, ‘a passive, obedient heroine is 
portrayed as undergoing a process of maturation or socialization during which she 
waits for deliverance by a prince, a king, or other male authority figure’ (1993:13). In 
‘Dornröschen’ (Sleeping Beauty) and ‘Schneewittchen’ (Snow White) female 
protagonists quite literally sleep their way into womanhood and it would thus seem, as 
Thum also argues, that ‘the paradoxical message of the tales is that passivity is a source 
of power, a means to achieve emotional and economic rewards’ (ibid.). The portrayal of 
heroines in this way raises interesting questions regarding the intended audience and 
the female contributors to the tales. As I have noted, the Grimms derived many of their 
tales from women and one could therefore ask, as Warner does, ‘if and when women are 
narrating, why are the female characters so cruel and the mother so often dead at the 
start of the story? Why have women continued to speak at all within this body of story 
which defames them so profoundly? Could they be speaking to a purpose?’ (1995:209–
210). She concludes that  
…attributing to women testimony about women’s wrongs and wrongdoing gives 
them added value: …if women say such things about themselves, then the matter is 
settled. What some women say against others can be usefully turned against all of 
them. 
(1995:209) 
Blackwell has helpfully reflected on the implications of what I would call the Grimms’ 
female ventriloquism and explores what it means when women tell their children stories 
of enforced female silence. She proposes that  
reading fairy tales aloud in the nineteenth-century household served to reinforce 
the public propagandistic model of the respectable German household: the 
forthright males explaining and ordering, the “good” women quiet and pliable, 
concerned only about the activities of men. Moreover, it is the female child-carer in 
the home who passes on the message of women’s deprivation of power; she would 
seem to give her consent to the project of keeping women silent. 
(1987:164–165) 
I would argue then, in agreement with Blackwell, that the Grimms were intent on 
defining the character of women in conformity with their bourgeois ideals, but I would 
further suggest that this characterisation was a crucial element in their construction of 
the ideal German nation, indicating, as I will discuss below, that authentic Germanness 
was equivalent to strong and determined manliness. Gender, class, and nation were thus 
intertwined narratives: the Grimms naturalised inequitable gender and class 
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arrangements at the same time as they constructed German national identity through 
their attempts to restore/invent the voice of the Volk.  
Tully (1987:149–169) provides a very clear and helpful comparative analysis of 
four of the tales that reinforces the parallelism between the national idealisation and the 
gendered/class dialectic that runs throughout the development of the tales. She 
compares versions from the Ölenberg manuscript, the 1812–1815, and the 1819–1822 
editions and demonstrates persuasively that the final product of the editorial process 
was the ‘consequence of a conscious selection process…which…was intended to 
advocate a specific value system’ (1987:152). It was one which conformed to the 
Grimms’ belief that the tales were a didactic guide to an ancient and exemplary German 
culture based on traditional (that is, patriarchal) morality, justice and values such as 
loyalty, familial love, and honour, and which would consequently promote the stability 
and unity within German society that was a prerequisite to the romantics’ German 
national vision. Moreover, as Tully later suggests, the value system conveyed by the 
tales was intended to ‘promote a hierarchical social structure with a clear mediatory role 
for the bourgeoisie’ because the ‘Volk…content of the texts serves an exemplary function 
as bourgeois values are projected on to an idealisation of life amongst the popular 
classes’ (1987:195). 
In addition, this value system, clearly encoded in the romantic worldview and 
indebted to Herder, made stark distinctions along gendered lines that mirrored these 
class divisions, where women’s roles in society were defined solely in terms of their 
domestic roles in the family, reflecting Novalis’ view that ‘Women know nothing of 
social conditions—altogether they are only connected to the State, Church, and the 
public, etc. by means of their husbands. They live in a literally natural state’ 
(Hardenberg [Novalis] 1968, III:568, Fragment 92). Here the ‘natural state’ of women 
parallels the romantic view that the Volk were closer to nature than their modern 
descendants, although significantly such a view does not accord women the same 
degree of valorisation or admiration. This is partly because women are seen frequently 
to present a threat to order and stability when they do not conform to the domestic, 
patriarchal stereotype of demure and obedient wife, mother, or daughter. This is a view 
vividly emphasised in several of the Grimms’ tales, in particular in ‘Hansel and Gretel’ 
where the mother is presented as malevolent and uncaring, selfishly putting her own 
well-being over that of her family, neglecting her maternal duties, and persuading her 
meek but loving husband to abandon their children in the forest. Here the mother 
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personifies an aggressive overturning of the natural order (Naturordnung) and the 
outcome is potentially calamitous for all concerned. The other female character in the 
tale—the witch in whose ‘gingerbread’ cottage the children are imprisoned—is similarly 
evil. Redemption of the family within the tale is only secured through the filial loyalty 
and cooperation of the young brother and sister and, when the children are reunited 
with their father at the end of the tale, the mother and the witch are dead, signalling the 
restoration of the natural order. 
Tully shows that the misogynist tone of the tale is progressively more marked as 
it develops over several editions, predominantly through the depiction of the mother, 
and then step-mother, as increasingly cruel. For Tully, this is achieved in several subtle 
ways, including ‘the addition of an aggressive tone through direct speech, using such 
interjections as “ei Narr” [‘oh fool’]’ and providing ‘insights into [the mother’s] thoughts 
supplied by the narrator’ which ‘heightens the reader’s view of her evil nature’ 
(1987:155). Bottigheimer also shows that the Grimms’ tales were increasingly permeated 
with a ‘general pattern of exculpating men and incriminating women’ (1987:81). 
Mothers in the tales are regularly portrayed in wholly negative terms although 
admittedly fathers too are not always viewed entirely positively, usually when they fail 
to assert paternal authority or are too easily swayed by the cunning of their wives or 
daughters. The difference in the portrayal, however, is that female wrongdoers are 
much more likely to suffer punishment than their male counterparts (Bottigheimer 
1987:81–94).  
The presentation of familial roles in this way reinforces a bourgeois ethic which 
foregrounds the importance of family loyalty and cohesion, paternal authority, and a 
clear-cut gendered division of labour. Zipes suggests that the failure of individuals to 
act in conformity with these family values is often the catalyst for the tale’s narrative 
action and that this again encodes a bourgeois view of the family structure which, I 
might add, is also clearly patriarchal: 
The portrayal of the family in the Grimms’ tales reflects the dissolution of the 
original family at first, whereby the protagonist or protagonists must go on a quest 
to establish a new realm. The loss of family must be compensated by the recreation 
of a new type of family that incorporates a sense of the Grimms’ own bourgeois 
ethics. 
(1988:39) 
Strikingly, then, the events in the tales parallel the intention of the Grimms’ editorial 
choices and confirm the didactic value of the Märchen in that the brothers were on their 
own quest to restore or to create a new familial model of the German nation which drew 
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inspiration from the stable, hierarchical, and wholesome past. The German nation is 
thus unambiguously aligned with the bourgeois familial setting while at the same time 
the contours of German nationalism are defined in terms of a clear gendered division of 
labour and characterisation. The implicit message is that manliness and Germanness are 
analogous.  
The alliance of gender with class in this regard suggests to me that the 
construction and idealisation of German national identity was considered by the 
Grimms to be founded on a patriarchal archetype—of the father as guardian of tradition 
and guarantor of social cohesion and stability—derived from Herder: just as 
(fore)fathers shape posterity in their position as the source and conduit of tradition, the 
concept of the fatherland has a seminal and ongoing role in the development of a nation. 
The portrayal of the family in the Grimms’ tales is thus intended as paradigmatic both 
for bourgeois measures of respectability and for nation building. Roles are created in 
accordance with specific gendered guidelines and the suggestion is that compliance 
with these roles is the key to familial harmony and by implication, national unity and 
stability. Fathers should be strong and authoritative, mothers submissive and caring, 
and children obedient and loyal. Non-compliance leads to punishment and the 
destruction of the family unit. The bourgeois family is thus construed as a microcosm of 
the German nation where reciprocal care and patriarchal authority are the ideals. The 
Grimms’ reworking of the tales emphasised these factors and laid the foundation both 
for the value system which their Erziehungsbuch sought to promote and for the 
fatherland that they envisaged.  
As a whole, within the broader context of romantic nationalism, the KHM was 
largely a successful project as far as raising national consciousness was concerned, as 
Aris remarks: 
The Romantics started as literary revolutionaries, shocking the people…and 
cultivating the past as a protest against the present. A few decades later, fairy tales, 
folk songs, stories of knights and witches, had become the common property of the 
people and had greatly strengthened the national consciousness, so that Germans 
became interested for the first time in the treasures of their literature and poetry. 
(1965:219) 
Furthermore, the KHM provided Jakob Grimm with the material basis upon which to 
reconstruct Germanic myth, developed in his four-volume work Deutsche Mythologie, 
which Feldman and Richardson claim was ‘responsible for the development by which 
mythologic study has become the study mainly of folklore’ (1972:410). The Deutsche 
Mythologie was certainly a central influence in the development of comparative 
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mythology throughout the nineteenth century leading Feldman and Richardson to 
equate it with James Frazer’s achievements in The Golden Bough (ibid.). In the Deutsche 
Mythologie, Grimm consolidated his view that the origins of the German nation were to 
be found in its ancient lore and legends and that, further, these could rival the pedigree 
of the ancient classical Greek and Roman myths. In the following chapter I will examine 
the content of the Deutsche Mythologie and Grimm’s achievement in ostensibly retrieving 
a remarkably thorough and rounded picture of German myth.  
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C H A P T E R   S I X 
GERMAN IDENTITY: 




This chapter examines the culmination of the romantic retrieval of myth and folklore in 
the form of Jakob Grimm’s Deutsche Mythologie (henceforth DM). The DM was the most 
systematic and comprehensive contribution to the creation of a national mythology in 
nineteenth-century Germany, inaugurating what was, according to Grimm, a new 
science of mythology. Grimm believed that the meticulous analysis of textual sources 
following rigorous philological principles, supplemented by the study of folk narratives 
and practices, would peel back the layers of the past revealing the pure source of 
German myth traditions and therefore the character of the German Urvolk. The DM was 
also a manifesto of sorts for the Heidelberg romantics in that it set out an anti-Catholic 
position—deliberately against the Jena romantic school led by the Schlegel brothers—
regarding the chronology of the German nation and the kind of past that would best 
serve the retrieval of vernacular traditions and character. The Heidelberg romantics’ 
resistance to the Catholic Church, which they viewed as an imperial interloper in the 
German territories, thus informed the project of the DM and wider debates concerning 
the proper origin, form, and content of a national mythology, and was thus part of a 
confessional divide between the Jena and Heidelberg romantics that I survey in the first 
section of this chapter. Grimm used a variety of sources to sketch out the contours of 
German mythology, none of which were more important than Tacitus’ Germania and the 
Scandinavian Prose Edda. Drawing on these sources, Grimm claimed that the incursion 
of Christianity in the Middle Ages had been a foreign import and had repressed the 
pagan religion of the indigenous populations of northern Europe. However, remnants of 
their practices and beliefs had survived in a heavily disguised form and could be 
rediscovered by attending to contemporary folklore, peasant practices, and some of the 
liturgical festivals of the Catholic church. The Protestant Reformation, for Grimm, 
signified the triumph of the indigenous German spirit over the imposition of 
Catholicism. The moral of the tale that Grimm told in the DM, as he sought to decipher 
the remnants of ancient German paganism, was that where Germany had once been true 
to its indigenous spirit, it would be so again when the German people were recalled to 
their noble pre-Christian past and traditions that he believed his sources represented. As 
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in the KHM, Grimm presented his national mythology in patrilineal terms, that is, as 
rooted in the cult of the father god Odin who had, according to the Norse sources he 
consulted, created the world. Following the publication of the DM, Grimm’s theories 
became widely popular and in the second section of the chapter I discuss the outcome of 
his work. The effort to construct a national mythology moved out from the rarefied 
atmosphere of academic institutions into the public arena through art, monument 
building, and national festivals of remembrance where the figures of Arminius, 
Germania, and Odin were celebrated as representatives of the spirit of the German 
people. In this process the landscape was simultaneously ‘territorialised’ and sacralised 
through the nostalgic depiction of the German past as a golden age that would be reborn 
through collective acts of memorialisation. More importantly, this territorialisation was 
represented in almost entirely masculine and patrilineal terms. 
I. Grimm’s Deutsche Mythologie and the German Vorzeit 
The valorisation of antiquity, as I have already noted, was a crucial element in the 
romantic nationalist project and Grimm’s interest in the ancient past of the Germans was 
no exception. As Anthony Smith comments, in terms that well explain the utility of 
antiquity for nationalists like Grimm, 
Antiquity is…deemed to be canonical, because it stands at the inception of national 
time. This is a time when nations are most ‘authentically’ themselves, unmixed with 
later accretions and foreign borrowings; and when nations are most heroic, for 
antiquity itself can enhance the sense of national dignity and inspire emulation. 
(2001a:445) 
In contrast to the heavy-handed editing of the KHM, the DM was less a smooth and 
crafted rendering of tales designed to appeal to a popular audience than a densely 
annotated work of scholarship, with evidence of its learning provided in lengthy 
footnotes and numerous references to variant readings and sources on every page, all of 
it intended to establish the canonical nature of the German past. After the publication of 
the DM, for most scholars and writers of the time, the path to a national mythology led 
through the forgotten texts and scattered remnants of the German past preserved in folk 
customs and sayings, to the Vorzeit (literally ‘pre-time’),1 indicating once more the 
nostalgic quality of German romanticism. As Williamson puts it,  
                                                           
1 In general the term Vorzeit referred to period lasting from antiquity through the Reformation. 
However, the ambivalent meaning of the term suggested a period external to the process of 
historical change and thus it lent itself well to the more imaginative or speculative elements of 
romantic mythology and to the view that the recovery of the origins of the German people in the 
Vorzeit would reveal an autochthonous purity, untouched by the ravages of time. 
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In the minds of most commentators, the Vorzeit seemed simpler, more pious, and 
more organically unified than the fragmented and disjointed contemporary world. 
For some, it was the inspiration for a future German community based on the 
principle of cultural nationality. For others, however, the demands for a 
revolutionary transformation of the present gave way to a scholarly imperative that 
wedded reverence for the past with a rigorous attention to sources. 
(2004:74) 
Although Williamson makes a distinction between the projected future of German 
cultural nationalism and emergent philological scholarship concerned with the past in 
the face of contemporary political upheavals, in my view these two forms of romantic 
mythology were intertwined: they both looked to the ancient past as the basis for the 
realisation of German unification and so past, present, and future merged together, 
reflecting Levinger’s and Lytle’s triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric outlined in the 
Chapter 4. 
The methodological principles and assumptions that underpinned the intended 
form and content of this national mythology did, however, reveal some significant 
differences amongst those romantic scholars who advocated its reconstruction, 
particularly concerning its origins, nature and cultural implications. At the heart of the 
dispute was a confessional divide, touched on in the previous chapter, with scholars 
split into two main camps—those who subscribed to the Jena romantic circle’s literary-
aesthetic perspective, exemplified in the work of August Schlegel, and those Heidelberg 
romantics, particularly Jakob Grimm, who were collecting folklore and developing 
philological methods for the study of ancient literature towards nationalistic ends. As 
Williamson remarks, ‘the nexus of concern [was] the transition from paganism to 
Catholicism, which was viewed alternatively as a spiritual triumph or as a moment of 
tragic loss’ (2004:74). In the first two decades of the nineteenth century the focus of the 
debate regarding the nationalist utility of myth centred on questions regarding the type 
of myth—whether pagan or Christian—that best exemplified the original German 
character. Both groups regardless of their differences, however, predicted that 
contemporary efforts to recover myth would be a decisive moment in renewing the self-
image of the German Volk, particularly against a political backdrop where German 
culture and identity was both threatened from outside and divided within.  
The view that favoured a Catholic revival was represented by August Schlegel 
who saw the Middle Ages as an era of material and spiritual pre-eminence for the 
German races, united under the Holy Roman Empire: 
The knightly spirit emerged from the combination of the robust and honest bravery 
of the German North with a completely spiritual religion coming from the Orient—
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Christianity, an occurrence that was not just brilliant but truly enchanting, and 
hitherto without parallel in human history. 
(1812:434; trans. Williamson 2004:77) 
Schlegel was thus keen to emphasise the specifically Christian quality of medieval epics 
and legends, suggesting that Christian orders such as the Knights Templar, and a manly 
chivalric spirit fused with chaste monasticism, gave rise to a Christian mythology 
(Rittermythologie)—ritterliche und christliche Mythologie—that centred on courageous 
saints, bold quests, and crusading wars of religion (see Williamson 2004:77–78 and 
Feldman and Richardson 1972:341–348). For Schlegel these qualities were embodied in 
the Nibelungenlieder epic (henceforth NL). The exploits of Siegfried, the hero of the NL, 
were already known from the Völksbucher (chapbooks; literally ‘people’s books’) but it 
was not until the discovery of a full manuscript version of the NL in 1755, published two 
years later by Johann Jakob Bodmer (1698–1783), that Siegfried began to figure in 
scholarly discussions. In the first decade of the nineteenth century the study of the NL 
reached a pinnacle as both a scholarly and a nationalist enterprise. Schlegel offered a 
series of lectures on the NL in 1803 (‘Mythologie des Mittelalters’ in A. Schlegel 1965) 
where he dated its composition to the fifth century, considering at least the second half 
of the text to be an accurate portrayal of actual historical events and claiming its poetic 
quality to be superior to the Iliad (Williamson 2004:86). Somewhat predictably, he 
argued that although some elements of the text were clearly derived from German 
paganism, as a whole its character was Christian, conveying the spirit of medieval 
chivalric culture, particularly with its concerns for justice, retribution, and manly 
honour. In particular, he viewed the NL as an exemplary template for dramatic 
adaptations of the tales contained within it, suggesting that  
If our national mythology is ever successfully renewed, a number of narrower, 
more limited dramatic works could be developed out of this epic tragedy. After we 
have roamed all corners of the earth, we should finally begin to use our indigenous 
poetry. 
(1965:114) 
He advocated, therefore that the NL, along with the Heldenbuch, a thirteenth-
century collection of poems2 should be elevated to the status of national epics and be 
taught in schools as canonical texts, on the model of the Iliad and the Odyssey 
(Williamson 2004:86). 
                                                           
2 The poems were mainly collated from romances and two contemporary sagas, the Ostrogothic 
saga of Ermanrich, Dietrich, and Etzel (Attila), and the saga of Hugdietrich, Wolfdietrich and 
Ortnit, probably of Franconian origin. 
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A number of writers and dramatists heeded Schlegel’s call. The German 
philologist Friedrich von der Hagen (1780–1856) published a popular reworking of the 
epic in 1807 and by 1810 five different editions of the NL had been published. Public 
readings of the poem were held regularly in the salons of Berlin and the geographer 
August Zeune (1778–1853) in a series of public lectures on the NL in 1809 suggested that 
it should become the basis of national education, reducing cultural dependence on the 
French and possibly laying the foundation for political education of the general public. 
Schlegel too had high hopes for the revival of the epic as a inspirational guide for 
German unity, suggesting that the renewed interest in the NL that these efforts 
represented, indicated a ‘return to the womb of the Vorzeit, the great means for a rebirth 
of an original language that has never been separated from its roots’ (in Williamson 
2004:86). The best known, and perhaps most warmly received reworking of the NL was 
Friedrich de la Motte Fouqué’s Sigurd der Schlangentöter, ein Heldenspiel (Sigurd 
[Siegfried] the Dragon Slayer: A Hero’s Tale’; 1808) whose composition had been 
undertaken on the advice of Schlegel who had stressed to Fouqué the need for an ‘alert, 
immediate, energetic, and especially a patriotic poetry’ (in Williamson 2004:87). 
Fouqué’s Sigurd influenced subsequent versions of the NL, most notably Christian 
Friedrich Hebbel's trilogy Die Nibelungen (1862) and Richard Wagner's Der Ring des 
Nibelungen (1854–1874). 
The renewed interest in the NL, and Schlegel’s claim regarding its parity with 
Greek epic eventually ended in an authorship dispute with scholars divided over 
whether it was the product of a single individual on the model of Homer, or the work of 
a group. Schlegel held the former view, suggesting that while the NL had probably 
originated as a series of unconnected tales and poems, a single individual had 
assembled the fragments together and crafted them into the finished version. In an 
article in 1812 he proposed Heinrich von Ofterdingen, a quasi-fictional Minnesinger 
(minstrel), whose participation in the Sängerkrieg (Minstrels' contest) at Wartburg was 
told in the thirteenth-century poem ‘Der Wartburgkrieg’,3  as the ‘final author’ of the NL. 
The Grimm brothers, in contrast, held the latter view, and so, as Williamson remarks, 
‘By identifying a single individual with the Nibelungenlied, Schlegel wandered into the 
crosshairs of the Grimm brothers’ (2004:89). The substance of the dispute concerned 
their distinct attitudes towards the origins and form of national mythology, particularly 
                                                           
3 Novalis also told the story of Heinrich von Ofterdingen in his unfinished novel of the same name 
(1802). 
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regarding the relative weight that should be placed on individual genius versus the 
instinctive expression of the Volk. Jakob Grimm objected to Schlegel’s account of the 
authorship of the NL on three main grounds. Firstly, he believed that myth and epic 
poetry originated in the unconscious of the Volk and, thus, to attribute authorship to a 
single individual was mistaken. He claimed, for example, that the creation of the NL had 
originated as a form of Naturpoesie4 before being developed over many generations into 
its medieval epic form: 
as we possess it, the Nibelungen is nothing other than the living reworking of the 
poem as it emerged inwardly and necessarily from popular poetry. There is no 
decisive external or internal reason to ascribe it to Heinrich von Ofterdingen. 
(in Williamson 2004:89) 
Secondly, he rejected Schlegel’s insistence on the Germanic value of Rittermythologie and 
his notion that the NL was exemplary in this regard. Grimm, as I will discuss below, 
viewed German myth as a survival from the pagan past, and thought that many aspects 
attributed by Schlegel to the Christianity of the Middle Ages were in fact far older and 
therefore more purely German that Schlegel was able to see. Finally, Grimm objected to 
Schlegel’s call for dramatic reworkings of material like the NL: ‘I don’t understand how 
one can demand from modern poets…that they work in the direction of nationality, 
when a certain national essence always and unavoidably appears on its own’ (in 
Williamson 2004:88). Thus, Grimm’s nationalist project was resolutely committed to the 
revival of purely indigenous culture and customs. For Schlegel, in contrast, the revival 
of medieval Christian mythology represented by the NL formed part of a program of 
what he considered ‘European patriotism’, which would ameliorate the destructive 
legacy of the French revolutionary wars and eventually unite the entire continent under 
the medieval form of Christianity he cherished. The NL would then take its proper place 
amongst the other great literary works of Christian Europe (Williamson 2004:90).5  
                                                           
4 The term ‘Naturpoesie’ was coined by Herder and referred to poetry that was natural and 
spontaneous, such as folk ballads. As with the distinction between Volksmärchen and Kunstmärchen, 
it was generally contrasted to Kunstpoesie, poetic literature produced by conscious creation in 
conformity with literary aesthetics. 
5 The dispute over the authorship of the NL was eventually resolved by the philologist Karl 
Lachmann (1793–1851), who presented his findings in his ‘Habilitationsschrift’ über die ursprungliche 
Gestalt des Gedichts von der Nibelungen Noth (‘Habilitation Treatise on the Original Form of the 
Poems of the Nibelungen’; 1816) and who supported Grimm’s view against that of Schlegel. He 
used form criticism—developed in Germany as a method of biblical criticism applied as a means 
of analysing the typical features of texts, especially their conventional forms or structures—in 
order to relate them to their sociological contexts, to propose the NL was composed of a series of 
twenty separate lays compiled by medieval redactors to produce the late twelfth-century version 
of the poem. Here he followed the work of Friedrich August Wolf who had demonstrated, citing 
evidence from Greek art, mythology, and architecture, that the Greek epics could not have been 
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Grimm saw those medieval sources which Schlegel lauded as Rittermythologie, 
as much older than the synthetic influence of (Catholic) Christianity. Indeed, the DM 
seems to be a veiled response to August Schlegel, particularly his accusation that the 
Grimm brothers’ interest in native folklore betrayed a ‘devotion to triviality’ (Feldman 
and Richardson 1972:409; see also K. Koerner 1990). In the DM Jakob Grimm sought to 
demonstrate that his attention to apparently inconsequential data—folk culture—would, 
contra Schlegel, lead to a firm and rigorously accurate reconstruction of ancient German 
myth and show Schlegel’s devotion to medievalism to be foolishly premature. Grimm 
later defended the collection of folklore and its importance for the interpretation of old 
literature in his autobiography in explicitly patriotic terms (see Denecke 1985:33). 
The DM is clearly indebted to Herder’s theories of the origins, development, 
and preservation of the original Volk in myth, but it departed from his more 
cosmopolitan consideration of folklore and myth in terms of a common fund of human 
experience in favour of a narrower and more immediately nationalistic preoccupation 
with isolating and distilling residual German mythic elements.6 The DM also displays 
the influence of Joseph Görres and Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858) who were loosely 
affiliated with the Heidelberg circle of romantics of which the Grimms were a part. Both 
scholars, whose work I will discuss in the following chapter, believed, on the basis of 
Jones’ discoveries, that India was the cradle of humankind and the source of all myth, 
which, as it was dispersed westward after early migrations, had become increasingly 
degraded and had lost its original purity. The remnant of this early golden age was, 
however, preserved in the diverse mythological traditions of the world and could thus 
be retrieved through close textual analysis of extant sources, especially the Indian Vedas 
and Upaniads (as they were believed to be closest to the original source). Creuzer, in 
particular, surmised that behind the mythological diversity of existing traditions and 
narratives lay a single, symbolically construed world of human experience which had 
subsequently developed into an organically conceived natural religion, a theory he 
                                                                                                                                                             
composed by a single author, but had been assembled from a series of oral poems by redactors in 
the sixth century BCE and then further revised and embellished over the following centuries. His 
main conclusion was that the Iliad and Odyssey were the work of an entire culture. Wolf’s work 
became the model of classical philology amongst German scholars in the nineteenth century. See 
Williamson 2004:84–92. 
6 Grimm’s attitude towards Catholicism resembles that of Herder. Herder saw the arrival of 
Catholicism in Germany as having done irreparable harm to the indigenous pagan religion. Like 
Grimm, he commended Luther for reasserting something of the ancient German spirit in religion 
against the ‘religion of the monks’ which had used Latin to impose foreign customs and beliefs on 
the German people and which had ‘helped to keep the vernacular languages of the European 
nations, and with them the people themselves, in barbarism’ (in Hayes 1927:732–733). 
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developed most systematically in his Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker 
(‘Symbolism and Mythology of the Ancient Peoples’; 1810–1812). His major contribution 
to the field of romantic mythology was his claim that the surviving myth traditions of 
the world concealed an original, unifying spirit behind the multiplicity of mythical 
narratives and that the transformation of this unity into diversity represented a 
deterioration of the original human spirit.  
In Symbolik und Mythologie Creuzer argued that an arcane symbolic system 
(Symbolik) had served as the original foundation of religious expression throughout the 
ancient world and that it had originated with the Brahmanic caste in ancient India who 
had formulated an esoteric cosmology based on astronomical observation and expressed 
by means of symbols. Because of the occult nature of these symbols the Brahman priests 
had to translate them into cosmological narratives in order for them to appeal to and be 
understood by the common people, and for Creuzer this translation of symbols into 
narratives was the origin of the first myths. According to him, the ancient Indians had 
subsequently disseminated their wisdom far beyond India, travelling to Asia Minor, 
Egypt, and Israel, where they came into contact with primitive pastoralists whose 
religion was a form of crude fetishism. The priests not only passed on their religious 
system to these people but also taught them the rudiments of agriculture and statecraft, 
the implication being that civilisation was endowed upon the rest of the world by the 
ancient Indians. From Egypt the priests crossed the Mediterranean, colonising the 
Samothracians, who in turn exercised a profound influence on the early religion of the 
Greeks. Following Herodotus, Creuzer claimed that the essence of Greek religion lay in 
the Eleusinian mysteries that were a legacy of early contact with the Samothracians, 
rather than in the popular tales recited by Homer and Hesiod as was conventionally 
believed by scholars of the ancient world in the nineteenth century. Creuzer also 
believed that the transformation of the Symbolik into narrative resulted in the production 
of a prototype of the essential aspects of Christianity, including the belief that God had 
become human, suffered death, and risen to new life (Williamson 2004:121–150; see also 
Blok 1994; Feldman and Richardson 1972:387–396).  
Like Görres and Creuzer, Grimm saw myth as a survival of an original 
primordial unity and of the original divine revelation upon which it was founded. He 
traced the origins of mythology to the period of the great migrations from a central 
homeland, when the peoples and languages of the earth were believed to have spread 
from the East, and he agreed with Creuzer that myth was the residue of this lost but 
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once universal original revelation. Grimm differed from Creuzer in one important 
detail, however. While he accepted the Asiatic origin of Germanic mythology, he saw it 
as proceeding not from a group of priests but out of the instinctive spirit of the German 
Volk in its first encounter with the climate and geography of central Europe. In his view, 
Germanic myth was thus intimately bound up with the language, customs, and unique 
history of the Germanic peoples. Grimm viewed his task in the DM, therefore, as he 
indicated in his preface to the second edition, to reconstruct this early world of German 
religion and myth from a variety of existing sources including the creation narratives of 
the Prose Edda, Tacitus’ Germania, Das Nibelungenlieder, a number of other manuscript 
sources, and the peasant lore that the two brothers had gathered as part of the 
compilation of the KHM (1966, III:ix). He believed strongly that the combined study of 
folklore, as it persisted in fragmentary form in the sayings and the customs of the 
common people, most notably in the fairytales collected in the KHM, and what he 
referred to as legends—namely works such as the Nibelungenlieder and the Edda—would 
provide the missing link in a chain of historic continuity that would reconnect the 
German Vorzeit to the present. Moreover, it would enable him and scholars who 
followed to distinguish between the authentically vernacular elements of these sources 
and those which were foreign and this belief was itself a discourse of differentiation.  
For Grimm, the best method for sifting out what was and was not natively 
German from these diverse sources was comparative. He not only attempted to retrieve 
the specifically Germanic elements in his sources but also attempted to purge German 
mythology of the influence of Christianity, showing how many apparently Christian 
traditions—particularly holidays, the adoration of saints, and liturgies—were in fact 
survivals of Germany’s pagan past. In so doing, Grimm implicitly rejected August 
Schlegel’s notion of a medieval Rittermythologie (‘chivalric myth’), arguing instead that 
what was imaginative and spirited in the German medieval tradition stemmed from a 
repressed and then subtly integrated pre-Christian paganism rather than from Christian 
chivalric customs and lore (Williamson 2004:82). Grimm’s driving ambition in the DM, 
which he sustains through three volumes, thirty-eight lengthy chapters, and numerous 
supplementary appendices, was thus to demonstrate the survival—against the odds—of 
the autochthonous elements of the German history and myths: 
My object is, faithfully and simply to collect what the distortions early introduced 
by the nations themselves, and afterwards the scorn and aversion of Christians have 
left remaining of heathenism. 
(1966, III:xx) 
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Against Schlegel, Grimm believed that Christianity had never been a popular 
(volksmäßig) force amongst the German people but rather that  
It came from abroad, it aimed at supplanting the time-honoured indigenous gods 
whom the country revered and loved. These gods and their worship were part and 
parcel of the people’s traditions, customs and constitution. Their names had their 
roots in the people’s language and were hallowed by antiquity….The new faith 
came in escorted by a foreign language, which the missionaries imparted to their 
disciples and thus exalted into a sacred language, which excluded the slighted 
mother-tongue from almost all share in public worship. 
(1966, I:4) 
These surviving indigenous elements, for Grimm, had re-emerged during the 
Reformation, best exemplified by Martin Luther who had advocated a religion without 
ecclesiastical trappings such as churches, clergy and Catholic imagery. For Grimm, 
Luther’s contribution in this regard recalled the ancient Germanic affinity for simple 
religious expression rooted in the experiences and aspirations of the ancient German 
Volk as portrayed by Tacitus and connected to a love of their homeland. He went so far 
as to claim, in his preface to the second edition of the DM, that ‘It was no accident, but a 
necessity, that the Reformation arose first in our country, and we should long ago have 
given it our undivided allegiance, had not a stir been made against it from abroad’ 
(1966, II:xxxvii–xxxviii). For him the Reformation thus signalled a return to the original 
beliefs—the natural religion—of the ancient Germans and represented the reassertion of 
their indomitable spirit: ‘As in language and myth, so in the religious leanings among 
the peoples there is something indestructible’ (1966, II:xxxviii). The impetus behind the 
whole of the DM was thus to recover the religion of the oldest Germans and in doing so, 
to make contact with the inherent spirit of the Germanic peoples. However, as 
Williamson remarks, ‘Grimm’s Germanic religion looked remarkably like an 
enlightened or liberal form of Protestantism’ (2004:105). 
In reconstructing the religion of the ancient Germans Grimm sought to 
accomplish three things, all of which were intertwined with his nationalist leanings. 
Firstly, he wanted to demonstrate the ancient autochthony of the German religion and 
myth traditions which he achieved by frequently citing Tacitus’ Germania and 
Sturluson’s Prose Edda as authoritative sources in this regard. In the preface to the 
second edition of the Deutsche Mythologie he took his cue from Tacitus’ Germania, hinting 
that, in the past, it had been used erroneously to suggest that the Germans’ owed their 
lore to the Romans rather than to their own unique and ancient traditions. His 
subsequent statements in this regard contain many of the stock themes that 
characterised his attitude to the nationalistic value of indigenous myth, to the Germanic 
  196 
past more generally, and to the implicit value he accorded to philological methods. He 
suggested that mythology could be reconstructed on the same principles of language 
classification—as well as exemplifying the persistent thread of argument that runs 
throughout the DM regarding the retrievability of Germany’s indigenous sources: 
One may fairly say, that to deny the reality of this [indigenous Germanic] 
mythology is as much as to impugn the high antiquity and the continuity of our 
language: to every nation a belief in gods was as necessary as language. No one will 
argue from the absence or poverty of memorials that our forefathers at any given 
time did not practise their tongue, did not hand it down; yet the lack or scantiness 
of information is thoughtlessly alleged as a reason for despoiling our heathenism, 
antecedent to the conversion, of all its contents, so to speak. History teaches us to 
recognise in language, the farther we are able to follow it up, a higher perfection of 
form, which declines as culture advances; as the forms of the thirteenth century are 
superior to our present ones, and those of the ninth and the fifth stand higher still, it 
may be presumed that German populations of the first three centuries of our era, 
whose very names have never reached us, must have spoken a more perfect 
language than the Gothic itself. Now if such inferences as to what is non-extant are 
valid in language, if its present condition carries us far back to an older and oldest; a 
like proceeding must be justifiable in mythology too, and from its dry watercourses 
we may guess the copious spring, from its stagnant swamps the ancient river…. 
If the heathens already possessed a finely articulated language, and if we concede to 
them an abundant stock of religious myths, then song and story could not fail to lay 
hold of these, and to interweave themselves with the rites and customs. That such 
was the case we are assured by Tacitus. 
(1972:411; my emphasis) 
His second task was to recover the ‘national’ past by creating a meaningful 
religious narrative that would link that past to the difficulties and concerns of the 
present. Thus, Grimm’s descriptions of the ancient Germans struggling against the 
incursions of a foreign Christianity, and his allusions to Tacitus’ Germania and the defeat 
of the Romans by Arminius, drew much of its rhetorical force from the parallels it 
invoked with the current French occupation. In the DM he spun a tale of resistance, as 
the peasants and country folk held onto the old religion under the outward trappings of 
Christianity. The DM was thus intended to be an inspirational and therapeutic guide for 
Grimm’s fellow Germans, offering a model of nationalistic resistance against the French:  
As past and future, the lost and the expected paradise, meld together in the 
imagination of the people, so they believe in the awakening from the mountain 
sleep of their beloved kings and heroes: Friedrich and Karl, Siegfried and perhaps 
also Dietrich.7 That is the real sign of the epic, that it secures eternal and 
imperishable permanence for its figures. But Siegfried is also Wotan, Dietrich is 
Wotan, Karl is Wotan, and according to the Muspilli [a ninth-century Bavarian 
poem], Wotan returns to the world a rejuvenated, reawakened god. 
                                                           
7 Friedrich refers to Friedrich Barbarossa and Karl to Charlemagne. Dietrich was a popular hero in 
German legend and literature whose story is told in the collection of legends known as the 
Dietrichsage. He also appears in the Nibelungenlieder. The tales seem to be based on the historical 
figure, Theodoric the Great, an Ostrogoth king who ruled Italy from 493–526 CE.  
  197 
(1966, II:666–667) 
Grimm, seems here to create an analogy between the resurrection of Wotan (Odin) and 
the revival of the German people’s fighting spirit. 
The third task of the DM was closely related to the second and bears on the 
attempt described in earlier chapters to purge German, and indeed European, history of 
any Semitic influences. In Grimm’s schema, the myths and legends of the ancient 
Germans took over the role once assigned to the stories of the Hebrew Bible. He insisted 
that the Germanic myths stood closer to the original Indo-European sources than the 
Christian-Jewish myths, which he described, echoing Herder, as ‘distorted’ and ‘torn’ 
from their original context (1966, II:802).  
The DM was encyclopaedic in its scope and detail, serving as a compendium of 
every imaginable aspect of the ancient German religion and its myth traditions, and 
building its case through the sheer force of the numerous examples presented. Grimm’s 
method was to combine references to textual sources such as Tacitus’ Germania and the 
Prose Edda with frequent allusions to extant folk customs and tales that then, in turn, 
served to confirm those very textual sources. In an implicit invocation of Herder’s view 
that these tales were transmitted patrilinearly, he sought both to demonstrate an 
unbroken chain of continuity and to assert the precedence of oral narrative forms: 
If these numerous written memorials have only left us sundry bones and joints, as it 
were, of our old mythology, its living breath still falls upon us from a vast number 
of Stories and Customs, handed down through lengthened periods from father to son. 
(1966, II:ix; my emphasis) 
The story that Grimm tells in his introduction to the DM is one where 
Christianity, via the Romans, slowly spread throughout Europe, starting in Greece and 
Rome and then moving to France (Gaul) in the second and third centuries CE. The Goths 
were then the first of the ‘Teutonic people’ to embrace Christian doctrine through the 
fourth to the sixth centuries, followed by the Suevi in Spain. Grimm then deals with the 
conversion of a number of other Germanic tribes in the following centuries (Grimm 
1966, I:2). He lists these conversions by way of introducing his argument in favour of 
including Norse traditions in the study of Teutonic mythology because the other 
northern tribes had ‘clung to heathenism longer and more tenaciously’ (1966, I:9) than 
any others, and further, were clearly related to German ‘heathenism’ (1966, I:10). 
He goes on to list a number of grounds upon which the affinity of the German 
and Norse mythologies can be established, all of which demonstrate the core premises 
upon which his comparative method rested: (1) the closeness of their languages and the 
form or style of their poetry; (2) the existence of similar terms for religious worship; (3) 
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the ‘identity of mythic notions and nomenclature’; (4) the fact that both mythologies are 
concerned with heroic legend and that their genealogies merge with each other’s; (5) the 
‘mingling of the mythic element with names of plants and constellations’ which Grimm 
holds to be ‘an unaffected vestige of the primeval intimate union between religious 
worship and nature’; (6) the way in which both traditions’ gods have been transformed 
into devils under the influence of Christianity but their names have survived in 
‘disguised ejaculations, oaths, curses, protestations’, nonetheless, ‘The popular religion 
of the Catholics, particularly in the adoration of saints, includes a good many and often 
graceful and pleasing relics of paganism’; (7) the survival of ‘god-myths’ in the names of 
the days and months, folktales, nursery rhymes, games, and curses; and (8) the mixture 
of ancient pagan beliefs with the systems of law (1966, I:10–11). 
The main source that Grimm turned to in order to demonstrate the affinity of 
the Norse and German sources was the Prose Edda of Snorri Sturluson (1178–1241).8 As 
with Jones’ theory of the kinship between Sanskrit and the European languages, the 
Edda was also held as evidence that the German people had originated from Asia 
(Williamson 2004:99). The prologue of the Edda starts with the story of the founding of 
Asgard, the home of the Æsir (said to be descendents of King Priam of Troy) in the cold 
reaches of northern Europe following their migration from Asia Minor at the end of the 
Trojan War. At the end of the prologue and again at the end of the second section of the 
Edda—Gylfaginning (the ‘Beguiling of Gylfi’)—the process whereby the kings of the 
migrating Æsir came to be honoured as gods is described, stating that it developed from 
worship of the earth and other natural forces. It is in the Gylfaginning where the clearest 
description of the religion of the Æsir is provided.  
It begins with the story of how Gylfi, a Swedish King, was tricked out of some 
of his lands by one of the Æsir newcomers (a woman named Gefjun). He visits the Æsir 
in Asgard, disguised as a beggar and calling himself Gangleri, to find out whether their 
success is due to their own skill or to the gods they worship. The Æsir, who have the gift 
of prophecy, foresee his arrival and prepare what the text calls ‘deceptions of the eye’ 
(1916:14), namely the creation of a hall covered with gilded shields like tiles, which 
Sturluson, drawing on the Poetic Edda, calls Val-hall. He is welcomed hospitably, and is 
                                                           
8 Grimm appeared to be following up Herder’s argument in his dialogue ‘Iduna, oder der Apfel 
der Verjüngerung’ (Iduna, or the Apples of Rejuvenation), published in Schiller’s journal Die 
Horen in 1796, in which he argued in favour of using the Nordic gods as the basis for a new 
national literature. On the debate over the authenticity of the Edda as a source of Germanic myth 
see Williamson 2004:102. 
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ushered into a hall in which three men—Hárr (High), Janhárr (‘Just-as-high’) and Thridi 
(‘Third’)—sit on three thrones. On being asked by them to explain his visit, he says that 
he desires to learn whether there are any wise men within Asgard. Hárr tells him that he 
may question them to establish their wisdom but that his life depends on proving 
himself wiser than them. Gylfi then begins his questions by asking them ‘Who is 
foremost, or oldest, of all the gods?’ (1916:15) and in return he is told about the king of 
their gods, All-Father, the beginning of the world, the origin of the giants and the gods, 
(of whom the chief, Odin, turns out to be the same as All-Father), the creation of the 
earth and humankind, the creation of night and day, sun and moon, and then numerous 
stories of the various gods and goddesses. He is also told about Odin’s hall (Val-hall). 
Finally, the story of the twilight of the gods (Ragnarok) in their last battle against the 
giants, the destruction of the world and its subsequent renewal is narrated, all in 
response to Gylfi’s questioning. Before Gylfi can ask any further questions there is a 
loud crash and the Æsir and their hall disappear because they are unable to answer any 
more questions. Gylfi appears to have won the contest but is cheated out of the spoils of 
victory (the return of his lands). The final portion of the Gylfaginning tells how the Æsir 
decided to adopt the names of the gods in the stories they have told so that people will 
think that they themselves are deities. Sturluson ends the section by suggesting that the 
myths told of the Æsir are really allegories of the events in the Trojan War. 
It was the detail about the Norse gods in the Edda that enabled Grimm to 
suggest that the earliest religion of the people throughout the German territories was the 
cult of Wotan (superseded in the Norse mythology of the Edda by Odin) who was the 
god of thunder and the leader of the Æsir (1966, I:Ch. 7). Despite all the evidence to the 
contrary, Grimm attributed to these early Germans a primitive (euhemerist) 
monotheism, centred on Wotan, based on his assumption that  
Monotheism is a thing so necessary, so natural, that almost all heathens, amidst 
their motley throng of deities, have consciously or unconsciously ended by 
acknowledging a supreme god, who has already in him the attributes of all the rest, 
so that these are only to be regarded as emanations from him, renovations, 
rejuvenescences of him. 
(1966, I:147) 
Thus Wotan was not just an anthropomorphised sky god but also a 
metaphysical force, creating the creatures of the earth, granting fertility to fields, 
inspiring poets, and granting wishes and good luck. More interestingly, Grimm suggests 
that the early Germans, the Saxons in particular, traced the genealogies of their kings 
and heroes back to Wotan (1966, I:147–162). While the tracing of ancestry through the 
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male line, and the belief in a father God are not unique to the ancient Germans (at least 
in Grimm’s reading), their significance and superimposition in this context indicates to 
me confirmation of the broader patrilineal preoccupations and assumptions of the 
German national mythology as constructed by the romantic scholars and writers of the 
nineteenth century, an aspect I will directly address towards the end of this chapter. 
Indeed, Grimm frequently aligned the German Vorzeit with specifically masculine 
attributes and suggested that it marked a chain of patriarchal inheritance through the 
generations from antiquity until the Middle Ages: 
One has only to recognise the mild and manly spirit of our higher antiquity in the 
purity and power of the national laws, or the talent inherited by the thirteenth 
century in its eloquent, inspired poems, in order justly to appreciate legend and 
myth, which in them had merely struck root once more. 
(1966, II:ix) 
According to Grimm, the worship of Wotan was accompanied by cultic 
practices centred on sacrificial offerings to appease the gods or to thank them for their 
bounty (1966, I:Ch. 3). Grimm drew heavily on existing folk custom at this point in order 
to demonstrate the survival of these cultic practices in certain Christian sacraments, for 
example, arguing that the Christian Eucharist had been preceded by the practice 
amongst the early Germans of collecting the sacrificial blood of animals which was then 
mixed with beer and drunk by the participants in the ancient rites (ibid.). He was 
continually at pains to explain contemporary practices in terms of this ancient religion 
and to portray it in a favourable light compared to the foreign influences of Christianity. 
He suggested, for example, that these ancient Germanic ancestors had very little need 
for their mediating role of priests, the male head of each household usually conducting 
rituals in his own home (1966, I:74). According to Grimm, the collective rites of the 
ancient German communities took place in sacred forest groves, marked by a sacred 
tree—with its obviously phallic connotations—which was decorated with flowers or the 
carcasses of animals, and with images sometimes carved into their trunks. The vestiges 
of such practices, he maintained, still flourished amongst the peasant classes of his day 
(1966, I:Ch. 3). He claimed that ‘The earliest testimonies to the forest-cultus of the 
Germans are furnished by Tacitus’ (1966, I:61).9 One such tree was the ‘Irminsul’,10 
                                                           
9 Tac. Ger. IX: ‘[The Germans’] holy places are woods and groves, and they apply the names of 
deities to that hidden presence which is seen only by the eye of reverence’; Tac. Ger. XXXIX: ‘The 
grove is the centre of their whole religion. It is regarded as the cradle of the race and the dwelling-
place of the supreme god to whom all things are subject and obedient’. 
10 Irmin was the war god of the Saxons, son of Mannus, whom Tacitus mentions (Tac. Ger. II), and 
ancestor of the tribe of the Herminones. The Old Norse form of Irmin was Jörmun and 
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which according to Grimm was a ‘great wooden column…set up and worshipped under 
the open sky, its name signifies universal all-sustaining pillar’, and he further noted its 
phallic symbolism (1966, I:97). During the conversion of Saxony in 772, Charlemagne 
ordered the Irminsul at Eresburg Castle near Paderborn cut down before finally forcing 
the Saxon king Widukind to be baptised in 785 (Mayr-Harting 1996:1116). Grimm 
suggested that this paradigmatic event marked the end of open pagan worship in 
Germany and that thereafter the newly converted Christians built churches on these 
previously sacred sites in order to preserve and remember them as religious places of 
worship (1966, I:65). 
With the DM taken as a whole, Grimm’s reconstruction of the ancient German 
religion is remarkably comprehensive, especially given, in reality, the paucity of the 
sources available. According to Grimm the ancient Germans had migrated from Asia, 
bringing with them religious beliefs and practices that were derived from the Brahmanic 
religion of India but which had developed their particularly Germanic character when 
these tribes had settled in northern Europe and had encountered its climate and 
geography. In addition to the aforementioned religious practices and beliefs, there was a 
strong belief in the migration of souls after death, particularly those of heroes who were 
carried from battlefields to the halls of Walhalla (Val-Hall) by the Valkyries (semi-divine 
female warriors) where they would feast and participate in games of manly combat. The 
survival of the early Germanic cultus, under the rubric of Catholic festivals and 
holidays, had led to the Protestant Reformation, where Martin Luther had called for a 
religion without churches, priests, or idolatrous imagery, indicating the indomitable 
character of the German people in resisting foreign influences and dogma. 
The overall effect of the DM was to create the impression that the contemporary 
religious and geographical divisions in nineteenth-century Germany concealed an 
underlying cultural and religious unity which, though it lay dormant, was not extinct. 
The moral of the tale Grimm told was that where Germany had once been true to its 
indigenous spirit, it would be so again when the German people were recalled to their 
noble pre-Christian traditions. As Williamson puts it, ‘In the Deutsche Mythologie what 
was most local and quaint became that which was most national and…the landscape 
                                                                                                                                                             
interestingly, just like Ygg, it was one of the names of Odin. Yggdrasil was the yew or ash tree on 
which Odin sacrificed himself, and which connected heaven and earth. It appears, thus, that 
Irminsul may have represented a world tree corresponding to Yggdrasil among the Saxon tribes. 
See Mayr-Harting 1996. At the time of Charlemagne, there were probably numerous Irmin pillars 
standing and Grimm cites the twelfth-century Kaiserchronik as mentioning several (1966, I:108). 
  202 
suddenly seemed to be the repository of a noble religion rather than base superstition’ 
(2004:112). Grimm’s defiant and triumphalist narrative thus established a national 
mythology where the foreignness of Catholicism was superseded by a newly 
configured, historically aware, and purely German Protestantism and which could 
appeal to a public demoralised by French imperialism and religious disunity. The result 
of the Deutsche Mythologie, and of the KHM, was that the basic elements of a German 
national mythology had fallen into place by the end of the 1830s. An epic literary 
tradition had been uncovered, folktales were widely read, and the outlines of a 
Germanic pantheon had been reconstructed. Moreover, the elements of this mythology 
had been connected to the geography of Germany: the Rhine River, the Teutoburg 
Forest, and the North Sea. On the basis of his findings in the DM, Grimm was thus able 
to make an implicit claim for the central mediating role of scholarship, one that placed 
the scholar in the role of national champion, preserving and disseminating the 
vernacular culture and granting it the stamp of ‘scientific’ authority. It was only the 
scholar, for Grimm, following the scientific methods of Germanistik (German 
studies/philology), who had the skill and insight to resurrect the past for the present. 
Romantic nationalists like Grimm sought to undermine existing ethnic traditions by 
recreating the past as one of continuous creativity, something he achieved by rooting the 
origins of the German people back in time, and, above all, by identifying a golden age 
that authenticated the German character. In search of collective authenticity, the 
romantics focused on the earliest emergence of peoples when their original character 
was most clearly displayed. It was a compelling vision and what emerged in the 
aftermath of the DM was a much broader public interest in the mythology of the 
German people, with writers and artists outside of the universities working with what 
they considered to be a now established repertoire of national ‘myths’ which formed the 
literary-religious patrimony of the German nation. In the final section of this chapter, 
therefore, I want briefly to examine the more public expressions that this scholarly 
production of a national mythology assumed in the years leading up to and after 
German unification and the establishment of the Kaiserreich in 1871. 
II. Monuments, Masculinity, and the German Character 
By the 1830s, the basic elements of a German ‘national mythology’ had fallen into place 
largely due to the efforts of the Grimm brothers and their contemporaries. The picture 
that they had presented of the ancient Germans served as an inspirational model for 
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more literary and artistic creations, and political movements. Artists began to produce 
paintings, songs and stories based on the Hermann (Arminius) legends, Wotan, and the 
Nibelungenlieder. Societies were formed to promote native dress, national sporting 
associations, gymnastic, arts and crafts societies. Architecture in the form of monuments 
also provided a medium through which nationalist ideals of German character, history, 
and unity could be expressed. While these images and symbols achieved far more 
popularity among the educated classes than in other sectors of Germany society, they 
served nonetheless to make Germany’s ‘glorious past’ a national object of popular focus 
and interest, reflecting what Rudy Koshar has suggested was the ‘national state’s need 
to create objectified symbols of national identity that offered a point of contact and 
easily recognized visual referent for many disparate groups’ (1998:23). Where 
mythologists and Germanistik scholars had provided a map of national identity through 
recourse to past literature, folklore, and history, it was now artists, writers, and 
architects who translated their efforts into the national landscape, seeking to return the 
people to a memory of a national archetype that was disseminated according to a visual 
grammar of national unity. I want to examine in what follows, two examples of the 
symbolisation of national unity and character found in the paintings of the romantic 
artists Georg Friedrich Kersting (1785–1847) and Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840) 
and in the Niederwald and Hermann (Hermannsdenkmal) monuments that were erected 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, in order to explore the ways in which the 
myths of the ancient Germans that Grimm ‘retrieved’ were intertwined with doctrines of 
what the nation state should be. In each case Tacitus’ Germania served as the unifying 
thread, directing the German people to recall their ancient autochthony and nobility. 
Further, I want to show how a patrilineal and fraternal ethos directed efforts in this 
regard.  
The symbolisation of German national identity was intimately connected to the 
German landscape which was seen to embody all the qualities of Germanness and to 
foster in its inhabitants a natural and abiding love for the Fatherland. However, in the 
same way that German myth and folklore were essentially invented, the image of the 
landscape that was promoted during the nineteenth century was itself an elaborate 
fiction designed to root German culture in its ‘native’ soil where the Volk and the rural 
topography were deemed to form an essential unity along the lines suggested by Herder 
but which, with the advent of industrialisation, was fast disappearing. In the period 
from the 1840s to 1900 Germany overtook Britain to become the second biggest 
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industrial power after America and the population consequently shifted from being 
predominantly rural to being urban to the extent that by 1907 48% of Germans lived 
outside of their place of birth (Boa and Palfreyman 2000:1). Nonetheless, the 
sacralisation of the rural landscape that the efforts of artists and architects sought to 
achieve preserved an image of the German territories as resolutely pastoral. This image 
operated through a series of oppositions which set the countryside against cities, 
tradition against modernity, nature against artificiality, organic culture against 
civilisation, fixed, familiar and rooted identity against cosmopolitanism, hybridity and 
foreignness. As Celia Applegate suggests, these oppositions ‘formed part of a difficult 
negotiation as individuals struggled to find a stable ground from which to cope with 
rapid change…and to express a sense of national as well as local belonging and to 
celebrate…a community of common purpose’ (1990:17).  
Both Kersting and Friedrich drew their images of German life and character 
from the forests and rural landscapes of Germany, nostalgically depicting a timeless 
way of life and valorising, in particular, the fraternal bonds between men who were 
placed in the landscape as its defenders and sons. Clark (1996) suggests that these 
images served to compensate for the lack of monuments to the nationalist-voluntarist 
efforts of groups like the Landwehr militia and Lützow volunteer corps in the Wars of 
Liberation. Those that did exist merely commemorated the role of the various German 
monarchies in defending the Fatherland against Napoleon, a form of memorialisation 
conspicuously at odds with the view of the Wars expressed by the ex-volunteers. As 
Clark notes,  
The Wars of Liberation were wars of governments and monarchs, of dynastic 
alliances, rights and claims, in which the chief concern was to re-establish the 
balance of power in Europe. But they also involved militias and politically 
motivated volunteers. Of just under 290,000 officers and men mobilized in Prussia, 
120,565 served in units of the Landwehr, a militia recruited locally (and largely 
voluntarily) from the civilian population….In addition to the Landwehr 
regiments…there were a variety of ‘Free corps’, units of voluntary riflemen 
recruited from Prussian and other German states. Unlike their colleagues in the 
regular army they swore oaths of loyalty not to the king of Prussia but to the 
German fatherland. 
(1996:552) 
Thus, these ex-volunteers conceived of the victory against the French as having been 
secured  by the common people rather than the result of monarchical resistance, a view 
which, as Clark points out, ‘constrasted crassly with conservative recollections of the 
war years’ (ibid.) as represented by the political journalist Friedrich Gentz (1764–1832). 
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For him it was ‘the princes and their ministers’ who ‘achieved the greatest [feats]’ in the 
war against Napoleon and he suggested that 
Not all the demagogues and pamphleteers of the world and of posterity can take 
that away from them….They prepared the war, founded it, created it. They did 
even more: they led it, nourished and enlivened it….Those who today in their 
youthful audacity suppose that they overturned the tyrant, couldn’t even have 
driven him out of Germany. 
(1838, III:39–40; trans. Clark 1996:552) 
The absence of a monument to the efforts of the ‘common people’ during the Wars was a 
theme to which both Friedrich and Kersting returned repeatedly in their paintings. 
Friedrich and the nationalist Arndt worked together on a sculpture of Scharnhorst, a 
volunteer who had died in battle in 1813 but they received no official support for the 
project, leading Friedrich to remark in a letter to Arndt in 1814 ‘I am not surprised that 
no memorials are being erected, neither to mark the great cause of the Volk, nor to the 
magnanimous deeds of great German men. As long as we remain manservants to the 
princes, nothing of this sort will ever happen’ (in Hermand 1982:224).  
Nineteenth-century Prussian schoolbooks followed this version of events but 
the accounts of the Wars retold by the ex-volunteers focused on their own efforts. It was 
this version that Friedrich and Kersting promoted in their paintings and sculptures. 
Kersting, who had himself been a volunteer, painted a series of portraits of volunteers, 
most famously his On Sentry Duty (1815) which depicted three friends—Ferdinand 
Hartmann, Theodor Körner, and Karl Friedrich Friesen—who had fought alongside 
Kersting in the same company of the Lützow Freikorps and who had died in the wars. 
The three friends are shown in the loose black garb of the altdeutsch uniform of the 
Freikorps in the midst of a deep oakwood. As Schama suggests, the figures in the 
painting are 
Posed in complementary attitudes, the upright and vigilant figure balanced by 
another figure at rest (but only after the insignia of the iron cross has given proof of 
his valor in combat). Paradoxically, the most famous of the three, Theodor Körner, 
the young Saxon poet who had written stirring calls to arms…is shown in the 
glades, pensive and melancholy as if mediating the heave price of patriotic sacrifice. 
(2004:105) 
The work has been described as a ‘painted monument’, standing in for the lack of an 
official site of commemoration to the efforts of the volunteers. Körner’s memorial and 
burial site was itself sited beneath a massive and ancient oak and it became something of 
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a site of pilgrimage for nationalists throughout the nineteenth century.11 The regular use 
of trees and woodland in many of the paintings by Kersting and Friedrich perhaps 
signal a reproductive motif insofar as it confirms to the botanical metaphor discussed 
above in the context of linguistic family trees. Perhaps forest symbolism was one way of 
the painters encoding an idea of traditions handed from generation to generation and of 
the land nourishing the people over centuries. 
Friedrich’s landscape paintings regularly depict idyllic rural scenes that are 
simultaneously detailed and impressionistic. Friedrich rejected the form of landscape 
painting that sought to reproduce nature as realistically as possible, arguing that ‘a 
picture should not portray nature itself but only remind us of it. The task of the artist is 
not the accurate representation of air, water, rocks and trees, but his soul, his sensations, 
should be mirrored in his artwork’ (in Mitchell 1982:416). The ‘soul’ of Friedrich was 
clearly preoccupied with cultivating nationalist sentiment, portraying the rural 
landscape as a place of beauty and stability. Significantly, most of his landscapes are 
empty of people, an aspect that perhaps suggests that the idealisation of the countryside 
which was such a central aspect of romantic thought, was predominantly a bourgeois 
projection. The rapid migration of the rural population to metropolitan centres had 
originally started in the seventeenth century. As Abrahams points out, ‘there are 
manifest ironies involved in this process of sentimentalizing a way of life only after 
those who once practised it have been taken from the land’ (1993:4).12  
The motif of woodland is also repeated in many of Friedrich’s paintings of 
volunteers and appears to represent a symbol of ancient German valour and manliness, 
recalling the Battle of the Teutoburg forest retold by Tacitus. Friedrich again uses the 
image of the oak tree in his most famous painting Ulrich von Hutten’s Grave which 
depicts a man, also dressed in the altdeutsche uniform of the volunteer brigades, leaning 
on (the imaginary) tomb of Hutten on which are engraved the names of well known 
patriots such as Arndt, and Jahn amongst others. The figure is enclosed by the arches of 
a ruined gothic church covered in shrubs and weeds, which Clark argues ‘transform the 
painting into a lamentation over the failure of memory and the triumph of forgetfulness’ 
                                                           
11 In June 1845, on the thirtieth anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, many of the veterans who 
had served in volunteer regiments congregated at Körner’s memorial. See Clark 1996:552; Schama 
2004:105–106. 
12 Eugene Lunn argues similarly that the ‘discovery of the people’ was related to the fact that the 
‘kind of indigenous folk arts that romantic writers sought to rescue were already in danger of 
disappearing’ and that this suggests that ‘the romantic populists were well aware…of the changes 
that were eroding the primitive, “folk” way of life’ (1986:483).  
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(1996:573). It should be recalled that Hutten was a champion of the cult of Arminius as a 
means of resisting papal control and it was in the nineteenth century that he was hailed 
as the father of German nationalism by the likes of Friedrich and Kersting. The 
significance of the painting, therefore, as Schama suggests, is that it brings together 
the most recent Liberatores Germaniae with the most ancient, Arminius himself, and 
von Hutten’s chosen historical doppelgänger. And if the connection between 
ancient and modern Germania were not already sufficiently indicated, a lived 
blood-red dawn illuminates a young German oak rising from the tomb and a tall fir 
tree that provides the canopy of the sepulchre: the images respectively, of national 
and spiritual resurrection. 
(2004:108–109) 
Another painting by Friedrich entitled the ‘Chasseur’ in the Forest makes similar allusions 
to a series of patriotic symbols, not least Arminius’ victory over Varus. The painting 
depicts a lone chasseur (‘soldier’) entering a dense forest. A raven perches on a felled tree 
stump, perhaps singing a warning to the soldier. The soldier’s helmet, as Schama 
suggests ‘seems strangely Roman, as if borrowed from one of Varus’ lost centurions’ 
(2004:106). The trees themselves surround and dwarf the soldier, and perhaps they 
signify ‘the massed troops of the reborn Germania’ (ibid.).  
The paintings of Kersting and Friedrich taken together bring together three 
important elements in the nationalist movement that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Wars of Liberation: landscape, manly comradeship, and the figure of Arminius as the 
archetypal German hero. The ideal of male friendship forged in the conflict of war was a 
powerful image of patriotism for many Germans in the nineteenth century, 
exemplifying the virtues of discipline, honour, courage, discipline, competitiveness, 
stoicism, and dignity, and all of which were considered to be indispensable to struggle 
to found a nation state as I discussed in Chapter 4. The link between patriotism and 
fraternal bonds between men were seen to be inseparable (Mosse 1982b:352) and it was 
Arminius who in this regard stood at the helm of the German character as the paradigm 
of manly virtue. 
It is no surprise therefore, that the figure of Arminius as Hermann was soon 
deemed the national symbol par excellence. From the 1840s onwards many plans were 
drawn up to create monuments celebrating him as a German national hero. Karl-
Friedrich Schinkel, for example drew plans for a monument of Hermann to be erected 
on the site of his famous victory in the region of the Teutoburger Wald. Schinkel 
explicitly followed Friedrich in weaving together elements of the native landscape with 
the German myths retrieved by Grimm. The figure of Hermann, leaning on his sword, 
dressed in a popularly imagined Teutonic style with winged helmet and sweeping 
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cloak, was to be set upon a massive pedestal of roughly-hewn rock emerging above the 
treeline of the oaks which surrounded it (see Schama 2004:109). Schinkel’s design was 
never to be realised but in 1838 the sculptor Joseph Ernst von Bandel was commissioned 
to produce a Hermannsdenkmal (‘Hermann monument’) in order to commemorate the 
Battle of the Teutoburg Wald on a site just south of Detmold near Bielefeld and between 
the Ems and Weser rivers. Bandel’s design drew upon German myths derived from the 
Nibelungelieder and of course from the image of the ancient Germans described by 
Tacitus. As Schama suggests, 
Von Bandel may not have been the most flamboyantly inspired of 
monumental sculptors but he evidently knew his public. He provided it 
with exactly the image of the Wagnerian hero it expected: whiskery, wing-
helmeted, flourishing the invincibly tempered Nothung13 in the skies, a 
repatriated version of Tacitus’s Arminius as ‘the liberator of Germany’. 
(2004:112) 
The statue took over forty years to construct and was paid for by contributions 
from all the states of Germany, including Austria. However, with the defeat inflicted 
upon Austria by the Prussian troops and their allies in 1866, von Bandel aligned himself 
with the Prussian Kaiser Wilhelm I (1797–1888) who visited his workshop in 1869 to 
inspect the work in progress. Von Bandel began to promote the Kaiser as the new 
Arminius and when the monument was finally finished in 1875 (four years after the 
establishment of the Kaiserreich), the official commemorative book identified Wilhelm as 
the successor to Arminius as the bringer of unity and national freedom (Schama 
2004:112). The official opening of the monument reinforced the association, as Schama 
describes it: 
It was orchestrated as a stupendous imperial triumph, with hundreds of banners 
and pennants flying the imperial colors and the arms of the now elaborately 
obsequious dependent princes of the empire. The Arminius Redivivus, Kaiser 
Wilhelm I, sat in an immense pseudo-medieval pavilion at the top of the Groteburg 
listening to a Luther preacher fulminate passionately on German destiny. Three 
actors got up in Romano-Teutonic costume impersonated the hero, their swords 
held aloft in the August sunshine. 
(ibid.) 
The monument itself stood at 53.46 metres, set on a circular temple made of sandstone 
bricks with ten columns foliated at the capitals. At the base of the temple, a flight of 
steps led to a place from which to view the dense forest of the Teutoburg. As such, it 
was not just a commemorative symbol but also made into a sacred space. Anthony 
                                                           
13 The Nothung was the mystical and omnipotent sword of the Nibelungen, forged for heroes. 
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Smith explains how monuments of this type might contribute to the sacralisation of the 
native landscape when he suggests that 
legendary or historical figures are venerated by the people for the benefits, material 
and spiritual, that they bestow on the community, and for the divine blessings they 
bring on the people. So the places where holy men and heroes walked and taught, 
fought and judged, prayed and died, are felt to be holy themselves, their tombs and 
monuments become places of veneration and pilgrimage, testifying to the glorious 
and sacred past of the ethnic community. 
(1997a:14) 
In the previous chapter I examined how authenticity was considered to be a 
vital aspect of the romantic nationalist concern to retrieve folk traditions. Perhaps just as 
important to German romantic nationalism, however, was territory insofar as the 
German nation, not having recourse to a civic model of national identity, sought to root 
itself in a particular terrain, one that was considered to be the historic homeland and to 
guarantee—in the same way that folklore and myth was believed to—the familial 
continuity of the contemporary inhabitants with those of the past. In Smith’s view, ‘the 
rubric of continuity points to the persistence of cultural components of particular 
nations’ (1999b:11), while reappropriation of the heroic figures of the past represents a 
‘reaching back into the ethnic past to obtain the authentic materials, and ethos for a 
distinct modern nation’ (1999:12). Placing monuments that celebrated the ancient 
ancestors of the German people on the native landscape was a way of asserting the 
nation and its heroes as the products of the land, just as the land was thought, after 
Herder, to aid the expression of Völkisch character and culture. Monuments such as that 
of Hermann were able to convey the sense, in the aftermath of nearly three-quarters of a 
century of social turmoil, invasions, and war, that the land was not only inhabited but 
could now be more truly ‘repossessed’ and that the golden age of German unity could 
now be retrieved.  
The Hermannsdenkmal was one of several such monuments to celebrate the 
golden age of the German people. In 1842, the Bavarian King Ludwig I (1786–1868) had 
completed construction of the Walhalla Hall of Fame and Honor, which overlooked the 
Danube River near Regensburg and was an enormous shrine to Germany’s heroes 
covering 1800 years of German history starting with the Arminius’ victory in the Battle 
of the Teutoburg Forest (Williamson 2004:112). Another important monument, this time 
commissioned to celebrate German unification under the Kaiserreich, was the 
Niederwald monument that I now want to discuss in some detail, drawing on Patricia 
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Mazón’s helpful account (2000),14 because it, perhaps even more than the 
Hermannsdenkmal, represented Germany in explicitly gendered terms and recalled 
Herder’s belief in the patrilineal transmission of traditions amongst the Volk. 
It was in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 that plans for the 
Niederwald national monument were drawn up. Completed in 1883, it was situated on 
the Rhine, outside Rüdesheim between Koblenz and Mainz. Because of its size, 
popularity, and the cost involved in building it, it has often been presented as the most 
important monument of Imperial Germany (Mazón 2000:162). The monument, like the 
Hermannsdenkmal was intended to be financed by the people in order to reflect their 
unification, as Lutz Tittel suggests (1979:7–8). The cost proved prohibitive, however, 
eventually reaching 1.2 million marks, making it the most expensive monument 
constructed in Germany until then. Instead of coming from the population as a whole, 
the monument was instead financed by the Reichstag, imperial and princely donations, 
and contributions from the wealthy and upper-middle class (Tittel 1979:43–74). Tittel 
concludes that the monument thus ended up being less representative of the German 
people than of the committee charged with organising the construction of the 
monument and which consisted of a small group of conservatives supported by the state 
(1979:120–121). However, there was enormous public interest in the monument as 
indicated by the lengthy press reports and popular books documenting its building 
(Mazón 2000:167). 
The monument’s focal point is a large female statue that represents the nation 
Germania and stands at just over ten metres (the monument as a whole is thirty-eight 
metres high). She holds Charlemagne’s crown in one hand and the Holy Roman 
Imperial sword in the other. She stands in front of a throne clothed in chain mail and a 
breastplate decorated with the insignia of the German eagle and Mazón suggest that the 
sculpture’s features call to mind ‘an ideal Teutonic type rather than a real person’ 
(2000:169). In the 1850s and 1860s the figure of Germania had gradually been 
represented as a symbol of national unity against the backdrop of the passionate debates 
around the Klein- and Grossdeutsch solutions to the question of the German nation state 
(discussed above) and this concept of unity was nourished by a vision of a common 
enemy (first France, and then Austria) that resulted in a number of increasingly 
                                                           
14 Most of the available information in the Niederwald monument is in German and my language 
skills in that regard are not sufficiently capable of reading the material with the care and detail 
required. Mazón, however, provides a useful survey of the available literature throughout her 
article. 
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belligerent depictions of Germania (see Gall 1993: 9, 15–20). The image of Germania on 
the Niederwald monument conveyed a similarly belligerent stance with the difference 
that, as Mazón suggests, 
No longer did she stand for an undifferentiated yearning for a German nation-state 
but instead represented the achievements of Bismarck’s three wars of 
unification….What is interesting about the Niederwald Germania is how she has 
changed from earlier figures, which seemed to encompass all solutions to the 
German questions, to a Germanic Athena, guardian of Imperial Germany’s 
patriarchal and authoritarian political order. 
(2000:171) 
Interpretations of the symbolism of the Germania statue varied amongst the populace 
according to social class and gender. In the main though it was seen as explicitly 
representative of the national character and virtues. As one author noted, ‘we can 
recognize the virtues of the Germans in this face’ suggesting that it embodied ‘loyalty, 
love of the Fatherland, persistence and endurance’ (in Mazón 2000:174) 
The association that Mazón draws between the Germania statue and Athene is 
significant. Marina Warner has suggested that Athena was a conventional symbol of the 
nation in nineteenth-century Europe which she attributes to the ‘patriarchal implications 
of Athene’s story’ (1985:124) that in turn gave support to the conservative nineteenth-
century political and family structures that excluded women from the public sphere 
(surveyed in Chapter 4 above), She suggests, therefore, that ‘The coincidence of the 
Athenian code and Victorian domestic ideals inspired a renewed, official celebration of 
the goddess Athena in the 19th century in England, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the 
United States (1985:125). The story of Athene as told in Hesiod’s Theogony relates the 
story of her birth from the head of Zeus who has appropriated female parturition in 
order to deal with the threat posed by his wife Metis. In Aeschylus’ Oresteia Athene 
sides with Orestes to vindicate him of the charge of matricide and she claims that on the 
basis of her own birth, fathers are the true parents of their offspring, aligning herself in 
the process with patriarchal values (I discuss this episode in more detail in Chapter 8). 
Warner argues that Athene’s authority and virtue were expressed through the 
‘metaphor of defensive combat’ reflecting her willingness to protect her property and 
honour. For Warner, the construction of the nineteenth-century symbol of Athene 
involved several representational steps, the first of which concerned swathing the 
previously demure and fragile female form in armour in order to achieve the effect of 
heroism. Moreover, the use of breastplates, swords, and other weaponry in these 
representations served to masculinise the female body and ‘to manifest [women’s] good 
behaviour in recognizing male authority in society’ (1985:107). However, the sword 
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served less as a phallic symbol than as an asexual ‘tool of separation, as the instrument 
which cleaves one in two’ (1985:160) and as such symbolised asexual rather than sexual 
reproduction. Consequently these images were drained of any real association with 
femininity and projected a virile symbol of autonomous masculine fantasy. As Mazón 
points out, ‘Germania’s ancient symbolism was surely not lost on more educated 
Germans, who would have recognized her as an Athena figure, or as Athena Nike, 
goddess of victory’ and she goes on to suggest that Germania in this guise represented 
an ‘entirely legitimate representation of her fatherland’ (2000:174–175). 
Mazón is not suggesting here that the Germania statue stood for an atemporal 
form of patriarchal domination, but rather that because ‘male authority in matters both 
public and private was still firmly ensconced during the Wilhelmine era’ (2000:175) and 
as such the Germania was a response to and a reflection of social norms and values. 
Moreover, Mazón suggests that the Germania statue has to be interpreted within its 
overall context which may suggest other possible meanings: 
Her colossal size signalled to her contemporaries that she represented the state and, 
through this, power itself. The message of power was further articulated by 
attributes that were clear even without reference to Athena. Germania’s obvious 
youth and strength were an allusion to the youth and vigour of the German 
nation….The [Franco-Prussian] war and the ensuing German victory were apparent 
in the combination of battle gear with the more ceremonial, flowing lines of her 
skirt and the garland in her hair; Germania resembles a warrior dressed for a 
victory celebration. The theme of vigilance is represented in the way in which 
Germania holds the Imperial sword drawn but not raised, implying a watchful but 
not necessarily aggressive stance. She looks boldly across the Rhine, her eyes turned 
away from the Imperial crown that she holds out. The implicit message is that she is 
the keeper of the Imperial sovereignty symbolized by the crown. 
(Mazón 2000:175–176) 
As if to confirm this reading, at the laying of the monument’s foundation stone, the 
chairman of the monument’s executive committee, Graf zu Eulenberg, was attributed as 
reciting Germania’s ‘warning cry’ with the following words: 
I pointed the tip of my sword toward the heavens 
And from the storming came the light of day. 
An imperial shield hangs from the oak again, 
The young empire arose from battle and victory. 
Hear this, my people! And stand by this empire, 
Stand by the Kaiser and by your fatherland. 
(in Mazón 2000:175) 
Consideration of the broader context of the statue involves examination of the 
pedestal of the monument, a section that comprises about two-thirds of the total 
memorial. At the base of the statue are richly decorated bas-reliefs and inscriptions 
depicting specific historical events in the recent past, particularly the beginning of the 
Franco-Prussian war and the Prussian victory. The images depicted seem to be part of a 
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project of legitimising the Kleindeutsch solution that the Kaiserreich represented, resulting 
in an interesting juxtaposition of the timeless and inclusive aspects of the German past 
as represented by Germania against the specific events that resulted in the (partial) 
unification of Germany under the Kaiserreich. The monument could thus be read as an 
attempt to authorise the Kleindeutsch and to present it as the natural and most legitimate 
culmination of the nationalist effort to secure cultural, if not political unity.  
From its inception the monument was intended to represent as well as cultivate 
a feeling of unity and shared traditions amongst the general populace in the newly 
established nation. Mazón draws attention to how the three design contests that 
preceded the commissioning of the monument sought models that would commemorate 
‘the recent victorious and successful, united rising of the German people and of the re-
establishment of the German Empire’ (in Mazón 2000:176). The concept of ‘re-
establishment’ invoked not only the Holy Roman Empire, but looked to a more distant 
past through its depiction of Germania and implied that the Kaiserreich had fulfilled 
Germany’s destiny. In many ways the monument brought together August Schlegel’s 
vision of a medieval ritterliche mythologie with that of Grimm’s Deutsche Mythology, 
rooted in the pagan past. As Mazón comments,  
With her very name, Germania suggested the earliest Germans and their timeless 
origins. Her dress, however, is a nineteenth-century interpretation of the German 
fairy-tale world of the Middle Ages….The swans on Germania’s skirt allude to 
Nordic mythology, in which Valkyries took on the form of swans, as described in 
the Nibelungenlied. 
(2000:176–177) 
In ways probably unintended, therefore, the Niederwald monument was representative 
of Germany—at least the Germany that was haggled over in the midst of the 
confessional divide between the romanticism of the Schlegel brothers and that of the 
Grimms. What the monument was able to achieve was a visual synthesis between these 
ideas and represented a popularisation of the types of mythology promoted by the 
romantic nationalists. Perhaps the Niederwald monument was, in an obscure way, in 
the end a testament to their disparate visions. As Helmut Walser Smith acutely observes, 
‘Confessional animosities…were not incidental to German nationalism, but the thing 
itself’ (1995:234). 
Regardless of how one might interpret the monument, however, what remains 
is that the design of the monument sought to express a historical and cultural vision of 
continuity between the German past and present. It was an image, however, that 
papered over what was still a divided territory. Although the monument invoked the 
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Holy Roman Empire, Austria which for so long had stood at its helm was not mentioned 
apart from in the silent subtext of the vanquished enemy. As Koshar suggests, ‘The 
myth of a national community originating in the mists of time increasingly depended on 
the saturation of local communities with visual markers of the nation’s perdurability’ 
(1998:23) and this was necessary because the Kleindeutsch form of the Kaiserreich was all 
too obviously only a partial unification of the German territories. All of this points, 
therefore, in my view, to the fact that political unification was unable to satisfy the 
yearnings, expressed particularly by the romantic nationalists, but disseminated to the 
common people, for cultural unity on a Großdeutsch model. It was the monument, 
therefore, rather than the political efforts of Bismarck and his contemporaries, which 
was able to offer a confirmatory but nonetheless invented representation of German 
cultural unity by drawing haphazardly from a broad repertoire of national myth and 
tradition. The images of recent history mingled together with those of the past to 
transform the contemporary meanings of tradition and modernity so that they became 
mythicised as one and the same. As Levinger and Lytle suggest, by delineating the 
essential qualities of the original community as conveyed in monuments like the 
Niederwald, nationalists were also able to identify what needed to be recovered through 
collective struggle. The construction of a mythic original identity thus defined the stakes 
of present-day political action (2001:181). 
Mazón points out that while the monument served the purpose of creating a 
sense of political and cultural unity, it also ‘offered lessons in citizenship, defining 
which individuals were to take an active part in the nation’ (2000:184) and her 
observation is, I believe, significant. The monument served essentially as a didactic 
device, cultivating patriotism and love for the fatherland as the duty of every citizen but 
simultaneously specified who was and who was not to be counted amongst the 
members of the nation as well as delineating the borders of the German territory. I will 
return to discuss the constitution of citizenship shortly but first I want to examine the 
issue of territoriality that the monument was able to secure. Jan Penrose suggests that 
place and territory are ‘quite different from space….[S]pace is present whether anyone 
knows about it or not, but space only becomes a place when it acquires “perceptual 
unity”, and it only becomes a territory when it is delimited in some way’ (2002:279). The 
Niederwald monument was able to transform place (the diverse and disunited German 
territories) into territory through virtue of its own location in the ‘natural’ setting of the 
Niederwald forest overlooking the Rhine (which itself was a potent symbol of 
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Germanness), leading one commentator to suggest that the area belonged ‘only now, 
through the efforts of our heroic warriors…completely to the German fatherland’ (in 
Mazón 2000:185). Mazón suggests, moreover, that ‘the Rhine occupied a privileged 
symbolic space. Other major German rivers such as the Danube, which joins Germany 
and Austria, did not share the same central importance after the kleindeutsch solution’ 
(2002:186). Further, the Niederwald monument was occasionally referred to as a 
‘German garden of Eden’ (ibid.), suggesting both the natural beauty of its surroundings, 
a ‘picture of German political innocence and grace’ (Mazón 2000:187), and perhaps even 
an idyllic origin. The kind of territorialisation that the monument achieved was closely 
connected to forms of geographical exclusion and inclusion insofar as it created 
territorial boundaries between the German nation and its neighbours, most particularly 
Austria and France. However, these exclusions and division of space also corresponded 
to exclusions and divisions amongst people. As Penrose argues, 
When people create territories, they create boundaries that both unite and divide 
space along with everything that it contains. By combining some people and certain 
resources and separating them from other people and other resources, the creation 
of territories gives physical substance and symbolic meaning to notions of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ and ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’. 
(2002:280) 
The Niederwald monument displayed its exclusions and inclusions in this 
regard in the bas-reliefs at its base, all the more ironic given the intention that it should 
serve as a unifying symbol of Germanness. In addition to excluding Catholics, Social 
Democrats, Jews, Poles, and the working class (see Mazón 2000:187–188), the reliefs 
marginalised one other important group, namely women, from the national community, 
particularly insofar as it prescribed the forms of political participation. The central bas-
relief depicts numerous German princes and soldiers ready for battle with the Kaiser 
placed in the middle which Mazón suggests depicts the ‘Kaiserreich’s political order’ 
(2000:188). Women are entirely absent from this main panel and are only depicted in the 
smaller side sections. One could of course argue that the statue of Germania is a central 
symbolisation of femininity in the founding of the nation, but as I have discussed above, 
her representation seems more indicative of an asexual figure who serves as an allegory 
of German strength and loyalty to the fatherland than as an inclusive image of women. 
Here her role seems to replicate the purely symbolic role that women were granted 
within much nationalist discourse as I suggested in Chapter 4. The women that are 
depicted in the smaller side panels of the monument merely confirm a public/private 
division of labour that I also suggested was a feature of cultural nationalism. Shown as 
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weeping over their husbands as they depart for war, comforting their children, or 
rejoicing at the safe return of their loved ones, they stand in contrast to the stoic and 
solemn courage of the soldiers preparing for battle. As Mazón suggests, these panels 
‘depict the threshold of public and private life and present lessons in male and female 
virtue’ (ibid.) and further, that feminine and masculine roles are juxtaposed ‘showing 
men taking action and women reacting’ (2000:1990).  
The men are more obviously aligned—at least visually—with the vigilant and 
poised image of Germania, symbol of the nation. The subtext thus appears to me to 
signal an equation of nation with masculinity, which as I discussed in Chapter 4, 
indicates that nationalism—at least in the nineteenth century— may well have been an 
expressly masculine enterprise. Perhaps it was for this reason that Germany, almost 
uniquely amongst other nations, referred to its territory as the ‘fatherland’ rather than 
the ‘motherland’; it enabled its men to invent themselves as the legitimate sons and heirs 
of an ancient and noble patrimony which consisted of a natural and abiding connection 
to the land, chivalrous and ancient institutions that distilled the traditions of the 
forefathers along the lines suggested by Herder and reinforced by the Grimms, and 
myths of masculine valour and high pedigree. The lowly status of Germany within 
Europe throughout its long history and French disparagement of its cultural traditions 
during the eighteenth century, combined with the French invasions of the nineteenth 
century, all of which I have surveyed above, perhaps together contributed to a sense of 
emasculated manhood that was further extended (and exacerbated) by analogy to the 
divided and susceptible German territory. By asserting the fatherland as a bounded and 
secure territory as figured by the Niederwald monument, the asexualised Germania 
figure not withstanding, and by promoting myths and traditions that would unify the 
German people, masculine honour could be restored. Moreover, the motifs of unity and 
synthesis that underwrote the efforts of the romantic nationalists may well have 
signalled a desire to measure up to the model of autonomous and whole individuality 
promoted by the Enlightenment philosophes but which in Germany was transferred from 
the individual to the male collective in their fraternal bonds. Thus, I believe that 
romanticism, as it was articulated in Germany, was an heir to the clarion call of the 
Enlightenment—Liberty! Equality! Fraternity!—with the one difference being that where 
the rationalist tradition that produced civic forms of nationalism emphasised liberty and 
equality as the basis of national identification, the German romantics pinned their hopes 
on fraternity, a band of brothers united by and in the fatherland. 
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In the following chapter I want to pursue this relationship between territory and 
masculinity (specifically in its patrilinear form) and to demonstrate how it was caught 
up in a search for the original homeland of the German people and was activated as a 
discourse of differentiation that was predicated on the exclusion of an explicitly 
feminised Jewish population. To do so I return to the discussion that I began in Chapter 
3 that surveyed the increasing interest in, and search for, the origins of the European 
people in the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. It was a search that was eventually 
bolstered in the eighteenth century by William Jones’ discovery of the affinities between 
Sanskrit, Latin, Greek and the other European languages which pointed to the recovery 
of the original language of the human race, and by implication, the homeland and the 
original race. As I showed in Chapter 3, Jones’ discovery contributed to an accumulative 
rejection of Semitic origins and in what follows I want to examine the particular 
implications and outcomes that this narrative of origins had in nineteenth-century 
Germany, a narrative that was, in many ways, the culmination of the search for German 
identity that I have traced so far. 
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C H A P T E R   S E V E N 
MYTH AS A DISCOURSE OF DIFFERENTIATION: 




This chapter returns to my earlier discussion in Chapter 3 of the broader European 
search for origins during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to trace the 
ways in which German scholars in the nineteenth century exploited and appropriated 
the notion of an Urheimat. It was a process that was to prove, in addition to the 
reconstructive efforts of the German romantics surveyed in the previous chapters, 
decisive in consolidating a belief in the purity and nobility of the German people. I 
show, in the first section of this chapter, how an initial romantic idealisation of India as 
the Urheimat of the German people, itself a product of the Indo-European hypothesis 
surveyed in Chapter 3, was eventually replaced by claims for a Germanic homeland and 
the concomitant assertion of pure Aryan ancestry, both of which were granted 
legitimacy—or at least focus—by Tacitus’ ethnographical depiction of the ancient 
Germans, by Herder’s theories regarding the Volk and their providential place in history, 
and by developments in comparative philology and race science. Each in turn served to 
sanction and strengthen the growing nationalist movement. Section I discusses how the 
idealisation of India as the Urheimat was enabled through the philological efforts of 
Friedrich Schlegel and others, who sought to recover the Ursprache upon which concepts 
of the original homeland were premised. Section II then shows how the connection 
between the original homeland and the original language was conflated into a racial 
discourse that enabled some German scholars to affirm an Aryan origin for the German 
people. The assertion of India as the original homeland was subsequently rejected and a 
German Urheimat was established in its place resulting in a virulent discourse of 
differentiation premised on a myth of Aryan origins. In section III I examine the 
subsequent production and imposition of an anti-Semitic discourse of differentiation 
that displaced the preoccupation with French imperialism as the focus of German 
enmity, and look at the way in which it provided an additional focal point for the 
consolidation of a stable construction of German identity, reinforcing German 
nationalist sentiment. I thus focus on the German elaboration of ancient origins, and 
examine the specifically gendered nature of German identity construction in order to 
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show how the genealogical priorities articulated in the myth of Aryan origins were 
patrilineal and monogenetic, producing an archetype of Germans as masculine, heroic, 
and pure in contrast to a projected effeminate Jewishness.1 The broader implications of 
this myth of origin and its intersection with patrilineal assertions will be theorised more 
fully, however, in the following chapters. I end the chapter in section IV by reflecting on 
the productive function of myth and mythmaking in the politics of German identity, 
                                                           
1 This chapter is confined to a discussion of developments in the nineteenth century. It does not, 
therefore, cover the emergence of National Socialism, the ‘Final Solution’ and the Holocaust in 
Germany in the twentieth century, despite the fact that in some important ways they could be 
seen to be the culmination of the search for identity and origins that I am dealing with. I have two 
reasons for limiting my discussion to this period. Firstly, my intention is to demonstrate the 
degree to which the German search for national identity both produced and depended on a myth 
of origins, one which was, as I have argued, initially part of a wider European concern with its 
own ancestry from the Renaissance onwards. It was in nineteenth-century Germany, however, 
where it took on a unique urgency, defining the form of German nationalist effort due to the very 
distinct set of circumstances confronting the Germanic territories at the time discussed in Chapter 
4. It is neither necessary nor desirable, in my view to extend my discussion beyond the end of the 
nineteenth century; to do so would be to impose an unsustainable teleological narrative by 
implying a causal—and naively linear—connection between the first-century writings of Tacitus, 
for example, and the events of the Second World War. Further, it would oversimplify and 
potentially misrepresent the relationship between the German nationalism of the nineteenth  
century and the violent articulation of German anti-Semitism in the Third Reich, particularly 
given that anti-Semitism was a Europe-wide phenomenon, that other ‘marginalised’ groups were 
also victims of Nazi policies of extermination, and that many similar nationalist movements of the 
time did not result such policies. However, it is certainly true that Nazi ideology did make 
frequent use of the myth of Aryan origins as a propaganda tool, and that it amplified Völkisch 
traditions in order to accent Jewish difference and other ‘alien’ influences against German Aryan 
purity and homogeneity. There is, nonetheless, some evidence to indicate that Hitler and his 
government did so selectively and as a way of manipulating the public mood in terms which 
would be broadly familiar, rather than because of their loyalty to a single, coherent, and 
historically derived ideology of Aryan superiority (see Kamenetsky 1972, 1977; Dow and Lixfeld 
1994). That Völkisch myths were employed by the Nazi regime to cultivate nationalistic fervour 
and to justify its expansionist and anti-Semitic policies indicates, of course, the utility of ‘national’ 
myths for political agendas. Thus there is a need for more research into the status and use of myth 
in National Socialism and the Third Reich (and of course, the story does not end there), but it 
would take at least a volume to survey such a complex area in any reasonable or satisfactory 
detail. This chapter will focus instead on the contexts and sources that served as the ground of 
possibility for imagining the German nation in the nineteenth century through recourse to a myth 
of Aryan origins. In keeping with my broader understanding in this thesis of the discursive 
quality of myth, I will show how this myth was simultaneously produced by and was productive of 
anti-Semitism. 
My second reason for confining my discussion to nineteenth-century Germany is the existence of 
voluminous scholarly literature on twentieth-century Germany, National Socialism, and the root 
causes of the Holocaust, all of which provides detailed—if fiercely disputed—documentation of 
the numerous possible causes of the Nazi rise to power and the virulent anti-Semitism of the 
Third Reich; to summarise it here would be redundant and would distract from the task at hand. 
On the origins of Nazism and the Holocaust as well as the intimately connected intellectual debate 
over the ethics of representational historiography (the Historikerstreit or ‘Historians’ Debate’) see 
Baumann 1989; Fischer 1998; Lindemann 1997; Burleigh 1997; Peukert 1994; Goldhagen 1996; and 
Henry Friedlander 1995. On Holocaust historiography see Broszat and Friedländer 1988; Baldwin 
1990, Saul Friedländer 1992, 1993, 2002; Bernstein 1994; Birn and Volker 1997; Evans 1997; Wehler 
1997; Bartov 1998); and Adorno 2003. 
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showing how the assertion of a common origin, reinforced by mythic schemes of 
homogeneity and alterity, secured and maintained the sense of autonomy, strength, 
destiny, and purity that defined popular notions of Germany identity as masculine and 
monogenetic in the nineteenth century. 
I. Romantic Linguistics and the Idealisation of India 
The issue of relative cultural prestige, whether racial or cultural, was a central concern 
for most European countries during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
and functioned as a ‘morphology of domination’ (Pollock 1993:77),2 one that ran 
alongside frequent military conflict within Europe. Many European nations utilised the 
past (and present) as a signifier of their superior stature: the southern Europeans turned 
to their illustrious Greek and Roman ancestry to assert their cultural supremacy; the 
French gestured towards the philosophical achievements of the Enlightenment and their 
Revolution; the British, in spite of, or perhaps because of, their indefinite racial 
hybridity, pointed to their colonial and scientific achievements in the present to assert 
their cultural advancement (Trigger 1981:145). At the turn of the nineteenth century 
Germany, however, had very little in the way of a noble ancestry to which it could turn 
with any degree of confidence, apart from a few lines in Tacitus. In addition to the work 
of the romantic thinkers of the first half of the nineteenth century, Jones’ discovery 
therefore provided the Germans with a convenient and much-needed opportunity to 
establish their own ancient pedigree by bringing together Tacitus’ claim regarding the 
ancient Germanic autochthony, romantic nationalism’s restoration of mythology as a 
reservoir of German identity, and contemporary speculations regarding the identity of 
the Ursprache, the Urheimat, and the Urvolk. As Bryant suggests, ‘if the Germans could 
somehow appropriate the mantle of the original Indo-Europeans…they could then lay 
claim to being the progenitors of all subsequent derivative cultures, be they Greek, 
Latin, or colonial’ (2001:30).  
The German philologists and intellectuals of the nineteenth century seized 
quickly on Jones’ acknowledgement of the kinship of Germanic languages and Sanskrit. 
In this regard, as Lincoln notes, the importance of Herder’s writings on the Volk in 
                                                           
2 Pollock defines this morphology as ‘…invoking higher knowledge, naturalizing cultural 
inequality (“revelation”, “science”, “intuition of the blood”), creating the idea of race and 
concurrently legislating racial exclusivity, asserting linguistic hierarchy and claiming superiority 
for the language of the masters, and securing an order of domination by monopolizing “life 
chances” such as forms of literacy’ (1993:78). 
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conditioning the German response to Jones’ theories should not be underestimated: 
‘Germans were relieved of the need to compete with Greeks and Romans, for they now 
discovered themselves as part of the same primordial group’ (1999:55). The question is 
why Germans should seize on the idea of ‘Indo-European’ origins more firmly than any 
other group of Europeans. In order to understand the German quest for an ancient 
pedigree I will trace the emergence, in Germany, of what Poliakov refers to as the ‘myth 
of Aryan origins’ (1974). 
I have already shown that in late eighteenth-century Europe India was a 
popular candidate for the original homeland but that in Britain this theory was rejected 
due to colonial exigencies. In early nineteenth-century Germany, an Indian Urheimat 
also initially proved an irresistible thesis for a group of scholars, poets, and philosophers 
led by Friedrich Schlegel and influenced by Herder’s belief that the Germans should 
‘seek an affiliation with Mother India’ (Bryant 2001:19).3 For them, India, as discovered 
in its ancient Sanskrit sources, seemed to confirm and to bear all the hallmarks of the 
romantic vision of a golden age of natural religion and the innocent childhood of 
humankind. In keeping with the broader romantic agenda, as Raymond Schwab 
suggests, ‘Sanskrit was the providential answer…to the German Romantics’ long 
appeals for the light of the Orient’ (1984:13), appeals that were, at least in part, the result 
of the rejection of biblical ethnology. In this regard, it should be remembered that the 
rejection of India as the birthplace of Indo-European civilisation in Britain was related to 
an ideology of progress upon which colonial endeavours were justified, in contrast to 
the providential discourse of romanticism. Thus providence and progress became a 
functional pair in the intellectual struggle over origins and over interpretations of 
historical causality and continuity. In Germany a proto-nationalist doctrine of divine 
providence, popular since the time of Martin Luther and the German humanists, 
influenced the sense that many nineteenth-century German scholars had regarding the 
divinely ordained role of the German nation in universal history. The theories of an 
Indian Urheimat, at least at first, therefore, seemed to provide the means of confirming 
the providential place of Germany within world history. 
                                                           
3 Herder is widely held to have been the thinker most influential in cultivating an interest in India 
amongst the German romantics (Schwab 1984:52–64; Halbfass 1988:69–73). Herder, who referred 
to India as the ‘Orient, soil of God, rightly elected for this purpose’ (in Schwab 1984:13), had first 
become enthralled by India through the English translation by Charles Wilkins (c. 1749–1836) of 
the Bhagavad Gītā (published in 1785) and he used excerpts of it in his Zerstreute Blätter (‘Jottings’) 
published in 1792. His interest was further peaked by George Forster’s German translation of 
Jones’ English translation of Shakuntala which Forster (1754–1794) had sent to him in 1791 (he 
wrote the preface for Forster’s second edition of 1803). See Schwab 1984:59.  
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In this vein, Dorothy Figueira suggests that there were two connected reasons 
for German interest in India: one was the general romantic preoccupation with the past 
as a golden age of religion and language; the other was the possibility that the Germans 
would find their own origins in ancient Sanskrit sources and thus the means to restore 
the archaic greatness of the Germanic past as portrayed by Tacitus (1994:145–146; see 
also Bryant 2001:30). Figueira’s theory is supported by Raymond Schwab’s contention 
that one of the main reasons for the German enthusiasm for philology and Indology was 
the German ‘inferiority complex’ and that it led to what he calls ‘the Oriental 
Renaissance’ (1984).4 Schwab shows persuasively that this ‘second Renaissance’ 
mirrored the recovery of Greek manuscripts and Byzantine commentaries after the fall 
of Constantinople in 1453, which had generated the first Renaissance when Europe 
realised and then capitalised upon its noble pedigree. For Schwab, the discovery of the 
linguistic affiliations between the more ancient Sanskrit and Latin, Greek, and other 
European languages provided a much-needed opportunity for Germans to assert their 
own Indo-European ancestry and from there to lay claim to being the progenitors of all 
subsequent derivative cultures, be they Latin or Greek (1984:45–47; see also Bryant 
2001:30–35). I shall show below how such claims were sustained, but first I want to 
examine the impact of German romantic linguistics on the study of India.  
As I suggested in Chapter 1, the romantic movement arose in response to social, 
political, religious, and philosophical upheavals brought about by the Enlightenment 
and rapid industrialisation, all of which induced a sense of disorientation and the loss of 
nostalgically cherished modes of sociability. The romantic sensibility as represented by 
the Frühromantik philosophy surveyed in Chapter 4 was nurtured by the belief that the 
recovery of the past, of a kind of holistic and harmonious way of life, was the best way 
of ameliorating the ill effects of modernisation. According to Wilhelm Halbfass, ‘the 
Romantic interest in India was inseparable from a radical critique of the European 
present’ (1988:83), a view well reflected by Friedrich Majer (1771–1818), an influential 
German orientalist and friend of Herder, who believed that the turmoils brought about 
by modernisation in Europe could only be remedied through a return to the simplicity 
and purity of Indian origins (Willson 1964:94). This yearning was graphically employed 
by Majer’s contemporary Johann Joseph Görres (1776–1848) when he pondered the 
significance of the ‘Orient’ for contemporary Europeans: 
                                                           
4 Schwab (1984:11) takes the term from Edgar Quinet (1803–1875), a French poet, historian, and 
political philosopher heavily influenced by Herder.  
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And do you know the land where infant mankind lived its happy childhood 
years?…Towards the Orient, to the banks of the Ganges and the Indus, it is there 
that our hearts feel being drawn by some hidden urge—it is there that all the dark 
presentiments point which lie in the depths of our hearts, and it is there that we go 
when we follow the silent river which flows through time in legends and sacred songs to its 
source. In the Orient, the heavens poured forth into the Earth….In the primitive 
cultures of this earth, the original force must still appear undivided; in them, everything 
must be contained in the same homogeneity which would later become separated into 
the various camps. 
(in Halbfass 1988:73–74; my emphasis) 
Several important themes are conveyed in this passage that bear on the specific qualities 
the origin of the Indo-Europeans, and specifically the German people, was thought to 
contain. Görres here makes a series of connections between the location of an origin, a 
line of continuity—between the people and their source, the past and the present, and 
ancient traditions and contemporary yearnings—and a unifying, homogenous, ideal 
which the origin represents. While the belief in Indic provenance was later transposed to 
Europe, here Görres beautifully expresses the key elements of the German romantic 
perspective concerning the means through which the German people might achieve the 
cultural unity at the heart of the nationalist vision. Returning to their roots or 
‘childhood’ in the original Indian Urheimat through a remembrance of their traditions—
‘legends’ and ‘sacred songs’—would revive the instinctive ‘urge’ embedded in the heart 
of every true Indo-European and would lead them back to their original unity, a unity 
that had been fragmented and forgotten through the intervention of time and space. 
Within the German romantic paradigm, then, as Halbfass notes, ‘The very idea of India 
assumed mythical proportions; the turn towards India became the quest for the true 
depths of our own being, a search for the original, infant state of the human race, for the 
lost paradise of all religions and philosophies’ (1988:72). 
It was Friedrich Schlegel, however, who did more than any other during the 
early part of the nineteenth century to cultivate the enduring German interest in Indian 
origins and to strengthen the belief that India was the Urheimat. Schlegel had travelled to 
Paris in 1802 to study Persian under Antoine-Leonard de Chézy (1773–1832) and by 
chance he met Alexander Hamilton (1762–1824), an employee of the East India 
Company, who started to teach him Sanskrit. Schlegel, who had been encouraged to 
take up the study of Sanskrit by Majer (Willson 1964:96) and Herder (Hayes 1927:732), 
proved to be a keen student and quickly began to translate Sanskrit texts into German. 
While in Paris he began work on his most well known work Über die Sprache und 
Weisheit der Indier (‘The Speech and Wisdom of the Indians’; 1808) which set out to 
establish for a German audience the beauty, perfection, and antiquity of Sanskrit as well 
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as the notion that, as Martin Thom observes, it ‘might supply the German language, 
conceived in Tacitean terms as itself ancient and separate and pure, with ancestral titles’ 
(1995:221). It was in the first part of the Über die Sprache that he sought, by analysing 
grammatical structures, conjugations, and declensions, to argue that India was the 
cradle of humanity and that Sanskrit was the source of all the Indo-European languages.  
As I suggested in Chapter 3, it was common amongst philologists of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century to argue that a language’s structural regularity 
and the extent of its vocabulary provided clues to its age. Sanskrit’s sophistication on 
both fronts, in keeping with the deist and romantic belief in the degenerative nature of 
cultural forms from an original state of perfection and thus divine origin, suggested for 
romantic linguists like Schlegel that it was likely that Sanskrit was the oldest language. 
From here it was an easy step to see Sanskrit as the source of German and the other 
Indo-European languages because they, like Sanskrit, were inflected. Schlegel contrasted 
languages like Hebrew or Chinese to the inflected languages suggesting that they were 
instead agglutinative by means of affixes joined to the roots (1977:33, 44ff., 48, 50ff.). He 
then deployed a further subdivision of languages into synthetic and analytic forms, 
suggesting that Sanskrit was a synthetic language because it could produce 
modifications of meaning by inflection alone, without having to resort to the use of 
repositions, affixes and suffixes in the way that analytic, agglutinative languages did 
(Thom 1995:223; Figuiera 2000:29–30). Inflection in language was a mark of a refined 
intelligence, one that displayed the marks of divine origin, and Schlegel used this 
feature to suggest the perfection of the origin: 
The structure of language…is but one proof added in confirmation of so many 
others, that the primitive condition of mankind was not one of mere animal instinct, 
which by slow degrees, and with many a weary effort, at length attained some 
slight glimmering of reason and intelligence; it rather confirms…that…the most 
profound study and the clearest intelligence were early called into operation, for 
without such labour and reflection it would have been impossible to frame a 
language like the Indian, which…displays the entire ground plan of the 
consciousness. 
(1849:454) 
Schlegel ranked agglutinative languages in a lower order, and having 
established a principle of hierarchy, he was then able to arrange the Indo-European 
languages on a descending scale where Greek, Latin, and the Romance languages 
proceeded out of Sanskrit as the Ursprache, each marking a progressive erosion or 
degeneration of the original (1808:425; see Thom 1995:223). Using what should by now 
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be a familiar botanical analogy,5 Schlegel argued that the nominal and verbal forms of 
inflected languages stemmed from a linguistic root in the same way that a stem, 
branches, and leaves develop from a plant’s root (1977:41–59, 65–70). Because of 
inflection, Schlegel saw Sanskrit and its derivative languages as living organisms, 
capable of penetrating intelligence (1977:68–69) whereas agglutinative languages 
resembled mere agglomerations of atoms (1977:51). 
It is important to note that in postulating the division of language types into 
these two forms, in common with many other comparative philologists, Schlegel subtly 
realigned linguistic studies away from a preoccupation with the monogenesis of the 
human races built on biblical assumptions towards an acceptance of polygenetic origins. 
This should not be mistaken, however, as a proto-postmodern celebration of plurality; 
rather, it represents yet one more attempt to free the Indo-European languages from any 
affiliation with Hebrew. As Dorothy Figueira suggests, ‘The divine status [Schlegel] 
accorded to inflected Sanskrit necessitated a less than divine origin for what he 
perceived as the agglutinative languages’ (2002:30). After Schlegel, the Germans were 
free to focus on producing monogenetic accounts of their own origin, however much 
such accounts depended on an assumption of polygenesis, and it was here that 
nineteenth-century racial science and romantic linguistics began to coalesce.  
In his Über die Sprache Schlegel initially set out to offer a ‘Romantic manifesto on 
India’ (Figueira 2002:29), believing as he did that the particularly European articulation 
of religion, mythology, and poetry originated in India. For him, ancient Indian culture as 
revealed in its texts and language exhibited a pure, undiluted form of what, in Christian 
Europe, was a barely discernible trace of a natural and original fusion of philosophy and 
poetry. In other words, he initially believed, based on his linguistic theories, that the 
ancient Indians had achieved the romantic dream: the synthesis of philosophy and 
poetry, of mind and spirit.6 However, the leap that he wished to make from the purity 
and complexity of Sanskritic linguistic forms to a corollary purity in religio-
philosophical forms proved difficult. His increasing familiarity with Indian sources, and 
the recognition there of something approaching polytheism, which, under deist 
influence, he viewed negatively, soon convinced him that India too had succumbed to 
the degeneration of religion and philosophy. As Figueira argues, Schlegel’s ‘larger plan 
                                                           
5 Thom suggests that these botanical inferences were intended and that they ‘suggest debts both to 
Herder or Schelling and, in Paris, to Cuvier’ (1995:223). 
6 Such a view seems to have drawn some inspiration from Majer’s own theories on the mythology 
of Sanskrit India. See Willson 1964:96–104. 
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was to salvage the palatable aspects of the Divine from his abortive Indic studies. He 
projected onto Sanskrit what he could not find in Indian philosophy and religion’ 
(2002:30). Having approached India in search of unity and original revelation, Schlegel 
thus came away only with erroneous linguistic theories that nonetheless allowed him to 
transform Herder’s depiction of India as the cradle of humanity into the Urheimat of his 
own language and Volk. He became increasingly disillusioned with his study of India 
and Sanskrit, and it is arguable that this may have contributed to his conversion to 
Catholicism in 1808. 
However, despite his disappointment with India, he still believed that remnants 
of the primordial religion were to be found there and that the most profound revelation 
of the human spirit could be attained through a synthesis of the intellectual cultures of 
India and Europe (Willson 1964:93). Friedrich Schlegel’s work proved influential on, or 
at least was reflected in, the work of a number of important German scholars of the early 
nineteenth century, particularly his brother August Wilhelm Schlegel, who became the 
first professor of Sanskrit in Germany in 1818, Joseph Görres (1776–1848), Georg 
Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858), and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, who also 
contributed to the idealisation of India (see Willson 1964:106–110; Figueira 2002:31–33) 
who in turn cultivated Sanskrit philology and the study of Indian mythology within the 
German universities. By the end of the nineteenth century, Germany had more experts 
in the field of Indology and Sanskrit studies than any other European nation, a fact that 
McGetchin finds puzzling in view of the fact that unlike Britain, Germany had very little 
direct interaction with India. He suggests however, that it was ancient rather than 
modern India that was of interest to German scholars but that by the 1820s serious 
attention to Indian material was on the wane, at least amongst the romantics (2004: 197; 
204–205). What had initially been held to be a realistic hope of a homeland was turned 
into a mythical image that continued to sustain the German romantic dream, but it also 
contributed to a distancing, within Germany, from the idea of India as the Urheimat. The 
theme of cultural and religio-philosophical degeneration soon combined with racial 
science to shift the speculations that situated the cradle of humanity in India to either a 
Central Asian or European location, and Germany, though coming late to the party, as it 
were, had more reasons than most other nations to embrace this change.  
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II. The German Urheimat and the Myth of Aryan Origins 
I showed in Chapter 3 how the German humanists from the fifteenth century onwards 
had become enamoured with Tacitus’ claim that the Germans were an autochthonous 
race. In the latter half of the nineteenth century Tacitus was brought together with the 
discovery of William Jones to claim a German homeland for the Indo-Europeans but as 
Kristian Kristiansen has claimed, the foundation for establishing this case had been set 
in motion for some time before the discovery of Sanskrit and its affiliations with the 
European languages. Nonetheless, it was in the nineteenth century that this idea began 
to take on a life of its own: 
The myth of indigenous barbarian origins developed in Middle Europe, especially 
in Germany, which regarded barbarian Europe as the original source of 
uncorrupted freedom…as opposed to the despotism of Classical empires. 
[However], with the aid of historical linguistics [from the eighteenth century 
onwards]…a national historical framework was constructed to legitimate the 
expanding German nation. Direct ethnic links were postulated between the 
prehistoric past and the present on the basis of ethnic explanations of archaeological 
cultures….It later served as a platform for racist constructions of a Germanic 
‘Urvolk’ to serve the Nazi regime. 
(1996:141) 
The Nazi regime notwithstanding, however, it was in fact the scholars of the nineteenth 
century who began the task of conflating linguistic affiliations with racial and ethnic 
identity.  
Max Müller was a firm advocate of the theory of racial kinship between the 
Europeans and the Indians and he drew on his theories of Aryan military and cultural 
supremacy to support Britain’s colonial project and later to suggest that the German 
people too had much to gain from association with the Aryans. Although he himself 
tried to resist ‘patriotic’ impulses, he admitted that he would be proud to look upon 
‘Germany as the cradle of all Aryan life’ (1888:127), and ‘Teutonic speech as the fountain 
of all Aryan thought’ (1888:154). In 1847, he presented a paper entitled ‘On the relation 
of the Bengali to the Arian and aboriginal languages of India’ to a meeting of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science in Oxford, which was chaired by Prichard 
and attended by Prince Albert, Robert Gordon Latham (1812–1888) and John Crawfurd 
(1783–1868), the latter two of whom were very hostile to his theories of Indo-European 
consanguinity as I suggested in Chapter 3. In this paper Müller proposed what 
Trautmann refers to as a ‘two-race theory of Indian civilization’ (1997:174), where 
India’s population was composed of indigenous Cushites (or Hamites) and Caucasian 
Japhetites. For Müller, the northern Brahmins were descendants of the Caucasians, 
differing only from their European relatives in their slightly darker complexion caused 
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by the Indian climate, whereas the darker indigenous race who inhabited southern India 
and the mountainous regions of the north resembled negroes (Cushites) physically and 
intellectually, and spoke languages that were not Indo-European in origin but rather 
Dravidian, again thought to be of Cushite/Hamite origin. He suggested that early Indo-
European warrior tribes—who he later argued had originated somewhere in the 
northern steppes, and who were the ancestors of the Greeks, Italians, Slavs, Germans, 
Persians, and Celts, as well as the Hindus (1899, I.63–64, 66; II.20)—had invaded 
northern India, and subdued the indigenous population, an achievement that was made 
easier by the latter’s degenerate and savage propensities: 
We generally find that it is the fate of the negro race, when brought into hostile 
contact with the Japhetic race, to be either destroyed and annihilated, or to fall into 
a state of slavery and degradation, from which, if at all, it recovers by the slow 
process of assimilation. 
(1847:348) 
He argued that a process of assimilation had indeed occurred in the north of India and 
therefore that  
The lower classes of the Hindus consist of those aboriginal inhabitants, some 
continuing in a state of the utmost degradation as outcastes; but others have 
intellectually and physically undergone a complete regeneration, so that after three 
thousand years it would be difficult to trace the Sudra [the structurally idealised 
lowest class Müller derived from his reading of the Puruasūkta hymn, gveda 10.90] 
origins of many highly distinguished families of India. 
(ibid.) 
Müller clearly connected the mission of colonial Britain to the early Aryans as I noted 
above and he further contributed to the assertion of a racial differentiation between 
Aryans and Semites and to the consolidation of the demotion of Hebrew from its 
previous status as the Ursprache although he was later to reject the conflation of race 
with language as I will discuss below. 
However due to the efforts of a number of scholars, it soon became the case, as 
Bryant notes, that ‘An oriental origin for the Indo-Europeans was no more compatible 
with German agendas and aspirations than with British ones’ (2001:31). Bryant (2001:31–
32) attributes the ethnologist Robert G. Latham (fl. 1862) with the most well-known and 
widely disseminated assertion that Europe was the homeland of the Indo-European 
race. Latham, intent on challenging Müller’s contention that the Indians and Europeans 
were ‘brothers’, argued that, ‘when philologies make the Veda 3000 years old, and 
deduce the Latin and its congeners from Asia, they are wrong to, at least, a thousand 
miles in space’ (1862:620). He utilised a zoological metaphor to suggest that language 
derivation proceeded from diversity to homogeneity rather than vice versa as the 
leading philologists seemed to suggest:  
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Where we have two branches of the same division of speech separated from each 
other, one of which is the larger in area and the more diversified by varieties, and 
the other smaller and comparatively homogeneous, the presumption is in favour of 
the latter being derived from the former, rather than the former from the latter. To 
deduce the Indo-Europeans of Europe from the Indo-Europeans of Asia, in 
ethnology, is like deriving the reptiles of Great Britain from those of Ireland in 
herpetology. 
(1851:cxlii)7  
Latham was a follower of the ethnologist James Prichard, who, as I discussed in Chapter 
3, was one of the first to use the term ‘Aryan’ to refer to the racial origins of the Indo-
European tribes. Prichard initially held that the original humans had been dark-skinned 
and that their skin had gradually become lighter due to the effects of civilisation. He 
shifted this position gradually towards the more commonly held view that skin 
complexion was due to climate, offering the proof that the inhabitants of the Himalayas 
had fair skin, blue eyes, and auburn hair (1843:169); he went on to oppose the fair Aryan 
race of Indo-European stock to the indigenous inhabitants of the subcontinent 
(1843:240). It was his follower Latham, along with fellow Prichardian John Crawfurd 
(1783–1868) who was instrumental in forcing a break with comparative philology and 
promoting racial science in its place.. He viewed the contemporary population of India 
as having a Mongoloid ancestry, distinguished from the Indo-Europeans (whom he 
referred to as Japhetic), and that the ancient speakers of Sanskrit were therefore a race 
apart, further suggesting that the Sanskritic homeland had been in the Baltic region, 
probably the eastern or southeastern border of Lithuania (Trautmann 1997:179). 
Crawfurd, in an article published in 1861, disputed the account of linguistic and racial 
affiliation and origin promoted by comparative philologists, suggesting that these 
theories were based on the faulty assumption of the conformity of language to ethnicity 
(1961:268). However reasonable his argument seems, it should be noted that it was 
motivated by a concern to reject any kind of racial affinity between the British and the 
Indians and he concluded his paper by stating that 
The theory which makes all the languages of Europe and Asia, from Bengal to the 
British Islands, however different in appearance, to have sprung from the same 
stock, and hence, all the people speaking them, black, swarthy, and fair, to be of one 
and the same race of man, is utterly groundless….I can by no means, then, agree 
with a very learned professor of Oxford [Müller] that the same blood ran in the 
veins of the solders of Alexander and Clive as in those of the Hindus whom, at the 
interval of two-and-twenty ages, they both scattered with the same facility. 
(1861:285) 
                                                           
7 See also Bryant 2001:32 and Trautmann 1997:168–172. 
  230 
Trautmann suggests that Crawfurd’s intervention marked the beginnings of a 
‘doctrine of racial essentialism’ and placed India at the ‘centre of the growing quarrel 
between ethnology and philosophy or, to put it more exactly, between race science and 
the Sanskritists’ (1997:181; 182). It also marked a shift in the models that were used to 
understand the development of the human race, away from the botanical metaphor (or 
perhaps more accurately the arboreal) of the Stammbaum (discussed in Chapter 3) to one 
that was more obviously hierarchically organised on the model of a scale of descent, an 
idea considerably aided by Darwinist theories of evolution after the 1860s. As 
Trautmann frames it, it was subsequently argued that ‘the racial differences among 
humans had come about over a timescale vastly longer, measurable in the tens and 
hundreds of thousands of years, than the period in which the Indo-European languages 
differentiated themselves from one another and from their common ancestral language’ 
(1997:183). Müller himself was quick to acquiesce in this idea and to distance himself 
from his earlier claim of a two-race theory of Indian civilization, suggesting that ‘The 
science of language and the science of ethnology should not be mixed up. Races can 
change languages. Different languages can be spoken by our race and the same 
language by different races’ (1899:450). 
From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the idea that the European 
peoples were not necessarily related to the Indians and that their original homeland was 
not located in the East gained ascendancy even in Germany, although German romantic 
linguists had initially clung to the idea of India as the Urheimat of the German peoples as 
I have already suggested. However, the response in Germany towards India as the 
original homeland and to the Indo-European hypothesis, tied as it was to an emergent 
nationalism and the concomitant flowering of romanticism discussed in the previous 
chapters, was certainly more enthusiastic and longer lasting than it was in Britain. 
Poliakov suggests that it was Herder, in placing the homeland in the ‘primitive 
mountains of Asia’ (1803:518), who was influential in inaugurating the German devotion 
to India, a claim that certainly has merit when one considers his influence on the 
Schlegels, the Grimms, and Fichte. Herder, in promoting his theory of the Urheimat, 
argued that the ‘discovery’ of the homeland indicated that Europeans—perhaps 
Germans in particular—could now be relieved of the necessity of having to assert any 
kinship with the Semitic races (1803:517–518). 
The German philologist Lazarus Geiger (1829–1870) was the first to suggest that 
the Aryans had been a blond and blue-eyed race and that dark skin was the result of 
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miscegenation with non-Aryans. He drew on Tacitus to suggest that ‘The Indo-
Germanic people remain unadulterated wherever pure blond traits are best preserved’ 
(in Bryant 2001:31). As Bryant suggests, Geiger supported his claim, again through 
recourse to Tacitus, on the basis that the ‘then available data showed no evidence of a 
pre-Indo-European linguistic stratum in north Europe, unlike other European countries’ 
(ibid.). The implication clearly had to be, therefore, that the Indo-Europeans were 
indigenous to Europe and, based on the prevalence of fair-skinned physical traits were 
further to be differentiated from their southern neighbours who were darker skinned. 
Armed with the data suggested by the likes of Latham and Prichard, and by Geiger, as 
well as with Tacitus’ suggestion of the autochthony of the ancient German people and 
their fair skinned and blonde appearance, Theodor Poesche (1826–1899) similarly 
proposed that the original Aryans had been a blonde race who had originated in 
northern Europe and that they had spoken Indo-German.8 Because Lithuanian was the 
oldest Indo-European language, Poesche believed that it was most likely in that region 
that the Urheimat would be found (1878). Bryant suggests that Poesche’s logic was even 
more simplistic than Geiger’s insofar as he 
accepted without question that the original Aryans spoke Indo-European and were 
blond. Greeks, Italians, and French had the correct linguistic credentials but were 
disqualified due to being dark, while some of the Scandinavians had the right 
physical qualities but spoke the wrong language. The Germans won by default. 
(2001:32) 
Regardless of the flaws in the logic by the likes of Geiger and Poesche, their 
ideas were received with enthusiasm in Germany and provoked a search for more data 
that would confirm the status of the German people as the original Aryans. In 1886 the 
phrenologist Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902) published the results of a large survey he had 
undertaken involving fifteen million schoolchildren. Titled ‘The Skin, Hair, and Eye 
Colour of German Schoolchildren’ it collated the results of questionnaires soliciting 
information about the hair and eye colour of the children attending the schools in 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium. The results overall indicated a preponderance 
of ‘Aryan’ physical traits and for many Germans secured ‘hard scientific proof 
correlating the Germans with the pure blond Aryans’ (Bryant 2001:33). Many scholars 
working in diverse fields began to look for further confirmation of Germany’s Aryan 
origins and to claim that Germany was the Urheimat, for example the archaeologists Karl 
                                                           
8 The term ‘Indo-German’, proposed by Julius Klaproth in 1823, was the preferred German 
designation for ‘Indo-European’ on the grounds that Sanskrit and German ‘encapsulated the 
entire Indo-European-speaking area’ (Bryant 2001:20). 
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Penka (fl. 1883) and Gustav Kossina (1858-1931). While debates regarding the location of 
the Urheimat continued outside of Germany, the belief in a German homeland for the 
Indo-Europeans, by the end of the nineteenth century, had won widespread popular 
appeal within Germany and became somewhat of a settled proposition in many circles. 
I will return below to consider the racial implications of this idea below, but first 
I want to examine briefly how the concept of a German Urheimat fed into the broader 
programme of the German search for origins and identity. Anthony Smith maintains 
that a collective identification with a particular territory is an essential foundation of 
ethnic identity (1986:28–29; 1995:56). In the previous chapter I examined the ways in 
which the German romantic painters and then the Kaiserreich territorialised the 
landscape, investing it with a mythical quality that tied together the imagined past and 
the present. The notion of a German Urheimat served a similar function but more 
securely connected the people to the land and was further able to legitimise not only the 
commonality of the Germans but also their ancient pedigree granting them a status akin 
to that of a chosen, or at the very least, a providential people. They could now undertake 
a form of mythmaking that suggested that it had been the German people who had 
bequeathed the world the wonders of Indo-European civilisation and that they were 
divinely ordained to rescue Europe from degeneration. As Olender suggests, ‘From the 
old “Aryan myth” devoted to the romantic quest for a paradise lost, a programmatic 
vision of the future of [Europe could] be derived’ (1994:23) and as such this myth 
constituted a concept of ethnic election.  
Anthony Smith has argued that ‘Myths of ethnic chosenness not only underpin 
peoples and cultures; they also provide charters and title deeds of sacred homelands’ 
(Smith 1992:450). In a similar vein, Cauthen suggests that such a view of a homeland 
‘consecrates’ the land insofar as it ‘encompasses the terrain on which heroic ethnic 
forebears led the community in the collective realization of its providential destiny and 
contains the soil in which they now rest’ (2004:24–25). The Urheimat was thus one more 
means of asserting the continuity of the German people and the contiguity between 
them and their land but it also served to create a means to assert the distinctiveness of 
the German race and to provoke the necessity of excluding others who did not match 
the Aryan type for fear of miscegenation that would corrupt the pure blood of the 
original race. 
Penrose suggests four main dimensions of territoriality, the character of which I 
discussed briefly in the previous chapter, that enabled the separation and inclusion of 
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people within a national homeland. Firstly, ‘territories are often conceptualised and 
promoted as “natural” divisions of the earth’s surface’ which are reinforced by the 
physical terrain of a territory or through the act of ‘naming a territory and 
demonstrating its longevity—sometimes through reference to origins in “time 
immemorial”—that people are convinced of its “naturalness”’ (2002:280–281; see also 
Smith 1999b). Secondly, and by implication, ‘the relationships between specific groups 
of human beings and the territories that sustain them are also conceptualised as 
“natural”….Thus, kinship ties are commonly viewed as stronger than any other 
connections between people, and bonds to homelands are cemented through processes 
of birth and nurturing over time’ (2002:281). Thirdly,  
the emotional power of territory stems from the fact that the vast majority of people 
have direct and personal experience of attachment to particular places….[W]hen 
individuals have personal experiences of geographical attachments, this makes it 
very easy for them to extend the same sentiments to others over both time and 
space. Through this process, personal experiences of territorial attachment give rise 
to the assumption that such bonds have a “natural universality”. This in turn makes 
it relatively easy to downplay the exclusionary power of territories because it 
becomes incomprehensible that anyone would want to live where they do not 
belong. 
(2002:281–282) 
Finally, this emotional aspect of territoriality is reflected in the propensity of people to 
reinforce their relationship to particular places through recourse to history, memory, 
and myth. As such, Penrose suggests that 
Every society has stories about its origins and past [which] reflect the uniqueness of 
the society and this distinctiveness is reinforced through the language of 
communication and through religious and/or historical allusions. Moreover, these 
stories always occur in space and are usually associated with specific sites and/or 
landscapes. 
(2002:282) 
The concept of a German Urheimat notion was one such story—a myth forged by other 
myths—and it served to reinforce yet another myth: that of the Germans as the Urvolk, 
the original people. As the original people it was one short step for many Germans to 
see themselves as a ‘chosen’ or ‘elect’ people on the model of the ancient Israelites and 
this was an idea that became consolidated in the Sonderweg (‘special path’) doctrine.9 
Cauthen has suggested that ‘myths’ of ethnic election (although I would prefer the term 
‘discourses’ because that is how they function)10 when mixed with nationalist ideologies 
‘morally elevates the members of the nation above those who are not part of the ethno-
                                                           
9 See Kocka 1988 for an informative discussion of the Sonderweg doctrine and the various debates 
around it. 
10 See my discussion of discursive practices as defined by Foucault in the Introduction. 
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national community’ (2004:26). Nationalism when inflected with a belief in ethnic 
destiny therefore establishes, according to Cauthen, socio-cultural criteria which 
distinguish members of the nation from non-members in the demarcation of an 
exclusive ethno-national boundary (ibid.; see also Smith 1999a:334–9). Against the 
background of the growth of cultural nationalism that continued to assert its claims to 
the essential unity of the German people in spite of the Kleindeutsch solution of the 
Kaiserreich, and together with the more broadly European effort to sever ties with any 
Semitic provenance through recourse to Indo-European origins (see Chapter 3 above), 
the doctrine of the Urheimat certainly coincided with, and was probably productive, of a 
discourse of differentiation between Aryan Germans and Semitic Jews . This discourse, 
however, served as the condition of possibility for the assertion of a distinct German 
Aryan identity, an aspect that suggests that even the idea of a secure origin—whether 
the Urheimat, Ursprache, or Urvolk tied together as a myth of election—did not suffice to 
legitimise this identity. It had to be performed iteratively and it did so by manufacturing 
an image of feminised Jewishness as a threat to the purity of the Volk.  
In what follows I want to examine how particular images—myths—of 
Jewishness as degenerate, corrupt, and parasitical was juxtaposed against the myth of 
Aryan origins. In the next section I will examine the forms of anti-Semitism that 
emerged throughout the nineteenth century but which took a particularly ominous form 
when combined with the doctrine of the pure origins of the Aryan race.  
III. German Aryanism and Antisemitism as a Discourse of Differentiation 
Sheldon Pollock (1993) has argued that nineteenth-century German Indology (in 
particular) was a form of ‘inverse orientalism’ insofar it ‘has to be seen as vectored not 
outward to the Orient but inward to Europe itself, to constructing the conception of a 
historical human essence and to defining Germany’s place in Europe’s destiny’ (1993:83; 
see also Moore 2003). It was not of course only Indology that could be described in this 
way; the entire field of German studies that adopted the assumptions of the romantic 
nationalists could equally be seen to be directed inwards, securing the superior pedigree 
of the German people at the expense of a series of ‘others’, whether they were other 
Europeans or German Jews. Pollock thus recalls that ‘The principal German cultural 
dichotomy in the early nineteenth century had juxtaposed Germania and Rome’ (and 
one could also add, France). However, in the course of the century, this dichotomy 
came to be replaced by the antithesis and finally essentialized dichotomy between 
‘Indo-German’ and ‘Semite’. Indo-German…was largely a Kontrastbegriff [‘a 
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discourse of contrasts’], called into being by the social and economic emancipation 
of the Jews in the course of the century. But what made it possible to construct and 
consolidate this dichotomy, in addition to an ‘orientalizing’ epistemology, was 
‘oriental’ knowledge itself.  
(1993:82) 
I will return to the issue of the Jewish emancipation shortly. First, however, I want to 
suggest that the two-race model (of Semites and Aryans) promoted by Müller proved to 
be influential in forging a contrastive doctrine of Aryan purity and consolidated the 
rejection of Jewish traditions and culture that had begun with William Jones’ discovery.  
Müller depicted Jewish people as deficient historically in several respects, 
taking for granted the disaffiliation between the Semitic and Japhetic (Aryan) races. He 
described their poetry, scientific inquiry, political thought, and philosophical originality 
to be defective, and attributed the cause of this deficiency to be an excessive 
introversion: 
We look in vain among their poets for excellence in epic and dramatic composition. 
Painting and plastic arts never more than at the decorative stage. Politics patriarchal 
and despotic, and their inability to organize on a large scale has deprived them of 
the means of military success. Perhaps the most general feature of their character is 
a negative one—their inability to perceive the general and abstract whether in 
thought, language, poetry or politics; and, on the other hand, a strong attraction 
towards the individual and personal, which makes them monotheistic in religion, 
lyrical in poetry, monarchical in politics, abrupt in style and useless for speculation.  
(1895: 1.339)11 
Müller thus sought to dismantle any possible Jewish pretensions to superiority but his 
description of their manifold weaknesses sounds uncannily like the image of the 
Germans popularly held throughout Europe, as I have shown, and internalized by many 
Germans as they sought to assert an identity against this typology. As in the case of the 
elision of biblical ethnology I discussed in Chapter 3, the displacement of the Jews 
served as a prerequisite for the legitimation of the German Aryans but it in fact 
replicated and appropriated the very ‘Semitic’ model of history, religion, and culture, 
derived from biblical ethnology to secure its claims. Olender draws attention to this 
elision when he suggests the story of the separate origins of the Aryans and Semites 
were in fact ‘the culmination of a historiographical effort aiming to discover for itself 
splendid ancestors in an East purged of all Semitism; they favoured the idea of a West 
superior to all other civilisations, but were nonetheless able to identify themselves with 
                                                           
11 While Müller later decried the association of the division between the Semitic and Indo-
European languages with racial taxonomies (1869–1876, IV:103–27; 1888:89–90, 108, 120)—a 
division, it should be remembered, he played an influential role in promoting—according to 
Figuiera, he ‘spoke too little and too late’ (2002:44). 
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the actors of a providential history whose rules were decreed, once and for all, by 
biblical revelation (1994:22). The very use of the term ‘Semite’ (and the association of the 
Aryans with Japheth) recalled the post-Babelian dispersal and the belief that the human 
races descended from the sons of Noah. Thus, invoking a separation between Semites 
and Aryans in order to disassociate European culture from any Semitic provenance 
could only do so by recalling that very provenance. Towards the end of this section I 
will return to examine the paradoxical form of identification that constituted the 
differential discourse of Aryan and Semite. In the meantime, I want now to discuss the 
context in which anti-Semitism developed in nineteenth-century Germany and the 
various forms it took. 
As the history of the Indo-European hypothesis suggests, anti-Semitism was, at 
the very least, a latent force in driving the scholarship in the field. However, a more 
overt form of anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century Germany seems to have first erupted, 
in the context of the Napoleonic Wars. The imposition of the Napoleonic Code in the 
territories occupied by the French armies resulted in laws that ‘emancipated’ the Jews, 
first in Baden (1807–1809), Württemberg (1807–1811) and Westphalia (1808), and then in 
Frankfurt (1811), and Bavaria (1813) (Pasto 1998:453). These in turn led to the Prussian 
Edict of Emancipation around 1812 which abolished the autonomous status of the Jews 
and required them not only use to German in their legal transactions, but also to adopt 
German names. The reward for the Jews that complied with the law was to be 
citizenship with all the rights and equality that attended, and it was a reward that was 
presented as a form of ‘regeneration’ for the Jews, a way of forcing them to give up their 
distinct but ‘degenerate’ identity and to assimilate into German culture and to align 
themselves with the emergent patriotism of the first few decades of the nineteenth 
century. Thus, as Pasto points out, ‘Despite these laws…only those Jews who showed 
signs of regeneration were allowed to assume hitherto forbidden occupations, which in 
most cases meant converting to Christianity’ (ibid.). After the defeat of Napoleon at Jena, 
many states rescinded the laws and what became known as the ‘Jewish question’, which 
essentially concerned how to manage the Jewish communities within the framework of 
a unified nation state, began to be debated. 
The status of the Jews had in fact long been a topic of debate in Germany, 
particularly amongst biblical scholars (see Pasto 1998:439–449; Robertson 1999:45–54), 
but prior to the nation-building efforts that emerged in the aftermath of the Napoleonic 
Wars, the Jews in German had lived in relatively autonomous and self-determining 
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communities, treated as single units by the authorities for the purposes of taxation and 
legislation (see Carlebach 1978:12–17; see also Carlebach 1972:21–45; Pulzer 1992; 
Sorokin 1987). There was a fairly free amount of interaction between the Jews and 
Christians during this period but the Christians tended to view the Jews as a foreign and 
‘eastern’ population, ‘essentially in opposition to Christianity and in divinely mandated 
exile from their ancient homeland in the East’ (Pasto 1998:450). To some degree this was 
a view that was also shared by the Jews themselves (see Robertson 1999:54–64). 
However, the growing nationalist movements throughout the German territories with 
their ideology of cultural unity began to designate the Jewish communities as a ‘state 
within a state’ and this characterisation played into ‘the Jewish question’. Sorokin 
suggests that the administrators and intellectuals of the German Confederation viewed 
the Jews and Judaism as ‘corrupt and debased’ (1987) embodied in their ‘superstitious’ 
religious customs, their occupational involvement in trade and commerce, and their 
apparent hostility towards Christians. As Pasto puts it, 
The Jewish Question…became a series of questions concerning the capacity of Jews 
to participate in the state. Would the emancipation of degenerate Jews cause the 
decline of the wiser society? What was the cause of Jewish degeneration? Was it due 
to something essential to Judaism—its oriental nature? Talmudic customs? Or was 
it the result of centuries of Christian persecution? How could Jews become farmers 
if they were predisposed to commerce? How could Jews become soldiers if they 
could not fight on the Sabbath? Did the Talmud preach hatred of non-Jews and 
disdain of non-Jewish authorities? Was the Talmudic interpretation of the Mosaic 
Law a misunderstanding of those laws? And what was the basis of the Rabbinical 
leadership who were so resistant to assimilation (that is, Germanization and 
Protestantization)? 
(1998:450) 
Many different answers were offered to these questions but the most popular conclusion 
was that the Jews would have to exchange their autonomy for ‘regeneration’ and 
assimilation, transforming their religious practices in line with German Protestantism 
and transferring their loyalties to the state. 
The ‘Jewish Question’ itself was a microcosmic representation of the concerns of 
the nascent nationalist movement as described above in Chapter 4. As Pasto’s list of 
subsidiary questions indicates, anxieties about the possibility of the renewal and purity 
of the German people, the necessity of resisting modernisation that occupations like 
trade and commerce represented, the importance of maintaining and nurturing a 
relationship to the land (through farming and other rural pursuits as practiced by the 
common folk), love of and defence of the fatherland against foreign intruders, shared 
traditions and religious history, and a willingness to take part in the nation building 
effort, all mirrored the preoccupations of the romantic nationalists. The Jewish Question 
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thus appeared to be a projection on to the Jews of the efforts of the nationalists to define 
the constitution of cultural unity. The debate continued for most of the century with 
sympathisers and detractors equally involved. 
When the Jewish Question was combined with the myth of Aryan origins, 
however, a more virulent form of anti-Semitism emerged, one that was altogether more 
definitive in its portrayal of the Jews as the ‘enemy within’ and as a threat to the purity 
of the Volk. As Figueira suggests, 
The myth of the Aryan was fundamentally Manichaean. Borrowing from the social 
Darwinists the vision of humanity in a constant struggle for survival, the Aryan 
myth explained the world in terms of a relentless combat between the forces of 
good and evil. The Aryan was solidly identified with everything good. Goodness 
was defined in terms of its necessary correlative, evil, which increasingly became 
identified with the Jew. What was needed to complete this vicious equation were 
theorists who would amalgamate the myths of Aryan superiority and cultural 
decay with anti-Semitism. 
(2002:67) 
One such theorist was Joseph Arthur Comte de Gobineau (1816–1882) leading John Day 
to suggest that ‘France has been called “the homeland of racial” theory’ (1994:15). 
However, Gobineau’s racist theories concerning the Jews in particular were not well-
received in France and he found a much more receptive audience in Germany, where 
numerous societies were named after him (Bryant 2001:33). 
Gobineau wrote the four-volume Essai sur l’inégalité de races humaines (‘An Essay 
on the Inequality of the Human Races’; 1853–1855) as means of explaining the 
superiority of the white Aryan race. He suggested that they had inaugurated civilisation 
but had degenerated when their blood became diluted through mixing with other races. 
Gobineau held that the Germans represented the purest type of Aryan, which was, 
Figuiera suggests, ‘an assessment that contributed significantly to his early and warm 
reception in Germany’ (2002:67). He established his arguments by analogy with organic 
growth and decay, and transferred this idea to an analysis of society and the ethnic 
communities of the world. Unlike other intellectuals who were also concerned with the 
dangers of ‘degeneration’, Gobineau did not attribute its cause to climate, over-
indulgence, or endemic weakness. Instead, basing his arguments on the biblical story of 
the descent of humankind from the three sons of Noah, he suggested that the human 
races had been created by God as pure and noble but because of centuries of 
interbreeding all the races had become contaminated. He argued that a race degenerated 
when the blood of its ancestors no longer flowed in its veins, in the process becoming 
irretrievably lost (1966:162–163), contending that it was Aryan history that offered a case 
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study of how a once noble race had succumbed to this kind of degeneration, exemplified 
by the Europe of his day. 
Gobineau divided the human races according to male and female 
characteristics. Among the ‘female’ nations, he classified the Egyptians, the Assyrians, 
and the Indian and designated the Chinese, ancient Romans, and the Germans as races 
of the male type. He further divided them into three different colours: yellow, black, and 
white, each with their own physical and psychical traits and dispositions. He believed 
that the yellow race tended towards pragmatism and mediocrity, but also had an 
affinity and respect for tradition. Gobineau characterised the black race in terms of 
animal appetites, a propensity to give in to their senses, and as fundamentally unstable. 
He suggested that they were intellectually inept, phlegmatic, and destined to perpetual 
servitude (1966:507). Predictably, he considered the white race to be the most superior of 
the three, functioning as what he referred to as the race civilisatrice, powerfully 
intelligent, driven towards freedom, strong, honourable, and so on (1966:342, 347). The 
black race could improve itself, however, by mixing with other races, gradually 
developing intelligence, imagination, and an artistic temperament (1966:474–76). In fact, 
for Gobineau culture as a whole could only evolve through controlled miscegenation 
but that excessive mixing would lead to degeneration. 
In line with the biblical motif he employed, the black race was descended from 
Ham, sent to Africa as a result of Noah’s curse (Gen. 9:25). The descendants of Shem had 
originally started out white but had degenerated through intermixing and had become 
akin to a Negroid race. Gobineau conventionally aligned Japheth’s descendants with the 
Aryans. One branch of the Aryans migrated to Iran and India but had been corrupted 
through mixing with the aboriginal (black) inhabitants and Gobineau presented India’s 
racial situation as a warning to all nations. (1966:557). Another branch settled in 
southern Europe founding the Greek and the Roman civilisations. However, they too 
intermarried with degenerate Mediterranean Semites and were corrupted by the yellow 
races through Alexander’s imperial expansions so that black blood from the west and 
south, and yellow blood from the east and west had led to their own degeneration and 
led to the collapse of their civilizations. For Gobineau, the German Aryans were 
Göttersöhne (‘God’s son’s’); they incarnated all that was pure, noble, and fruitful 
(1966:479) and here his vision of the Aryans was clearly more inclined towards the 
‘Indo-Germanic’ rather than the Indo-European hypothesis. He, like many of his 
contemporaries, believed that the original Aryans were white-skinned, blond, and blue-
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eyed (1966:485) and that it was the Germans, more than any other branch of the race 
who had maintained their racial purity. As such, they had nothing in common with their 
Indian, Iranian, or southern European ‘brothers’, all of whom who had long since 
‘detached’ themselves from the moral values of original Aryans whose blood still 
remained within the northern European nations (1966:481).12 Gobineau viewed the 
northern Europeans, and particularly the Germans, as the last remaining, virtually pure, 
white race, suggesting that it was their duty to save humanity. Were they to fail to 
maintain their purity and to extend the benefits of their culture to the rest of the world 
then civilisation would disappear completely and he concluded his essay by warning 
that the Germans were in danger themselves of falling prey to the ‘Asian, Mongolian, 
and Slavic hordes’, an event that would signal not only the end of the civilised world 
but also the twilight of the gods (1966:1161–1166).  
Figuiera suggests that ‘Gobineau had set the standard for the popular historical 
genre subsequently adopted by cultural critics to prognosticate the decline of 
civilization. Masked by a veneer of scholarly respectability, the literature of 
degeneration fed on society’s fears of cultural decay’ (2002:73–74). Certainly, those who 
followed his theories within Germany developed a similar vision of the purity of the 
Aryans and the necessity of guarding against contamination, none more so than the 
British Germanophile and son-in-law of Richard Wagner (1813–1883),13 Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain (1855–1927). In his Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrunderts (‘The 
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century’; 1899), Chamberlain sought to provide a bio- 
anthropological basis for racial theorising and Figueira points out that ‘his…theories 
made him so famous in his adopted country that he was popularly known as the 
Kaiser’s anthropologist’ (2002:74). Gobineau divided humanity into two races of distinct 
physical stature and mental and moral dispositions, the Aryans and the Semites. He 
                                                           
12 However, as Figueira suggests, Gobineau was ‘capricious’ insofar as ‘he shifted the designation 
of the purest Aryan to suit his needs. At times, he found its purest strain in English blood. On 
other occasions, he discovered it in Scandinavia. In other words, when Gobineau spoke of purity, 
he did not mean it in any absolute sense. The deadly germ of race mixture, ‘le fond corrompteur’, 
pursued all peoples. The Germanic Aryans, like all other peoples, would also eventually succumb. 
This key principle of Gobineau’s thought was curiously ignored by his German nationalist 
disciples’ (2002:69). 
13 For reasons of space I am not going to discuss the efforts of Wagner to popularise Germanic 
mythology through his monumental operas nor his well-known anti-Semitic attitudes, 
particularly given that there is already a good deal of literature that tackles this. For a useful 
overview in keeping with the material presented in this thesis see Williamson 2004:180–210. I am 
also not going to examine Nietzsche’s complex writings on myth, Aryanism, anti-Semitism, the 
‘blond beast’ and so on for similar reasons. See instead Williamson 2004:234–283; Lincoln 
1999:101–120; Grottanelli 1997. 
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considered the struggle between these two races to be the driving force of history where 
their development and degeneration in each age defined a dominant human type. 
However, the main purpose of the Grundlagen was to demonstrate that the Germanic 
people had been the main force behind philosophy, law, and the figure of Christ. He 
charted their progress up to the nineteenth century showing that their ancient greatness 
had been perverted by the fall of Rome which he suggested was the pivotal moment in 
history when the Aryan race and its providential mission began to unravel. He laid the 
blame firmly at the door of racial miscegenation and the pernicious efforts of the Jews. 
He further argued that Catholic Church had continually pandered to the Papacy and the 
needs of a degenerate population under the sway of Semitic influences, to the extent that 
true Christianity no longer truly existed. In Chamberlain’s estimation, it was Teutonic 
mission to undo this chaos by rescuing Christianity, expunging it of Semitic elements, 
and sifting out the original revelation of Christ. The way of achieving this was to seek 
out the original divine understanding of the ancient Aryans, now only partially 
retrievable within Indian sacred texts and of acknowledging Germany’s racial and 
spiritual affinity with them. Chamberlain thus sought to (re)construct a notion of the 
Aryan based on ‘scientific’ fact, but acknowledged that this process ran the risk of 
inventing an Aryan figure in the image of its maker (1968, I:265). He criticised Gobineau 
for drawing upon biblical chronology suggesting that it weakened what Chamberlain 
thought was his otherwise rigorous scholarship, reducing it to ‘scientific 
phantasmagoria’ (1968, II:206). He also disagreed with Gobineau’s assertion that even 
the noble white race had degenerated arguing instead that the pure races had developed 
like trees, gradually becoming more majestic with the ability to renew themselves (1968, 
I:263). Nonetheless, where he did agree with Gobineau was in his suggestion that racial 
decline was due to racial miscegenation; he differed however in that he placed the sole 
blame on the Semitic race, most particularly the Jews (1968, I:262).  
Chamberlain established his claims initially through recourse to physiology, 
suggesting that it was by careful study of physical traits that an individual’s race could 
be determined. As far as he was concerned, Aryans shared certain physiognomic 
characteristics—skin colour, dolichocephalic skulls, light coloured hair, blue eye colour, 
and strong musculature (1968, I:437, 577, 575, 580). They only differed from each other 
significantly to the extent that they had mixed with other races. As a whole, however, 
according to Figueira, Chamberlain was more interested in ‘revealing the spiritual 
characteristics of this superior race’ and that the physiological indicators of race ‘had to 
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be complemented by spiritual traits. Inner depth, loyalty to a master that one has freely 
chosen, and intellectual freedom were characteristics he discovered in the 
Teuton/Aryan’ (2002:76). Thus where physiognomic analyses might only provide subtle 
hints about the race of a group or individual, spiritual indicators such as religious 
orientation, political ideologies, folk poetry, and idealism combined with a strongly 
pragmatic sensibility, a pleasure in freedom and so on, could prove or disprove Aryan 
ancestry more solidly (1968, I:592, 320. 94). As such, Chamberlain shifted the criteria for 
Aryan identity from the linguistic and physical registers to a moral and spiritual plane. 
For all his touted scientism, he ultimately relied on that old romantic staple, intuition. 
As far as he was concerned the indicators of Aryanhood could be found amongst his 
contemporary Germans Aryans insofar as they were able to strike a balance between 
individual and public freedom and combined autonomy with a deep sense of ‘Teutonic’ 
fraternal loyalty (1968: I:866, 543–544). Figuiera points out that Chamberlain’s 
idealisation of modern Germans was clearly influenced by Tacitus’ Germania (2002:76). 
However, unlike the ancient autochthonous and pure Germans as depicted by Tacitus 
Chamberlain’s Germans had been infiltrated by foreign elements and the noble 
patrimony of their race was in danger of being decimated by ‘mongrel races and Jews’ 
(1968, I.494). Moreover, in a striking echo of Jakob Grimm’s arguments in the DM, he 
believed that the ancient Germanic Aryan religion had been corrupted by the Roman 
Catholic Church itself having fallen prey to Semitic superstition and its obsession with 
sin and divine retribution. Nonetheless the German race had struggled to preserve their 
religion during the Reformation and to expel Latinised and Semitic elements, waging a 
continuous though not altogether successful battle against the forces of Rome and the 
Jews. The result was what Chamberlain referred to as Völkerchaos, ‘robbing areas of 
influence of pure blood and unbroken vigor and depriving them of the rule of those 
with the highest talent’ (1968, I:494). 
In contrast to the German Aryans, it is unsurprising that Chamberlain portrayed 
the Jews as violent, fanatical, and intolerant (1968, I:404). Aryan religious literature, by 
far the greatest in the world (1968, I:402), differed from whimsical and egotistical 
Hebrew scripture (1968: 1.402). Moreover, the philosophy such as the Jews possessed 
had been stolen from the Aryans (1968, I:403), in the same way that every other 
achievement they called their own had been stolen (1968, I:401). In comparison with the 
humane and gentle Aryan, Jews were callous and sharp-witted. Compared to the tender 
sympathetic, and pious Aryan (1968: 1.434), the Jew was hard-hearted and stunted in his 
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spiritual development (1968: 1.213). Chamberlain drew heavily on the Sanskrit g Veda 
to draw a portrait of Aryan religion in order to compare it to the superstitious, craven 
religiosity of the Jews (1968, I, 215–216, 242). Moreover, according to Chamberlain, the 
Aryans had invented the monotheism in the g Veda which the Jews had subsequently 
stolen. He went so far as to claim that it was the g Veda that was the true source of 
Christianity rather than the Hebrew scriptures (1968, II:412–413). He portrayed Jesus as 
an Aryan because the idea that he was in fact a Jew was, for Chamberlain, preposterous 
largely in view of the fact that the Jews had no capacity for religious innovation or 
thought (1968, I:256). More significantly, however, Christ had the character of an Aryan 
to the extent that his teaching expressed Aryan rather than Jewish values. He was thus 
the ‘God of the young Indo-European peoples’ (1968, I:245) and God’s representative of 
the Germanic  soul (1968, I:893). Despicably, the Jews, ‘men of chaos’ had distorted these 
Aryan elements and passed them to Christianity in their present corrupted form (1968, 
II:23–27, 109–110), making of Christianity a mere appendage to Judaism (1968, I:417). As 
Figueira points out, Chamberlain’s treatment of the g Veda was the result of a very 
‘creative and unsubstantiated reading’ enabling him to construct ‘the history of the 
Aryan people’ in such a way that ‘allowed him to argue that the Jew was the purveyor 
of materialism, intolerance, and social dissolution as well as the destroyer of civilization’ 
(2002:80). Furthermore, his selective and superficial interpretation of Indian texts 
enabled him to create a Manichaean image of the idealistic, antimaterialist, active, 
valiant, and serious Aryan and a corrupt, effeminate, crafty, thieving, and unoriginal 
Jew and to spur his contemporaries to retrieve their glorious heritage from the utterly 
alien hands of the benighted Jews.  
Chamberlain’s representation of the Aryans and Semites, while extreme, was 
certainly not unique in the latter half of the nineteenth century and in many ways he 
brought to fruition the process that had begun with Jones and Herder, of detaching 
Europeans (or at least the Germans) from any dependence on a Semitic provenance. 
Some comment, however, is required about the reason for the extremism in the division 
between Aryans and Semites. As far as I can see, part of the problem was with the 
doctrine of assimilation that was promoted for German Jews. As Moore suggests ‘there 
was a marked tendency in the…anti-Semitism of the late nineteenth century to insist 
upon the Oriental heritage of the Jewish race, to remind Jews of their non-European 
origins, especially once Western nations came face to face with the foreign manners and 
dress of migrating East European Jews’ (2003:27). At the same time, the interest in the 
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connections between the German Aryans and the Indo-Aryans lead to schizophrenic 
attempts to exclude the Jews from having any share in the ancient wisdom of the East by 
arguing that their religious and cultural heritage was utterly alien to the idealism of the 
Orient, as represented in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), Eduard von 
Hartmann (1842–1906) and Philipp Mainländer (1841–1876).14 This paradoxical attitude 
towards the Jews was itself part of another confessional divide between those like 
Chamberlain who wanted to retrieve a Germanic form of Christianity and those like the 
aforementioned who sought Germanic religion in the traditions of India. However, both 
required the total exclusion of Jewish influence, and by implication, the Jewish people. 
Both were also tied up with a discourse concerned to preserve the purity of the German 
Aryan race. 
Another aspect that led to the extreme anti-Semitism of the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, touched on by Moore and also intertwined with the issue of 
assimilation, was the difference between ‘assimilated’ Jews and the new arrivals from 
Eastern Europe. As Boa and Palfreyman observe, 
Anti-Semitism served at once to sustain German identity by providing the 
antagonistic figure of the alien, non-German other, but also to fuel anxiety of 
dilution of identity through infiltration: if the eastern Jew in caricature represented 
a radically different, alien being, almost more laden with hatred was the stereotype 
of the assimilated western Jew who was identified with international capitalism and 
portrayed as a mimic who could never become a true German but who, without 
roots in a Heimat [‘homeland’] or a national identity of his own, might infiltrate and 
undermine German identity. These two figures fulfilled different roles in the 
reactionary version of [nationalist] discourse in that Jews could be portrayed both as 
an archaically demonic threat and as the very acme of a rootlessly cosmopolitan 
modernity which threatened to destroy traditional communal values 
(2000:7) 
As such, what is clear is that images of the Jewish people were essentially a social 
construct, and imaginative exercise (with the qualities of a nightmare) in asserting 
German identity through the invention of a threatening other. As I will discuss in detail 
the following chapter and then throughout the remainder of the thesis, this ‘social 
construction of enemies’ (David Norman Smith 1996) reveals the logic of the self-same 
wherein the construction of a distinct and impermeable identity can only be achieved 
through the violent exclusion of the ‘other’—a discourse of differentiation—in order to 
secure the coherency and singularity of the self. However, this ‘other’ remains a spectral 
being, haunting the constructed self, seemingly threatening both to disrupt and strip 
away the armour with which the self protects itself. That this was the case with German 
                                                           
14 See Moore 2003:22–27. 
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anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century appears undeniable to me. The history of the 
search for German identity as I have shown consisted of a series of such exclusions—the 
German people were juxtaposed against the Romans, then the French, other Europeans, 
women, and finally, more violently than any other form of exclusion, the Jews. 
However, these exclusions do not, for me, express something essential about the 
character of the German people. Rather they point to the very human and fragile nature 
of identity and the ways in which the narration or construction of that identity resorts 
seemingly naturally to the logic of the self-same. The difficulty of remaining open and 
vulnerable to those things that are perceived as threatening to a core, stable, and valued 
sense of self or which appear to trample on the things held sacred or precious, 
particularly in a context of loss and upheaval, is not to be underestimated. However, as I 
will suggest in the following three chapters, there are other models of selfhood that are 
both theorisable and realisable, models that seek to avoid the exclusionary, fearful 
struggle that the logic of the self-same inscribes. Before I move to discuss these 
frameworks, however, I want to summarise the search for German identity and origins 
through recourse to myths (whether of origins, or of others) I have traced so far, and to 
suggest the ways in which I believe it inscribed a patrilineal narrative of collective 
selfhood. 
IV. Myth, Patrilineal Origins, and the Politics of Identity 
While the relationship between myths, origins, and patrilinearity will be more 
thoroughly theorised in the next three chapters, in this section my concern is briefly to 
reflect on the extent to which the characteristics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century German attitude towards myth and mythology described above indicate a 
particular example—but by no means the only possible one—of the connection between 
the positing of a singularity of origin and patrilinearity. The specific relevance of my 
summary here will be developed more fully in the remainder of the thesis. 
In the period of German history that I have surveyed in Chapters 2–7, I have 
endeavoured to demonstrate that the search for Germany identity was closely bound up 
with myth and mythmaking, to the extent that it is often difficult to distinguish between 
them. I began tracing the recovery of Tacitus’ Germania in the fifteenth century and the 
impact that both it and the Annales had on the German humanists who were seeking a 
weapon with which to challenge the hegemony of the papacy. Both manuscripts served 
to cultivate a cult of primitive German virtue in view of the fact that Tacitus praised the 
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autochthony of the German people, their natural nobility, and simple way of life, and 
further furnished them with a noble ancestor in the form of the Cheruscan chief 
Arminius who had inflicted the spectacular defeat of the Roman legions. I suggested 
that the enthusiastic response to the recovery of Tacitus within Germany was in part 
tied to a national sense of inadequacy and inferiority compared to the other European 
nations who were more easily able to establish their national pedigree by asserting 
Greek or Latin ancestry. Tacitus’ work, as an ostensibly historical source on ancient 
German ethnography contributed much to ameliorating the German ‘identity crisis’ 
insofar as the Germania and Annales indicated the honourable pedigree of the German 
people and it was for this reason that Tacitus remained, throughout the course of the 
German search for origins, a primary resource. Nonetheless, in the post-Enlightenment 
context, French cultural imperialism, coupled with the breakdown of traditional modes 
of society, themselves a product of the modernising impetus of the Enlightenment, 
German vernacular traditions and ways of life were under threat. It was Herder who 
sought, more influentially than any other scholar of his time, to cultivate indigenous 
practices and folkways as a way of combating the cosmopolitanism that was sweeping 
Europe. I then examined his theories regarding the connection between the Volk and its 
myths, showing how he conceived of this relationship as an integral aspect of the 
character of the nation (viewed as a community of individuals bound together on the 
basis of their shared traditions, intimate involvement with their environment and the 
process of Nationalbildung), which in turn was again reflected in its myths and customs. 
Herder valorised the common folk, arguing that it was they who had preserved, 
virtually unchanged, the essential elements of Völkisch patrimony that, if they were 
recovered and taken up by the general populace, would restore to the population a 
sense of their authentic selves, alleviate the pressures of contemporary life, and retrieve 
their origins. I also suggested that Herder conceived of the process of cultural 
transmission as operating according to a patrilineal model, where fathers handed the 
traditions of their fathers to their sons and that this model set the tone for the romantic 
nationalist project that sought to recover indigenous folklore as a means of tracing the 
history of the German people back to their origins. 
However, before I examined the efforts of the romantics in this regard, I 
explored the context in which Herder developed his theories, namely the broader 
preoccupation with origins in Europe, focused around a framework established by the 
biblical narrative of the sons of Noah, and which culminated in William Jones’ discovery 
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of the affinities between Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, and other European languages. Jones’ 
discovery had far-reaching implications, not least the idea that the people of Europe 
were now relieved of any necessary association with the Semitic traditions of the Bible. 
As such it coincided with an increasing move towards a quasi-secularism that had 
preceded out of the Enlightenment but it also provoked an enormous interest in the 
religious traditions of India in particular. Debates about the original homeland of the 
European people accelerated with an early consensus suggesting that it was most likely 
to have been India. I suggested that the identification of India as the Urheimat was 
related to the identification of the people who spoke the Ursprache as the Aryans and it 
was this idea that began to crystallise what was later to become, in the context of 
nineteenth-century Germany surveyed in this chapter, a virulent discourse of 
differentiation between the Aryan Germans and the Semitic Jews. 
I then turned to look in more detail at the rise of the romantic nostalgia for 
origins, one that could be traced back to Herder and was further reflective of the interest 
in the source of the German people cultivated by Jones’ discovery in eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century Germany. Before examining the influence of several key 
romantic scholars, particularly the Schlegel and Grimm brothers, who pursued their 
work with an explicitly nationalist agenda, I surveyed a variety of contemporary 
theories of nationalism in order to suggest that German romantic nationalism 
represented a cultural rather than a civic form, largely because of the lack of any central 
institutional frameworks in the German territories that were able to establish a unified 
nation state out of the diverse regions inhabited by the German people. I argued that the 
cultural model invoked a triadic structure of national rhetoric, characterised by a 
derogation of the present and the valorisation of the past through the retrieval of folk 
traditions and ancient myths redolent of the nation’s golden age which had to be 
recalled in order to achieve an authentic and unified future. I further argued that this 
model was firmly embedded in a gendered discourse where women served as symbolic 
commodities, representing the timeless and glorious past but that they were 
simultaneously excluded from active participation in the nation-building effort and 
confined to the private domestic sphere that was regulated by a conservative model of 
gender roles. This led me to suggest that nationalist projects encoded a masculinist ethos 
that depended upon a model of patrilinearity and fraternality that secured men as both 
the progenitors and sons of the nation. National unity in this case was figured almost 
solely in terms of the bonds between men and these bonds in turn established a 
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relationship to territory and landscape as a masculine space. I then explored these ideas 
in relation to the abstract notion of synthesis promoted by the early Frühromantik 
scholars who believed that the creation of a ‘new mythology’, founded on the values of 
chivalry and medieval Christianity, would translate into an actual and realisable sense 
of political and cultural unity amongst the people. The stress on chivalry and the 
ritterliche mythologie of August Schlegel again relied on a motif of virile and exclusive 
masculinity and implicitly suggested a patrilineal model of descent, where 
contemporary male Germans would receive their traditions from their forefathers and 
translate these resources for national unity.  
I next examined the somewhat differently directed work of the Grimm brothers  
as they developed philological methods of folklore collection in order to retrieve the 
voice of the common people. The issue of origins was again important in this context—
folklore was seen as a fast-dying tradition but also as the only possible means of locating 
the authenticity of the German character. The Grimm brothers set about collecting and 
editing a vast store of traditional tales, proverbs, songs, and nursery rhymes that they 
gathered together in their multi-edition KHM. They claimed, and seemed to believe, that 
despite their editorial interventions in the collection, it reflected the authentic voice of 
the Volk. However, I queried the extent to which this was the case, noting that not all 
their sources were oral, and nor were many of their informants as ‘rustic’ as they 
seemed to suggest. I argued that their prioritisation of orality over written sources was a 
form of logocentrism, tied up with what Derrida refers to as the metaphysics of 
presence. I will suggest in the following chapters that logocentrism is a subset of 
phallogocentric discourse which itself is predicated on a patrilineal economy of 
inheritance and which places fathers as the non-transcendable origin, altogether eliding 
motherhood from the scene of identification. In my examination of the Grimms’ oeuvre I 
argued that their collection and editing practices replicated the exclusionary nationalist 
projects, discussed above, insofar as they valorised an image of the demur, silent, and 
housebound woman and demonised women—step-mothers, witches, disobedient 
daughter—in order to promote the KHM as a pedagogic guide for appropriate German 
behaviour and values. 
I then moved to look at Jakob Grimm’s DM, a monumental work of mythology 
that traced in minute detail the practices, religious beliefs, and myths of the ancient 
pagan Germans prior to the advent of Christianity in northern Europe. The myths that 
Grimm retrieved drew on a rich reservoir of sources—folklore, folk customs, and 
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canonical manuscripts such as the Prose Edda and the Nibelungenlied—and enabled him 
to present a remarkably complete picture of the ancient Germans as valiant, defiant, 
virile, and thus resolutely masculine. He promoted their customs and beliefs as 
authentically German, opposing them to the artificial and alien forms of religiosity 
imposed by Roman Catholicism and suggested that the Reformation had signalled the 
triumph of the original German spirit and the distillation of the remnants of a pagan 
past, a suggestion that placed him against August Schlegel’s own theories of the ‘proper’ 
nature of German mythology. Nonetheless, both Schlegel and Grimm produced a 
thoroughly patriarchal repertoire of German myth, in Schlegel’s case populated with 
brave and manly knights and in Grimm’s case dominated by the figure of the father god 
Wotan. As the efforts of these romantic scholars filtered down into the cultural drinking 
water, so to speak, a number of public monuments to the glorious German past as 
represented by Germania and Hermann were erected as sites of memorialisation and 
celebration. I suggested these symbols of Germanness themselves conveyed a patrilineal 
subtext, particularly in the Niederwald monument where the asexualised, Athenic 
figure of Germania stood clearly affiliated with the manly endeavours of the soldiers 
who had fought for German unity against the French and Austrians and that 
consequently women were either marginalised or excluded in the public idealisation of 
the nation, once more reflecting a public/private divide that confined women to the role 
of mute symbols of the nation’s patrimony. I argued that these representations, along 
with the fraternal images of volunteer soldiers in the paintings of Kersting and 
Friedrich, as well as the repetitive motif of woodland and ancient oaks, provoked once 
more an association with male comradely bonds as constitutive of both the German 
character and the German nation, as well as gesturing towards the virile origins of the 
German people. They further enacted a form of territorialisation that conveyed a 
contradictory image of the German landscape as both masculine and feminine. 
However, symbolisations of the German territories united under the Kaiserreich on the 
model of the Kleindeutsch solution as providentially replicating the ancient German 
polity suppressed the divisions that lay at the heart of the nation under the rubric of the 
‘fatherland’. 
Finally, in this chapter I have returned to the question of the Urheimat that I 
began to discuss in Chapter 3 and I have shown how the earlier idealisation of India as 
the source of the original people shifted to the Germany, confirming the Germans as the 
original Aryans in possession of a pure, and intact national pedigree. It can be argued 
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that this turn of events represented the culmination of the lengthy process of 
identification—of mythmaking—that the history I have described above represented. 
Along with all the other exclusionary practices that defined the attempt to retrieve an 
authentic German character, it was anti-Semitism that enabled, with more clarity and 
conviction than before, the assertion of a bellicose, masculine, and noble identity for the 
German people. And yet, the very fact that this image required an abjected, feminised 
other in the form of the Jew suggests that even with the strength of the symbol of 
originality, German identity was still threatened, still in question. 
I stated at the beginning of this section that myth and mythmaking played a 
central role in the process of characterisation and identification and that it was 
sometimes difficult to see where mythmaking began and myth ended. I have tried to 
convey so far the extent to which both are forms of discursive practice, practices that, as 
I suggested in my introduction, place limits around what it is possible to think, know, 
believe, and imagine, and that they operate through modes of exclusion and through an 
attempt to set up a clear boundary between truth and falsity. In what follows I want to 
shift my focus a little to examine the ways in which the clarity of these boundaries and 
exclusions might be shown to be less clearcut and more porous than they appear by 
examining a variety of theories concerning identity construction. 
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C H A P T E R   E I G H T 
 NARRATIVITY, SINGULARITY, AND PATRILINEARITY 




The narration of identity that I have explored in the previous chapters was both the sign 
and the product of a poignant and monumental struggle to define a stable, unified, and 
pure collective ‘self’ on behalf of a community of people who thought of themselves as 
culturally and politically embattled. The retrieval and use of myths in this context gave 
shape to and expressed a deep yearning for communal and individual belonging as a 
means of confronting and overcoming the social and political fragmentation that 
threatened the German territories during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 
particular. As such, the German search for origins was a very human quest and, in the 
course of my research, one I found myself increasingly sympathetic towards. As 
described in the Pretext, my own life history has been marked by an uncertainty 
regarding my sense of self as rooted in any particular place. A question I have asked 
myself, and have sometimes been asked by others, is whether by coming from 
‘nowhere’ I belong ‘anywhere’; do I have a home and if so would I be able to name it, to 
point to it on a map? Is my sense of self consequently impoverished socially or indeed 
ontologically? Why do I seek to ‘belong’ and what is it that I want to belong to?  
Perhaps in researching the German search for origins, I have been seeking an 
analogically reassuring narrative of selfhood for myself or, on the contrary, searching for 
a salutary tale that warns against the too stable construction of identity, thus confirming 
my own sense of fragmented identity as a source of strength and insight. The material I 
have explored has certainly not lent itself as a source of reassurance, but has indicated 
the difficulties and dangers of constituting identity as singular and rooted in a bounded 
place and a nostalgia for the past. My implicit concern, consequently, has been to 
investigate why place, self, origins, and belonging seem so often to be intertwined and 
inseparable and whether the connections between these elements are a necessary 
building block in the construction of identity under the sign of western metaphysics. 
The conclusion that I have reached is that they are not, and that there are other ways of 
keeping place, self, and belonging in play. In the final chapter I will argue that finding 
these can be part of an ethical project of a being towards an other, that is, of embracing 
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otherness as constitutive of one’s self rather than something that must be overcome or 
excluded. To say this is not to claim a self-referentially authoritative and experiential 
basis for either my analysis or the conclusions that make up the following chapter; but 
to omit any mention of my own experiences and biography as one of the hermeneutic 
lenses that informs my analysis would go against the grain of what I have tried to do 
here, which in part is to demonstrate the subjective content of myth and mythmaking. 
The basis of identity-through-belonging and through narration remains something of a 
question for me, and the conclusions I draw are necessarily tentative.  
I have suggested that the differential model upon which the German romantic 
and nationalist construction of identity was based throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, was ethically problematic and dangerous. In these two final 
chapters I bring together the preceding history of the German search for origins (which 
used myth as both a repository and a vehicle of identity) with a theoretical reflection on, 
and a critique of, the exclusionary model of ontology that I believe this particular search 
produced. Against this model, in my final chapter, I propose an alternative framework, 
informed by—but also extending—poststructuralist feminist theories regarding the 
ethics of maternality-as-origin, one which proposes the origins of the self as multiple, 
ambiguous, and achieved through a dialogic model of self and other. In so doing I seek 
to theorise a means of avoiding the exclusionary practices of identity narration; the 
German case stands as but one example of a broader pattern of self-constitution within 
the western metaphysical tradition, a pattern that in this chapter I will argue employs a 
patrilineal syntax to establish its coherence and legitimacy. 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that one of the main mechanisms of 
identity narration—myth and mythmaking—which characterised the search for and 
then eventual identification of a collective origin in the German case relied initially on a 
triadic rhetoric of cultural nationalism that elevated concepts of historic continuity and 
causality to the status of a communal creed. I have shown that this rhetoric enabled the 
presentation of German identity as singular, pure, and autonomous. In the process it 
encoded a patrilineal economy of inheritance where the glorious and ancient past, 
ostensibly retrieved through myth and heroic narratives, served as confirmation of the 
purity and nobility of Germanic values and traditions and was contrasted to the social 
fragmentation and instability of the present. Many of the public figures I have 
discussed, particularly in the romantic nationalist movement, hoped and worked 
determinedly to ensure that collective remembrance and reenactment of the past would 
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secure a utopian future for the German people. In light of my comments above it is 
worth recalling that the term ‘utopia’ comes from the Greek ou-topos, meaning ‘no place’; 
and against the sense of accomplishment and finality that the project of German 
unification seemed to offer, in some significant ways, German identity remained 
displaced and in question throughout and beyond the period surveyed. The 
identification of the German people’s origin as the original linguistic and racial 
community also revealed an assumption of inheritance through a male line. In relation 
to this point, I have also tried to show throughout that embedded in the narration of 
German identity was a valorisation of the German national ‘self’ as masculine, 
autochthonous, and unified, and that it was myths (as narratives) that provided the 
medium through which such an assertion could be made. The reason for the equation I 
have posited between origins, singularity, and patriliny will be explored in some detail 
in this chapter, and followed up in the next when I discuss the work of Jacques Lacan. 
In the context of the quest for German identity, the assumption of singularity, 
autochthony, and masculinity secured through a patriline was not enough to create a 
sense of stable identity. A second means through which German identity was, as shown 
in the previous chapter, constructed a mythic discourse of differentiation—the myth of 
Aryan origins which took the form of myth-as-discourse. One of the main ways this 
discourse was articulated was through the assertion of an incommensurable and value-
laden difference between the German people as pure and original, and the Jewish 
people who were represented in terms of an abjected and therefore dangerous alterity. 
This assertion of difference obscured, however, a series of striking resemblances 
between the German people and their Jewish others and as such was, I argued, a form of 
appropriation or absorption of the role the Jewish people were previously believed to 
have played in world history. As such, the construction of German identity was enabled 
through the construction of and then effacement of otherness where singularity and 
duality were placed in an awkward and seemingly contradictory relationship of 
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. I reflect in more detail on this paradox of 
identity-formation in the following chapter. 
The construction of identity through narratives of continuity and discourses of 
differentiation that inscribe a negative logic upon which the self can be asserted against 
an other is closely related to the mechanisms of its authorisation established on the basis 
of the relative truthfulness or otherwise of narratives of the self. The claim to speak 
truthfully, in effect to possess the truth and to accrue the legitimating qualities of 
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truthfulness to oneself, has been shown throughout the thesis so far to be the 
mechanism through which the authority of identity construction was secured. In the 
context of German romanticism, the positing of an unequivocal division between the 
true and the false in the context of myth as a genre of narrative aided the formulation 
and reconstruction of an ‘authentic’ German identity. As such, vernacular narratives 
were represented containing the essential truth of Germanness, and therefore were 
deemed to be self-evidently authoritative in themselves. The cosmopolitan forms of 
culture that emerged out of the Enlightenment and against which romanticism set itself 
were, by contrast, false by virtue of their novelty, their rejection of the bounded, 
autochthonous, and primordial community, and their elevation of individual rationality 
over and against kindred feeling. 
Taken altogether, then, the mechanisms of identity formation that I have 
detailed have consisted of narratives of continuity and causality, discourses of 
differentiation along an axis of value-laden oppositions, and the assertion of 
truthfulness upon which to found the authority of identity claims. In each case I have 
tried to show how definitions of myths and practices of mythmaking are enabling 
devices for this identity work. As such they bring into question the extent to which the 
conventionally clear-cut distinction between myth and truth can be maintained. The 
truth of myth seems rather to depend on the extent to which the teller is successful in 
conveying the legitimacy of her or his discourse and of encouraging others to participate 
in its narration. In what follows in this chapter, I continue to probe the relationship 
between truth and myth through an analysis of the narration of identity. 
In the first two sections I examine contemporary theories regarding the 
narrative construction of identity, particularly as developed by Paul Ricoeur. I proceed 
to show that while Ricoeur provides an insightful account of the narration of identity, 
his analysis bears a good deal of similarity to the triadic rhetoric of cultural nationalism 
that I introduced in Chapter 4 and used in the following chapters to understand the 
reconstructive efforts of German romantic nationalism. Ricœur replicates this model to 
the extent that he sees towards temporality as necessarily linear and continuous, and 
suggests that linearity is foundational to the ways in which humans grant meaning to 
their sense of self. As a result there are limits, in my view, to the usefulness of his model 
for exploring what may in fact be the fragmentary nature of human identity that linear 
narration tries to cover over. Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida and Hélène 
Cixous and their respective analysis of logocentrism and phallogocentrism I show how 
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such a model of continuity and linearity may in fact be indebted to a form of inflected 
and obscured patriliny. My discussion of Derrida and Cixous leads to an analysis of the 
paradox of subject-formation mentioned above. Each of these thinkers stresses the 
constructed nature of identity, opposed to a naturalised essentialism, and identifies the 
narrative and discursive strategies through which the self, as construed and gendered 
by post-Enlightenment thought, is placed in an agonistic relationship to others along a 
series of oppositional axes where similarity/difference, singularity/duality, 
inclusion/exclusion, autonomy/dependence, and self/other are set up dialectically. In 
contrast, the models of identity suggested by Derrida and Cixous reveal a profound 
degree of interdependence amongst these apparently opposed forces and enables me to 
analyse the ways in which the self both narrates itself and is narrated. Ricœur’s stress on 
the singularity and linear coherency of narratable selves, while it has the merit of posing 
identity-formation as a dialogic process, suggests that it occurs between two already 
separate selves, and this is an aspect I return to challenge in the final chapter. 
I. Narrativity and Identity 
Narrativity has, since the 1980s, become a focus for the study of the ways in which 
identity is constructed and signified.1 The notion that identity formation is bound up 
inextricably with narrative is now a relatively uncontroversial claim and is connected to 
two developments in the field of social theory. The first is the emergence of the concept 
of ‘identity politics’2 and the subsequent academic interest in the social construction of 
identity. The phrase ‘politics of identity’ has regularly been wielded to refer to the 
efforts of groups who have been marginalised from dominant political domains and 
‘normative’ configurations of identity to demand a redefinition of what is normative 
and to challenge their exclusion from the political frameworks that operate on the 
assumption of normativity. Many of the liberatory projects of the second half of the 
twentieth century are often interpreted as expressions of the politics of identity in this 
vein, for example, second-wave feminism, the black civil rights movement, the gay and 
lesbian liberation movement, and the postcolonial resistance to western hegemony, 
amongst others. These movements have been influential in demonstrating the 
constructed nature of identity in that they have opposed the self-referential account of 
western modernity as universal when opposing its normative assumptions. Thus 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Mitchell 1981; Bakhtin 1981, 1986; Ricœur 1981, 1984, 1985; Sarbin 1986; Bruner 
1986, 1990; Bauman 1986; Nelson 1989; Britton and Pellegrini 1990. 
2 See Aronowitz 1992; Jean Cohen 1985. 
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normativity, as conventionally defined under the sign of western modernity, has been 
revealed against its universal claims to be a particularistic and narrow configuration, 
namely that of the white, male, middle-class, and western individual so beloved of the 
post-Enlightenment era.  
Within the politics of identity, on the other hand, identity is asserted through 
vectors of commonality, whether along the lines of shared gender, race, class, physical 
ability, sexuality, or a combination thereof, and these vectors establish a foundation for 
solidarity and activism from which rights can be demanded. The politics of identity has 
thus tended to operate in terms of a conflicting relationship between demands for 
equality on the basis of individuals’ similitude to the self of Enlightenment formulations 
of normativity, and demands for the recognition of the difference that operates through 
these vectors.3 Further, these movements have shown that the normative self has only 
been able to claim its normative status by devaluing, repressing, or denying other forms 
of identity that do not meet its exclusive criteria. However, the problem with this kind of 
identification is that it tends to resort to a secondary form of essentialism that views the 
basis of solidarity for marginalised groups to be one of essence—whether one is 
essentially female, or black, for example. This essence also reinscribes the very basis on 
which they are marginalised from the ‘dominant’ accounts. Hence, these liberatory 
movements have often performed a reversal of the devaluation of marginalised 
identities, transforming gendered or racialised otherness into a valorised and 
normativised form of identity by simultaneously derogating the normative subject of 
western modernity. Consequently these projects have often failed properly to challenge 
the normativising, universalising efforts of western modernity. As a result, the 
emancipatory projects that are identified within the broader rubric of identity politics 
have regularly reproduced a narrative of origins that bears a resemblance to that of 
western modernity. An example would be the authenticating role that the feminist 
narrative of matriarchal prehistory about the past has played in constructing a present 
where a positive ideal of femininity can be presented in order to challenge discourses 
that are seen to have denigrated women.4 The problems with this view of the past are 
manifold and have been the subject of sustained, and often impatient, critiques by 
                                                           
3 For a useful example see Di Stefano 1990. 
4 See, for example, Stone 1976; Starhawk 1979; 1982, Gimbutas 1982, 1989, 1991; Eisler 1987; Lerner 
1986; Christ 1987; Gadon 1989, Baring and Cashford 1991. 
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scholars (primarily historians, anthropologists and archaeologists) since the 1960s.5 The 
objections raised by scholars to this account and the charge of ‘misappropriation’ of 
their work by matriarchy proponents suggest questions about the reach of scholarship 
and the status of its knowledge production: in this era of ‘difference’ can there be such a 
thing as ‘History’ in the sense of a monolithic account of human origins and 
development, or should the concern be rather to promote a heterogeneity of ‘histories’? 
Are all accounts equally valid? If not, which criteria determine validity, who adjudicates 
such determinations, and on what basis? (see Leslie 2003). In addition, what role can, 
and should, narrative play in re-creations of the past? These are questions I will return 
to in the final chapter, but the point here is that the politics of identity have turned to a 
narrative of the past in order to ameliorate the present in ways that are very similar to 
the German search for origins. The politics of identity seems to take for granted the need 
to narrate identity through a nostalgic narrative of an alternative past.  
The second development that has led to the recognition of the relationship 
between narrativity and identity is a reconfigured conception of narrative that 
incorporates an understanding of its discursive tenor, whereby narrative is not 
construed as a straightforward representation of the real social world but rather as 
constitutive of it. As a result, narrative and narrativity have come to be reconceptualised 
as discursive devices that can both convey and construct social identities, thus linking 
narrativity to identity politics by tracking the mechanisms through which normativity 
and difference are constructed and maintained in a dialectical relationship. Margaret 
Somers has clearly expressed the confluence of narrativity and identity and its relation 
to the discursive placement of individuals and communities within the social world: 
It is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the 
social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our 
social identities….[A]ll of us come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple, 
and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in 
social narratives rarely of our own making. 
(1994:606) 
Somers uses Lyotard’s concept of metanarratives (1984) as grand, overarching stories in 
which individuals are historically embedded, such as stories of the nation, of progress or 
degeneration, of the ‘end of history’, or, more recently, of the ‘war on terror’. Identities 
then, according to Somers, are always formed within broad discourses—worlds of 
available, created, and shared meanings—and are related to the historic positionings of 
                                                           
5 See, for example, Ucko 1968, 1996; Fleming 1969; Bamberger 1974; McCance 1990; Fagan 1992; 
Haaland and Haaland 1995; Wood 1997; Goodison and Morris 1998:6–21; Eller 2000. 
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the subjects involved, which are themselves constituted and given meaning through 
narratives.  
The term ‘identity’ is by no means a straightforward or uncontested way of 
referring to the ways in which human beings organise and are positioned within 
society.6 This is partly because of the way in which the term emerged as an analytical 
category in the social sciences from the 1960s onwards, resulting in a distinction, most 
famously suggested by Pierre Bourdieu (1990), between its analytical utility and its 
praxis-based properties. The analytical use of the term has tended towards the view that 
‘identity formation’ is a fragmented and contested process whereas the more common, 
everyday use of the term usually defaults to an essentialist, often primordialist 
naturalised reference to a stable core, an actual unity and internal harmony of ‘selfhood’. 
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) have disputed even the analytical validity of the term, 
proposing instead substitute terms such as ‘identification’, ‘self-understanding’, and 
‘commonality’.7 Although they make a strong case for the use of the term ‘identification’ 
as an active processual term, my own use of the term identity seeks to preserve its actual 
ambiguity and is directed at investigating the tension between the analytical and 
practical uses of the term. However, the term identification would serve just as well 
because it preserves a sense of agency, indicating that the process of aligning oneself 
with an identity is an active and iterative one. As such, ‘identity’, can be conceived as an 
active work of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction, as Ronald Suny 
suggests: 
[Identity is] a provisional stabilization of a sense of self or group that is formed in 
actual historical time and space, in evolving economies, polities, and cultures, as a 
continuous search for some solidity in a constantly shifting world—but without 
closure, without forever naturalizing or essentialising the provisional identities 
arrived at. 
(1999/2000:144) 
However, when people speak of identity, their language often omits a sense of this 
historical construction or contingency and instead almost always affirms a present 
identity as fixed, singular, bounded, internally harmonious, distinct from others at its 
boundaries, and marked by historical longevity, if not rooted in nature. As such, 
                                                           
6 See Strauss 1959; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Berger 1974; Gleason 1983; Sen 1985; Taylor 1989; 
Giddens 1991; Bauman 1992; White 1992; Calhoun 1994; Appiah and Gates 1995; Eisenstadt and 
Giesen 1995; Martin 1995; Posnock 1995; Hall and du Gay 1996; Tilly 1996; Laitin 1998. 
7 Stuart Hall, however, warns against the unreflexive substitution of ‘identity’ with ‘identification’, 
suggesting that it too is ‘almost as tricky as, though preferable to, “identity” itself; and certainly no 
guarantee against the conceptual difficulties which have beset the latter’ (1996:2). I will return to 
this point when I consider Jacques Derrida’s reflections on the impossibility of either identity or 
identification in light of his claim that there is no identity without a ‘disorder of identity’ (1998:14). 
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identification seems to tread a contradictory path where discursive construction and 
contingent positionality are obscured by claims to an essential and stable self. Stuart 
Hall conveys these discursive properties of ‘identity’ well when he suggests the he uses 
the term ‘identity’ to refer to 
the point of suture between on the one hand, the discourses and practices which 
attempt to…haul us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on 
the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as 
subjects which can be ‘spoken’. Identities are…points of temporary attachment to 
the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us. 
(1996:5–6) 
Hall eloquently demonstrates the tenuous process of self-formation. It is this mutually 
imbricated and somewhat paradoxical conception of identity that I have explored so far 
through my analysis of the ways in which myth and mythmaking within the German 
search for origins regularly intersected to produce the appearance of an essential, 
naturalised form of identity. The identity so produced was shown to be a process of 
intricate construction, an essentially imaginative act—a form of mythmaking—that, 
whether deliberately or not, obscured the contingent and provisional nature of 
identification. Paul Ricœur, perhaps the best-known theorist of narrative identity, offers 
a broadly helpful explanation for the disjunction between essentialist and constructivist 
identity-formations that produce this paradoxical production of a stable self which I will 
now outline. 
II. ‘Oneself as Another’: Ricœur and Narrative Identity 
[Our own existence] cannot be separated from the account we can give of ourselves. 
It is in telling our own stories that we give ourselves an identity. We recognise 
ourselves in the stories we tell about ourselves. It makes little difference whether 
these stories are true or false, fiction as well as verifiable history provides us with an 
identity. 
(Ricœur 1981:31) 
It was in the third volume of Time and Narrative (1988) where Ricœur first formulated a 
phenomenological/hermeneutic treatment of the interrelationship of time, narrative, and 
human identity. Put simply, he argues that identity is constructed through narrative 
because narrative’s particular properties of coherence and continuity enable individuals 
successfully to negotiate the traumatic disjunction between cosmological time as 
permanent and constant and the existential experience of phenomenological time 
particular to each individual as marked by change and inconstancy. For Ricœur, there is 
a mutual imbrication but also a disjunction between the constancy of temporality or 
cosmological time and the lived, contingent experience of phenomenological time. This 
disjunction is traumatic for individuals, Ricœur suggests, because it appears to be 
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contradictory and yet innately part of human being in the world. It is narrative, 
however, which is able to order scattered events into a new coherency—narratives are 
for Ricœur ‘arrangements of events into unified stories’ (2005:6371)—a process he refers 
to as the ‘synthesis of the heterogeneous’ (1984:8), thus seeming to resolve the 
fragmentation of phenomenological time in the stability and homogeneity of 
cosmological time. His main argument throughout his first article on the relationship 
between narrativity and temporality (‘Narrative and Time’, 1980) is that temporality is 
‘the structure of existence that reaches language in narrativity’ and he defines 
narrativity as ‘the language structure that has temporality as its ultimate referent’ 
(1980:169).  
Ricœur defines identity in terms of two categories: idem and ipse. Idem are those 
forms of identity that are based on notions of Sameness—the seemingly continuous and 
stable human existence which corresponds to cosmological time. For Ricoeur, this form 
of identity indicates static temporality in terms of sameness and similitude but he 
suggests that alone it is an inadequate basis for asserting selfhood because it obscures 
the dynamic, temporalised aspects of the self which he refers to as ipse. Ipse identity, 
defined by Ricœur as (individual) Selfhood, incorporates all the many changes an 
individual undergoes in the course of her or his lifetime. These two aspects of identity 
are mutually irreducible insofar as they are disconnected through what Ricœur refers to 
as an ‘interval of sense’ created by the opposition between the two forms of temporality 
(1992:124). A sense of stable identity, therefore, is formed through the fusion and co-
existence of the idem and ipse; selfhood is always comprehended at least in part through 
reference to the constancy of corporeal and psychological criteria while at the same time 
being contingent and changing. As such, the temporalised understanding of the self that 
the idea of narrative captures for Ricœur suggests that the narrative self is a dynamic 
unity of change through time.  
In Time and Narrative (1984) the combined force of the ipse/idem is presented as a 
narrative identity which concerns the telling and retelling of a life-story, a biography, 
whether factual or fictional, such that the figure of identity that emerges in the story 
offers an insight into the forms of the self in both phenomenological and cosmic time. It 
is narrative, Ricœur suggests, which enables the mediation of these two temporal 
dimensions, and he goes further to argue that without being able to resort to narrative 
the individual would be condemned to an irresolvable and unliveable aporia. The 
aporia of temporality resides in the fact, as Hayden White suggests, that humans are 
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unable not to think about their experience of time, and yet time can never be thought 
about ‘both rationally and comprehensively’ (1987:233–234, fn. 6). Ricoeur states that  
speculation on time is an inconclusive rumination to which narrative activity can 
alone respond. Not that this activity solves the aporias through substitution. If it 
does resolve them, it is in a poetical and not a theoretical sense of the word.  
(1984:6) 
Ricœur argues, therefore, that narrative is a universal and fundamental aspect of 
the social world and the primary mode through which the complex and aporetical 
temporality of human experience can be borne. Because the two temporal figurations 
are (like the ipse and the idem) irreconcilable, Ricœur suggests that narrative attempts to 
mediate the resulting multiplication of aporia (1988:244–74) through a process of what 
he calls ‘emplotment’. Emplotment is the manner through which the heterogeneous 
elements of a life story are brought together as a coherent narrative of causality and 
continuity, and as such it stands for what Ricœur considered, after Aristotle,8 myth to 
be: ‘Plot or mythos gives a tragic poem its structure and purpose: The fundamental trait 
of mythos is its character of order….’ (1977:35).9 Through emplotment a sequence of 
events is configured in such a way as to represent ‘symbolically’ what would otherwise 
be inexpressible in language, namely the ineluctably ‘aporetic’ nature of the human 
experience of time (1984:41–42). Emplotment thus functions to organise the 
contingencies and resolve the paradoxes of existence into a coherent whole, into a third 
form of time that interleaves fiction and history, which for Ricœur are the two main 
forms of narrative.  
He characterises history as a secondary referential discourse, that is, an indirect 
reference to the ‘structure of temporality’ that gives to historical events related in a story 
the aura of ‘historicality’.10 As such, history relates to the ‘what was’ of the past, but the 
                                                           
8 Aristotle used muthos as a technical term for a certain type of drama. In his Poetics, he considered 
both literature and music to be primarily modes of imitation (mimesis), differing in the medium, 
the objects, and the manner of imitation. Aristotle distinguishes mimesis praxeos, imitation of action 
(praxis), from mimesis logou, imitation of thought (theoria). The former he classified as an imitation 
of specific action, and muthos as an imitation of typical action. 
9 Ricœur has defined myth as ‘a narrative of origins, taking place in a primordial time, a time other 
than that of everyday reality’ which he contrasts with history (2005:6371). 
10 Ricœur’s term ‘secondary referentiality’ indicates the double nature of all symbolic speech, that 
is as positioned between the literal and the figurative (1984:57–8, 77–82). In the case of historical 
narrative, its literal referent is the series of events of which it speaks while its figurative referent is 
the ‘structure of temporality’ which, following Heidegger, Ricoeur calls ‘historicality’ 
(Geschichtlichkeit). Ricœur suggests that the two features of ‘historicality’ are ‘the extension of time 
between birth and death, and the displacement of accent from the future to the past’ (1984:61–62). 
Hayden White helpfully explains Ricœur’s distinction between the chronicle and the historical 
narrative: ‘[T]he crucial difference [between the chronicle and narrative history] is between the 
experience of time as a mere seriality [the chronicle] and an experience of temporality in which 
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events of history only acquire meaning, or significance, through narrative (1983:7). Thus, 
while Ricoeur rejects the possibility of historiography as being able to represent the 
‘what was’ of the past wholly accurately, he supports its ability to act as a mediating 
composite of trace and figurative language that draws out, or supplies, the meaning of 
the past insofar as history, as a type of text, utilises literary forms in order to convey the 
world of the past that is only retrievable through its traces, the archive and testimony.11 
As such, history can never be a purely literal rendering of the past (see Kearney 
2002:136). If history did not aspire to truthfulness, then there would be no possibility, for 
example, of opposing erroneous accounts of a particular sequence of events, such as 
those of Holocaust deniers. Ricœur’s claim is not that historians collectively overlay a 
narrative structure on a series of actual events that could just as easily be presented in 
another non-narrative form, but that historical events have the very same structure as 
narrative. In other words, it is their narrative structure that distinguishes historical 
events from natural events. As White notes, ‘It is because historical events possess a 
narrative structure that historians, for Ricœur, are justified both in regarding the story-
form as a valid representational medium of such events and in treating these 
representations as reasonable explanations’ (1987:171).  
Narrative fiction, like history, for Ricœur, also mediates between cosmological 
and phenomenological experiences of time. Fiction is, in Ricœur’s thought, presented as 
synonymous with the novel, and he argues that novelistic fiction differs from history in 
that it can craft the past unconstrained by archival records and the ‘truth-telling’ 
imperatives of history, resulting in an imagination of the ‘what might have been’ of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
events take on the aspect of elements of lived stories, with a discernible beginning, middle, and 
end [narrative history]….Historians…[cast] their accounts in the form of narratives, because this 
mode of discourse alone is adequate to the representation of the experience of historicality in a 
way that is both literal in what it asserts about specific events and figurative in which it suggests 
about the meaning of this experience’(1987:177) 
11 Michel de Certeau has similarly reflected on history as a ‘treatment for absence’ (Ahearne 
1995:9) where the object of enquiry (the past, conceived by Certeau as a radical Otherness) is 
irretrievably separated in time and space from the historian who nonetheless seeks to recover its 
presence. Certeau considers the interpretative acts of historians to be ‘operations’ which 
redistribute traces of alterity in order to make them comprehensible and thus manageable. Unlike 
Ricœur, however, he argues that the irrecoverability of the past is problematically elided in the 
production of history, because of its unconscious obscuring of Otherness. The discipline of history 
thus carries a cumbersome weight: in order to exist; it must deny that it is a mere narrative, and it 
must, consequently, refuse epistemological reflection, that is, the elucidation of its own regulatory 
grounds—historians assert that their accounts are not merely stories but truths. He problematises 
the productive role of the historian in reconfiguring cultural artefacts into a coherent narrative, a 
process that he calls ‘fabrication’. By fabricating accounts of the past according to context-specific 
regulations and processes, the historian produces the past and transforms it into history (1988:71). 
See also Certeau 1988:20–113 and Kellner 1987. 
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past. The fabricated past that fiction can conjure aids a redescription of the past 
mediated by the imaginative and moral insights of others, which may open up new 
ways to understand the past and therefore the self. The narration of identity through 
history and fiction thus creates a meaningful order out of the variability and 
discontinuities of life by grounding the self (ipse) in the similitude of the idem. At the 
same time, narrative, taken as a whole, enables the investigation of the potentialities of 
the self (ipse/fiction) relatively freed from the actualities of idem/history. As such, 
identity is formed through an interplay of trope and trace, or, more simply, through a 
negotiation between the oscillation of the productive imagination and the constraint of 
the archive. Only particular identities, particular narratives can be told, but they can be 
told imaginatively. However, for Ricœur, truthfulness is not entirely absent from 
fictional narratives but is rather of a different quality to that of history: 
In the conventional sense attached to the term ‘truth’ by the acquaintance with this 
body of science, only historical knowledge may enunciate its referential claim as a 
‘truth-’claim. But the very meaning of this truth-claim is itself measured by the 
limiting network which rules the conventional descriptions of the world. This is 
why fictional narratives may assert a referential claim of another kind, appropriate 
to the split reference of poetic discourse. This referential claim is nothing other than 
the claim to redescribe reality according to the symbolic structures of fiction. 
(1983:11) 
Narrative identity, for Ricœur, is formed in three successive moments which he 
calls the circle of triple mimesis. The first, ‘prefiguration’, is the individual’s experience 
of being-in-the-world that is semantically construed without any clarity of form or 
figure. The second moment is that of ‘configuration’ where the contingencies and 
inconstancy of experience are selected, shaped and then ordered within the framework 
of a plot, that is, a life is configured in the act of telling its story. The third moment 
occurs in the noetic act of reading where the self comes to a greater understanding of 
human experience over time through the mediatory effects of narrative and therefore 
returns from narrative text to action. This final moment results in a transformative 
understanding of oneself in the world: ‘the fragile offshoot issuing from the union of 
history and fiction is the assignment to an individual or a community of a specific 
identity that we can call their narrative identity’ (1988:246). Richard Kearney explains 
that the movement between these three reiterative stages is a mimetic and circular 
process of  
movement from action to text [narrative] and back again—passing from prefigured 
experience through narrative recounting back to a reconfigured life world. In short, 
life is always on the way to narrative, but it does not arrive there until someone 
hears and tells this life as a story. Which is why the latent prefiguring of everyday 
existence calls out for a more formal configuring (mythos-mimesis). 
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(2002:133) 
What historical and fictional narratives share in common, therefore, is twofold. 
Firstly, they share a single ‘ultimate referent’ (Sinn). While Ricoeur agrees that history 
and literature differ in terms of their immediate referents (Bedeutungen), insofar as both 
produce emplotted narratives their ultimate referent is the human experience of the 
‘structures of temporality’ (1982:140–142). If history resembles literature it is because 
both speak figuratively (‘symbolically’) and therefore indirectly about the same ultimate 
referent—the structural aporia of temporality—which cannot be simultaneously spoken 
without contradiction and so has to be conveyed in the idiom of symbolic discourse. The 
difference, as I have noted, is that history and literature speak indirectly about the 
aporetic experiences of temporality by means of and through signifiers that belong to 
different orders of being—real events on the one side, imaginary events on the other. 
The second area of commonality between the history and fictional narrative is 
their similar mimetic function. Here Ricœur challenges Aristotle’s distinction (Poetics, 
1448a.1) between mimesis as an imitation of action/event which constitutes a fictional 
and imaginative redescription of the phenomenal world such that its hidden patterns 
and hitherto unexplored meanings can unfold, and diagesis, the straightforward, factual 
description of events, in order to demonstrate how narrative is both mimetic and 
diagetic (1985:36–37). For Ricœur, the diagetic elements of history and fiction convey a 
descriptive representation of temporal identity and events while the mimetic elements 
are able to provide that identity with structure, coherence, and significance such that 
description and representation (the provision of meaning to the description) are bound 
up together. As White suggests, therefore,  
In Ricœur’s view…narrative discourse…works up the material given in perception 
and reflection, fashions it, and creates something new, in precisely the same way 
that human agents by their actions fashion distinctive forms of historical life out of 
the world they inherit as their past. 
(1987:178) 
Ricœur’s work offers an insightful, descriptive, and strongly phenomenological 
account of how individuals struggle to assert a stable self against the contingencies of 
time through narration. As such it certainly has explanatory power for understanding 
how myths and mythmaking together, in the context of the German quest for a stable 
identity, were an important part of the apparatus of nation-building, such that the 
German search for identity could be read as a response to the unsettling disjunction 
between temporal aporias. However, I think that what is needed is a model that does 
more than explain, but rather challenges the ways in which narrative identity is 
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configured; there are three areas in which his theorisation of narrative identity proves, 
in my view, inadequate. 
The first area concerns the normative and implicitly universalist presentation of 
identity in his work. Narrative, in Ricœur’s work, is a politically neutral medium of self-
formation and, therefore, he seems unable or unwilling to account for the damaging and 
oppressive potential of narratives as they encode the interests of specific groups and 
individuals, and as they serve to delineate between selves and others, (as discussed in 
the chapters above). In this sense, not all narratives have integrative qualities—some 
narratives deny some people a coherent self-identity. The self that emerges from 
Ricœur’s account is seemingly unimplicated in the will-to-power or will-to-truth that I 
have shown is an integral aspect of myth and mythmaking. I am wary of his account of 
narrative because, from a feminist point of view at the very least, it does not seem able 
to address the ways in which narratives can function as negative templates of selfhood 
that disarm and harm women amongst other ‘marginalised’ groups. Narrative may 
indeed perform an act of integration but it is equally able to exclude and marginalise 
people as other to the narratively constituted self.  
The second problem in Ricœur’s account concerns his attitude to the language 
of narration as stable, reliable, and predicated on a communicative model of being that 
seeks the common good of all people everywhere. Consequently, the figure of identity 
that emerges from his account of narrative is very much an ordered and stable image of 
selfhood, and reflects his belief in the transparent and reliable structure of language. As 
Patrick Crowley suggests, although Ricœur 
argues in favour of a mediation of self-understanding through texts, he 
subordinates the destabilizing potential of language to the principles of Aristotelian 
poetics, particularly the importance of composition and plot which result in the 
subordination of chance events to a teleological structure….[He] seeks to stabilize 
signification and save the identity of the subject by appealing to a greater good 
beyond narrative identity, namely a coherent notion of self-identity that ethically 
responds to the call of the other. 
(2003:6) 
His later work, particularly Oneself as Another (1992), stands as an example of Ricœur’s 
appeal to stability in which he continues to consider the mechanisms of narrative 
identity. However, Oneself as Another also marks a striking shift in his thinking 
regarding the basis upon which identity formation can take place. It seems to have been 
a response to the claim regarding the fragmented nature of identity, and of the 
constitution of individuals in language, posited by poststructural and postmodern 
theorists such as Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan (explored below).  
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In Oneself as Another Ricœur takes up the problem of ethical action and the place 
it has in the formation of identity. He suggests a model of identity that crosses the 
divide between self and other as opposed entities through an analysis of friendship (that 
is, a non-agonistic relationship between two selves predicated on an acceptance of the 
mutuality of being) and by implication, of ethical action. Friendship, for Ricœur, 
operates on the basis of three structural principles: reversibility, non-substitutability, 
and similitude (see also Flood 2000:211). Reversibility concerns the interchangeability of 
the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ because the designated ‘you’ also refers to an ‘I’: ‘When 
another addresses me in the second person, I feel I am implicated in the first person’ 
(Ricœur 1992:193). Non-substitutability suggests that the ‘I’ nonetheless remains discrete 
insofar as the substantive difference between the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ cannot be completely 
removed and the two pronouns are not syntactically or indeed ontologically 
interchangeable from the perspective of the ‘I’ (here Ricœur seems to employ a 
structuralist sense of the differential logic of language that I will outline below). Finally, 
similitude relates to the eponymous notion of ‘oneself as another’ in that the ‘I’ must 
recognise the other as like itself and therefore as similarly agentive (ibid.). For Ricœur, as 
I have noted, selfhood is posited in relation to a particular narrative sequence—the 
person in phenomenological time—which is then placed in relation to others within a 
linguistic and social community. It is in the telling of oneself to another that one is 
revealed as both an ‘I’ and a ‘you’. 
However, Ricœur’s analyses of particular narratives forces him to acknowledge 
that there are narratives (he focuses on Robert Musil’s ‘modernist’ novel Der Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften; ‘Man without Qualities’) in which the identity of the ‘I’ (ipse) can be 
systematically deconstructed by the narrative itself to the extent that narrative no longer 
provides the comforting mediation between the temporal contingency of 
phenomenological time and the static sameness of cosmological time. This is because it 
does not allow for—in fact, actively disrupts—a settled coherency of both time and self. 
He opposes modernist novels to folklore which he argues epitomises the unchanging 
character of human beings, a tactic that bears a similarity to the claims of authenticity 
that constituted the Grimm brothers’ folkloristics discussed in Chapter 5. The 
protagonists of folktales (and of realist novels) serve as the exemplars of narrative 
identity in Oneself as Another on the basis that their characterisations (usually in the third 
person) invite the reader to identify or otherwise—but certainly position her- or himself 
in reference to—a choice of action in the tale, consequently providing the reader with, at 
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the very least, a provisional or virtual narrative identity. Further, it is the 
unambiguously moral force of folklore and its undertone of authenticity that appeals to 
Ricœur as he attempts to settle on a narrative form that secures identity.  
The significance of Ricœur’s claim in this regard is that it emphasises how the 
self comes to self-realisation through the mediation of the fictional (or real) other rather 
than through its own self alone. Against this form of characterisation, Ricœur sets 
modernist novels. He suggests that the disintegration of narrative identity is bound up 
with the disintegration of the narrative (novelistic) form: 
The erosion of paradigms…strikes both the figuration of the character and the 
configuration of the plot. Thus in the case of Robert Musil, the decomposition of the 
narrative form paralleling the loss of identity of the character breaks out of the 
confines of the narrative and draws the literary work into the sphere of the essay. 
Nor is it by chance that so many contemporary autobiographies…deliberately move 
away from the narrative form and move into the literary genre with the least 
configuration—the essay. 
(1992:149) 
That Ricœur singles out the autobiographical form as an exemplar of the instability of 
contemporary narrative is at first glance puzzling. One would expect that, in Ricœur’s 
terms, autobiography is rather the most obvious form of narrative identity, the genre 
through which individuals are best able to narrate the coherency of their own lives. This 
is because autobiographical works appear to negotiate and resolve the potentially 
fraught relationship between subject and writing and the possibility of drawing the 
contingencies of existence into a configuration that suggests the stability of the self over 
time.  
However, recent work on autobiography indicates that rather than stabilising 
the self, the very act of setting down an account of one’s life may perhaps result in 
destabilisation thus revealing a latent sense of unease in the narrator: the temptations of 
fictionalising memories, the tensions between competing versions of the self through 
time, the uncertainty that might erode the identity of an ‘I’ as it attempts to recover and 
re-present the past. Autobiographical narratives reconstruct the events of a life in the 
light of ‘what was not known then’; the narrative reconstruction of a life history 
provides the opportunity for a retrospectively teleological rereading of events, and the 
analysis the autobiographer undertakes in the process of writing these events ‘seeks 
those intentions which would have been determinate of the good fortune or misfortune, 
of the subject, had they been recognized as such’ (Forrester 1990:210).12 Linda Williams 
                                                           
12 Nicola King provides a painful example of this retrospective inscription of a teleology on past 
events in a story she tells of the Holocaust survivor Leon Greenman, who, at an anti-Nazi League 
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understands this retrospective signification through recollection as an element of 
narrative that challenges the straightforward linearity of time, suggesting that ‘If 
subjects come into being through their relationship with narratives, then narratives are 
formed in time; but…the form of narrative time…does not flow in only one direction’ 
(1995:126). As such, narrative can only achieve coherency after the fact (and a tenuous, 
fragmented coherency at that)—the narration of a life story relies on selective and partial 
remembrance in search of meaning. Andrew Benjamin suggests that autobiography is a 
form of ‘retranslation’ (1992:149). In some autobiographies13 the process of retranslation 
will be more consciously acknowledged than in those autobiographies where the ‘I’ who 
speaks is assumed to be coterminous with the ‘I’ who is spoken of. Benjamin applauds 
the ‘present imperfect translation…ceaselessly…push[ing] for renewed translation’ 
which inscribes the ‘dynamic of a self-presencing that is always, and of necessity, 
incomplete’ (1992:146). It is perhaps this aspect of autobiography that Ricœur recognises 
and then rejects because the ‘decomposition’ that appears to be inherent in this kind of 
autobiographical narration does not only ‘parallel the loss of identity’ but is rather 
constitutive of it. 
Rather than investigate the implications of narrative disintegration for his 
theory of narrative identity, Ricœur transfers his loyalty away from narrative and 
towards the field of ethical action precisely at the point where the stability of the self is 
put in question. It would seem, therefore, that when particular narratives undermine 
identity to such an extent that the nature and stability of the ‘I’ has been put in question 
and hangs in the balance, then the narrative’s utility has been exhausted and the 
individual must seek identity elsewhere. In his article ‘Narrative Identity’ (1991) Ricoeur 
advises his readers to be wary of identifying too closely with narrative identities because 
of the possibility of being disarmed and fragmented by narrative disintegration, and in 
so doing he prioritises ethical action over narrative. He therefore defers moments of 
                                                                                                                                                             
meeting in Winchester in 1994, narrated the story of his arrival, with his wife, at Auschwitz where 
he saw his wife taken away to the gas chambers, although he stated that ‘he didn’t know that 
then’. As King recalls, ‘His memory of that moment seems to have been deeply affected by what 
he didn’t know at the time of the event: what he also has to remember is the painful fact of his 
own ignorance, as if not knowing was in some way culpable, as if it deprived him of a degree of 
moral responsibility, or of human agency. His memory has been forced to assimilate later 
knowledge which now also belongs to the wider realm of ‘history’: what he can never recover is 
the ‘innocence’ of the time when he “didn’t know”’ (2000:1). She goes on to suggest that this 
‘paradoxical “knowing” and “not knowing” is the position of any autobiographical narrator, who, 
in the present moment of the narration, possesses the knowledge that she did not have “then”, in 
the moment of the experience’ (2000:2). 
13 Benjamin draws examples from the work of Carole Steedman (1982; 1996), Georges Perec (1989), 
and Ronald Fraser (1984). 
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identification to the world of ethical action (in friendship), arguing that it is praxis alone 
that can finally stabilise meaning and therefore identity. It is not only action, however, 
that assists the definition of identity; the statement of a promise to another connects 
speech to action and in so doing defines the ipse/idem as constant through and within 
change: ‘The properly ethical justification of the promise suffices of itself, a justification 
which can be derived from the obligation to safeguard the institution of language and to 
respond to the truth that the other places in my faithfulness’ (1992:125).  
The implication of this statement, as I understand it, is that in keeping one’s 
word, one is able to stabilise language through an intention expressed in words which is 
then followed through by action. It is in keeping one’s promise, Ricœur argues, that both 
language and the self are able to withstand the traumatic aspects of the temporal 
disjunction between cosmological and phenomenological time. As such, this form of 
identity is congruent with the claim he makes throughout Oneself as Another that the self 
is defined through its acknowledgement of and response to the other and that 
contingency can be come to terms with through a continual act of self-affirmation that is 
consequent upon the ethical choices one makes and the actions one takes. However, the 
problem I have with this view is that it presupposes the inherent stability and 
transparency of language and allows Ricœur to ignore the increasingly influential claim 
that selves, and even the concept of ‘self’, are created in language. Poststructuralist 
theorists, for example, have shown the impossibility of fixing language as a transparent 
and stable system of representation and this has had enormous implications for 
understanding subjectivity, as I will discuss in the following section and in the next 
chapter. Any attempt to fix identity in language must, after the poststructural turn, 
acknowledge the metonymic, supplemental, and inconstant structure of language and 
the fact that even the assertion of a stable self is subject to a diversity of possible and 
ongoing interpretations where any stability of meaning is always already in doubt. 
However, rather than pursuing the possible imbrication of self and language, and the 
differential logic of texts, Ricœur turns to realist texts and folklore. Ultimately, this 
enables him to argue that it is moral action—moral through language—which defines 
personal identity and which subsumes narrative identity within the greater cause of 
ethical order. It seems to me, therefore, that Ricœur’s work is founded on a 
presupposition that language is available for the individual to use as a tool for the 
attestation of the self, rather than on the very different poststructural proposition that 
meaning, self, and the act of attestation are themselves products of a differential 
  270 
language structure. As such he reveals a nostalgia for the certainty of meaning and 
thereby of the self.  
The third area of difficulty that I have with Ricœur’s account is related to the 
first two. He portrays temporality as linear and therefore as a coherent economy of past, 
present, and future, even if that linearity is created in narrative rather than replicating 
some inherent property of the world. He denies, for example, that the world of 
experience is completely unformed prior to narrative, but suggests that narrative 
introduces configurative meanings which are not found there: ‘The ideas of beginning, 
middle, and end are not taken from experience: They are not traits of real action but 
effects of poetic ordering’ (1984:37). As I have shown, for Ricœur, narrative’s ability to 
produce a ‘poetic ordering’ is necessary for the attestation of identity (because narrative 
can confront and mediate the multiplications of aporia that characterise temporality and 
the distinctions between the ipse and the idem). He strongly asserts the beneficial aspects 
of linearity, because linearity equates to meaningfulness and coherency. However, 
rather than being a product of narrative, it could be argued, at the very least from a 
poststructural perspective, that linearity is itself an element of linguistic, rather than 
narrative, ordering inasmuch as it inscribes a differential logic that enables the assertion 
of past-present-future as sets of differential and arbitrarily linked relations. As such, the 
meaning or significance of this kind of linear configuration cannot be derived through 
the prioritisation of any one aspect of its chain of meaning, but only in reference to its 
other signifiers. Ricœur’s prioritisation of the linearity of narrative inscribes, therefore, 
an intrinsic reliance on continuity and causality as the only means through which the 
coherency and stability of identity can be maintained, and thus it recalls the triadic 
model of nationalist rhetoric that I argued defined the German cultural nationalist 
project. What separates Ricœur’s utilisation of temporal linearity from that of the triadic 
model is that he offers a primarily descriptive account of identity narration as an ethical 
enterprise (albeit the only one) that does not privilege any one aspect of the temporal 
line, rather than as an enterprise which is didactically oriented towards retrieving 
identity as essence and which prioritises the past over the present as in the case of 
German nationalism. Where Ricœur privileges the organising principle of linearity over 
the instability of disintegrating narratives, in the German case the past was valorised 
against the present and towards the future. 
Nonetheless, both accounts of temporality may be seen to constitute a form of 
what Jacques Derrida names ‘logocentrism’, where the meaning of any given sign 
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(within language, but also necessarily within metaphysics)—in this case past, present, or 
future—is provided through differential relations (binary oppositions) that appear to 
stabilise meaning by prioritising the first term in any given pair. As Barbara Johnson 
suggests, ‘In general, what these hierarchical oppositions do is to privilege unity, 
identity, immediacy, and temporal and spatial presentness over distance, difference, 
dissimulation and deferment’ (2004:viii). If this is in fact the structure of western 
metaphysics and of language in general, then the German prioritisation of the past 
might seem to contradict the logocentric privileging of ‘presentness’. However, in my 
view, the derogation of the present and the search for a glorious past that would ground 
a stable German identity in the context of the nationalist project was in fact an attempt to 
derogate only a particular form of the present and as such was a response to the need to 
stabilise the present, to ameliorate its destabilising properties rather than to reject it 
altogether. Further, the past itself could only be defined as a present which had passed. 
Ricœur’s reliance on narrative as logically continuous and causal also reveals a 
logocentric assumption of the stability and unifying aspects of language. Because of his 
logocentric prioritisation of linear temporality, he is able to present identity as a 
coherent narrative of continuity and causality precisely because it privileges the notion 
of being as a presence, albeit negotiated and strived for. It is a prioritisation that is 
predicated on what he identifies as the universal human need to resolve the 
phenomenological disjunctions between past, present, and future in order to stabilise 
identity as a coherent narrative form.  
I am reminded here of a startling passage in Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1972) where he suggests a connection between the assertion or identification 
of historical continuity and the ‘sovereign self’ of Enlightenment formulations, while 
first remarking that the elision of discontinuity is a marker of the sovereign self’s 
inability to come to terms with the Other. It is a passage worth citing at length because 
of its clear and incisive analysis of the type of ontological dependence on continuity that 
for him marks modernity: 
It is as if it was particularly difficult, in the history in which men retrace their own 
ideas and their own knowledge, to formulate a general theory of discontinuity, of 
series, of limits, unities, specific orders, and differentiated autonomies and 
dependences. As if, in that field where we had become used to seeking origins, to 
pushing back further and further the line of antecedents, to reconstituting 
traditions, to following evolutive curves, to projecting teleologies, and to having 
constant recourse to metaphors of life, we felt a particular repugnance to conceiving 
of difference, to describing separations and dispersions, to dissociating the 
reassuring form of the identical. Or, to be more precise, as if we found it difficult to 
construct a theory, to draw general conclusions, and even to derive all the possible 
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implications of these concepts of thresholds, mutations, independent systems, and 
limited series….As if we were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own 
thought…. 
Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the 
subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; 
the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted 
unity; the promise that one day the subject - in the form of historical consciousness - 
will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things 
that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his 
abode. Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making 
human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all 
action are the two sides of the same system of thought. In this system, time is 
conceived in terms of totalisation and revolutions are never more than moments of 
consciousness. 
 (1972:12) 
As such, according to Foucault, it would seem that ‘the discourse of the continuous’ 
goes hand in hand with the regulation of the self as an autonomous unity, and, further, 
is a discourse which, after Derrida, might be said to rely on a logocentric impulse for 
narrative ordering implicit in what he refers to as the ‘metaphysics of presence’. In what 
follows, I want to investigate further the dynamics that underlie the rejection of 
discontinuity as a ground for subjectivity in favour of continuity (expressed through 
linearity). I will return to the politics of identity with which I began this chapter, 
outlining Derrida’s critique of logocentrism as a mechanism of stabilisation that 
obscures the fluid, unstable, and ambiguous nature of both language and identity. I will 
then extend his critique to analyse the extent to which patrilinearity can be viewed as an 
expression of the logocentric impulse for the ground of identity as stable, unified, and 
present.  
III. Self/Other and Patrilinearity 
In Chapter 5 I noted how Derrida’s critique of phonocentrism, as a subset of 
logocentrism, was a useful way of understanding and challenging the prioritisation of 
orality over written sources in the context of the Grimms’ collection of folklore. In this 
section I want to apply his concept of logocentrism to an analysis of the constitution of 
the ‘self’, or of identity more generally, within western metaphysics. I will do so in order 
to demonstrate that the structuralist supposition that all signification is dependent on 
negative relations of irresolvable difference—modelled on the synchronic structure of 
language as identified by Saussure—is less clear-cut than the structuralists would have 
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it.14 If individuals cannot think or be without language, as structuralists have suggested 
against the phenomenological tradition that begins with Edmund Husserl (1859–1938),15 
then the idea of a ‘self’ or ‘subject’ ceases to refer to a metaphysical absolute, a self-
evident ‘given’ of existence and becomes something constructed in and through 
language. In this way, the rejection of the transparency of thought, of a priori structures 
of rationality, and the downgrading of the ‘subject’ from a transcendental foundation to 
an empirical construction are mutually inseparable presuppositions of the adoption of a 
structuralist approach. This model of language and ontology plays a central part in 
Derrida’s thought. In the poststructuralist turn inaugurated by Derrida (amongst others) 
the formative nature of language as established by the structuralists is taken for granted, 
but Derrida demonstrates a series of paradoxes that underlie the structuralist positions, 
                                                           
14 Briefly, the intellectual movement that became known as ‘structuralism’ originated with 
Saussure’s analysis of the phenomenon of language as a signifying system predicated on relations 
of negative difference. For Saussure, the most important relation between signifiers in language, 
one that creates that value of any given sign, is the idea of difference. One signifier has meaning 
within language, not because it is connected to a particular signified, but because it is not any of 
the other signifiers in the system. Saussure referred to this difference as a negative value and 
proposed that language does not begin from meanings that it then labels, but rather meaning 
occurs because of the differential relations within language. Saussure’s analysis was extended to 
the examination of different social systems and became known as Structuralism, flourishing 
during the middle of the twentieth century, most influentially in France. The most well-known 
structuralists in this vein were Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes (at least in his earlier 
work). In general Structuralism can be defined as the systematic analysis of human sociality 
through the identification of all the structures and systems that underlie all the things that 
humans do, think, perceive, and feel. Structuralist analysis posits these systems as universal: every 
human mind in every culture at every point in history has used some sort of structuring principle 
to organise and understand cultural phenomena. For instance, every human culture has some sort 
of language, which has the basic structure of all language: words/phonemes are combined 
according to a grammar of rules to produce meaning. Every human culture similarly has some 
sort of social organisation (for example, government), a system for who can marry whom (a 
kinship system), and a system for exchanging goods (an economic system). All of these 
organisations are governed, according to structuralist analyses, by structures which are universal, 
that is, they all operate on the assumption of different units working in conjunction with others to 
establish order. More formally, a structure is any conceptual system that has the following 
properties: (1) wholeness; (2) transformation; (3) self-regulation. For Structuralists, the order that 
individuals perceive in the world is not inherent, but is rather a product of consciousness. 
However, structuralists do not posit that there is no ‘reality out there’, beyond human perception, 
but rather that there is too much ‘reality’ to be perceived coherently without some kind of 
‘grammar’ or system to organise and limit it. See Sturrock 1979, 1993. 
15 Husserl viewed signs as derivative and dependent indications of meaning which he defined as 
what is present to consciousness at the moment of any given utterance. His central thesis, as 
articulated in his Logical Investigations (1900) and Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology 
(1931) was that the world is constituted by consciousness and that consciousness is intentional. 
That is, every act of consciousness is directed at some object, whether material or abstract. For 
Husserl, the work of a phenomenologist is to distinguish and describe the nature of the intentional 
acts of consciousness and the intentional objects of consciousness, which are defined through the 
content of consciousness. In Ideas, Husserl defends a strongly realist position: the objects that are 
perceived by consciousness are taken to be not merely objects of consciousness but the things 
themselves.  
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querying the structuralist assertion of universality, its presentation of language and 
social structures more generally as static, totalised, and stable systems (see Derrida 1982; 
2002; 2004—all originally published in 1972). Poststructuralism thus has some important 
implications for understanding the constitution of selfhood as unstable and tenuous, an 
aspect that suggests it may be open to an ethical reconfiguration as I will discuss briefly 
here and detail more fully in the final chapter.  
In his most well-known work, Of Grammatology (1978), Derrida undertakes a 
critique of western metaphysics by examining its prioritisation of speech over writing, 
suggesting that this occurs because of a foundational privileging of presence over 
absence.16 Thus, speech is privileged because both the speaker and listener are assumed 
to be present to the utterance concurrently without any temporal or spatial disparity. 
The one who speaks hears her- or himself in the same instant as the listener, and this 
contiguity appears to secure the notion that in speech a person’s meaning is 
transparently present. Regardless of whether or not complete understanding is actually 
secured between speaker and listener, this notion of consummate self-present meaning 
is, according to Derrida, the foundational ideal of western culture. For Derrida, the 
history of metaphysics has always determined being as presence and he suggests that 
It would be possible to show that all the terms related to fundamentals, to 
principles, or to the centre have always designated the constant of a presence—
eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), alētheia, 
transcendentality, consciousness or conscience, God, man, and so forth. 
(2001:353) 
I will return to Derrida’s analysis of the centre shortly. What I would note here is that 
Derrida suggests that underlying all metaphysical constructs is presence as an 
organisational principle of coherency, regardless of which element of the system is 
singled out as foundational. The belief in the self-presentation of meaning at the 
moment of utterance is logocentric in that the spoken word stands at the centre of 
language as the original organising principle of the whole system. In the oppositional 
schema of speech and writing, therefore, writing must be considered by the logocentric 
system to be merely a representation of speech, a second-order substitution that 
attempts to overcome the distance and disparity between the speaker/author and 
                                                           
16 Derrida’s project in his early writings is to elaborate a science of writing called grammatology: a 
science that would study the effects of this différance which western metaphysics has 
systematically repressed in its search for self-present Truth. But, as Derrida himself admits, the 
very notion of a perfectly adequate science or –logy belongs to the logocentric discourse which 
grammatology would try, precisely, to put in question. Derrida thus finds himself in the 
uncomfortable position of attempting to account for an error by means of tools derived from that 
very error. I am of course attempting something similar in this thesis.  
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listener/reader but that cannot succeed in doing so because distance signifies either the 
absence of the speaker, the listener, or both. Thus when the writer puts pen to paper, his 
or her thoughts become distant both from her- or himself and from the potential reader. 
This recognition of distance and difference is thought within logocentrism to be a 
corruption of the self-presence of meaning and to open meaning up to all forms of 
adulteration through the vagaries of interpretation which the contiguity between 
speaker and listener could hold off. 
However, Derrida shows that the opposition of the two terms on the basis of 
presence/absence, or contiguity/distance is deceptive, because speech, like writing, is 
always already inhabited by difference and distance. This is because, at least according 
to Saussure, a sign is divided into a phonic signifier and a mental signified, and 
language is a system of differences rather than a collection of independently meaningful 
units. So language is already constituted by the very distances and differences it seeks to 
overcome. As Johnson interprets Derrida, ‘To mean, in other words, is automatically not 
to be. As soon as there is meaning, there is difference’ (2004:ix). Derrida’s word for the 
differential delay inherent in any signifying act is différance, from the French verb différer 
(both ‘to differ’ and ‘to defer’) (see Derrida 2002:7). He further notes that the -ance 
ending in the term signifies an ‘undecidable’ element of language that disrupts the 
coherency of oppositional thought:  
[B]ecause it brings us close to the infinitive and active kernel of différer, 
différance…neutralizes what the infinitive denotes as simply active, just as mouvance 
in our language does not simply mean the fact of moving, of moving oneself or of 
being moved….We must consider that in the usage of our language the ending -ance 
remains undecided between the active and the passive….[T]hat which lets itself be 
designated différance is neither simply active nor simply passive, announcing or 
rather recalling something like the middle voice, saying an operation that is not an 
operation, an operation that cannot be conceived either as passion or as the action of 
a subject on an object, or on the basis of the categories of agent or patient, neither on 
the basis of no moving towards any of these terms. For the middle voice, a certain 
nontransitivity, may be what philosophy, at its outset, distributed into an active and 
a passive voice, thereby constituting itself by means of this repression. 
(1982:9) 
As such, différance as an operation that is inherent within any act of signification disrupts 
and disallows any solid assertion of straightforward differentiation in terms of 
hierarchical distinctions that oppositions encode. And it is significant that Derrida 
suggests that philosophy ‘at its outset’ repressed this undecidability. Here he could be 
obliquely referring to the ‘primal scene’ of philosophy where a distinction was enforced 
between itself as logos and its other as muthos. This is a point I will return to at the end of 
the next chapter. 
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Derrida’s neologism ‘différance’ is central to his practice of deconstruction in that 
he recognises, after Saussure, that signification is only possible because of differences 
(usually presented as a series of binary oppositions) between signifier and signified: if 
there is no difference, there is only redundancy rather than signification. Because the 
elements of signification are negatively relational—a is a because it is not b, for 
example—there is nothing present ‘behind’ a sign that guarantees the stability of its 
meaning without ambiguity, and this prevents any possibility of achieving a definitive, 
determinate, or singular reading of a system of meaning such as language or 
metaphysics. Jonathan Culler defines deconstruction clearly when he describes it as  
a critique of the hierarchical oppositions that have structured Western thought: 
inside/outside, mind/body, literal/metaphorical, speech/writing, presence/absence, 
nature/culture, form/meaning. To deconstruct an opposition is to show that it is not 
natural and inevitable but a construction, produced by discourses that rely on it, 
and to show that it is a construction in a work of deconstruction that seeks to 
dismantle it and reinscribe it—that is, not destroy it but give it a different structure 
and functioning…. [A]lso a mode of reading, deconstruction is…a ‘teasing out of 
warring forces of signification within a text’, an investigation of the tension between 
modes of signification, as between the performative and constantive dimensions of 
language. 
(1997: 22) 
Close scrutiny of the significances, or presentation of meanings, in a relational pair 
reveals, for Derrida, an aporia, a moment at which the illusion of determinacy and 
singularity breaks down because of an internal inconsistency or blindspot. Furthermore, 
because there is difference, there is always a space (espacément)—a gap (an aporia), a 
rupture—between signifier and signified which means that while one meaning or set of 
meanings is foregrounded, another is simultaneously and temporarily put on hold, or 
‘deferred’. The idea of deferral resists the closure of meanings which might appear to be 
the effect of difference, because the process of signification is seen always to delay or 
displace immediate or pure intelligibility. If the foregrounded meaning is viewed only 
as a meaning effect produced by a filtering process, différance requires that one also 
consider what has been filtered out, or marginalised, in order to open interpretation to a 
range of new possibilities. Meaning thus can be seen to rest upon lack or absence (of 
signs) rather than presence.17 
                                                           
17 Derrida theorises two means of registering this absence: the supplement (supplément) and the 
trace. He argues that each element in a system of meaning (for example, a signifier) ‘is related to 
something other than itself but retains the mark of a past element.’ (1973:6) which he calls a ‘trace’. 
Traces are the various kinds of marks which rupture our certainty about the relation between an 
element and its meaning. A supplement is something ‘added on’, seemingly deliberately, to a 
prior term in order to address an omission within it. Thus, the supplement appears to be exterior 
and secondary to the primary term it supplements. Derrida, however argues against the 
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What Derrida argues first in Of Grammatology, and then throughout his oeuvre, 
is that différance inhabits the very core of what appears to be immediate and present. 
Even in the seemingly non-linguistic areas of the structures of consciousness and the 
unconscious, Derrida analyses, for example, the underlying necessity that induces 
Sigmund Freud to compare the psychic apparatus to what, for Derrida, is a structure of 
scriptural différance, a ‘mystic writing-pad’ (see Derrida 2004:246–291). The illusion of 
the self-presence of meaning or of consciousness is thus produced by the repression of 
the differential and deferred structures from which they spring. Thus, even Saussure’s 
theory of the structure of differentiation that marks language is predicated on différance: 
the opposition between a material signifier and intelligible signified must already have 
been marked out or traced by a process that cannot be brought to full presence. 
The totalising imperative of logocentrism—its endless attempts to fix and 
guarantee meaning by keeping paired terms in a negative relation—functions through 
its identification of a centre as guarantor of meaning. As Derrida suggests, ‘By orienting 
and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the play of 
its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any 
center represents the unthinkable itself’ (2001:352). However, because of his 
identification of différance at work in logocentrism, he wants, instead, to identify a 
structure without a centre, to decentre the centre, or, if that is unthinkable, to 
problematise the way in which, for structuralists, structures are always organised 
around centres, origins, points of presence and power, while their boundaries remain 
impermeable (see Derrida 2001:351–370). Between the centre and the margins of 
structures, Derrida finds a space, a resistance built into the attempted uniformity of the 
system; and he locates its breakdown—différance—at the point at which it tries to draw 
its own limits. Derrida has introduced into structuralist analyses, therefore, a 
recognition of a system’s radical instability. In any system, he has suggested, there will 
always be sites of force that are, precisely, forced, and that therefore allow for pressure 
and intervention which may open up the possibility of emancipation from (or, at the 
very least, resistance to) the totalising logic of the structure.18 Thus madness as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
metaphysical logic which places the supplement in a secondary or derivative position to a prior 
term. He suggests that if the supplement is necessary to compensate for the absence it reveals in a 
prior term, then it is not so much an external extra as a necessary constituent of the term it 
supplements.  
18 This claim bears a good deal of resemblance to Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem which he 
proved in 1931. Gödel essentially demonstrated that within any given branch of mathematics, 
there would always be some propositions that could not be proven either true or false using the 
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excluded other of the operation of reason, inside/outside structures, the same and the 
other, the reign of violence in the difference between the same and the other, the ethical 
relationship to the Other, alterity, difference, differences in identity, identity that is 
different from itself—all these are made visible, effecting the destabilisation of the 
system. In examining what identity is, therefore, in the context of Derrida’s work, the 
logic of identity as sameness, that is, as a product of logocentrism, can be brought into 
question. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (9th edn.) defines the term ‘identity’ in two ways: 
‘the state of being the same in substance, nature, qualities, etc., absolute sameness; [in] 
Algebra, the equality of two expressions for all values of the quantities expressed by 
letters [as in the equation (x + 1)2 = x2 + 2x + 1]’. Thus, according to the OED, whether in 
the relation expressed in mathematics and logic by the symbol =, or in terms of an 
individual identity, the term ‘identity’ indicates absolute sameness, the condition of being 
a specified person or thing which is the same in all situations and circumstances through 
time. It is constancy, therefore, that appears to constitute identity. This definition of 
identity would correspond to Ricœur’s notion of idem identity, that is, sameness. Yet if 
identity is sameness it is, at the same time, also signified through difference; 
paradoxically, it can only be defined by difference from other things or people. As a 
concept, therefore, the inscription of ‘identity’ necessarily summons its opposite, 
difference. Rather like the structure of metaphor in which one can only say what 
something is by saying what it is not, in order to say who one is, one has to say who one 
is not. In the realm of identity politics, for example, a form of sameness between two or 
more persons is declared as the basis for solidarity against another group.  
Identity politics, however, evoke not only the power structure implicit in the 
hierarchy of same and other, but also the fact that in this same-other relation the identity 
of the other is only defined in relation to that of the same, not in terms of its own 
qualities. The identity of the other group is only a negative image; the ‘other’ is thus a 
unitary category, like the same, applicable to any number of groups who are 
characterised without any specificity, inasmuch as they are all ‘others’. Identification 
                                                                                                                                                             
rules and axioms of that mathematical branch itself. One might be able to prove every conceivable 
statement about numbers within a system by going outside the system in order to come up with 
new rules and axioms, but by doing so all that would be achieved would be the creation of a 
larger system with its own unprovable statements. The implication of Gödel’s theorem is that all 
logical systems of any complexity are, by definition, incomplete; each of them contains, at any 
given time, more true statements than it can possibly prove according to its own defining set of 
rules. See van Heijenoort 1967:596–616. 
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understood in these terms conforms to the basic model that Edward Said established in 
Orientalism (1978). The ‘oriental’ other’s only identity (within orientalist discourse) is 
that which is imposed on ‘it’ by the Occident, as other to the Occident’s self; but, as Said 
persuasively shows, this other is nothing more than a mirror in which the Occident sees 
the disowned parts of itself, and through which it is able to orient itself precisely as a 
self. Samuel Weber also describes this strategy well when he states that in order to 
define itself, any group must ‘simultaneously set itself apart from what it is not’ and yet 
remain ‘ineluctably haunted by what it seeks to exclude’ (1982:33). As I have already 
shown in the case of late nineteenth-century German anti-Semitism, this dual movement 
was at work in the efforts to define Germanness as distinct from Jewishness. This 
identity so construed was reliant on—haunted by—a model of elided biblical ethnology 
that had placed the Jews as the original people, and as such the model had to be both 
appropriated and reemployed in order to establish the originality of the German people. 
I will return to offer an analysis of the significance of this strategic dual encoding of 
identity shortly. First, however, I want, via Derrida, to examine the particular 
metaphysical logic that posits the self as the same—the self-same19—against (but always 
in reference to) an other. 
Derrida has defined metaphysics as follows: 
The enterprise of returning ‘strategically’, ‘ideally’, to an origin or to a priority 
thought to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to 
think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. All 
metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in 
this way, conceiving good to be before evil, the positive before the negative, the 
pure before the impure, the simple before the complex, the essential before the 
accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one 
metaphysical gesture amongst others; it is the metaphysical exigency, that which 
has been most constant, most profound and most potent. 
(1988:236) 
                                                           
19 The term ‘self-same’ in Derridean discourse comes from the French term ‘propre’ and 
corresponds to ‘ownself’. It suggests both property and appropriation (enveloping) as well as the 
notion of the proper, the appropriate, and the clean. It bears some similarity to the term ‘sacred’ 
from the Latin root sacer ‘to set apart’. Otherness cannot be constituted as a self unless it conveys 
the properties of selfhood as a bounded entity. For example, femininity as the apparent opposite 
of masculinity does not, in dualist thinking, share the properties of the masculine self and so is 
represented as the other of the self-same. This enables the constitution of the masculine self as 
bounded, but it simultaneously threatens the purity of that boundary and must therefore be 
contained, appropriated, or effaced. Masculinity on the other hand can recognise other 
masculinity because it corresponds, more or less, to the self-same.  
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As such, metaphysical thought, in much the same way as language, is premised on a 
division,20 one that is immediately and deliberately hierarchical. However, even such a 
division itself secures the legitimation of its hierarchical valuation through the 
assertion—enabled by a prioritisation of the first term of singularity, that is, the 
singularity of the origin. According to this logic, the division is thus necessarily 
repressed or rendered secondary through the prioritisation of singularity as origin. Such 
an origin forms a stabilising centre for logocentric discourse because an origin seems to 
guarantee being as presence by enabling the assertion of an ‘I am’. Singularity is 
presumed, therefore, to precede duality, in the same way that presence precedes 
absence.21 For Derrida, then, all metaphysics in the western tradition privileges presence 
or that which is. This has some important implications for understanding how the self 
might be construed as an undivided—singular—self-presence and also as an origin.  
Within Derrida’s analysis of logocentrism, the function of a binary opposition in 
every case is not to hold two terms in tension as equal but different, but rather to distil 
singularity from duality, signalling, therefore, that western metaphysics is troubled by 
anything that exceeds singularity. Because of the valuation of the first term in any given 
pair as singular—in this case, the self—the other must signify more than one and as such 
must be either managed or marginalised as inessential. Thus, if the self is both 
temporally and qualitatively primary within the terms of a dualistic metaphysics, the 
self can be logically construed as prior to, and therefore the origin of, the other. In this 
way, otherness, as such, cannot help but share the qualities of the self—and yet 
otherness is nonetheless syntactically inscribed as oppositional to the self. Its similarity 
to the self is thus necessarily, but paradoxically, devalued and derogated.  
Derrida refers to this inscription of the singularity of the self as a violence, and 
suggests that the assertion of the self as ‘One’ is enabled by an act of forgetting that the 
self is always already divided, that it constitutes a scene of self-otherness:  
As soon as there is the one, there is murder, wounding, traumatism….The one 
guards against the other. It protects itself from the other, but, in the movement of 
this jealous violence, it compromises in itself the self-otherness or self difference 
(the difference from within oneself), which makes it One. The ‘One differing, 
deferring from itself’. The one as the other. At once, at the same time, but in a same 
time that is out of joint, the one forgets to remember itself to itself, it keeps and 
erases the archive of this injustice that it is. Of this violence that it does….The One 
                                                           
20 Derrida is alert, at the same time, to the problems inherent in identifying division as a site of 
origin: ‘The attempt to write the history of the decision, division, difference runs the risk of 
construing the division as an event or structure subsequent to the unity of an original presence, 
thereby confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation’ (2004:48). 
21 A similar idea occurs in early Indian philosophy. See Bhadārayaka Upaniad I.IV.1–3. 
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makes itself violence. It violates and does violence to itself, but also institutes itself 
as violence. It becomes what it is, the very violence—that it does to itself. The 
determination of the self as one is violence. 
(1995a:78) 
Thus violence is not only enacted against otherness, but also against the self because the 
construal of the self as the self-same erases or denies its divided origin, an origin that for 
Derrida consists of a movement of differing and deferring. As such, origins might be 
read as a site of différance rather than of temporal singularity and distilled essence.  
I want to suggest, therefore, that when an other is defined against the self, in a 
profound sense it is not really other at all, because the other is become part of the same. 
If the other must be part of the identity of the same for the same to be itself at all, then 
the same is riven with an alterity which might open it up to the difference of the other, 
effecting an inner dispersal. Identity consequently becomes decentred, and cannot be 
defined except as non-essential and negative. The significance of this is that meaning is 
not fixed: if identity is differential, it is open to change, it is porous. It can constantly be 
remade in relation to all through which it is negatively defined (Derrida 1978:128).  
Derrida's argument that the structure of language is ‘logocentric’, which he 
extends to account for the organisational properties of metaphysics more generally, has 
enabled the application of his work to the field of gender theory. Here the analysis of the 
structural function of binary oppositions in language has been extended to demonstrate 
the alignment of the first term in any pair with masculinity and the second devalued 
term with femininity. Hélène Cixous has developed this idea to argue that the structure 
of language is predicated on a gendered division where linguistic and conceptual 
oppositions signify a foundational couple, that of male and female. In her essay ‘Sorties’ 
(1996:63–132) she lists a series of binary oppositions that she claims have structured 
western thought—male/female, activity/passivity, order/chaos, language/silence, 
presence/absence, speech/writing, light/dark, good/evil—suggesting that the first term is 
privileged over the second because it is aligned with masculinity: 
Everywhere (where) ordering intervenes, where a law organizes what is thinkable 
by oppositions (dual, irreconcilable; or sublatable, dialectical). And all these pairs of 
oppositions are couples. Does that mean something? Is the fact that Logocentrism 
subjects thought—all concepts, codes and values—to a binary system, related to 
‘the’ couple, man/woman?….We see that ‘victory’ always comes down to the same 
thing: things get hierarchical. Organization by hierarchy makes all conceptual 
organization subject to man. Male privilege, shown in the opposition between 
activity and passivity, which he uses to sustain himself. Traditionally, the question of 
sexual difference is treated by coupling it with the opposition: activity/passivity. 
(1996:64) 
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The consequence of this alignment is to produce women as a sign of negativity, 
passivity, powerlessness, and death. Toril Moi usefully summarises the implications of 
Cixous’s analysis 
for one of the terms to acquire meaning…it must destroy the other. The ‘couple’ 
cannot be left intact: it becomes a general battlefield where the struggle for 
signifying supremacy is forever re-enacted. In the end, victory is equated with 
activity and defeat with passivity; under patriarchy, the male is always the victor. 
(1989a:125) 
Consequently, dualist thinking is reducible to singularity, to a logic of the masculine as 
the self-same. In the context of the German search for origins, as I have shown, 
singularity and duality were placed in the same awkward and paradoxical relationship 
but this secured a foundation for a solid expression of German identity against a 
backdrop where such an identity was in question and under threat. And this was 
achieved in explicitly gendered terms. In the case of German nationalism, its nostalgia 
for ‘Aryan’ origins secured a solid basis for the establishment of a German ‘fatherland’, 
the expression and imagination of a distinctly Germanic, autochthonous identity, and 
the means through which it could be favourably contrasted to a fabricated spectre of 
threatening, and feminised, Jewishness. I argued in the previous chapter that this 
discourse of differentiation was predicated on a patrilinear model of inheritance that 
enshrined fathers as the source and origin of German culture. In what follows I want to 
extend my identification of patrilinearity examined in the context of the German search 
for origins to western metaphysics more generally, in order to argue that patriliny has 
been a trope employed with striking regularity throughout the history of western 
metaphysics for the reason that it seems to offer a stable and reliable point of origin for 
individual, masculine ontology.  
The issue of what I am calling ‘patrilinearity’ in myths of origin and its 
relationship to assertions regarding the singularity of identity clearly requires some 
clarification here. My central claim is that patrilinearity is monological in its very 
essence: it seeks singularity as its organising principle and it is singularity, rather than 
presence, as Derrida would have it, that is the defining preoccupation of western 
metaphysics historically. In my view, paternity, origins, and singularity, and the 
concomitant appropriation of a procreative-reproductive function for males, are 
intertwined and interdependent in western metaphysics, permeating scholarly rhetoric 
regarding notions of intellectual lineage, legal rulings on inheritance, concepts of 
citizenship, literary production, the monotheistic basis of the Judaeo-Christian religious 
matrix, and almost every other cultural form or expression imaginable. The concept of 
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patrilinearity invokes a series of lexical associations and continuities, all of which point 
to the originary, unifying, authorising, and singular power of the father: pater–pater 
familias–paternal–paternity–patrialis–patriarch–patriarchy–patrie–patrician–patricide–
patriot–patrimony–patristic–patron–patronage–patronal–patronise—patronymic. Each 
term is connected through an etymological economy of patriliny and as such gestures to 
‘the Father’ as a self-contained singularity, the origin of an almost complete social 
system—of governance, kinship, social status, inheritance, cultural legitimacy, 
ownership of territory, national affiliation, and so on. The father-as-origin/originator 
establishes a non-transcendable basis upon which individuals—men and women—can 
assert their connection with each other and the authority by which these bonds are 
maintained. As such, the father signifies the imposition of a regulatory law upon which 
social relations are founded and sustained. Culture, as the social form that inscribes 
male bonding is conceived as an expression of paternity, the frequent notion being that 
‘culture’ somehow owes its origin, its validity or legality, even its coherence, to some 
deep structure or principle identified as the father.  
Maternity, by implication the ‘other’ of paternity, is rendered culturally or 
symbolically incoherent, an anomaly that is regularly resolved by associating it with its 
lexical derivative, matter or material, and consequently derogating it to nature and 
representing it as secondary or inferior to culture. Thus, as Judith Butler puts it, when 
‘reason and mind are associated with masculinity and agency’ then ‘body and nature 
are considered to be the mute facticity of the feminine, awaiting signification from an 
opposing masculine subject’ (1999:48). If language guarantees meaning (signification) 
then, in Butler’s terms, it is a masculine enterprise that creates of women a no-place. 
‘Woman’, as such, is an empty signifier and women’s being can only be deemed to be 
constituted—originated—through a masculine subject, logically a father.  
For Cixous, it is the logic of the self-same that underlies the prioritisation of 
patrilinearity within western metaphysics: 
[W]oman is always associated with passivity in philosophy. Whenever it is a 
question of woman, when one examines kinship structures, when a family model is 
brought into play. In fact, as soon as the question of ontology raises its head, as soon 
as one asks oneself ‘what is it?’, as soon as there is intended meaning. Intention: 
desire, authority—examine them and you are led right back…to the father. It is 
even possible not to notice that there is no place whatsoever for woman in the 
calculations. Ultimately the world of ‘being’ can function while precluding the 
mother. No need for a mother, as long as there is some motherliness: and it is the 
father, then, who acts the part, who is the mother. Either woman is passive or she 
does not exist. What is left of her is unthinkable, unthought. Which certainly means 
that she is not thought, that she does not enter into the oppositions, that she does 
not make a couple with the father (who makes a couple with the son). 
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(1996:64) 
In an important sense, therefore, the figure of the father within a patrilineal schema—
whether linguistic, philosophical, juridical, and so on—is erected as a sign of origin and 
of non-transcendable singularity. As such it seems to constitute an implicit ontological 
law. Butler has suggested that the law (of the father) named as patriarchy necessarily 
points to a ‘pre-juridical’ past to sustain its claim to authority: 
The self-justification of a repressive or subordinating law almost always grounds 
itself in a story about what it was like before the advent of the law, and how it came 
about that the law emerged in its present and necessary form. The fabrication of 
origins tends to describe a state of affairs before the law that follows a necessary 
and unilinear narrative that culminates in, and thereby justifies, the constitution of 
the law. The story of origins is thus a strategic tactic within a narrative that, by 
telling a single, authoritative account about an irrevocable past, makes the 
constitution of the law appear as a historical inevitability. 
(1999:46) 
The notion of the law of the father(s) as inevitable—natural—is precisely what 
patrilinear rhetoric is able to achieve through its presentation of temporality and 
ontology as inexorably linear. Moreover, the authority of its claims can be seen to rest on 
the assumption of a procreative metaphor for masculine endeavours such that the 
authority of the father is inscribed in his creation of order under the sign of the law. In 
the following chapter I will explore this metaphor in the context of Lacan’s structuralist 
psychoanalytical theories. 
Edward Said’s etymology of the word ‘authority’ provides an instructive case 
for understanding the relationship of origins to paternality and the regular 
appropriation of metaphors of procreation by males to explain their activities in the 
sphere of culture (particularly the production of narrative as linear coherency): 
Authority suggests to me a constellation of linked meanings: not only, as the OED 
tells us, ‘a power to enforce obedience,’ or ‘a derived or delegated power,’ or ‘a 
power to influence action,’ or ‘a power to inspire belief,’ or ‘a person whose opinion 
is accepted’; not only those, but a connection as well with author—that is, a person 
who originates or gives existence to something, a begetter, beginner, father, or 
ancestor, a person also who sets forth written statements. There is still another 
cluster of meanings: author is tied to the past participle auctus of the verb augere; 
therefore auctor…is literally an increaser and thus a founder. Auctoritas is 
production, invention, cause, in addition to meaning a right of possession. Finally, it 
means continuance, or a causing to continue. Taken together these meanings are all 
grounded in the following notions: (1) that of the power of an individual to initiate, 
institute, establish—in short, to begin; (2) that this power and its product are an 
increase over what had been there previously; (3) that the individual wielding this 
power controls its issue and what is derived therefrom; (4) that authority maintains 
the continuity of its course. 
(Said 1973:83; my emphasis) 
He later remarks that ‘the unity or integrity of [a] text is maintained by a series of 
genealogical connections: author—text, beginning—middle—end, text—meaning, 
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reader—interpretation and so on. Underneath all these is the imagery of succession, of 
paternity, or hierarchy’ (1973:162).  
According to Said’s etymology, the logic of patrilinearity is apparently bound 
up with concepts of linear continuity, and, perhaps more importantly, with causality—
that the patriline follows a pattern of linear inheritance, handed from fathers to sons, 
and that fathers are the paradigmatically causative agents as they establish their 
bloodline whether literally or figuratively. The issue of patrilineal continuity and 
causality is in turn connected to narrativity, the notion that every story must have a 
beginning, a middle, and an end, as Said suggests. More broadly, therefore, a 
narratology such as Ricœur’s that operates by prioritising continuity and causality as 
coherence is arguably embedded in a patrilineal model. The efficacy of continuity, as 
Said demonstrates, is that it enables the identification of a single origin and thus implies 
the paternal agent as original cause: ‘begetter, beginner’. This reproductive simile, 
within a phallogocentric economy, must necessarily efface or appropriate the 
procreative potential of women. Paternality as conveyed in a patrilineal schema is thus 
also a form of mimesis, an appropriation of metaphors of biological reproduction in 
order to found male agency and authority. Patrilinearity, as a paradigmatic mechanism 
of self-identification through recourse to a father as origin, has enabled the male gender 
in a variety of contexts to be promoted as a sole progenitor, and thus father, master, and 
owner of both biological children and ‘brainchildren’. In the process women are 
necessarily deprived of any authoritative share in cultural production and by 
implication, in procreation. Examples of this elision of female participation are too 
numerous to list here, but one could consider the promotion of a father God as creator in 
the monotheistic traditions of Judaism and Christianity, the endless textual genealogies 
that establish inheritance down the male line, or in the myths of male parturition such as 
that of Zeus, Metis and Athena, as appropriations of procreative metaphors that 
establish the authority of the patriline.  
In Hesiod’s Theogony, as I touched on briefly in Chapter 6, the story of the 
goddess Athene’s birth is related. Zeus learns that if his wife’s second child is born, he 
will lose his power. In order to forestall this danger, he takes his pregnant wife Metis, 
places her in his belly, and then, ‘…produce[s], from his own head, grey-eyed Athene, 
fearsome queen who brings the noise of war and, tireless, leads the host’ (Th. 924–925). 
One could also recall how in Aeschylus’ Oresteia Athene’s paternal parentage is used to 
justify the matricide of Clytemnestra by her son Orestes. Clytemnestra has murdered 
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her philandering husband Agamemnon, in part as revenge for his having sacrificed their 
daughter in the name of military expediency and sexual honour. Orestes kills 
Clytemnestra and takes refuge in the temple of Athene where he is put on trial. Athene’s 
casting vote ensures that he is vindicated. She finds in favour of Orestes because she 
herself is motherless, and so for her, fathers are the true parents of their offspring 
(Aeschylus Or.Eu. 736–738). Motherhood is also completely negated by Apollo (son of 
Athene) who claims that 
The mother is no parent of that which is called her child, but only nurse of the new-
planted seed that grows. The parent is he who mounts. A stranger she preserves a 
stranger’s seed, if no god interfere….And of this truth, that father without mother 
may beget, we have present, as proof, the daughter of Olympian Zeus: one never 
nursed in the dark cradle of the womb. 
(Or.Eu. 659–666).  
Within the Oresteia, the order of the reproductive process is inverted and (the father’s) 
sexuality and death take precedence over the mother’s parturition and over birth. 
Clytemnestra becomes the agent of death, while the son born of her reproductive labour 
transforms his birth relationship into a death relationship, murdering his only certain 
parent on behalf of the dubious sexual honour of his uncertain father. As Mary O’Brien 
points out, these events ‘rest absolutely and resolutely on the negation of femininity, in 
the symbolic person of motherless Athene’ (1981:155–156). The Oresteia exemplifies the 
broader ideological configuration of the father as originator within the classical Greek 
tradition and it was extended over time to Christianity. In this classical view, all modes 
of personal experience, communal order, law, economy, and justice derive from a 
beginning marked by paternal reference, a locus in a hierarchy of associations 
articulating origin and order. 
Taking the Oresteia as an example of the assertion of patrilinearity as a first 
order parentage, the idealisation of the father that the story represents necessarily 
ensures a prioritisation of creation over procreation, production over reproduction, and 
culture over nature—all of which are embedded in the oppositional form of gender 
differentiation that characterises phallogocentrism. As Martha Weigle suggests, 
therefore, within a patrilineal economy, 
Procreation is the antithesis of creation; to be procreant is not to be creative; and 
parturition is not symbolically equivalent to cosmogony. This polarizing means that 
procreation is relegated to elemental or physical or biological status, while 
creation—viewed as spiritual or metaphysical or symbolic—becomes the valued 
paradigm for important rituals, customs, narratives, and belief systems. Both 
androcentrism and ethnocentrism figure in this opposition. 
(1987:427) 
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O’Brien similarly suggests that the appropriation of procreative metaphors to describe 
male cultural endeavours is a displacement of patrilineal anxiety over the verifiability of 
paternity. She argues that male thinkers from Plato onwards have sought to create 
modes of continuity and intellectualised mimicry22 of the reproductive process for the 
reason that  
They must resist the alienation from nature and from time which is inherent in their 
reproductive praxis, investing intellectual creativity with a power superior to 
ambiguous procreativity, and creating institutional and ideological modes of 
continuity over time, to heal the discontinuous sense of man the uncertain father. 
(1981:131) 
Thus a patrilineal economy represses maternality-as-origin in order to assert male 
primacy and legitimacy for the possible reason that paternity itself is less than securely 
anchored and verifiable. There is a sense in which the notion of paternality is, as Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar note, a ‘legal fiction’, a ‘story requiring imagination if not 
faith’, for ‘…a man cannot verify his fatherhood by either sense or reason after all: that 
his child is his. It is, in a sense a tale he tells himself to explain the infant’s existence’ 
(1984:5). While a mother can know with certainty that a child is hers by virtue of having 
carried it in her womb and given birth, a father, at least until the advent of DNA testing, 
cannot.23  
                                                           
22 Luce Irigaray’s early work provides a very productive interrogation of the masculine mimicry of 
female parturition. See Irigaray 1985b. 
23 Said’s analysis of prevalent notions of authority and author reveals a similar concern in 
narrative production, and to some degree in the arena of scholarship. The preoccupation within 
scholarship with the form and structure of scholarly endeavour, particularly concerning historical 
and textual referents, functions to establish the authority of the scholar and is perhaps rooted in, 
or at least connected to an anxiety over the verifiability of male paternity. It is not an overly 
imaginative leap to see how the genealogical connections that constitute patrilinearity are visible 
in the relationship of scholars to their texts, sources, and history. That the achievements of 
intellectual predecessors are absorbed and then approved or rejected is a central practice in 
scholarship and the relationship of scholars to those who have preceded them is regularly stated 
in patrilineal terms: one’s ‘intellectual forefathers’, the ‘fathers’ of any given field of study, and so 
on. The compulsory negotiation of one’s forefathers purportedly establishes one’s mastery of a 
field of study, but, as Gilbert and Gubar point out, the dynamics of the confrontation with one’s 
intellectual ancestors can produce an ‘anxiety of influence’, a phrase they borrow from the literary 
theorist Harold Bloom (1973). This anxiety of influence is a fear that an author is ‘not his own 
creator and that the works of his predecessors, existing before and beyond him, assume an 
essential priority over his own writings’ (1984:46). Gilbert and Gubar suggest that the historical 
relationship between authors, and, I would add, scholars, is akin to one of fathers and sons, 
particularly as described by Freud’s theorisation of the Oedipal crisis. Thus the scholar must 
‘engage in heroic warfare with his “precursor” for, involved as he is in a[n]…Oedipal struggle’ he 
can only be established as a scholar in his own right by somehow invalidating, or working in 
reference to, his intellectual forefathers (1984:47). The anxiety of influence is partially resolved by 
a successful absorption of the past, but it is further ameliorated by the motif of patrilinearity that 
renders the scholar/author a father, or owner of his texts, as Said’s discussion of authority implies. 
Gilbert and Gubar go further than this to suggest that male sexuality is intimately connected to the 
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It is possible, therefore, that patrilinearity is a longstanding means of 
ameliorating the anxiety that doubt over parentage could invoke. As such, the certain 
assertion of a patriline conveys a hidden undercurrent of uncertainty which is perhaps 
why it is invoked as a trope with such striking regularity—it requires continuous 
reiteration. Whether or not this is the case, the assertion of a patriline has arguably been 
a determinative factor in the forms of ontology that have been developed in the public 
history of western thought, particularly as they have depended upon a dualist (and 
paradoxically monologic) model of identity that elevates singularity to the status of a 
primary ontology. Thus masculinity, in the form of fatherhood, is stabilised and 
prioritised and the maternal body as an equal origin of being is repressed. Fatherhood is 
a fundamentally fragile construction that requires the endlessly iterative myths of 
continuity and causality that constitute patrilinearity. In my view, the psychoanalytic 
literature derived from Sigmund Freud’s considerations of the ‘Oedipal crisis’ and from 
Jacques Lacan’s modifications provides a compelling account of the reasons for, and 
implications of, this displacement of patrilineal anxiety.  
In the following chapter I will explore the tenuous basis of identity formation 
within patrilineal rhetoric through the poststructural rereading of Freudian 
psychoanalysis undertaken by Jacques Lacan, and then in the final chapter discuss the 
challenges offered and adjustments made to this reading by Julia Kristeva. While Lacan 
himself offers a patrilineal model of identity, he does much to explain the essential 
fragility of the construction. Julia Kristeva, on the other hand, by focusing on the 
significance of maternality in the identity-work of individuals offers a model of identity 
that is well placed to undo the patrilineal logic of being that I have discussed here. I will 
argue that she offers a means of viewing maternality as an ontological origin but one 
which can in no way be conflated with singularity and transcendence. Moreover, the 
models of identity she suggests on this basis, I will argue, offer a framework in which a 
feminist reading of narrative and myth can be conceived differently, that is, as non-
linear, ambiguous, and disintegrative of solid identification. There is the possibility of 
unsettling the boundaries that are drawn up to distinguish selves from others 
                                                                                                                                                             
practice of authorship because it is ‘not just analogically, but actually, the essence of literary 
power’. They argue that a writer’s pen is ‘even more than figuratively, a penis’ and contend that 
‘the patriarchal notion that the writer “fathers” his text just as God fathered the world is and has 
been all pervasive in western literary civilisation’ (1984:4). In a patriarchal society, a ‘text’s author 
is a father, a progenitor, a procreator…whose pen is an instrument of generative power like his 
penis. Moreover, his pen’s power, like his penis’s power, is not just the ability to generate life but 
the power to create a posterity to which he lays claim’ (1984: 6). 
  289 
agonistically, and so I will argue that narrative, language, and selves might be brought 
together in a discourse of discontinuity that prevents the assertion of selves as singular 
and autonomous, a discourse which has some important implications for understanding 
myth, particularly myths of origin, anew. 
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C H A P T E R   N I N E 
DIVIDED SELVES: 




The account of child development provided by psychoanalysis strongly disputes any 
conception of the self as stable and coherent. Psychoanalysis suggests, instead, a model 
of subjectivity as discontinuous and divided and thus stands alongside Derrida’s 
theorisation of logocentrism and deconstruction as inaugurating the ‘poststructural 
turn’ in philosophy and the human sciences. It is for this reason that I turn, in the first 
section of this chapter, to psychoanalytic theory, particularly that of Jacques Lacan who 
‘rereads’ Freudian theory through a poststructuralist lens. The form of psychoanalysis 
developed by Sigmund Freud stands, along with the theories produced by Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Nietzsche, at the beginning of the anti-humanist tradition that developed 
into poststructuralism in the twentieth century (Grosz 1990:1–3; Olivier 2004:1–3). It 
presented a profound challenge to the post-Enlightenment concept of the self 
represented by the Cartesian cogito which conflated consciousness, or at least rational 
mental activity, with subjectivity. The destabilising moment inherent to psychoanalysis 
is Freud’s notion of the unconscious as that aspect of the human mind which, as a ‘place’ 
differentiated from the conscious aspect, not only escapes the possibility of direct 
conscious access, but continually threatens to infiltrate conscious, ‘rational’ intentions 
and volitions.1 Thus Freud stands as one of the precursors of post-structuralism (see 
Spivak 1976:xlv–xlviii; li–lv). However, he believed that, by bringing the contents of the 
unconscious into consciousness, he could minimise the repression and neuroses of his 
patients, an idea summarised in his famous declaration about the relation between the 
unconscious (the id) and conscious self (the ego), where the purpose of psychoanalysis 
is to ensure that ‘Wo Es war, soll Ich werden’ (‘Where Id was, shall Ego be’; 1953–1974, 
                                                           
1 Freud himself compared his theoretical discoveries to the Copernican revolution (1953–1974, 
XVII:139–40; 1917b:284–285). In Freud’s view, the first challenge to the belief in the centrality of 
humankind was inaugurated by Copernicus’ discovery that the earth, and by implication, 
humanity, was not at the centre of the universe. Darwin’s contention that humanity is not the 
creation of God but rather has evolved from apes represented a second shift in human 
consciousness. Freud places his own analysis of the psychology of the unconscious as a third 
revolution in understanding the self in that it challenged the post-Enlightenment concept of the 
essence of the self as equated to consciousness.  
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XXII:80). The purpose of analysis, therefore, is to replace the repressed and chaotic 
drives of the unconscious with the ‘I’ (ego), by consciousness and self-identity.2 Freud’s 
goal was thus to strengthen the analysand’s ego, in order to ensure that it would master 
the unconscious. For the poststructuralist Lacan, as I will show in this chapter, this 
project is impossible. According to Ellie Ragland-Sullivan ‘Lacan…naturally opposed 
the idea that there is a whole self that serves as an agent of strength, synthesis, mastery, 
integration, and adaptation to realistic norms’ (1986:119). For Lacan, the ego can never 
take the place of the unconscious, empty it out, or control it, because the ego is only an 
illusion, a product of the unconscious itself. Individuals, for Lacan, are positioned in and 
by language, and are consequently rendered as subjects—subjected to the order of 
language which robs the individual of her or his inexpressible uniqueness and power as 
vested in a singular and autonomous body. As such, Lacan’s interpretation of Freud 
more clearly secures the poststructural credentials of psychoanalysis. I turn to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in the first section of this chapter, therefore, to explain the ways in which 
identity is conceived by Lacan as constituted through otherness and division, as 
fundamentally unstable and in question, and as requiring a vigilantly iterative 
performance to maintain the illusion of the ego’s autonomy and stability. I will argue 
that Lacan’s theories consequently offer one way of explaining the anxiety that underlies 
the assertion of patrilineal provenance discussed in the previous chapter.  
However, I will argue that psychoanalysis, at least in its Freudian and Lacanian 
incarnations, can itself be understood as a paradigmatic example of an assumption of 
patrilineal origins, particularly insofar as it seeks to understand how individuals come 
to consider themselves as autonomous and stable selves by describing the primal scene 
of childhood development as inaugurated by a father figure. It tracks the induction of a 
child into the world of regulated cultural discourses through the intervening force of the 
father, a movement that requires its separation from and negation of its mother, a 
process which constitutes an irretrievable loss. The father is thus ostensibly placed at the 
origin of culture which is viewed in psychoanalytic theory as the only viable mode in 
which individuals can function as integrated and healthy adults; culture represented by 
                                                           
2 For Freud, the id is the place of instincts, ‘the ultimate cause of all activity’ (1949:19) and he 
therefore speaks of it as the true psychic reality: ‘The core of our being…is formed by the obscure 
id’ (1949:108). Unlike the ego (as consciousness), the id does not think; it only wishes and acts. It 
has ‘no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the 
instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle’ (1991:100). The id, as the 
unconscious, struggles for the complete and immediate satisfaction of its desires without regard 
for others and it is for this reason that it has to be tamed by the ego. 
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the father, rather than nature as represented by the mother, is reality in these terms. As 
such, despite its challenge to the Cartesian self—which holds a good deal of promise for 
feminist projects that seek to demonstrate the partiality of that self—psychoanalysis has 
presented particular difficulties for feminist theory, resulting in a strained and 
ambivalent relationship between the two (Grosz 1990:7).3 On the one hand, 
psychoanalysis offers a compelling explanation for women’s secondary social position 
within patriarchal societies. Thus, Juliet Mitchell, in defending the feminist use of 
psychoanalytic theory, declared that ‘psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a 
patriarchal society, but an analysis of one’ (1974:xv). On the other hand, psychoanalysis 
has tended to validate hegemonic idealisations of normative masculinity and femininity, 
suggesting an essentialised and universal model of gender identity by aligning 
femininity with lack, passivity, and negativity and masculinity with wholeness, agency, 
and normativity. As such it seems to be a dangerous tool for feminists to wield without 
undertaking a series of critical adjustments to its core propositions. Elizabeth Grosz 
suggests, therefore, that 
While [psychoanalysis] relies on certain conceptions of femininity and of women’s 
social and sexual functions…it is also amenable to transformations and upheavals 
in its operations. This involves challenging its central terms, assumptions, and, 
above all, its unspoken masculine perspectives and interests. But because of [its] 
unspoken reliance on particular notions of femininity, major changes in its notions 
of femininity will necessarily transform psychoanalysis, which has assumed 
women’s ‘castration’ and passivity as one of its fundamental principles. It is thus 
prone to far-reaching feminist questioning. 
(1990:7) 
It is my intention in this chapter to demonstrate the ways in which Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory might not just be ‘prone’ to feminist challenge, but also aid it. 
While I will acknowledge some of the difficulties Lacan’s work presents for feminist 
theory, I will not engage in an extended assessment of the various reasons for and 
                                                           
3 For criticisms of the feminist use of psychoanalysis see Leland 1989; Fraser 1990; Flax 1990a:47–
132, 1990b:109–119; Moi 2004. Flax does not reject psychoanalysis per se, but rather objects to a 
Lacanian approach in particular on the grounds that she believes it results in the ‘annihilation’ of 
femininity and renders male dominance ‘unanalyzable in theory and inescapable in practice’ 
(1990:112). Flax further suggests that ‘Lacan recreates the myth of the isolated, disembodied 
monadic self….[He] replicates rather than dismantles a dominant strain of modern Western 
thought that extends from Descartes through Rousseau to Sartre. The Subject is not “decentered” 
in Lacan’s theory’ (1990b:118). For reasons I discuss below, I consider Flax’s claim to be a rather 
strained and superficial reading of Lacan’s work. It is surprising, in addition, that she makes no 
mention of Julia Kristeva’s use of Lacan which precisely challenges his androcentric presentation 
of women, and motherhood in particular, but retains central aspects of his theories to rich effect. 
For more sympathetic (although not uncritical) feminist approaches to psychoanalysis, see 
Silverman 1988, 1992; Brennan 1991; Elliot 1991; Cornell 1993. 
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against the use of the Lacanian oeuvre for feminist purposes. Rather, I will limit my 
discussion to a demonstration of its utility for explaining the instability of a patrilineal 
model of the singular, atomised self and origins, one that bears implicitly on the 
preceding case study of the German search for origins, and for enabling a feminist 
analysis of maternality as a potential site of dialogic subjectivity and multiple origins, 
particularly as undertaken in the work of Julia Kristeva. This chapter is also intended, 
therefore, to serve as an introduction to the technical vocabulary and primary frame of 
reference used by Kristeva to theorise subjectivity as ‘in process’ which I then explore in 
the final chapter. 
I. Stories of the Self: The Divided Self in Lacanian Psychoanalysis 
Lacan claimed that his work was a ‘return to Freud’ in that, by inflecting it with the 
(post)structuralist analyses of Saussurean linguistics, he was true to the spirit, if not to 
the letter, of Freud’s work (Walsh 1990:66). It was and continues to be a controversial 
claim, leading initially to Lacan’s expulsion, along with a number of his colleagues and 
students, from the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in 1952 (see 
Schneiderman 1983:141; Gallop 1985:55). There are certainly convergences between the 
theories of Freud and Lacan but where Freud sought to map psychoanalysis onto a 
biologically determinist framework at least in his early work,4 Lacan’s interpretation 
stresses a much more constructivist dimension. One of the primary areas of intersection 
between Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis concerns the way in which both 
describe the process of infantile development (how the ego is formed out of the 
unconscious); another is the account of the basis of sexual/gendered differentiation that 
marks the end of infantile development. It is mainly these two processes that are my 
concern in this section. 
Freud theorised early childhood (particularly infantile sexuality) as proceeding 
through three stages of ‘polymorphous perversity’: the oral, the anal, and the phallic 
that were brought to an end by the Oedipal and castration complexes enabling the 
transition of the child into an ‘adult’ being (see 1953–1974, VII:123–245).5 Lacan suggests 
different categories to explain a similar trajectory from infant to ‘adult’. He theorises 
                                                           
4 He describes the development of infantile sexuality, in particular, in biological terms: ‘In reality 
this development is organically determined and fixed by hereditary’ (1953–1974, VII:178). 
5 These phases are regulated biologically and ‘generate a series of norms, ideals, or goals directed 
towards the end of heterosexual genital and reproductive sexuality’ (Grosz 1990:55). See also 
Grosz 1990:51–58; Minsky 1996:31–47.  
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three concepts—need, demand, and desire—that roughly correspond to three orders or 
registers of development that occur more or less chronologically—the Real, the 
Imaginary, and the Symbolic.  
Lacan theorises the order of the Real as a (psychic rather than physical) site 
where the very young infant ‘experiences’6 the world as a unity, as a place of non-
differentiation between itself and the objects that surround it. As in Freud’s account, for 
Lacan the newly-born infant (from birth until it is between six- to eighteen-months old) 
begins life as a fragmented and uncoordinated aggregate of body parts, experiences, 
sensations, and impulses—what Lacan refers to as an ‘anatomical incompleteness’ and 
‘organic insufficiency’ (1977:4)—and it is unable to exert any control over its body and 
behaviour. Lacan suggests that the infant in this stage is ‘stuck in his motor incapacity 
and nurseling dependency’ (1977:2) rather being an integrated and controlled totality or 
individuated identity. Because the infant at this stage is wholly dependent on others for 
its physical (and psychical) survival, it is driven by need (for food, comfort, safety, and 
so on). These needs are essentially satisfiable by an object: when the baby needs food, it 
is offered a breast or a bottle; when it needs safety, it is embraced. In this state of need 
The child forms a syncretic unity with the mother, and cannot distinguish between 
itself and its environment. It has no awareness of its own corporeal boundaries. It is 
ubiquitous, with no separation between itself and ‘objects’, for it forms a ‘primal 
unity’ with its objects. It cannot recognise the absence [or otherwise] of the mother 
(or breast). 
(Grosz 1990:34) 
The child is unable to recognise that an object (such as a breast) is part of another whole 
person because it does not and cannot yet have any concept of ‘whole person’.7 In the 
state of non-differentiation in the early months of an infant’s life, there is also no sense 
of the loss, lack, or absence that later comes define and constitute the self; the Real is all 
fullness and completeness—Lacan refers to it as the ‘lack of lack’ (1981a:55). Because 
there is no absence, loss, or lack, there can be no language in the Real; language, at least 
                                                           
6 The term ‘experience’ does not accurately convey, however, that state in which the infant exists 
in the Real. The unity of the child with its world is a state of being unmediated by cognition. This 
is because ‘experience’ is, in Lacanian terms, a property of conceptualisation and representation 
which can only be inferred retrospectively to the Real through the reconstructive work of the 
Imaginary and Symbolic orders. See Grosz 1990:34–35. 
7 Lacan’s theories, however much they might fail to supply an empirical basis for their claims, 
have a good deal of explanatory power as an imaginative construct. Indeed, Lacan characterised 
the temporal underpinning of the psychoanalytic narrative of infant development as a ‘myth’: 
‘What I am telling you is also a myth, because I by no means believe that there is somewhere a 
moment, a stage at which the subject first acquires the primitive signifier, while after that play of 
significations is introduced, and later yet, signifier and signified having taken each other by the 
hand, we enter the domain of discourse’ (1981b:172). 
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according to structuralist analyses such as that of Saussure, depends structurally on 
difference (as non-unity) and deferral (as absence). The Real is always beyond language, 
unrepresentable in language, and therefore irretrievably lost when one enters into 
language. The infant begins to be able to distinguish between its body and the objects 
that surround it initially by its having to recognise and negotiate the intermittent 
absence of the mother. 
II. Registers of the Self: The Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic Orders 
Whether in Freudian or Lacanian terms, the child in the order of the Real exists in a state 
of ‘nature’ which has to be brought to an end in order for ‘culture’ to be formed. Thus 
the infant must separate from its mother and form a separate identity. The child is 
subsequently coerced into the identificatory relations that will make possible, constitute, 
and maintain the shape of its adult life. However, when the child can conceptualise the 
difference between itself and its mother and starts to become an individuated being, it 
loses its primal sense of unity (and consequently its sense of safety and security) and 
becomes figured as lacking, that is, as a being that can no longer exist as a non-
differentiated plenitude—it lacks or loses the original state of wholeness. It is this 
process that reveals the element of tragedy built into psychoanalytic theory: to become a 
civilised ‘adult’ always entails the loss of an original unity, a sense of non-
differentiation, and a merging with others (particularly the mother): 
The child is no longer in that happy state of satisfaction, protected by and merged 
with the (m)other. From this time on, lack, gap, splitting will be its mode of being. It 
will attempt to fill its (impossible, unfillable) lack. Its recognition of lack signals an 
ontological rift with nature or the Real. 
(Grosz 1990:35) 
Moreover, as the infant starts to become aware that it is separate from the mother, and 
that there exist things that are not part of it, it begins to be able to comprehend the idea 
of ‘otherness’.8  
This development—the partial recognition of otherness—coincides with a shift 
in the child’s orientation from having needs to making demands. The awareness of 
separation, or the fact of otherness, creates an anxiety and a sense of loss in the child. It 
then demands a reunion, a return to that original sense of fullness and non-separation 
that it had in the Real; essentially, it longs for the idea of the ‘other’ to disappear. The 
child may cry, and the mother will usually respond by attempting to meet its needs by 
                                                           
8 It is important to note, however, that at this point the binary opposition of ‘self/other’ does not 
exist cognitively for the child, primarily because it does not yet have a coherent sense of ‘self’. 
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feeding or changing it. However, Lacan suggests that no object can, in fact, satisfy the 
demand because the demand is always for a response on a different level. Grosz 
summarises Lacan’s concept of demand as follows: 
The child wants everything, an impossible plenitude; it wants to be filled by the 
other, to be the other, which is why no determinate thing will do. It demands a love 
that paradoxically entails its own annihilation, for it demands a fullness of the other 
to stop up the lack that conditions its existence as a subject. 
(1990:62) 
Lacan claims that a demand is always a demand for a return to the original place of non-
differentiation (1977:263). This is impossible, however, because lack, or absence—the 
sense of otherness—is the precondition for the child to become a self/subject, in that it 
ensures a self distinguishable from others. In addition, demand, in Lacan’s view, is 
always addressed to the (m)other (1977:286).  
Lacan here follows Freud’s theorisation of how a child comes to negotiate its 
loss of unity with the mother. In a case study which appears in Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud relates how his young grandson, aged about eighteen 
months, plays a game with a spool tied with yarn: 
This good little boy…had an occasional disturbing habit of taking any small objects 
he could get hold of and throwing them away from him…so that hunting for his 
toys and picking them up was often quite a business. As he did this he gave vent to 
a loud, long-drawn-out ‘o-o-o-o’ accompanied by an expression of interest and 
satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the present account were agreed in 
thinking that this was not a mere interjection but represented the German word 
‘fort’ [gone]. I eventually realized that it was a game and that the only use he made 
of any of his toys was to play ‘gone’ with them. The child had a wooden reel with a 
piece of string tied around it….What he did was to hold the reel by the string and 
very skillfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into 
it, at the same time uttering his expressive ‘o-o-o-o’. He then pulled the reel again 
by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful ‘da’ [here]. This, then, was 
the complete game: disappearance and return. As a rule one only witnessed its first 
act, which was repeated untiringly as a game in itself, though there is no doubt that 
the greater pleasure was attached to the second act. The interpretation of the game 
then became obvious. It was related to the child's great cultural achievement: the 
instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which 
he had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting. 
(1953–1974, VXIII:14–15) 
Freud goes on to suggest that this game was a means of ameliorating the child’s anxiety 
about his mother’s absence. When he threw the spool he replayed the experience of the 
loss of an object, that is, the mother; when he reeled it in he gained pleasure from its 
restoration. Lacan uses this case to focus on the aspect of language it displays, 
suggesting that the fort/da game indicates the child’s attempt to exert control over the 
mother’s presence and absence through the medium of language insofar as it substitutes 
a linguistic device that it may control for the mother’s presences and absences which it 
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does not. As such, the fort/da game indicates, for Lacan, the beginning of the child’s 
entry into the Symbolic order (1977:112–114, 257–260, 282–283, 315–317), the structure of 
language itself, because language, as I have noted, is always marked by loss and 
absence. 
The gradual awareness of the mother’s absence implies the rupture of original 
unity and this takes place in the Imaginary order through what Lacan refers to as the 
‘mirror stage’, a concept that has proved to be one of his most distinctive and accessible 
contributions to the field of psychoanalysis. As in the order of the Real, at this stage the 
child, between the age of six and eighteen months, does not yet have control over its 
own movements or a sense of its body as a whole. In his seminar ‘The Mirror Stage as 
formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience’ (1977:1–7), 
Lacan describes the entry of the child into the Imaginary order by analysing its 
encounter with its mirror image and suggests that this experience lays the foundation 
for the future constitution of the self as autonomous and whole (1977:2).9 It is at this 
stage that the infant has begun to seek—to demand—a return to the unity it originally 
experienced with its mother. The child has begun to recognise because of her absences 
that its mother appears to be a totality apart from the child and because this recognition 
leads to a sense of loss in the child, the mirror stage serves as an intermediate phase as 
the child is impelled towards a complete separation which will eventually be resolved—
albeit tenuously—in the Symbolic order. In the mirror stage, the child’s separateness 
from the (m)other is simultaneously affirmed and denied. As Grosz suggests,  
If we look more directly at the privileged stage for the acting out of the drama of the 
mirror state…that is, at the mother-child relation, in which the mother takes on the 
position of specular image and the child that of incipient ego, [then] the mirror 
stage is an effect of the discord between the gestalt of the mother, a total, unified 
‘completed’ image, and the subjective, spatially dislocated, positionless, timeless, 
perspectiveless, immersing turmoil the child experiences. 
(1990:42) 
It is the previously unmediated tension between wholeness as represented by the 
mother and the fragmented corporeality of the very young infant that the mirror stage 
starts to resolve.  
The act of seeing itself in the mirror is one that ensures that the child moves 
‘from insufficiency to anticipation’. The child, still unable to be whole, and therefore 
                                                           
9 Lacan suggests that the image of wholeness that a child is presented with in this stage occurs 
typically through an encounter with a mirror, although the form of the encounter—whether there 
is an actual external image or not, whether the child sees him- or herself in a mirror, or, by 
inference, in the gaze of someone else—is largely irrelevant. 
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fully separate from others (although it has started to have a notion of separation), begins 
to anticipate being whole. It moves from a ‘fragmented body’ to an ‘orthopaedic vision 
of its totality’, ‘orthopaedic’ because it serves as a crutch that assists the child to 
eventually achieve the sense of wholeness that is a prerequisite for becoming a subject. It 
is only gradually that the child comes to identify itself with its image in the mirror 
(Lacan 1977:5; see also Grosz 1990:35–37); but once it has conflated the image in the 
mirror as itself, it reacts to this discovery with delight because the image serves as a 
satisfying and seductive image of itself as a coherent whole.  
The child’s recognition of its own image means that it is able to adopt a 
perspective of exteriority on itself, one that is a Gestalt (‘form’) which grants the infant 
an impression of the totality of itself where it simultaneously becomes both subject and 
object (Lacan 1977:3). The child thus takes the image in the mirror as the summation of 
its entire being, its ‘self’ as a coherent and unified totality. It is an appealing image 
precisely because it seems both to negate the chaotic, unintelligible being that the child 
up until this point has experienced itself being, and it alleviates the anxiety of loss and 
absence that it has started to confront. The child’s identification with its specular image 
as a totality that substitutes for that of its relation to the mother signals the start of a 
nostalgic search for completeness that the divided self, which is a product of the mirror 
stage, will always yearn for and be denied. 
Lacan maintains that what is happening in the mirror stage is an identification 
that is, fundamentally, a misrecognition. While the child sees an image in the mirror and 
identifies that image as itself, it is not the child; it is an image. This process of 
misrecognising one’s self in the image in the mirror creates the ego (moi), the being 
(subject) that will eventually be able to identify itself with the signifier ‘I’ (je). In Lacan’s 
terms, this misrecognition creates the ‘armour’ of the subject, an illusion of wholeness, 
integration, and totality that surrounds and protects the fragmented body. The mirror 
image—the whole person the infant mistakes for itself—is referred to by Lacan as the 
‘ideal ego’ (1977:2–3; 339–340), a perfect, sufficient self. In the mirror stage, this ‘ideal 
ego’ begins to be internalised and enables the child to create its sense of ‘self’. As such, 
the child, according to Lacan, is able to imagine a self that has no lack, no incompleteness 
(1977:19). What is thus essentially a fiction of a stable, unified, and autonomous self that 
the child sees reflected in the mirror becomes a compensation for losing the original 
oneness with the mother’s body. In short, according to Lacan, the child loses its unity 
with the mother’s body, the state of ‘nature,’ in order to enter culture, but it protects 
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itself from the knowledge of that loss by misperceiving itself as not lacking anything—as 
being complete unto itself. Lacan argues that the self-concept (ego) that the child 
achieves at this stage will never, in fact, coincide with its actual being as figured in the 
Real. Its imago in the mirror is more stable than the child and is always ‘other’ than the 
child as something outside it. The child, for the rest of its life, will misrecognise its self as 
the whole and integrated other it sees in the mirror because it provides an illusion of self 
and of mastery. For Lacan the ego is always on some level a fantasy, an identification 
with an external image, and not an internal sense of separate whole identity, which is 
why he calls the phase of demand, and the mirror stage, the order of the Imaginary. The 
Imaginary is understood as a realm of images, whether conscious or unconscious. It is 
prelinguistic and preoedipal, and therefore necessarily based in visual perception, or 
what Lacan calls ‘specular imaging’ (1977:2).  
Grosz very clearly explains the significance of the specular as a first-order 
recognition of (spatial) differentiation and distance—prior to the cognition of difference 
as a structural principle that is a fundamental element of the linguistic order of the 
Symbolic. The specular image is the enabling device through which the self can be 
articulated as a self in an apparently secure and stable relation of difference to an other, 
a point I will return to shortly. Grosz suggests that, more than any other sensory 
perception, it is vision that ‘most readily confirms the separation of subject from object’ 
(1990:38). This is because vision fulfils a ‘distancing function’ that renders the one who 
looks as ‘unimplicated in or uncontaminated by its object’ (ibid.). Thus vision, Grosz 
suggests, differs from the other senses insofar as where they involve a continuity 
between subject and object, and to some extent require the internalisation and 
incorporation of the object by the subject (as in the sense of taste or touch), vision is 
predicated on, and is able to maintain, its distance from the object of its gaze. In 
consequence, the visual is the most responsive of the senses to spatialisation, which 
Grosz suggest is ‘hierarchically organized and structured in terms of a centralized, 
singularized point-of-view by being brought under the dominance of the visual’ (ibid.; my 
emphasis). The implication of the singularity of the gaze in this context is that it is the 
visual alone that is able to direct the child to a totalised, holistic self-image which is 
necessarily be construed as singular. However, and somewhat paradoxically, it is only 
vision that seems to suspend the distancing effects of temporalisation in the moment of 
apprehension and this is a prerequisite for the contiguity between subject and object to 
be recognised by the child in the mirror stage. As Grosz suggests, ‘only the simultaneity 
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afforded by sight confirms the integrity of a cohesive self and body. None of the other 
senses have this ability to perceive “synchronically”, in a non-linear and non-temporal 
fashion’ (1990:39). I will return to examine further the implications of spatialised 
distance, the simultaneity of vision, and the maintenance of difference between subject 
and object when I discuss Kristeva’s theories of abjection in the next chapter. 
The importance of the mirror stage for understanding the nature of identity, 
particularly with regard to its implication for the study of identity that is my concern in 
this thesis, lies in how Lacan demonstrates that the form of selfhood achieved in this 
stage is, against the Cartesian view, divided or split. It is divided in a variety of ways, 
not least insofar as the image in the mirror both is and is not an image of the child’s self. 
It is the dual, ambivalent relation to the self’s own image that is central to Lacan’s 
account of subjectivity and marks his difference from Freud who takes a realist attitude 
towards the ego as essentially in touch with and straightforwardly reflective of reality. 
For Lacan, when the child sees itself as a unified totality (Gestalt) in the mirror, what in 
actual fact occurs is a split between subject and object, self and other, and organic 
insufficiency and integrated totality—a split that remains the fundamental characteristic 
of the self/ego for the rest of its life. 
The Imaginary, in summary, is the psychic place where the child projects its 
ideas of ‘self’ onto the mirror image it sees. The mirror stage begins the process of 
consolidating a self/other dichotomy, because where previously the child had known 
only ‘other’, in the mirror stage it begins to be able to formulate an image of the ‘self’. 
The realm of the Imaginary inaugurated by the mirror stage is where an alienated but 
obscured relation of the self to its own image is created and it is one which is maintained 
thereafter in the Symbolic order. The ego is forever divided between a body it claims as 
its own and an other (its image) that it strives to conform to. For Lacan, the identification 
of ‘self’ is always in terms of ‘other’—which is not to say that this is as a binary 
opposition, where ‘self’ equals what is not ‘other’, and ‘other’ equals what is not ‘self’; 
rather, ‘self’ is ‘other’ in Lacan’s view because the very idea of the self is based on an 
external image. However, Lacan uses the term ‘other’ in a number of ways, which can be 
confusing. As I understand it, the first sense in which he uses it is with regard to the 
division between self and other, where ‘other’ is the ‘not-self’; however, in the mirror 
stage the ‘other’ becomes, or is translated as ‘self’. Lacan also uses an idea of Other, to 
distinguish between the concept of Otherness and actual others—objects or people. 
According to Lacan, the concept of Otherness, encountered in the Imaginary phase (and 
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associated with demand), necessarily comes before the sense of ‘self’. The image the 
child sees in the mirror is an actual other but its importance lies in the fact that it 
provides the child with the idea of ‘Other’ as a structural possibility, one which makes 
possible the eventual articulation of ‘I’ or self in language. As the child encounters actual 
others—its own image, other people—it begins to comprehend the idea of ‘Otherness’.  
As discussed above, the fort/da game that Freud’s grandson played is in Lacan’s 
view a marker of the entry into the Symbolic, because the child uses language to 
negotiate the idea of absence and the idea of Otherness as a category or structural 
possibility. The spool, according to Lacan, serves as an ‘objet petit a,’ or ‘objet petit autre’—
an object which is a little ‘other’ (1977:218–220).10 Lacan focuses on act of throwing it 
away, insisting that the child is primarily concerned with the idea of lack or absence of 
the ‘objet petit autre’, showing the child that it (the child) is not complete in and of itself. 
It is also the gateway to the Symbolic order, to language, since language is premised on 
the idea of lack or absence. Lacan argues that these processes and concepts—of other 
and Other, of lack and absence, of the (mis)identification of self with o/Other—are 
processed on micro level with each child, but that they form the basic macro structures 
of the Symbolic order which the child must enter in order to become a full subject. Thus 
the otherness acted out in the fort/da game and the identification of and with difference 
in the mirror stage (between self and other, mother and child) become categorical or 
structural ideas in the Symbolic which is defined by the structuring principles of 
Otherness and Lack.  
When the child has successfully formulated an idea of Otherness as a structural 
principle, and of a self identified with its own ‘other’, it is ready to enter the Symbolic 
order. The Symbolic order, marked by the concept of desire, and inaugurated by the 
‘name-of-the-father’ (discussed below), is the equivalent of adulthood, or, in more 
specifically Lacanian terms, it consists of the structure of language itself, which must be 
entered in order for an individual to become a ‘speaking subject’, to be able to say ‘I’ and 
have it designate something which appears to be stable and autonomous. The Symbolic 
and the Imaginary orders overlap to some degree; there is no clear division between the 
two, and in some respects they always coexist. The movement from the Imaginary to the 
Symbolic consists of a shift from a visual register to a verbal one, but loss, illusion, and 
alienation remain the registers in which the subject is constructed and maintained. 
Where the foundation for recognising a self lies in the Imaginary projection of the self 
                                                           
10 See also 1977:244–245, 264–265, 268–269, 276–279, 292–294, 303–304, 347–350, 356–359. 
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onto the specular image, the Symbolic enables the projection of a somewhat different 
sense of self (one that Lacan refers to as ‘subjectivity’) which is, nonetheless, also 
divided between the ‘I’ that speaks and the ‘I’ which is spoken about (Cavallero 
2003:30). Here the apparently fixed meanings offered in language as based on relations 
of difference offer an alternative, ostensibly stable sense of identity, a psychological place 
where the meaning of the self can again be discovered through its difference to others. 
As with the child’s identification with its whole image reflected in the mirror, within the 
Symbolic the child is able to identify with the certainty and coherency of meaning in 
language which appears to grant the stability and distinction (conceptually and 
linguistically) of the signifier ‘I’ (Minsky 1996:142).  
However, again as with the mirror stage, Lacan argues that the achievement of 
subjectivity in the Symbolic is not as coherent or as stable as it appears. Symbolic 
subjectivity, like its mirror-stage predecessor, is also a result of misrecognition, Lacan 
claims, because the subject in language misperceives itself as the autonomous author of 
its utterances when, in fact, it is spoken by language in the sense that identification 
proceeds via language through the conflation of the self with the pronoun or signifier ‘I’. 
Language, in seeming to give its subjects a means of asserting their identities, in actual 
fact ‘governs them despotically by engulfing individuality in the black hole of an 
impersonal order’ (Cavallero 2003:30). The conceptual image of the self that the subject 
fashions at this juncture is thus founded on alienation—on the individual’s subjection to 
an impersonal order of signs. The identification of the self in both the mirror stage and 
in the entry into the Symbolic is achieved via the phenomenon of displacement, an 
aspect I will return to shortly. The infant’s identification with an unreal, albeit pleasing 
totality in the mirror stage prefigures the ego’s ‘alienating destination’, namely its 
subjection to the disembodied signs or ‘phantoms’ of the Symbolic order; it is this that 
leads Lacan to claim that ‘I identify myself in language but only by losing myself in it 
like an object’ (1977:86).  
III. The ‘Name-of-the-Father’: Gendered Divisions of the Self 
Lacan’s theory proposes that the movement of the child into the Symbolic is provoked 
through the law of the ‘name-of-the-father’ (‘nom-du-père’; 1977:73–74),11 and this 
concept constitutes the Lacanian equivalent of the Freudian Oedipal crisis where a male 
child’s father intervenes to break up the archaic mother/child dyad, prohibiting (sexual) 
                                                           
11 See also 1977: 220–221, 240–241, 343–344, 347–348. 
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access to her. The patrilineal and androcentric tenor of the Oedipal event as Freud 
explains it is clear: the male child perceives his father as an unconquerable rival for his 
mother’s affections who threatens to castrate the young boy if he should fail to renounce 
his claim on the mother. Subsequent to the identification of the child with its father, the 
boy’s desire for his mother is repressed and this repression produces the contents of the 
unconscious. However, the renunciation of the mother is merely deferred rather than 
final; the boy and his father negotiate a ‘pact’ on the basis that ensures that in future the 
boy will be rewarded for his compliance by being able to secure a woman of his ‘own’.12 
The implication of the agreement between the boy and his father is, as Grosz 
notes, that it 
founds patriarchy anew for each generation, guaranteeing the son a position as heir 
to the father’s position in so far as he takes on the father’s attributes. In exchange for 
sacrificing his relation to the mother, who he now recognizes as ‘castrated’, the boy 
identifies with the authority invested in the father. 
(1990:68) 
A ‘metaphoric’ relationship between father and son is consequently established: the son 
is required to become like his father in acquiring the characteristics of authority and 
masculinity that the father has, while also not being like him—by not desiring the 
woman that the father desires (ibid.). Freud thus claims that the boy, in complying with 
the father’s prohibition, becomes heir to all that is ‘rightfully’ the father’s: ‘You ought to 
be like this (like your father)’ but ‘You may not do all the things that he does; some things 
are his prerogative’ (1923:34). 
This is one reason why I believe that patrilinearity, at least as it is conveyed in 
Freud’s account, is the foundation of patriarchy rather than vice versa as Grosz would 
seem to have it; in my view, it is the assumption of a chain of patrilineal inheritance that 
legitimises the authority of the father as constitutive of the organisation of patriarchy, 
rather than patriliny being a derivative product of patriarchy. I noted above that 
Freudian theory has been defended as a description rather than a recommendation for 
                                                           
12 Freud theorises the girl child’s relationship to the Oedipal drama as different from, though 
complementary to that of the boy. Unlike the young boy, the young girl is not compensated for 
renouncing her mother but rather must acquiesce in her subordination to the father, and by 
implication all men. Where the male child is threatened by castration, the little girl instead 
‘discovers’ that she is already castrated—she possesses neither a penis nor the power it signifies 
and so she must abandon her mother to focus her libidinal drives on the father whose power she 
desires. She must accept, however, that her socially designated role as subordinate to the 
father/males is inevitable and in so doing conforms to the passive, dependent role that is expected 
of women in patriarchal societies. Consequently her ego is formed on the basis of the lack, rather 
than possession of a penis. I will return to discuss the implications of this idea for female 
subjectivity below. 
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patriarchy (and by implication, patriliny). However, Freud’s Oedipal account, which 
purports to explain the origins of patriarchy, presupposes that for fathers to have 
control of women and for sons to be dominated by fathers patriarchy must already exist 
as an organisational principle of social relations. As Grosz suggests, Freud’s claims in 
this regard can be questioned on the ground that ‘One must postulate an earlier “event” 
at the origin of patriarchy which explains the father’s pre-eminent position. This is less 
likely to be a parricide than a matricide: the authority of fathers is already symbolic insofar as 
paternity remains uncertain and requires representation’ (1990:69; my emphasis). As such, 
the father’s intervention in the mother/child dyad marks his appropriation of a prior 
bond, that of the ‘mother’s (umbilical) authority over the child’ (ibid.). The father’s 
authority—his position and his prohibitive role—usurps the corporeal bond between 
mother and child and replaces it with his non-corporeal authority, and, because it must 
therefore operate in a symbolic register rather than through blood and matter, it is 
marked by uncertainty; it is more ephemeral and abstract than the corporeal 
relationship of mother and child. This symbolic appropriation of anatomical 
connectedness is in effect a displacement that is subsequently covered over by the 
edifice of culture—law and society—to render patriliny apparently seamless and 
continuous. Freud’s account, it is worth noting, also conveys a solid notion of 
causality—it is the father rather than the mother that ‘labours’ to bring the child into the 
world (of culture). 
Lacan translates Freud’s essentially anatomical/biological understanding of this 
process, maintaining its patrilineal tenor nonetheless, into a linguistic and symbolic 
register, substituting the ‘actual’ father of the Freudian model with the ‘Imaginary 
father’ which he suggests is later replaced by the ‘Symbolic Father’ as a ‘paternal 
metaphor’, ‘the place of the father’, ‘the name-of-the-father’—in short, a function or 
position rather than a discrete identity (Minsky 1996:149; Lacan 1982:39). As such, it is 
not necessarily particular fathers per se who ‘demand’ that the child conform to the 
social order; the imposition of enculturation can be undertaken by the mother (or in fact 
any other person), which is why Lacan refers to the father as ‘Imaginary’. However, the 
name-of-the-father privileges a masculine social ordering to which the mother herself is 
submitted (1977:218) and it is this submission that constitutes her symbolic ‘castration’. 
The implication of Lacan’s view here is that all individuals, whether male or female, in 
conforming to the ‘Law’ necessarily take up a masculine speaking position, as I will 
discuss below. The ‘name-of-the-father’, for Lacan, represents the place of authority and 
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law in society as a system of nomenclatures or kinship wherein the child is prohibited 
from sexual access to those identified—named—as family. As Grosz suggests, ‘the 
question of paternity is in fact a matter of naming, of the Father’s Name, not his blood’ 
(1990:70), which requires that the child submits to its norms of behaviour and 
identifications. As such, as Lacan notes, ‘It is the name-of-the-father that we must 
recognise as the support of the symbolic function, which, from the dawn of history has 
identified his person with the figure of the law’ (1977:67). It is worth noting here, 
therefore, that a fundamental feature of patriliny is the inheritance of a name—the name 
of the father—and it is the name that secures one’s location within 
In Lacan’s version of the Oedipal crisis, the child has to sacrifice its desire for its 
mother (who symbolises, as I have discussed, a integrated totality or place of non-
differentiation into which the child longs to merge) and internalise the name-of-the 
father. It is only by doing so that the child is able to acquire subjectivity (in that the child 
is subjected to the law, but also is able to take up a position as subject, rather than merely 
an object of discourse). The name-of-the-father essentially becomes a substitution or 
compensation for the loss of the mother by endowing the child with an illusory sense of 
wholeness secured through language. As David Crownfield suggests, like the 
substitution of other gratifications for the desire of the mother, the ‘positional logic of 
substitution, of representing one thing by another, of displacing desire along a chain of 
representatives, is the foundation of the formal order of language, of what Lacan calls 
the symbolic order’ (1992:xiii). That is to say, language itself is a system of substitutions 
where signifiers stand in for signifieds and appear to constitute a coherent and whole 
order of meaning. Lacan suggests that it is primarily language and other systems of 
coherent representation that symbolise the intrusion by cultural regulation into the 
fused, corporeal world of the mother and child, and sever the child forever from its 
object of desire. The law of the name-of-the-father, of what meanings and relations are 
permitted in language, takes up the space left empty by the sacrifice of the mother. 
Language as a system of differences, and therefore as the opposite of the non-
differentiation of the Real, represents the cutting off (castration) of the child from its 
phantasies of fusion with the mother.  
Entry into language is thus predicated on the ability to recognise difference—
between oneself and others, but also, simultaneously, between masculinity and 
femininity, maleness and femaleness. Lacan argues that sexual difference is produced in 
and by language insofar as language places individuals within a differentiated sexual 
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economy as women and men; and in so suggesting he connects sexuality and sexual 
difference to the Symbolic world of language. At the same time as a child begins to 
recognise sexual difference it also acquires language, and it is the discovery of language 
that conveys to the child the recognition that the units of language—signs—secure their 
meaning through their difference from other units. Moreover, it learns that the signifiers 
of language can stand in for things that are absent, insofar as words are 
representations—operating like metaphors—of objects (Minsky 1996:151). 
For Lacan, sexual difference is an arbitrary construction predicated on the 
concept of the Phallus as a central, primary, and singular signifier; Lacan refers to it as 
the ‘signifier of signifiers’ (1977:104), the first sign that a child recognises and whose 
meaning will henceforth enable the child to negotiate all the other meanings that are 
symbolised in language. It is both the signifier of (sexual) difference and the signifier 
that appears to efface lack and therefore, paradoxically, difference (Grosz 1990:117), an 
aspect that Leclaire recognises when he suggests that the Phallus ‘is a copula, a 
hyphen—in the evanescence of its erection—the signifier par excellence of impossible 
identity’ (in Lemaire 1977:86). The Phallus in Lacanian terms appears, therefore, 
simultaneously to signify presence and absence, as well as wholeness and singularity; as 
an image of totality and singularity it becomes the object of desire for all individuals and 
a substitution for the original unity with the mother.13 The recognition of the 
paradoxically divisionary and unificatory power of the phallic signifier within the 
context of the fear of castration—recognised and made significant by the obvious 
visibility of the penis as the only sign of significant difference between the young girl 
and boy—facilitates the acquisition of language by operating in the same symbolic 
way.14 By means of this joint entry into language and at the same time sexual ordering 
and identity, the small child gains an identity and becomes an individual capable of 
identifying with (seeing itself reflected in) the singular ‘I’ of language. The child thus 
discovers a conception of a gendered self within language and it then identifies with the 
sense of coherence and self that this conception imparts, just as it did with its image in 
                                                           
13 Luce Irigaray has provided a stinging criticism of Lacan’s privileging of the Phallus on the basis 
of its analogy to the penis and for presenting it in terms of singularity. She suggests that women 
are the ‘Sex which is not one’, using the analogy of female genitalia to suggest that ‘woman’ does 
not conform to the logic of singular identity, sexuality, desire. ‘Woman’ is thus the sex which is 
more than one and therefore excessive to singularity. Although Irigaray’s work in this regard is, 
alongside the work of Kristeva, a profound challenge to the phallic economy that Lacan assumes, 
for reasons of space I am unable to discuss her work here further. See Irigaray 1985a; 1985b. 
14 However, for reasons I will discuss below, the penis and the Phallus are by no means identical 
in Lacanian thought. 
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the mirror stage. However, although both male and female children enter the Symbolic 
in this way, Lacan’s theory suggests that only boys appear to become human subjects, 
because the apparently gender-neutral ‘I’ and the Phallus on which it is based is 
associated with the male body. Women as such become the excluded other, figured as 
lacking the tangible sign of a masculine subject position. As Grosz suggests, ‘The 
symbolic function of the phallus envelops the penis as the tangible sign of a privileged 
masculinity, thus in effect naturalizing male dominance’ (1990:123). I will return below 
to discuss the (fairly obvious) problems this idea presents. 
The entry into the Symbolic, inaugurated by the law of the name-of-the-father 
and the installation of the Phallus as the primary signifier, produces a constitutive sense 
of lack which is translated into desire. As Minsky puts it,  
[Desire is] the searching movement of language, an endless appeal to the Other for 
the meaning to end all meaning. Having lost access to the mother’s body during the 
Oedipal crisis we are, henceforth, caught up in a constant search for linguistic 
substitutes for it, words with which we try to paper over the cracks, plug the gaps 
at the core of our being, never able to regain the paradise of unity and self-
completion which we phantasised with our mothers in the Imaginary. 
(1996:147) 
Desire is thus essentially displaced and repressed need/demand in that it too seeks 
totality. However, desire is an extension beyond need and demand although it contains 
elements of both (Lacan 1977:287). While the basis of need, demand, and desire is the 
same—the result of the absence or privation of, and then longing for, plenitude—desire 
is different to the extent that it goes beyond conscious articulation; it is necessarily 
repressed in the aftermath of the Oedipal event and as such is one of the constitutive 
elements of the unconscious. Demand attempts to guarantee the ego its self-certainty 
and self-knowledge and is directed consciously towards others who can either comply 
with or refuse to satisfy it. It is therefore situated within an interpersonal and familial 
framework that is prefatory to morality and the norms that determine the social order 
into which the child is to be inaugurated. Demand inducts the child into the categories 
and terms of discourse, because the child is forced to acknowledge the facticity of 
otherness, but demand is unable to provide the child with a stable enunciative 
identity—as a speaker or discursive/socialised ‘I’. This is something that only 
language—and desire—can do. As Grosz suggests, demand is ‘protosocial, for the other 
is the child’s first point of access to the social’ (1990:65). Desire, on the other hand, is 
essentially antisocial; ‘it cares little for social approval or the rewards and punishments 
consciousness offers to demand’ (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is desire that regulates and marks 
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the entry of the child into the Symbolic order of language and it achieves this through 
the mechanism of repression. 
Lacan establishes his conception of desire via Hegel’s The Phenomenology of the 
Spirit (1979) in which he (Hegel) equates desire to lack or absence (Grosz 1990:64). 
Desire, for Lacan, signifies a fundamental lack in the subject that can only be assuaged 
by another’s (particularly the mother’s) desire—as the self-conscious ego desires to be 
desired by and to be the desire of the other (1977:264). Desire is therefore always an effect 
of the Other, an ‘other’ with whom it cannot engage, insofar as the Other is not a person 
but the locus of law, language, and the Symbolic. A child must find his or her place 
within this order to become both an enunciative subject and a subject of enunciation. 
Together the law, language, and the Symbolic serve to locate the subject as split and 
divided. Desire is thus an effect of language and the unconscious. The lack that 
characterises desire is based on the lack conditioning the chain of signification which 
Saussure defined as langue, the general structure of language as a system of differences 
and deferrals. Desire is the reality of the unconscious, the way in which the unconscious 
and (repressed) sexuality become coextensive. 
What emerges from these differentiated relations to the Phallus in terms of 
gender, is a contradictory image of the Phallus. On the one hand it is the Symbolic 
representation of wholeness—redolent of the Real—predicated on its appearance 
(defined against the feminine ‘castrated’ body) of not ‘lacking’; it is a visible marker of 
presence. However, while the Phallus appears to signal wholeness in that it represents 
‘not lacking’, it also entails, as part of its meaning, exclusion and absence, particularly 
the absence of the mother. The Phallus thus represents the moment when the father’s 
prohibition of the child’s desire for the mother must function, signalling to the child that 
having a viable, socialised identity can only be achieved at the cost of unity with the 
mother and that being a subject is only possible as a direct consequence of division 
(Lacan 1982:40)—between subject and object, alignment with the father against the 
mother, and between the conscious and unconscious. So, as well as wholeness, the 
Phallus also a signifies a division—like the Father, the Symbolic, and language. It is for 
this reason that the Father, the Symbolic, the Other, and the Phallus are interchangeable 
in Lacan’s schema—they each represent a ‘third’ term that intervenes in the 
mother/child dyad and breaks it up. As Minsky suggests, the ‘recognition of the phallus 
as a sign of difference’ has the ‘power to shatter the child’s relationship with the mother 
[which] allows the child to enter into the cultural system of meaning containing other 
  309 
signs based on difference, language’ (1996:152). The third term which separates the child 
from its mother is therefore at the same time both the father (as name or structural 
Other) and the cultural meanings that pre-exist the child in language. Both acquire their 
meaning through the operation of difference and impose limits to the child’s phantasies. 
They effect a symbolic castration, in other words, by dividing the child from what it 
most desires; but simultaneously they ensure that the child becomes an autonomous 
subject in language. 
The Phallus does not, however, wholly succeed in extinguishing the child’s 
longing for totality, and this fact ensures the conversion of the child’s needs and 
demands into desire which, like demand, can never be satisfied because once the child 
has separated from its mother, no return to the original unity is possible if it is to be able 
to function as a separate, autonomous being, the very prerequisite of sociality. Desire, 
like language, is consequently endlessly deferred, and it is this that becomes the 
motivating principle of human life and occasions the genesis of the unconscious—which 
Lacan suggests is structured like a language (1977:234)—as the ensemble of longings, 
fantasies and fears which language cannot and will not allow to be articulated. Lacan, 
like Derrida, argues that the production of meaning—most importantly the meaning of 
the self—is a forever deferred process, because any signifier will always require other 
signifiers to support its tentative claim to meaning in a limitless proliferation of possible 
links (1977:153).15 
However, as I have already stated, Lacan claims that it is only males who are 
able to assert a subjectivity that is seemingly fixed, autonomous, and whole, on the basis 
that they are able more easily than women to identify with the Phallus. It is this idea in 
particular that has led many feminists to reject Lacan’s psychoanalytic model as one that 
replicates and strengthens patriarchal values by assigning femininity as a sign of lack 
and negativity. However, I want to suggest that Lacan’s analysis of the phallic signifier, 
for all its deeply problematic implications for female subjectivity—some of which I 
                                                           
15 As such, the recognition of an ‘I’ depends on an unconscious recognition of the principles of 
difference, exclusion, and absence that are the basis of ordered language but these are effaced in 
the conscious in order to render the ‘I’ seemingly as a place of wholeness, autonomy, and 
presence. Reversing Descartes’ cogito Lacan claims that ‘I think where I am not, therefore I am 
where I do not think’ (1977:166). He derives this claim through recourse to the structural 
linguistics of Saussure but also to Freud’s account of the two main mechanisms of unconscious 
processes, condensation and displacement (Freud 1953–1974, IV–V). For Lacan, both are 
essentially linguistic phenomena, where meaning is either condensed (in metaphor) or displaced 
(in metonymy). Lacan suggests that the contents of the unconscious are acutely aware of 
language, and particularly of the structure of language as predicated on difference. See Grosz 
1990:82–114. 
  310 
touch on below—at the very least offers a means of understanding the basis of language 
as predicated on values of absence and presence that are then invested with discursive, 
ontological, and mythical significance. Where Freud construed the anatomical penis as a 
guarantor of sexual difference, Lacan suggests instead that this difference is produced 
by an abstracted distinction between having and being, insofar as masculinity might 
appear to possess the Phallus, whereas femininity might appear to be the Phallus: 
[O]ne may, simply by reference to the function of the phallus, indicate the 
structures that will govern the relations between the sexes. Let us say that these 
relations will turn around a ‘to be’ [être] and a ‘to have’ [avoir], which, by referring 
to a signifier, the phallus, have the opposed effect, on the one hand, of giving reality 
to the subject in this signifier, and on the other, of derealizing the relations to the 
signified. 
(1977:289) 
Through the Phallus, each sex is positioned as a speaking subject, (‘giving reality to the 
subject’); through the Phallus, the reality of anatomical sex is merely the significance and 
values that a culture gives to anatomy (‘derealizing the relations of the signified’). 
Within the logic of the differential nature of language (as a system of signifiers and 
signifieds) the man can be affirmed as phallic only to the extent that there is an other 
who desires (and therefore lacks) what he ‘has’. But what of his own desire? Lacan 
suggests that, because the Phallus is the signifier of desire (for totality/unity) men 
conflate women with the Phallus insofar as they ‘desire’ women. As Cavallero suggests, 
in this schema  
male subjects are expected—by the patriarchal system governed by masculine 
discourse—to own that attribute as the ultimate signifier of paternal authority, while 
female subjects, deemed incapable of such ownership, are expected to embody that 
signifier for the benefit of others, to incarnate the ultimate symbol of erotic 
gratification. 
(2003:31; my emphasis) 
However, Lacan insists that the suggestion that boys possess the Phallus is, like 
the conflation of the child with its image in the mirror stage, based on a misrecognition 
and a misidentification. The significance granted to the possession of the Phallus, via its 
conflation with the actual penis, is, in many respects, spurious because no one can 
actually possess it. The penis takes on the function of the Phallus only because it is an 
organ that is able to signify possession/presence rather than dispossession/absence.16 
Thus the penis becomes, in Lacanian terms, an imaginary object that divides the sexes 
on the basis of its presence or absence—possessed by some, desired by others. It can 
                                                           
16 The identification of the penis as a sign of presence is itself based on a set of unjustifiable and 
partisan assumptions. The penis as presence is, effectively, an interpretation, and a specious one at 
that. 
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subsequently function as a symbolic object (an object of exchange or union) between the 
sexes. By implication, therefore, because the Phallus signifies both division and unity, 
the penis (as imaginary or symbolic Phallus) is not the only ‘object’ that is able to serve 
as the Phallus’ metonym. Thus one would expect that in different socio-political 
structures the chain of signifiers in which the Phallus finds its context must vary 
historically, and indeed Lacan occasionally affirms that the Phallus as a signifier is not 
immutably conflated with the penis: 
The phallus is not a question of a form or of an image, or of a phantasy, but rather a 
signifier, the signifier of desire. In Greek antiquity, the phallus is not represented by 
an organ but as an insignia. 
(in Wilden 1981:187) 
This is because, as a signifier (of difference, desire, totality) rather than an organ, no 
individual has a privileged relationship to the Phallus. As Grosz observes, 
the penis…is not a representation or sign of the phallus [because] this would relegate 
the phallic signifier to the barred position of signified [and] would create two 
parallel orders—organic and symbolic—that are only externally, not constitutively, 
connected. The signifier is active in giving meaning and value to the organ….The 
penis…does not have the sole right of alignment with the phallus. Not only does the 
penis act as if it were the ‘meaning of the phallus’, a series of substitute objects are 
also capable of taking on this function….The penis, as imaginary object is already 
bound up with signification. It is itself already a signifier, and as such, can function 
as a metonymic displacement of the phallus. 
(1990:119) 
Although identification with the Phallus is the product of a misrecognition, Lacan 
believes that it is a necessary one in order for the individual to acquire subjectivity. As 
Minsky argues, ‘Language [as represented by the Phallus]…both forces the 
abandonment of the full, passionate world of the Imaginary, but it is also the best source 
of identification the child has had yet apart from the mother’ (1996:153). For Lacan, the 
Phallus seems to offer the only possibility of stalling or repressing the individual’s 
endless longing and yearning for completion, for the lost object of its desire. The Phallus 
thus functions as a structural concept which, as a signifier of difference and of unity, 
appears to be an absolute guarantor of all meaning within language.  
Lacan suggests that the acquisition of (gendered) identity is achieved at a 
devastating cost for both male and females and that ultimately both emerge as marked 
by and as lack(ing). The male child is figured as lack because the taking up of a male 
subject position requires the sacrifice of the mother and submission to the law of the 
father who retains the mother for himself, an act Lacan argues constitutes a symbolic 
castration (Minsky 1990:153). Thus, the actual meaning of the Phallus is not power and 
totality, but rather powerlessness and lack—the male child is constituted against the 
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Phallus as lacking (the desire of his mother). Similarly, the young girl’s acquisition of 
her gendered identity is costly—even more so than the boy’s—in that it requires the 
acceptance of her identity as lacking what her mother wants and therefore what marks 
cultural identity and power, namely the law-of-the-father. The qualitative difference 
between the young girl and boy is that the girl, as lack, is constituted as a site of 
negativity; although both genders lose the fusion with the mother’s body, the girl 
additionally loses any sense of the legitimacy and wholeness of her own body because 
she lacks any straightforward possibility of identification with the legitimising primary 
signifier, the Phallus.  
The significance of Lacan’s presentation of feminine subjectivity in this regard is 
that girls enter language ‘negatively’ insofar as they ‘lack’ the sign and guarantor of 
subjectivity. A girl enters a Symbolic order that defines her as ‘other’ rather than as a 
subject in her own right. Thus, as Minsky points out, ‘Having [a relationship to the 
Phallus] becomes the requirement for being, for a viable identity’ (1996:159). Lacan 
suggests that the only means through which a female can obtain a relationship to the 
Phallus is by ‘being’ the Phallus for males, that is, by being what the Phallus needs and 
signifies—a substitute for the mother. As Minsky puts it 
By doing this she also allows men to feel themselves to be the objects of her Desire. 
And this fulfils the vital patriarchal requirement of bolstering men’s identity—their 
sense of potency and phallic power which cannot be sustained without women. 
(ibid.) 
This phallic power cannot be sustained without women because in the economy of 
difference which is the basis of signification—and in which the categories of woman and 
man are dependent on each other for their coherence—‘woman’ constituted as other, as 
lacking, enables the construal of ‘man’ as whole. Thus, as Moi observes, ‘woman as 
defective becomes a defence against the thinking male subject’s potentially devastating 
insight into his own lack’ (1989b:195). Women are necessarily reduced to a projection of 
male lack within the (patriarchal) Symbolic order, leading Lacan to suggest that the term 
‘woman’ has no meaning, she does not exist: ‘There is no such thing as The 
Woman…there is woman only as excluded by the nature of things which is the nature of 
words’ (Lacan 1982:144). She is subjected in language only to become a passive 
receptacle of male projections. Thus, when men fall in love with women, in reality they 
are only responding narcissistically to projections of themselves and as such women 
become merely the symptom and receptacle of men’s lack. Woman as ‘nothing’, as the 
site of men’s unconscious projections, allows men, in contrast, to look like ‘something’—
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positive, whole, potent, and meaningful. Cavallero explains this well when she suggests 
that  
this dialectic of desire rests on a mendacious imposture: it endeavours to efface the 
male subject’s own constitutive lack, a universal concomitant of every individual’s 
absorption into the Symbolic, while simultaneously concealing the female subject’s 
self-dispossession: the fact that when woman is cast in a phallic role, she is not 
valued for herself but as a specious construct, a character in a 
masquerade….Although men possess the penis and women do not, no one in fact 
possesses the Phallus—because this denotes proprietorship of an absolute power 
which the Symbolic simply denies—or embodies it, since no human being is in a 
position to fulfil totally another’s desire. 
(2003:31) 
Lacan suggests that women respond to the fact that femininity is constructed only with 
reference to the male sign—the Phallus—by complying with the role they are assigned, 
but that this is effectively a masquerade. What society construes as ‘natural’ feminine 
behaviour is in fact an elaborate (unconscious) performance of what patriarchal (and by 
implication, heterosexual) society demands of women. Thus, while women are able to 
represent male phantasies, they can only exist as subjects to the extent that they can 
align themselves with the demands of the patriarchal social order which in effect means 
adopting a masculine speaking position. However, in the Symbolic order where no one 
in fact has a whole and stable identity, women represent a double lack—they lack the 
Phallus, and are a projection or symbol of male lack that is produced by men’s symbolic 
castration.  
Such an equation seems to destine women and men to inequitable relations 
forever, and to place women at a distinct disadvantage, as the empty or lacking 
container of men’s phantasies. However, Lacan’s stresses that the Phallus only appears 
to be whole and powerful because it has value as the primary (and universal) signifier. 
Signifiers are themselves arbitrary—they lack any value in themselves—and so the 
Phallus as signifier necessarily lacks any transcendent basis either for its singular power 
or its primary status. Nonetheless, its speciousness, Lacan argues, is transferred to all 
other signifiers: ‘The phallus, in provoking the chain of meanings “having” and “not 
having”, positive and negative, power and lack, “masculinity” and “femininity”, opens 
the way to the meanings of all other signifiers’ (Minsky 1996:160).  
Jantzen takes issue with Lacan’s claim that the Phallus is a universal signifier—
and that the Symbolic order is necessarily ‘phallocentric’—by using Lacan’s own 
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presentation of the logic of signification to undermine his elevation of the phallic 
signifier:17 
There is not, and there cannot be, any single term which is itself fixed and which 
grounds every other term. All terms, as signifiers, signify in relation to the shifting 
range of other terms in relation to which they are to be understood, not as fixed or 
grounded in actual need, but in relation to other desires and deferrals….In this 
shifting play of signifiers, no one signifier can be a constant. This is as true of the 
term ‘Phallus’ as of any other. To affirm that it is universal would be to undermine 
the whole account of language and the unconscious which Lacan has painstakingly 
built up. He cannot have it both ways. 
(1998:52) 
She goes on to suggest that while the Phallus cannot be a universal signifier, one can 
recognise that it has been a dominant one and this very fact means that it ‘can be 
resisted and perhaps dislodged’ (ibid.). A further implication of the instability of the 
phallic signifier, therefore, is that if the Phallus is false and arbitrary, all the other 
oppositions that are modelled on it must be as well—the division and valuations of 
‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, ‘power’ and ‘lack’, ‘having’ and ‘not having’ are brought 
into question and open to reconfiguration. Male identity as ‘power’ might thus be 
rendered as actually groundless. 
This would seem to suggest that the meaning and identity of women might be 
more solidly based or, at the very least, differently directed than those of men, and, 
strikingly, throughout the entirety of Lacan’s work, he never brings the mother (as 
woman), as the one who inspires all desire, into question. The desire for reunion with 
the mother is what drives language, and it might be woman-as-mother, therefore, who is 
able to produce the dislocations, subversions, and openings that reveal the coherency 
and stability of language to be illusory (I will return to assess this possibility in detail in 
the following chapter). While women may ‘lack’ the Phallus and although their 
sexuality is apparently circumscribed within the order of masculine phantasy, Lacan 
does suggest that women’s identities may be based on ‘something else’ (although it is 
‘something’ that is repressed and silent). Lacan, albeit belatedly and inadequately, thus 
tries to theorise a more ‘positive’ role for women through his concept of jouissance to 
suggest a form of sexual pleasure and identification particular to them. He suggests, 
therefore, in one of his more objectionable statements, that 
                                                           
17 Ragland-Sullivan defends Lacan against the charge of ‘phallocentrism’ in terms that recall 
Mitchell’s defence of Freud by stating that ‘Lacan discovered the phallic signifier, its effects and 
the resulting structure of substitutive Desire. These intrinsically neutral elements give rise to 
ideologies of the masculine and feminine that cluster around the male-female difference and 
dramatize themselves in a parade’ (1986:298). In my view, however, Jantzen offers a more 
convincing analysis. 
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There is woman only as excluded by the nature of things which is the nature of 
words, and it has to be said that if there is one thing they themselves are 
complaining about enough at the moment, it is well and truly that—only they don’t 
know what they are saying, which is all the difference between them and me. It 
nonetheless remains that if she is excluded by the nature of things, it is precisely 
that in being not at all, she has, in relation to what the phallic function designates of 
jouissance, a supplementary jouissance. 
(1982:144)  
He describes jouissance as an indefinable, unrepresentable ‘something more’; it is what 
escapes, or is left over from, or exceeds the phallic function (Lacan 1982:147). Here he 
seems to refer to other forms of pleasure and identifications that cannot be and are not 
absorbed into the phallic orientations that mark the Symbolic order. These are the 
sources of pleasure which, like the unconscious meanings which exist between words, 
lie beyond the reach and meaning of heterosexual physical satisfaction based on the 
Phallus and are perhaps those forms of pleasure which are associated with the search for 
an alternative identity through the re-union with the mother. Lacan infamously—at least 
in feminist circles—offers Bernini’s statue of St Theresa as an example of a woman’s 
jouissance that operates entirely separate from the phallic realm of language (and 
knowledge) and uses it to suggest that women, lacking the capacity (the ‘having’) 
necessary for the phallic function, instead have access to a greater capacity for 
undulating and excessive sexual diversity such as that expressed in St Teresa’s apparent 
mystically inspired orgasm: 
You only have to go and look at Bernini’s statue to understand immediately that 
she’s coming, there is no doubt about it. And what is her jouissance, her coming 
from? It is clear that the essential testimony of the mystics is that they are 
experiencing it but know nothing about it. 
(Lacan 1982:147) 
However, he conflates the ‘silence’ (the ‘not knowing’) of the statue with women’s 
silence regarding their jouissance when he states, having earlier begged women to tell 
him in what their jouissance consists (1982:146), ‘There is a jouissance proper to 
her…which does not exist and which signifies nothing. There is a jouissance proper to 
her and of which she herself may know nothing, except that she experiences it’ (ibid.). 
It is thus unclear from Lacan’s discussion whether jouissance is in itself 
unknowable, or whether it is something that women cannot know (Grosz 1990:139). It 
seems likely that Lacan here theorises a female jouissance beyond the Phallus on the 
basis of his own voyeuristic gaze; perhaps he does so for the reason, as Jantzen points 
out, that he is able to  ‘[link] together mysticism, female sexuality, and ignorance on the 
one hand, and masculinity, rationality, and the scientific gaze on the other, rejecting the 
subjectivity or possibility of language of Teresa herself’ (1996:53). Luce Irigaray 
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recognises this and mocks Lacan for his treatment of Teresa, taking him to task for 
failing to recognise that his description of Teresa might in fact be his own projection, 
asking pointedly ‘In Rome? So far away? To look? At a statue? Of a saint? Sculpted by a 
man? What pleasure are we talking about? Whose pleasure? For where the pleasure of 
the Theresa is concerned, her own writings are more telling’ (1985:91). If Lacan wants 
women to tell him in what their pleasure consists, he seems unprepared either to hear or 
to read what they have to say. As Grosz suggests, ‘The absence of an answer from 
women is clearly itself an answer—that this is a problem for men who want to know, to 
master, to name, that which is not theirs’ (1990:146).  
However, for all the weaknesses in Lacan’s account, he does offer a description 
of how and why women qua women are both contained within and marginalised from 
male fantasies of wholeness, unity, singularity; as such his work has a good deal of 
value for demonstrating the mechanisms by which women are subordinated and 
excluded within patriarchal systems. It further offers an insight into the fragile basis on 
which a patrilineal economy must operate to exclude difference and elevate singularity 
to the ‘truth’ of subjectivity. Thus the patrilineal valuation of paternal and phallic 
singularity as a metonymic device tries to substitute an original but forever lost 
wholeness with the compensatory fiction of masculine subjectivity. Patriliny substitutes 
corporeal bonds with what is, in reality, an unsatisfying impersonal law of signification 
and the name-of-the-father. Lacan reveals this valuation to be fundamentally a fiction, 
one that requires the vigilant patrolling of its borders to maintain its stability but which 
is always threatened by otherness, by the lack that is at the heart of the subject, whether 
represented by women, language, or the unconscious. Thus Lacan reveals patrilinearity 
to be a mechanism that endlessly struggles to obscure its fragility by displacing 
otherness as difference and distilling identity into singularity, an aspect that goes some 
way, in my view, to explaining the paradox of subject formation.  
I would also suggest that his work offers a heuristic tool for understanding the 
German search for origins discussed throughout the thesis. I have shown that this search 
was undertaken with a view to finding in the past an image and a place—the Urheimat—
of German unity, as one that would restore to the German people a sense of their purity, 
autochthony, and originality against a traumatic background of the loss of territory and 
social cohesion. The past in this context was viewed as a mirror, able to reflect back to 
the German people an image of themselves as cohesive and unified. I have shown, 
however, like the infant’s encounter with its image in the mirror stage, this image itself 
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was a fiction, a projected fantasy from the present into the past. The image of the past 
that was ostensibly retrieved through the efforts of the romantic nationalists was thus a 
product and reflection of the present, marked and determined by a desire to return to 
the origin. Further, the ‘restoration’ of German unity relied on a patrilineal model of 
cultural transmission—traditions handed down from father to son—where paternal 
provenance was assumed to guarantee the legitimacy and truthfulness of the German 
character, thus echoing the role played by the paternal metaphor in constituting 
subjectivity. Finally, the coherency and stability of the German narration of identity was 
secured through a discourse of differentiation that distilled the diversity of the German 
people into a singular notion of Germanness and the German territory—the 
fatherland—as masculine and impermeable, through the construction of Jewishness as 
the feminine, non-original, and radically other. However, as I showed in Chapter 7, the 
qualities assigned to the Jewish people were the very qualities that in actual fact defined 
the German people. ‘Other’ and ‘self’ in this context were identical but their similarity 
was violently obscured and annihilated, again reflecting Lacan’s theorisation of 
femininity as the necessarily excluded other within the Symbolic order—an excess that 
threatens the stability and coherency of the masculine self. 
Thus, where Lacan explains how patriarchal culture transmits and reproduces 
itself, he also elaborates ways in which it exceeds and contradicts itself. In other words, 
if he has explained how the law-like functioning of language and the interdictions of the 
symbolic father constitute the subject as such, he has also indicated the always open, 
ambiguous, and uncontrollable nature of language, its supra- and trans-subjective 
status. He shows that language is inherently open to disruptions, new meanings, 
reinterpretations, recontextualisations that are capable of giving it meaning other than 
that intended. However, he signally fails to offer an adequate theorisation of women, or 
feminine jouissance in particular, as a possibly non-referential construal which does not 
operate within the narrow world of its symbolic containment in the binary opposition of 
male/female as one that is reducible to the logic of the self-same (which, as I have 
argued, is the marker of patriliny). If he places this feminine jouissance beyond the 
Phallus and thus beyond the symbolic and representable, this is because the symbolic, 
linguistic structure he describes is necessarily restricted to, and in fact assumes as 
universal, those dominant discourses and systems which accord women both no place 
and no identity of their own. Could there be, as Grosz suggests and Jantzen affirms 
(1996), ‘other discourses and forms of possible representation capable of speaking of/as 
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women differently’ (Grosz 1990:146)? In my view, it is Kristeva, more than any other 
theorist who works within psychoanalytic parameters, who is able to suggest some of 
the ways in which this might be possible. What she offers, however, is not merely a 
theorisation of alternative forms of femininity per se; rather, she offers several models of 
identity, particularly one derived from the metaphor of the maternal body, that are 
extendable and applicable across gender lines. In the final chapter, therefore, I examine 
the broad thrust of her work before narrowing in to focus on her theories of maternality 
as a means of escaping the tyranny of the self-same. 
 
 C H A P T E R   T E N 
AGAINST SINGULAR ORIGINS: 




This final chapter undertakes a movement towards a feminist philosophy of myth and 
origins that offers some suggestions for an alternative to the patrilineal logic of identity I 
have traced throughout the thesis. To do so, I turn to the work of Julia Kristeva who 
presents a complex and intricate image of identity, like Lacan, as divided and unstable. 
However, her focus on what is marginalised by psychoanalysis opens a field of 
questions that enable a questioning of origins and of selves dramatically at odds with 
the Lacanian account. I begin by outlining the main themes regarding subjectivity—
particularly those of the ‘subject-in-process’, dialogism, and the relationship between the 
two linguistic modalities of the semiotic and the symbolic—in Kristeva’s work and 
establish its relationship to Lacanian thought. In the second section I examine Kristeva’s 
concept of the semiotic chora and suggest that her theorisation of it as a presymbolic 
arena of maternal regulation represents an attempt to theorise what might be ‘other’ to 
the positing of singular origins. Next I examine her theorisation of maternal regulation 
that precedes and prefigures the paternal interdiction that inaugurates entry into the 
Symbolic order, and her adjustment of the Lacanian structure of infantile development 
by means of the concept of abjection (a form of separation that takes place prior to the 
castration complex and operates in reference to the maternal body). In section (iv) I 
examine her work on maternality theorised—in contrast to the conventional 
psychoanalytic adoption of the infant’s perspective—from the point of view of actual 
mothers. I argue that Kristeva’s theorisation of a maternal economy implies an ethical 
orientation missing from patrilineal economies of identity and I focus therefore on the 
maternal body as a model for ethical identity oriented towards otherness with love; I 
will suggest that the maternal body is a metaphor for divided or split (but never 
severed) identity where the tension between self and other, sameness and difference is 
never mastered but always creative and processual. Kristeva suggests that far from 
being discarded at the beginning of a child’s entry into the realm of culture, the idea of 
the maternal remains a creatively disruptive force in the form of the ‘semiotic’ and 
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consequently poses an unmasterable challenge to the stability and coherency of singular 
selves that places the self in an agonistic relationship to otherness.  
In the final section of the chapter I propose a movement towards a feminist 
philosophy of myth that incorporates Kristeva’s theorisation of the maternal body but 
extends her work, reading it together with Derrida’s work on différance, to explore some 
possible connections between the maternal body, origins, narrativity, and identity. I 
conclude with a reflection on the implications of these connections for a feminist 
philosophy of myth. I believe that the maternal body, as a discursively construed ‘myth 
of multiple origins’, inscribes a fruitful arena in which the political project of feminism, 
and indeed other liberatory projects, might find a way of challenging some of the deep 
structures of thought that have contributed to the marginalisation and exclusion of not 
only women, but also of the groups and individuals regularly constituted as other to the 
western normatively masculinised self. I am proposing that a feminist philosophy of 
myth, mythmaking, and mythology is a critical, political practice engaged in the 
subversion of singularity and the patrilineal logic of causality and continuity affirmed 
by ‘mainstream’ mythology; while the marginality and irresolvable difference of the 
maternal body have been sites of domination and oppression in western metaphysics, 
they may also be imaginatively transgressive spaces where the logic of the self-same is 
resisted, disrupted, and ultimately refused. Identity, place, origin, belonging, and myth 
(and philosophy) may consequently be reconfigured as an intricately woven network of 
contingent and transgressive sites of self-constitution that opens a space for an ethical 
orientation towards otherness. 
I. Maternality and Origins: Julia Kristeva and the Maternal Body 
The phenomena which interest me are precisely those that blur the boundaries, 
cross them, and make their historical artifice appear, also their violence, meaning 
the relations of force that are concentrated there and actually capitalize themselves 
there interminably. Those who are sensitive to all the stakes of ‘creolization’…assess 
this better than others. 
(Derrida 1998:9) 
Kristeva arrived in Paris from Bulgaria to begin graduate study in 1966, the year that 
Lacan published his Écrits. Her doctoral dissertation, published as La Révolution du 
Langage Poétique: L’avant-garde à la Fin du XIXéme Siècle (1974; translated as Revolution in 
Poetic Language in 1984), brought together theoretical concerns with avant-garde 
literature, the somatic elements of language, borderline psychological states, the nature 
of public discourse, and the acquisition by children of language. Because of the 
coincidence between the ideas developed in this work and Lacan’s structuralist theories 
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of infantile development, she became interested in psychoanalysis. Between 1976 and 
1979 she trained as a psychoanalyst and has since practiced in Paris whilst holding a 
chair in linguistics in the Department of Texts and Documents, University of Paris VII 
and periodically teaching in comparative literature at Columbia University. Her work 
has subsequently been marked by crossings between disciplines, paradigms, genres, 
styles, and subject positions. As Marilyn Edelstein observes, 
Borders, thresholds, folds, crossroads, crosses—all have been recurrent metaphors 
of intersection and confluence…in Julia Kristeva’s writings. Her work on language, 
borderline patients, literary limit-texts, the maternal, the abject, and faith is united 
by an interest in what exists at and beyond those processes through which 
(subject/object) boundaries are both broached and maintained dialogically and 
relationally. 
(1992:27) 
I will argue that these ‘crossings’ open up a means of dismantling the binary logic of the 
self-same that I have examined in the previous chapters, and of putting in its place a 
dialogic frame for subjectivity that crosses back and forth between self and other. I want 
to examine Kristeva’s transgressive body of work precisely as a strategic embodiment 
of, and argument for, an ethical orientation towards otherness predicated on the image 
of divided (transgressive) subjectivity identified by Lacan but powerfully re-theorised 
by Kristeva. I will begin by outlining her conception of the ‘subject-in-process’ (sujet en 
procès) which demonstrates the dynamic qualities of the divided self and which she 
examines through images of foreignness, abjection, avant-garde literature and the 
maternal body. My discussion here leads me to focus on the maternal body as a 
metaphor for Lacan’s notion of the split subject, in order to challenge the patrilineal 
logic that maintains the self in opposition to the other and posits the father as a non-
transcendable origin. The maternal image that Kristeva presents radically reorients the 
Lacanian split subject towards a model of subjectivity that she refers to as a gendered 
‘herethics’. I focus on what is for her a stylistically unique essay—‘Stabat Mater’ 
(1987b)1— which examines a number of discourses about motherhood from the western 
philosophical, religious, and psychoanalytical traditions and simultaneously subverts 
them with a parallel discourse (and enactment) ostensibly by an actual mother. I pay 
particular attention to this essay in order to demonstrate, against her critics, that 
Kristeva’s conception of maternality does not succumb to an essentialist and 
conservative notion of motherhood; rather, ‘Stabat Mater’ distils many of the themes 
that characterise her work regarding subjectivity more generally and must be read 
                                                           
1 Originally published as ‘Hérethique de l’amour’ (1977); renamed ‘Stabat Mater’ when it was 
included in Kristeva’s Histoire d’amour (1983), later translated in English as Tales of Love (1987a). 
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alongside and in dialogue with her notions of the semiotic and the abject as disruptive 
forces that undermine the singularity of selfhood. I will argue that ‘Stabat Mater’ does 
not advocate a didactic model of ‘proper’ motherhood but instead is an enactment of 
herethics which endeavours to position its readers as mothers, as split subjects. I 
conclude the section with an examination of the implications Kristeva’s model of 
maternality for ethical relations with and towards otherness and for challenging the 
patrilineal prioritisation of singularity. In the next and final section of the chapter I 
suggest the ways in which Kristeva’s theorisation of mothers, the subject-in-process, and 
the transgression of self/other boundaries might open up a way to reconsider the 
division between myth and philosophy. 
(i) Julia Kristeva on the Subject-in-Process/on-Trial 
A central theme that runs throughout Kristeva’s oeuvre is that subjectivity is tenuous 
and processual: 
All identities are unstable: the identity of linguistic signs, the identity of meaning 
and, as a result the identity of the speaker. And in order to take account of this 
destabilization of meaning and of the subject I thought the term ‘subject in process’ 
would be appropriate. Process in the sense of process but also in the sense of a legal 
proceeding where the subject is committed to trial, because our identities in life are 
constantly called into question, brought to trial, over-ruled. 
(Kristeva and Sellers 1989:19) 
She derives her thinking about subjectivity in this regard from the Lacanian claim that 
the subject is essentially a product of language and as such is subjected to the laws that 
govern the Symbolic order, and also from her early work in the field of semiotics which 
was substantially influenced by Mikhail Bakhtin and Roland Barthes. Bakhtin in 
particular, suggested a dialogic model of human communication and subjectivity (based 
on analyses of the structure of novels) that Kristeva uses to good effect to understand 
the constitution of the self by analogy with textual signification unfolding as a process 
rather than packaged as a completed product bearing the signature of a single author 
(see Lechte and Margaroni 2004:7). For Bakhtin, the human subject is neither 
autonomous nor transcendent as suggested by the Cartesian cogito; rather it is produced 
as an effect of (and in the process of) the interactions and communications (the dialogue) 
between individuals: 
In reality the relations between A and B are in a state of permanent formation and 
transformation; they continue to alter in the very process of communication. Nor is 
there a ready-made message X. It takes form in the process of communication 
between A and B. Nor is it transmitted from the first to the second, but constructed 
between them, like an ideological bridge; it is constructed in the process of their 
interaction. 
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(Bakhtin in Todorov 1984:55) 
Kristeva recognises the similarity between Bakhtin’s conception of dialogic 
subjectivity and Lacan’s divided self and weaves their work together to offer an 
expansive theory of the relationship between sign systems—language, visual images, 
gestures, music, body posture, and so on—and human subjectivity. In ‘Word, Dialogue 
and Novel’ (1977a:64–91) Kristeva observes that Bakhtin shows how dialogism is 
‘inherent in language itself’ (1977a:68) and that it signals ‘another logic…the logic of 
distance and relationship…indicating a becoming—in opposition to the level of 
continuity and substance, both of which obey the logic of being and are thus 
monological’. ‘Becoming’ here signifies a fluid and ongoing process of subjectification 
whereas ‘being’ signifies closure and completeness. Kristeva thus suggests that 
dialogism offers an alternative to dualist systems of thought as represented by Hegelian 
dialectics, for example (see also Clark and Holquist 1984:7), or the logic of the self-same. 
Dialogism is thus an ‘other logic’ of ‘analogy and nonexclusive opposition, opposed to 
monological levels of causality and identifying determination’ (1977a:71–72; see also 
1977a:74). In differentiating the dialogic from the dialectic, Kristeva wants to replace an 
oppositional schema with a concept of ‘relation’ which does not  ‘strive towards 
transcendence but rather toward harmony, all the while implying an idea of rupture…as 
a modality of transformation’ (1977a:88–9). This idea underlies all her work on 
borderline states and on the interdependence of seemingly oppositional categories such 
as self/other, inside/outside, father/mother, and mind/body. 
Kristeva’s work seeks, therefore, to develop models that can respond to and 
exemplify a dialogic system of thought. She does so as part of an ethical project of 
resisting what she defines as ‘totalitarian’ social systems which seek to banish otherness 
from the scene of subjectivity and to consolidate subjectivity as monologic. Her work on 
foreignness and abjection (see 1991; 1982) demonstrates her concern to recuperate the 
marginalised heterogeneity of subjectivity that is effaced by monologism. She uses 
semiotic analysis to demonstrate, for example, that the idea of a stable and transcendent 
sign system that is privileged by western metaphysics—of language as a complete and 
objective medium of communication—is a fiction that bolsters subjectivity as monologic 
and homogenous and thus secures ideological stability but that also serves to maintain 
the interests of particular groups at the expense of others.2 Instead she suggests the 
                                                           
2 She contrasts monological texts (epics, myths, and folktales), for example—which in her view, 
promote single ideologies aimed at conveying a stable reality of officially sanctioned ideas 
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necessity of developing theoretical tools that enable the identification of aporias, 
lacunae, and heterogeneity in language where stable meaning disintegrates (and thus 
the clarity of oppositional thought is disturbed) and where sign systems can no longer 
function as the singular and simple guarantors of order. She sees this as an ethical 
project, of aligning ethics with sites of negativity—of all that is marginalised or effaced 
by singularity—in order to challenge the binary logic that places the other as inimical to 
the self. Indeed, Kristeva has stated that she is interested in discourses that disintegrate 
forms of identity as self-same, monological, and transcendent—because she is a woman 
(a site of negativity) and her work consequently ‘obeys ethical exigencies’ (in Marks and 
Courtivron 1981:138; see also Oliver 1993a:1). 
Kristeva thus suggests that semioticians shift their focus from the analysis of 
meaning (‘signifiance’)—the forms of interpretation—to the signifying process, using a 
critical method which she calls semanalysis (1986:28; see also Oliver 1993b:91–113). Her 
early work is marked by a concern to challenge structuralist theories of language insofar 
as they appear to render the (speaking) subject transcendental, ahistorical, and unitary 
by analogy with the seemingly static structure of language (1986:27; 1984:24; 1977a:124). 
She puts the Cartesian, phenomenological, and structuralist models of subjectivity ‘on 
trial’ and finds them wanting. She suggests that the possibility of a subject creating 
meaning—speaking—relies on a process prior to signification and that the theorisation 
of unitary subjectivity is unable to account for this anteriority. This anteriority, for 
Kristeva, is revealed in aspects of language (such as intonation, musicality, rhythm, and 
echolalia) that do not signify within syntactic regulation, and she points to Freud as the 
theorist who recognises this anteriority as located in the unconscious which is able to 
disrupt intended and present meaning (1986:83). Semanalysis thus combines linguistics 
with psychoanalytical theory in order to pay attention to the heterogeneous elements—
linguistic and non-linguistic—of the signifying process rather than to the totality of sign 
systems themselves.  
For Kristeva, subjectivity is a form of intertextuality where human beings, like 
texts, are signs of the intersection of multiple voices; they are multi-layered and plural. 
She introduces Bakhtin’s concept of intertextuality3 to refer to a particular kind of 
                                                                                                                                                             
according to a fixed repertoire of symbols—to dialogical texts such as avant-garde novels which 
invoke polyphony, transgress conventions, and present images of reality as inexorably fleeting 
and in flux (1977a:47–59). 
3 Kristeva derives the notion of ‘intertextuality’ from Bakhtin although she is often attributed with 
having coined it (Edelstein 1992:31–32). 
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textual history, one that is able to trace the citational influences and derivations of texts 
as they encounter others: ‘any text is constructed of a mosaic of quotations; any text is 
the absorption and transformation of another’ (1986:37). In suggesting that subjectivity 
is intertextual she aims to challenge the phenomenological and structuralist division 
between subject and object (and, by extension, consciousness and corporeality) in order 
to transform the basis on which subjectivity and language can be conceived. As Oliver 
suggests,  
Semanalysis uses intertextuality in order to transform meanings. It alters the 
positions of enunciation and denotation, the positions from which the subject 
speaks as well as what it speaks about. And, by so doing, semanalysis points to a 
shifting subject position, a subject in transformation, a ‘subject-in-process/on trial’. 
(1993b:93) 
Kristeva is at pains to stress the transformative aspects of the intertextual elements of 
subjectivity and of language. While she accepts the Saussurean claim that the 
relationship between signifiers and signifieds is arbitrary she emphasises that the 
speaking subject creates the connection between them and that the relationship between 
subjects and signification is marked by heterogeneity. One of the most distinctive ways 
in which she theorises the material, heterogenous aspects of language is through her 
reconfiguration of Lacan’s tripartite model of infantile development in order to 
challenge its temporal linearity and to theorise, more adequately than Lacan does, the 
processual nature of subjectivity by building in the dialogic quality of body and mind. 
She thus develops a theory of two distinct linguistic modalities, the ‘semiotic’4 and the 
‘symbolic’, that characterise both subjectivity and signification (see Anne-Marie Smith 
(1998:15).  
For Kristeva, like Lacan, the ‘symbolic’ is the realm of language and culture, the 
law of the Father. Her concept of the ‘semiotic’—which has no precise parallel in Lacan’s 
three-part scheme of Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real—is the realm of the body, drives, 
and the unconscious. Kristeva invites her readers to interrogate the endemic 
assumptions that language, as an abstract system, can produce unified, rational subjects 
and that syntax, in particular, serves to stabilise language by subjecting expression to 
relatively inflexible rules. To facilitate this interrogation, Kristeva posits an ongoing 
creative tension between the semiotic and the symbolic: 
                                                           
4 Kristeva makes a distinction between ‘semiotics’ (la semiotique) as the study of signifying systems 
and the semiotic (le semiotique) as the non-syntactical element of language which is clearer in 
French. 
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What I call ‘the semiotic’ takes us back to the pre-linguistic states of childhood 
where the child babbles the sounds s/he hears, or where s/he articulates rhythms, 
alliterations, or stresses, trying to imitate his/her surroundings. In this state, the 
child doesn’t yet possess the necessary linguistic signs and thus there is no meaning 
in the strict sense of the term. It is only after the mirror phase of the experience of 
castration in the Oedipus complex that the individual becomes subjectively capable 
of taking on the signs of language, of articulation as it has been prescribed—and I 
call that ‘the symbolic’. 
(Kristeva and Sellers 1989:19) 
For Kristeva, the semiotic ‘logically and chronologically precedes the establishment of 
the symbolic and its subject’ (1984:41) and yet symbolic and semiotic permanently and 
dynamically co-exist in the subject and in language: ‘Since the subject is always both 
semiotic and symbolic, any signifying system he/she produces is never “exclusively” 
symbolic, but necessarily marked by a debt to the other modality’ (1984:22).  
Kristeva’s introduction of the concept of the ‘semiotic’ opens up Lacan’s scheme 
to a fluid interpretation of how syntax is always intersected by corporeality, impulses 
and desires, in the process blurring the boundary between the symbolic and the 
presymbolic.5 The symbolic never conclusively succeeds in replacing and dominating 
the semiotic. Its supposedly rational criteria and rigorous syntax can never master the 
semiotic insofar as the territory of reason is continually criss-crossed by corporeal and 
irrational impulses and desires. As Kristeva puts it, ‘these two modalities are 
inseparable within the signifying process that constitutes language’ (1984:24), and the 
subject-in-process must always negotiate this terrain, must dwell within and (be 
constituted by the process of) that (lifelong) negotiation.  
Entry into the Symbolic order is what Kristeva refers to as the ‘thetic phase’ 
which operates as a point of rupture or a threshold and is necessary for social and 
linguistic functioning. As such it corresponds to Lacan’s mirror stage where the child 
must recognise itself as a separate being through the image of another: 
The thetic phase marks a threshold between two heterogeneous realms: the semiotic 
and the symbolic. The second includes part of the first and their scission is 
thereafter marked by the break between signifier and signified. Symbolic would 
seem an appropriate term for this always split unification that is produced as a 
rupture and is impossible without it. 
(1984:49) 
However, Kristeva is interested in what motivates the move through the mirror stage to 
the Symbolic. Although Lacan theorises symbolic castration as the catalyst that provokes 
                                                           
5 Oliver notes that Kristeva ‘has a more complex definition of the Symbolic than Lacan’s. She uses 
le symbolique in two senses. Le symbolique can refer to the Symbolic order or the symbolic element 
within the Symbolic order. She often makes the distinction explicit by using l’ordre symbolique or la 
dimension symbolique in contrast to le symbolique or symbolique’ (1993:39). See also Oliver 1993:40–41. 
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the infant to align itself with the phallic function of the paternal law, Kristeva suggests 
that in order to be cognisant of the paternal threat, the child has already taken up a 
position as a subject; it has already discerned the difference (in the mirror stage) 
between itself and an other (its image). Kristeva argues that this identification is already 
thetic and symbolic insofar as the mirror stage already requires a negation of the other—
which Lacan defines as an act constitutive of the Symbolic. As Oliver puts it, ‘Negation 
is already a judgement. A judgement is made only from a position. It is already thetic’ 
(1993b:43). Thus, for Kristeva, in the mirror stage, the child negates its own image by 
conflating its image with an idea of self and thus effectively denying the image as image. 
Because of this denial the mirror stage must already be Symbolic (1984:122). Kristeva 
thus accepts Lacan’s theorisation of the function of the mirror stage and the castration 
complex but she queries the exclusion in his account of what is heterogeneous to the 
Symbolic, namely the semiotic (1977a:276). She seeks an alternative explanation for the 
commencement of the Symbolic, suggesting, as Oliver observes, that ‘the only way to 
explain the transition is to acknowledge the material element that is heterogeneous to 
the symbolic. [Negation] is not unique to the symbolic function or the Symbolic order’ 
(1993b:43). Negation (as a logic of signification) exists for Kristeva even in the 
materiality of the semiotic and she suggests several means of identifying its operations 
as negativity (rather than as negation) prior to the infant’s entry into the Symbolic, most 
notably by suggesting that maternal intervention precedes and foreshadows the 
paternal interdict, and by introducing the concept of abjection as excessive to the 
Symbolic (see section (iii) below).  
Kristeva is concerned to theorise a means of demonstrating how the semiotic 
and symbolic, materiality and language, coexist as heterogeneous partners within the 
Symbolic register rather than remaining in a linear temporal relation. She suggests that 
there can be no subjectivity without the positioning that takes place in the thetic phase 
and so the subject must be the product of the ‘heterogeneous contradictions between 
two irreconcilable elements—separate but inseparable from the process in which they 
assume asymmetrical functions’ (1984:82). However, at the same time, the semiotic 
necessarily enters the symbolic in order to break the thetic phase: 
The semiotic in signifying practice needs laws, boundaries, and stases, in order to 
go beyond and transform them….Although the dialectic between them frustrates 
both and maintains a constant tension, the semiotic needs the symbolic as much as 
the symbolic needs the semiotic. Together in constant dialectical alternation, they 
make up the signifying practice. 
(Oliver 1993b:41; see also Kristeva 1984:81) 
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For Kristeva, therefore, signification is always heterogeneous, a combination of symbolic 
stability and semiotic materiality, of conscious articulation and unconscious drives: 
To keep an account of this heterogeneity implies that one no longer consider the 
symbolic function as super-corporeal, super-biological and super-material, but as 
produced by a dialectic between two orders. Therefore, rather than of ‘symbolism’, 
we will speak of the semiotic as the place of this heterogeneity of sense. 
(1977b:76; trans. Oliver 1993b:34) 
Although Kristeva refers to the relation between the semiotic and the symbolic as a 
‘dialectic’ (which, for Lacan, it is), the relationship actually seems more dialogic (in the 
sense discussed above), and it is the interplay between the two that I will argue is 
represented metaphorically by the maternal body. Kristeva thus argues, in agreement 
with Lacan that the unconscious is structured like a language, but she extends this idea 
to suggest that it is also structured as what is heterogeneous (or excessive) to language 
(Oliver 1993b:94). Where she differs from Lacan, therefore, is that she stresses that it is 
not only the psychological (conscious/unconscious) aspects of the self that are produced 
in language but also the physical (the semiotic) insofar as the body has a central role in 
the signifying process and should be thus included in linguistic analyses. As Lechte and 
Margaroni put it, Kristeva shows that the speaking subject ‘retrieves the body that has 
been confiscated from it and is resituated at the crossroads where biological, discursive 
and social forces collide’ (2004:23). Kristeva intends to restore materiality to the domain 
of signification in order to demonstrate how the ‘instinctual rhythm’ of the semiotic 
punctures, punctuates, and disrupts stable meaning (1984:100). 
Kristeva wants, therefore, to reimagine the space of signification (language 
itself) as a site where signification processes are simultaneously systematic (governed by 
pre-existent rules) and corporeal (contingent, contextual, and dialogic). The semiotic for 
Kristeva is thus not prior to entry into the Symbolic but rather coincides with it and thus 
should not be conflated with pure materiality or the undifferentiated, unmediated 
drives that constitute the infant in the Real according to Lacan. While Kristeva 
acknowledges certain correspondences between her work and that of Lacan, she is 
critical of Lacan’s theorisation of the Real as fundamentally unknowable (‘a hole, a 
void’), suggesting instead that  
the appearance of the real is not necessarily void. It is accompanied by a number of 
physical inscriptions that are of the order of the semiotic. Thus perhaps the notion 
of the semiotic allows us to speak of the real without simply saying that it’s an 
emptiness or a blank. 
(in Oliver 1993b:39) 
As Anne-Marie Smith explains it, for Kristeva in contrast to Lacan, 
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The semiotic draws upon a sort of corporeal memory…which psychoanalysis 
commonly refers to as ‘mnemonic traces’, a reminiscence of the play of energy and 
drives—both destructive and pleasurable—experienced in the body with great 
intensity before the achievement of real and symbolic separation from the mother, 
of subjectivity. The semiotic…is not this state itself, which corresponds to Lacan’s 
order of the Real…but the memory, the inscription of this state in language. So the 
semiotic’s transgression of and containment by the symbolic enables the impossible 
forces of the Real to enter the symbolic and the pain of becoming a subject, separate 
from the archaic mother and regulated by the exclusion of the oedipal structure, to 
be symbolised. 
(1998:16) 
Thus, although Kristeva theorises several ways in which the semiotic and symbolic 
intersect within signification she primarily figures the semiotic as the disposition—the 
rhythms and sounds of merged bodies—that exists in the pre- and post-natal mother-
child dyad (1977a:157). As Oliver suggests, for Kristeva, the union between the mother 
and child 
is not merely an imaginary union. Rather, at this point, it is also a real union. The 
child is physically dependent on its union with the mother. Their bodies physically 
‘signal’ to each other before the onset of language proper, before the mirror stage. 
Their semiotic relation sets up the onset of language. 
(1993b:34) 
As such, Kristeva introduces into her formulation of the semiotic a conception of a non-
verbal (or ‘unspeakable’), non-spatial, and non-temporal totality that precedes language, 
a receptacle of energy and drives that she refers to as the chora (borrowing the concept 
from Plato’s Timaeus 48a–49d; 50–52),6 an ambiguous enclosed space, receptacle, or 
womb. Kristeva makes the connection between chora and womb explicit: 
[T]he chora is a womb or a nurse in which elements are without identity and 
without reason. The chora is a place of a chaos which is and which becomes, 
preliminary to the constitution of the first immeasurable body…the chora plays with 
the body of the mother—of woman—but in the signifying process. 
(1977b:57; trans. Oliver 1993b:46) 
Thus, because it precedes (and prefigures) the formation of phallic (and paternally 
induced) subjectivity that marks the Symbolic, the semiotic chora signals a maternal site 
of origination.  
(ii) The Semiotic Chora and the Question of Origins 
It is in Revolution in Poetic Language (1984) that Kristeva first introduces the notion of the 
chora as a (maternal) receptacle that precedes signification but forms the basis from 
which signification is made possible: 
                                                           
6 ‘We borrow the term chora from Plato’s Timaeus to denote an essentially mobile and extremely 
provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases’ (Kristeva 1986:93). 
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The chora is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e., it is not a 
sign); nor is it a position that represents someone for another position (i.e., it is not 
yet a signifier either); it is, however, generated in order to attain to this signifying 
position. Neither model nor copy, the chora precedes and underlies figuration and 
thus specularization, and is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm….Though 
deprived of unity, identity, or deity, the chora is nevertheless subject to a regulating 
process, which is different from that of symbolic law but nevertheless effectuates 
discontinuities by temporarily articulating them and then starting over, again and 
again. 
(1986:94) 
The chora, for Kristeva, is thus in effect the ‘other’ of signification and the ‘other’ of the 
logocentric origin. It is ‘a modality of signifiance in which the linguistic sign is not yet 
articulated as the absence of an object and as the distinction between real and symbolic’ 
(1984:26). It appears to represent a ‘space’ (but also paradoxically a ‘no-space’ because 
spatiality is predicated on the signification of differences) at the intersection of 
‘corporeal, linguistic and social’ forces (1984:15). For Kristeva, the term chora highlights 
the problem she believes lies at the heart of signification, that of the constitutive role of 
that which lies beyond or in excess of language but which is only identifiable within 
language and makes language possible:  
[O]nce it has been named, that functioning, even if it is pre-symbolic, is brought back 
into a symbolic position. All discourse can do is differentiate, by means of a ‘bastard 
reasoning’, the receptacle from motility….This motility is the precondition for 
symbolicity, heterogeneous to it, yet indispensable. 
(1984:240) 
This idea can be extended to subjectivity in that—at least according to poststructuralist 
analyses such as that of Lacan, Derrida, and Kristeva—to be a subject is to be the 
product of signifying practices constituted by differences between signs. However, for 
Kristeva, in the Symbolic, ‘The subject never is. The subject is only the signifying process 
and…appears only as a signifying practice, that is, only when he is absent within the 
position out of which social, historical, and signifying activity unfolds’ (1984:215). Here 
Kristeva invokes the substitutionary logic that Lacan identifies as a characteristic of 
signification insofar as signification gestures towards and simultaneously effaces the 
lack or absence at the heart of the Symbolic.  
According to Kristeva the prior location of the subject is in processes that cannot 
be named because they operate initially outside of and then coincidentally within the 
Symbolic, rather than in signifying practices, where the subject (as process) is always 
absent. For Kristeva, as I have suggested above, the identity/non-identity of the subject 
as signifying process exists prior to its inauguration in the Symbolic order of language 
under the sign of the name-of-the-father. As such, she suggests that language only gains 
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its coherence with respect to its other and she places the chora as this other.7 She thus 
strategically undercuts Lacan’s prioritisation of desire as constitutive of the self as lack, 
suggesting instead that prior to the Symbolic,  
Without ‘believing’ or ‘desiring’ any ‘object’ whatsoever, the subject is in the 
process of constituting himself vis-à-vis a non-object. He is in the process of 
separating from this non-object so as to make that non-object ‘one’ and posit himself 
as ‘other’: the mother’s body is the not-yet-one that the believing and desiring 
subject will imagine as a ‘receptacle’. 
(1984:241) 
Kristeva may then theorise, much more substantially than Lacan does, the nature of this 
non-object, and she suggests that the archaic mother’s body is the ordering principle of 
the chora. This is because, according Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, speaking subjects 
enter into language out of a place of conflict—between the desire for and rejection of an 
image of the archaic mother. As Fisher suggests,  
The maternal body image is formed as the result of a major transposition. The 
fragmentary subject of early infancy, confronted with an idealized image of 
itself…confirms the attractiveness and power of that ‘perfect image’ and then—
fatally—identifies its ‘true self’ as that image; it seeks to be ‘other’ than it is. 
(1992:98) 
Kristeva summarises this oscillation between attraction and repulsion as the basis of the 
chora’s ambiguity suggesting that the quasi-constitution of the subject prior to its entry 
into the Symbolic is a product of this movement: 
The semiotic chora is no more than the place where the subject is both generated 
and negated, the place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges and 
stases that produce him. We shall call this process…a negativity to distinguish it 
from negation, which is the act of a judging subject. 
(1984:28)8 
Thus, while the speaking subject, as the product of signifying practices in the Symbolic 
order, may gain identity from a specific location, this location is seen in relation to the 
chora to have been the product of prior relationships between presymbolic elements. 
I will return to discuss the relationship between the concept of the archaic 
mother and the chora in Kristeva’s work, but here I want first to attend to the 
significance of the chora for understanding the status of origins—the presymbolic—in 
Kristeva’s thinking. It is with the concept of the chora that Kristeva raises two important, 
mutually intertwined questions—that of the origin of subjectivity and that of the extra-
                                                           
7 Indeed, she draws on Plato’s conception of the chora to suggest that it is other to the paternal law 
and therefore ‘maternally connoted’: ‘Plato’s Timaeus speaks of a chora…receptacle…unnameable, 
improbable, hybrid, anterior to naming, to the One, to the father, and consequently maternally 
connoted to such an extent that it merits “not even the rank of syllable”’ (1977b:133). 
8 See Lechte and Margaroni 2004:18–23 and Oliver 1993b:41–47 for a discussion of Kristeva’s 
concept of ‘negativity’. I will return below to discuss it in terms of her theory of ‘abjection’. 
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linguistic—out of her consideration of the dialogic relationship between the semiotic 
and the symbolic. What is at stake in her questioning—and indeed in this thesis in my 
analysis of the function and status of origins within western metaphysics—is as much 
the determination of the nature of the ‘origin’ as the understanding of the relationship 
between the origin and what might precede and exceed it, if anything. Kristeva thus 
positions herself explicitly against the western metaphysical logocentric tradition that 
places the ‘Word’ (logos) at the origin of human subjectivity (and that can be traced to 
the—biblical—Johannine narrative that places the ‘Word’—logos—at the ‘beginning’, or 
to the Platonic prioritisation of logos over muthos). She suggests that this logocentric bias 
has insinuated itself into psychoanalytic practice, particularly as exemplified by Lacan’s 
structuralist intervention. Her introduction of the principle of the chora is intended, 
therefore, to rectify this logocentrism and she has admitted that this is a central 
preoccupation in her work (in Pollock 1998:9). As Slavoj Žižek has suggested with 
regard to the nature of origins, ‘the point in question is the exact status…of “nothing”’ 
(1996:14) and it is precisely this question that Kristeva addresses herself to.  
The task for Kristeva as she sees it is to rewrite the Johannine narrative by 
attending to what the western logocentric tradition has designated as ‘nothing’ or as 
‘other’ and by making psychoanalysis return to it in order to reveal this ‘nothing’ as ‘the 
underlying’ but forgotten ‘causality’ of language and the subject (1986:153). Essentially, 
the question is  concerned with the other of the origin. The chora is the first principle she 
offers as a way of speaking of this ‘other’, although as Kathleen O’Grady has noted in 
conversation with Kristeva, there are several other ‘beginnings’ that Kristeva suggests 
throughout her work and O’Grady wonders about the extent to which they are 
dependent themselves on a Christian narrative of origins: 
You adopted Céline’s revision in Powers of Horror: ‘No!: In the beginning was 
emotion. The Word came next to replace emotion as the trot replaces the gallop’. In 
Tales of Love you sum up your understanding of Freud with the statement: ‘In the 
beginning was hatred’. Your text on the relation of psychoanalysis and faith is titled 
In the Beginning was Love. And more recently your work on Proust has reformulated 
this statement once again: ‘In the beginning was suffering’. This continual 
transformation of the New Testament invocation…[suggests] the question: which of 
your semiotic, psychoanalytic, or Catholic proclivities generates this perpetual 
revisionism, this persistent desire for tracking and tracing a beginning? 
(in Pollock 1996:8) 
Kristeva’s reply is most interesting, and while I will cite it here at length, it is one that I 
will return to deal with in the concluding section of this chapter. She responds to 
O’Grady by stating that 
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Origins are one of the fundamental questions of metaphysics that cannot be entirely 
avoided in linguistics or psychoanalysis. Let me take the psychoanalytic point of 
view [first]….In speaking, in traversing the universe of signs, we arrive at emotions, 
at sensations, at drives, at affects and even at what Freud named the ‘umbilicus of 
the dream’. This is something unnameable, which becomes, nonetheless, the source 
of our investigation….I am interested in language [langage], and in the other side of 
language which is filtered inevitably by language and yet is not language. I have 
named this heterogeneity variously. I have sought it out in the experience of love, 
abjection, of horror. I have called it the semiotic in relation to the symbolic….Then 
there is the second aspect of the question that my supposed ‘Catholic proclivity’ 
generates perpetual revisionism….[W]e do not have a choice but to put into practice 
a history of religion as a demystification. We have to rid ourselves of the history of 
religion. We have to say what it spoke of, otherwise….Instead…we have to question 
it….The phrase, ‘In the beginning was love’…returns us to the fact that the speaking 
being speaks in relation to an other. What is this relation? Is it from that point that 
we can begin to interrogate? Is it a relation of love? Is it also a relation of hatred? 
Freud discerns in the relation to the other a rejection of the other. But we are still 
within the frame of the Bible…which poses the necessity of thinking of the Other as 
indispensable to the horizon of language. Thus a tradition, stretching back two 
thousand years since its founding texts is still in debt to these texts and as such it 
cannot be abandoned or dissolved before we have interrogated it, lucidly and 
without complacency. 
(in Pollock 1998:9–10) 
Thus, Kristeva seeks to understand what enables the statement ‘In the beginning’ to 
signify the transition from the presymbolic semiotic to the symbolic and to render the 
semiotic as the lost or forgotten origin of subjectivity. 
Kristeva’s repeated preoccupation with ‘beginnings’ also signals a discomfort, 
therefore, with how the movement from the semiotic to the symbolic in western 
metaphysics is predicated on a violent rupture between the ‘One’ and the ‘Other’, where 
the logos is divided and separated from its others (muthos?), the mind from its material 
basis and where both are established within the logic of the self-same as a singularity. 
As Margaroni points out, for Kristeva this ‘rupture has repeatedly taken the 
(metaphorical) figure of a double denial, namely the denial of woman as the m/other of 
logos and the denial of the other as feminine’ (2005:81). This denial constitutes a form of 
matricide, a forgetting of the archaic mother of individual prehistory. As such, 
Kristeva’s conception of the chora seeks to transform the logic of the self-same through 
an act of remembrance, both in the mnemonic sense of the term but also in the sense of 
wanting to restore to a disembodied logos its dismembered corporeal other. It is the logic 
of the self-same that promotes a monolithic, monogenic conception of logos (cast into 
relief by a feminised, exteriorised other) and a ‘metaphorics of gendered hierarchical 
op/positions (speech vs. silence, spirit vs. matter, time vs. space)’ (ibid.). Kristeva instead 
seeks to traverse the space between the ‘One’ and the ‘Other’. As Margaroni argues, ‘the 
chora constitutes an effort on [Kristeva’s] part to explore a mediating space that 
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preserves the alterity of the entities engaged in the process of mediation, though not at 
the expense of their connectedness’ (2005:82). The search for a mediating space is, I will 
argue below, an ethical enterprise. 
In what follows, I will suggest that the maternal body in Kristeva’s thought 
constitutes a metaphor of mediation better than the chora does (even though the two 
concepts are related) and has enormous potential to undo the logic of the self-same that 
marks patrilinearity. The notion of the chora has been subject to a good deal of criticism, 
particularly with regard to its potentially essentialist tenor and seeming reification of 
femininity as existing outside of or other to the domain of the speaking subject of 
western metaphysics. Geraldine Meaney suggests, for example, that it ‘looks 
suspiciously like the eternal feminine’ (1993:84), and Butler has queried its subversive 
potential in view of the fact that the chora appears to be limited to ‘a site outside culture 
itself (1990:88).9 In my view, Kristeva’s chora narrowly avoids both charges in view of 
Kristeva’s suggestion that although it is presymbolic it also inhabits the symbolic 
through the rupturing affects of the semiotic. Moreover, she stresses that the chora is a 
cultural phenomenon (rather than a biological one) because it consists of the cultural 
formation and ordering of the drives which are ‘arranged according to the various 
constraints imposed on [the] body—always already involved in a semiotic process—by 
family and social structures’ (1984:25). She also repeatedly emphasises that what is at 
stake in this configuration is the structure and economy of the drives and not simply the 
presence of the biological body. As such, her argument appears to echo Butler’s claim 
(1993) that the materiality of bodies is subject to and constructed by the social order and 
as such is contingent and contextual. As Ziarek comments, ‘More akin to rhythm and 
mobile traces than structure, [the chora] describes regulated movements and their 
“ephemeral” stasis, moments of gathering and irruptions, which lead to no identity, no 
body proper’ (1992:95). However, Kristeva has tended in her recent work to avoid the 
use of the term chora, perhaps in light of criticisms, and this is one reason why I turn 
instead to examine her figuration of the maternal body as a mediating trope, a richer 
model than that of the chora. Although similar criticisms have been made of Kristeva’s 
work on maternality, I will show that these are also misplaced.  
I want, therefore, to address the significance of Kristeva’s understanding of the 
fusion of the maternal body with that of the infant and to focus on how Kristeva 
formulates the semiotic as a maternal space that precedes and then coexists with the 
                                                           
9 See also Rose 1993:53; Stone 1983:42. 
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paternal aspects of the symbolic. In so doing she challenges the Lacanian and Freudian 
notion of the paternal function and the negation of the maternal, making the radical 
suggestion that the maternal body foreshadows and prefigures the Oedipal crisis, the 
law of the father and the inauguration of the Symbolic (see also Oliver 1993:3–5). 
Because of the dialogic relation between the paternal and maternal functions, the subject 
will always remain in process, constituted as a dialogic division, and the image of 
origins that emerges from the metaphor of the mother’s body, therefore, presents a 
startling and counter-intuitive notion of an origin traversing the past, present, and 
future. I will then suggest in the final section that this notion indicates that origins must 
be understood as plural, temporally and spatially ambiguous, and produced out of a 
dialogic relation between maternality and paternality, between myth (muthos) and 
philosophy (logos).  
(iii) Maternality and Abjection 
The maternal has been a central focus (alongside literary avant-gardes, foreignness, 
ideological revolution, and the therapeutic and transgressive value of psychoanalysis, 
all of which are united under the practice of semanalysis) in Kristeva’s work from 
Revolution in Poetic Language onwards. She is at pains to stress that rethinking 
signification is inseparable from rethinking the place that the maternal body has 
occupied in western discourse. Hence in the mid- to late 1970s onwards, the tenor of her 
work shifted from a philosophically abstract preoccupation with Marxist and 
structuralist linguistic analyses to a more psychoanalytically-oriented and personal style 
and to an interest in motherhood as well as religion, love, horror, borderline 
psychological states, and so on. This shift was met with some dismay by some scholars. 
Paul Smith lamented the ‘deplorable turn of Kristeva’s work of late’ (1989:98) and Ann 
Rosalind Jones expressed disapproval with Kristeva’s ‘new’ direction:  
Kristeva began by raising important issues of subjectivity in culture, but she has 
ended up with escape routes that are especially unconsoling for women. Religion 
and romantic love have not been alternatives to women’s subordination; they have 
been the ideologies through which that subordination was lived. 
(1984:70) 
Jones’ criticism here, in my view, is particularly misplaced for two reasons. The first 
concerns the broader question of whether women should continue to engage with 
religious discourses that have traditionally marginalised or, as Jones suggests, 
‘subordinated’ them. As the scholarly literature that has emerged from the areas of 
gender studies and religion and feminist theology attests, women can be, probably 
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should be, and certainly have been involved in an intense and creative dialogue with a 
variety of religious traditions in order to challenge and transform them in such a way 
that their life-affirming potential is made available for women and men equally.10 The 
second and related reason that Jones’ criticism appears wrong is that Kristeva suggests 
that it is necessary to interrogate the sites that have constituted the power centres of 
western metaphysics in order to trace their causes, their effects, and the possibilities for 
their transformation (in Pollock 1998:9–10, cited above); this is not an attitude that 
contradicts much of the feminist effort of the last fifty years. Kristeva’s interest in 
motherhood thus represents, in my view, an attempt to interrogate dominant western 
images of motherhood, to challenge the logic that underlies them, and to present 
creative alternatives that transgress the structures of western thought and shake their 
certainty. Her attempts to theorise maternality differently, however, have also met with 
a good deal of criticism which I discuss below. 
Kristeva uses a psychoanalytic model inherited from Freud and Lacan to 
theorise motherhood, and it is one that is situated firmly within the ‘family romance’ 
that characterises this framework. She follows Lacan’s understanding of the mother-
child dyad that is interrupted by the Imaginary Father. However, where she differs from 
both Freud and Lacan is that Kristeva focuses on the mother’s own subjectivity and 
experience of child-bearing, and examines the regulatory function that the mother plays 
in the infant’s development. Kristeva also reconfigures Lacan’s Imaginary Father as a 
presymbolic signifier that represents the mother’s capacity to love someone other than 
the child and thus teaches the child about otherness (and love towards otherness). It is 
the Imaginary Father in Kristeva’s thinking who acts as a mediator between the two 
absolutes, the Symbolic father and the abject mother. As a psychic construction, the 
Imaginary Father concerns the specificity of the mother’s desire as it is played out in the 
child as a becoming-subject with identifications (1982:10).11 
                                                           
10 The literature in this area is vast and demonstrates the extent to which women have continued 
to be interested and involved in religion, despite the warnings of secular feminists. Pioneers in 
this regard are Christ and Plaskow (1979; 1989), Ruether (1983; 1985), Schüssler Fiorenza (1983; 
1984), Daly (1968; 1973; 1978), King (1987; 1989; 1995). See King (2005) and Hawthorne (2005a; 
2005b) for comprehensive overviews of the history and content of the area of gender studies and 
religion and of the relationship of feminism to religion. See Joy et al. (2002; 2003) for an overview 
of and justification for Kristeva’s (and other continental feminist theorists’) relationship to 
religion. 
11 For reasons of space I am unable to detail further the mediating function of the Imaginary 
Father. It is an idea that reinforces the dialogic nature of the ‘family romance’—between father, 
mother, and child—as Kristeva sets it out. See Oliver 1993b:69–90. 
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As I began to discuss above, Kristeva is concerned to discover how the infant is 
persuaded to make the transition through the mirror stage to the Symbolic and suggests 
that this is only possible because the child has already been constituted as a proto-
subject in relation to another. Kristeva identifies the mother as the catalyst in this 
process: the child is able to recognise the meaning of the paternal prohibition because it 
has already experienced maternal regulation, insofar as the mother supervises and 
orders the material processes of the infant’s body. The child, in Kristeva’s view, 
(unconsciously) experiences and accedes to social regulation with regard to the mother’s 
breast which is offered and then removed. This regulation establishes an entirely 
corporeal arrangement that is then reproduced in the infant’s psyche and it is this 
cognised regulation that prepares the child to recognise and conform to the paternal 
interdict. It is for this reason that Kristeva insists that maternal regulation precedes and 
prefigures the paternal regulation of the Symbolic. The paternal function is dependent 
on and incomplete without the mother and the corporeal relationship between child and 
mother because it is she who enacts the primary regulations that set the scene for the 
paternal law. The mother is the ‘law before the law’, so to speak. As Oliver argues, 
Kristeva presents this reprioritisation to reveal the permeability and secondariness of 
the paternal Symbolic: ‘Unlike Lacan, Kristeva rejoices both because the paternal 
prohibition is prefigured by, and dependent on, maternal regulation and because the 
paternal prohibition will never completely succeed since the semiotic makes its way into 
signification’ (1993b:47). Nonetheless, Kristeva still suggests that the bond between 
mother and child needs to be broken and that this happens in ways similar, though not 
identical to the castration complex. In Freudian theory the castration anxiety in a child 
that moves it to align itself with the father is provoked by the child’s view of his or her 
mother’s genitals which are misrecognised as castrated. Rather than seeing the mother 
as castrated, Kristeva suggests that for the child the mother’s sex is not focused on her 
genitalia but on the birth canal which is threatening because it represents the child’s 
location prior to birth—a psychic ‘no-place’—and thus signals loss of autonomy but also 
paradoxically leads the child to fear separation from the mother’s body. As such, the 
mother’s sex represents a fundamental ambiguity. The birth canal represents a kind of 
an ‘inverted castration’ (Oliver 1993b:55) that leads the child violently and somatically to 
reject the connection with the mother’s body, and yet to seek it out, a reaction that for 
Kristeva signals abjection. 
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Abjection is one of Kristeva’s most powerful ideas, one that she develops most 
comprehensively in Powers of Horror (1982), and can be extended to account for a variety 
of social exclusions and fears (of foreignness, for example) and the social rituals (such as 
sacrifice) that concern the management of ambiguity. Kristeva defines abjection as 
follows: 
[It] is something that disgusts you, for example, you see something rotting and you 
want to vomit—it is an extremely strong feeling which is at once somatic and 
symbolic, and which is above all a revolt of the person against an external menace 
from which one wants to keep oneself at a distance, but of which one has the 
impression that it is not only an external menace but that it may menace us from the 
inside. So it is a desire for separation, for becoming autonomous and also the feeling 
of an impossibility of doing so. 
(1988:135–136) 
Kristeva argues that the abject exists on the border—of bodies and the social, of the 
interior and exterior of body—but is not contained at the border; it is concretely 
transgressive of borderlines. Thus, it is not a ‘lack of cleanliness or health that causes 
abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order’ (Kristeva 1982:4). Abjection is what 
Derrida would refer to as an undecidable: neither one thing nor the other, syntactically 
undefinable. It threatens the possibility of distinction (and distinctiveness) which is, as I 
have discussed, considered by poststructuralists to be the basis of signification. Kristeva 
suggests that the abject is foundational to society in the sense that all societies must 
construct boundaries—political, territorial, moral, gendered, and so on—and reject 
anything construed as antisocial. The obvious example here is the anti-Semitism of 
nineteenth-century Germany that constructed of its Jewish citizens a feminised and 
threatening other in order to consolidate an image of the German people as masculine, 
strong, and original. Indeed, Kristeva singles out anti-Semitism as the ‘deadliest of 
fantasies’ suggesting that  
One may suppose…that anti-Semitism will be the more violent as the social and/or 
symbolic code is found wanting in the face of developing abjection….Do not all 
attempts, in our own cultural sphere at least, at escaping from the Judeo-Christian 
compound by means of a unilateral call to return to what it has 
repressed…converge on the same…anti-Semitic fantasy? 
(1982:179–180) 
In any social structure, therefore, the abject is what is excluded but always threatens to 
call into question and transgress the boundaries upon which structures are constructed. 
The broad implication is that the Symbolic can only cohere through the construction of 
boundaries which are never secure in themselves because the act of construction ensures 
the exclusion of elements that are rendered abject and that therefore threaten to return 
and disturb the order that is achieved by their exclusion.  
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Within the context of the Symbolic order, the boundaries erected are the result 
of the paternal prohibition (the name-of-the-father) which means logically that the 
excluded abject must be the maternal function, the semiotic, and the maternal body. As 
Oliver remarks, 
The prohibition that founds, and yet undermines society is the prohibition against 
the maternal body, whether it is the oedipal prohibition against incest formulated 
by Lacan, or the prohibition against the semiotic chora formulated by Kristeva. All 
of these are directed against the maternal body. 
(1993:56; see also Kristeva 1982:14) 
The first form of abjection is thus that of the child’s struggle to separate from (and 
therefore exclude) the mother’s body, but this proves monumentally difficult. The 
mother must be abjected in order to aid separation and this constitutes for Kristeva a 
stage prior to the mirror stage. Abjection constitutes a concept of the other (in Lacanian 
terms) in the state where the mother has not yet been configured as an object and the 
child as a subject. The child in this abject relation to the mother is not yet separated from 
her but is no longer identical with her; this seems to represent a separation before the 
‘beginning’ (a beginning that is configured in Lacanian terms as marked by the 
definitive separation enforced by the paternal interdict). It is not a complete separation, 
however; the child at this stage is unable to determine whether it is abject or other 
(Oliver 1993b:57).12 As Kristeva suggests, the abject is what exists in the space between 
the self and the other (1982: 10; 54). 
Abjection is also another means through which Kristeva marks her difference to 
Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis: she opposes the exclusion of the abject to the 
Freudian concept of denial. Abjection operates outside of and prior to the dialectic of 
negation that produces the unconscious as a site of repressed neuroses, drives, and 
impulses. She suggests that Freud proposes a theory of ‘denial as a means of figuring 
out neurosis, that of rejection (repudiation) as a means of situation psychosis’ (1982:7): 
The ‘unconscious’ contents remain here excluded but in a strange fashion: not 
radically enough to allow for a secure differentiation between subject and object, 
and yet clearly enough for a defensive position to be established—one that implies a 
refusal but also a sublimating elaboration. As if the fundamental opposition were 
between I and Other or, in more archaic fashion, between Inside and Outside. As if 
such an opposition subsumed the one between Conscious and Unconscious, 
elaborated on the basis of neurosis. 
                                                           
12 I have often thought that the very act of being born is itself an experience of abjection in the 
sense that the baby is expelled from the mother’s womb, moving between the inside and the 
outside and unable for some time to recognise its separation from the mother. This could mean 
that the constitutive identity of humans is in fact one of lifelong abjection and perhaps it is this 
‘memory’ that the constitution of subjectivity seeks to erase in its construction of the self as an 
unambiguous singularity. See also Oliver (1993b:57; 60). 
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(ibid.) 
The abject is the (pre)object that fills the infant with horror, disgust, and revulsion and is 
therefore the opposite of desire (which is the desire to merge with the mother). It is 
related to primary repression and the expulsion of the mother’s body before the subject 
separates from her. This negativity helps, therefore, to maintain and reinforce the 
paternal interdiction at the stage of what Kristeva considers to be a secondary repression 
(the thetic stage) where the infant enters into the Symbolic, the space of desire (1982:11). 
Abjection as negativity sets up and rehearses the imposition of the incest taboo and is 
thus not so much a violently imposed law (the name-of-the-father) that secures the 
subsitutionary status of patrilinearity as primary, but rather a bodily revulsion in 
respect of the mother’s body. It is the abject, therefore, that maintains the illusion of 
autonomy and grants the individual’s body a sense of achievable boundaries—equally 
illusory in Kristeva’s account—prior to the intervention of signification on the Symbolic 
level. 
It would appear that Kristeva represents the abject as a biological and therefore 
possibly essentialist or naturalised phenomenon which leaves mothers, and by 
extension women or femininity, in a naturally and necessarily excluded position. 
However, Kristeva has explored the broader social and political implications of this idea 
to explain and to challenge the forms of exclusion that constitute social structuration, 
and also to theorise how societies can tolerate difference, foreignness, and otherness 
without abjecting them. She develops her ideas in this regard most fully in Strangers to 
Ourselves (1991). Her focus is well summarised by McAfee: ‘Why is it that we find some 
people foreign, and what makes them so threatening? Why does difference beget fear 
and violence, and can we ever move to an ethics of respect for those different from us?’ 
(1993:116). One answer Kristeva proposes is that when a community ostracises or 
persecutes others, what is being excluded is in fact a part of that community’s own 
identity and is analogically related to an individual’s unconscious. Its own inherent 
otherness (insofar as Kristeva theorises the subject as always already inhabited by an 
irreducible alterity and dependent on the m/other’s existence for its own) is projected 
outwards onto the people who are excluded and thus the community’s other is 
transformed into an exteriority: 
‘Hell’, said Sartre, ‘is other people’. Perhaps, but because hell is my unconscious 
and I do not recognise it. Therefore, recognising what is not doing well in myself—
my death drives, my eroticism, my bizarreness, my particularity, my femininity, all 
these uncoded marginalities that are not recognized by consensus—I would tend 
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less to constitute enemies from those phenomena, which I now project to the 
exterior, making scapegoats of others. 
(1996:41) 
Foreignness and difference, therefore—like the abject—elicit anxiety because it is 
difficult to compartmentalise. Foreigners are disturbing not because of their specific 
identity—appearance, speech, or behaviour—but primarily because of their 
indeterminacy. In other words, a foreigner shares the same qualities of humanness and 
yet appears different to the one who considers her- or himself as fully human. In 
Strangers to Ourselves Kristeva suggests that when ‘Confronting the foreigner whom I 
reject and with whom at the same time I identify, I lose my boundaries, I no longer have 
a container…I lose my composure’ (1991:187). She thus argues that racism, sexism, 
genocide, extreme nationalistic identification, and so on, are all products of the anxiety 
of abjection. She not only diagnoses the effects of abjection, however, but also offers a 
prescription in suggesting that individuals will only be capable of living with others and 
tolerating difference to the extent that they are able to see themselves as other, to 
recognise that they are ‘strangers to themselves’. It is thus vital, in Kristeva’s view, to 
develop an openness to the imaginative and creative opportunities afforded by 
strangers, whether within or without the subject. As McAfee emphasises, ‘the foreigner 
presents an opportunity and not an abyss’ (1993:132), which is to say that what is 
strange, different, or alien serves to remind the individual that it is permeable and other 
rather than autonomous or whole. As such the stranger serves to enable a conception of 
identity as transformable insofar as the self is able to be open to the other. With this idea 
in mind, McAfee suggests that ‘Without completion, possibility thrives’ (ibid.) and I 
believe that at the heart of Kristeva’s attempt to signify the interrelatedness of self and 
other is an effort to guarantee the possibility of creativity and change, to resist the 
violence of singularity that is inscribed in the Symbolic by demonstrating its own 
porousness and openness. The mother’s body, more than any other image she presents, 
offers an imaginative figure through which a dialogic relation of self and other can be 
envisaged (and which constitutes a ‘heretical ethics’); and so I now turn, in order to 
conclude this section, to a reflection on the form of motherhood from the perspective of 
a mother that Kristeva opposes to the account of the mother that proceeds from the 
child’s point of view, an account which arguably inscribes a patrilineal logic, in her 
essay ‘Stabat Mater’. 
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(iv) ‘There stood the Mother’: ‘Stabat Mater’, the Split Subject, and Heretical Ethics 
‘Stabat Mater’ (1987b) is an essay unique generically and stylistically within Kristeva’s 
writing and appears to be an experiment in experimental writing, a form of postmodern 
writing that she refers to elsewhere as ‘writing-as-the-experience-of limits’ (1980:137). 
The essay is typographically split between two columns: the right-hand column 
occupies the majority of the text and is written in a conventional academic style; the left-
hand column, in bold typeface, has a more impressionistic, and personal tone.13 
Although Kristeva at no point states it explicitly, it appears to me that the purpose of 
‘Stabat Mater’ is to enact or embody an alternative, dialogic discourse on motherhood, 
from the point of view of a mother, that resists the totalising narrative of Christian 
Mariology, replacing it instead with a narrative of maternality recalling the dialogic 
relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic. It weaves together its two styles to 
demonstrate the ways in which the semiotic and the symbolic coexist in discourse. The 
right-hand column with which the essay begins is continually disrupted by the left-hand 
column and which appears to describe Kristeva’s own experience of motherhood, 
perhaps the birth of her own son around the time the essay was written. The left-hand 
account interleaves the right-hand column, occasionally seeming to mimic its tone, 
sometimes disappearing altogether. The columns finish almost simultaneously. 
The essay begins with an analysis of the Virgin Mother, the most resonant 
symbol of ‘maternality for the other’ (Edelstein 1992:29) in western socio-religious 
discourses where the ‘consecrated (religious or secular) representation of femininity is 
absorbed by motherhood’ (Kristeva 1987b:234). Kristeva points out that this image is a 
‘fantasy…of a lost territory’ that involves ‘less an idealized archaic mother than the 
idealization of the relationship that binds us to her, one that cannot be localized’ (ibid.). 
She argues that the figure of the Virgin Mary is a fundamentally unsatisfactory and 
paradoxical construction—both virgin and mother, unique (‘alone among women’) and 
simultaneously a generic model for all women that encourages them to be self-
sacrificing and submissive to male authority. Kristeva’s argument is that Mary is, in 
essence, projected as a mother solely for others and that she represents a form of 
‘masculine sublimation’, leading her to ask  
What is there, in the portrayal of the Maternal in general and particularly in its 
Christian, virginal, one that reduces social anguish and gratifies a male being; what 
is there that also satisfies a woman so that a commonality of the sexes is set up, 
beyond and in spite of their glaring incompatibility and permanent warfare? 
                                                           
13 I indicate in bold type any quotations from the left-hand column. 
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(1987b:236) 
She further asks if ‘there is something in that Maternal notion that ignores what a 
woman might say or want—as a result, when women speak out today it is in matters of 
conception and motherhood that their annoyance is basically centred’ (ibid.) Kristeva 
suggests that certain forms of feminism consequently demand a ‘new representation of 
femininity’ but in doing so they mistake the idealised representation of motherhood that 
the Virgin Mary appears to represent as the only possible discourse of femininity within 
patriarchy and so they reject it. However, as a result feminists ‘circumvent the real 
experience that the fantasy overshadows’ and simultaneously acquiesce in its power by 
granting it a hegemonic status (1987b:234). She appears here to be challenging a form of 
gynocentric feminism that argues that the assumption of masculine-neutral norms has 
meant that femininity has traditionally been presented as deficient, secondary, and 
lacking. Gynocentric feminism therefore is concerned to revalue sexual difference and 
femininity positively but does so through recourse to an essentialised notion of 
femininity.14 Kristeva seems to have in her sights particularly the form of feminine 
writing and language (l’écriture feminine) that was advocated by feminists such as 
Hélène Cixous in France during the 1970s and which was thought to retrieve a form of 
expression unique to women, uncontaminated by patriarchal language, and 
characterised by its defiance of conventional syntax, mellifluous tone, and allusive 
quality. In many ways, the left-hand column of ‘Stabat Mater’ appears to parody the 
style of l’écriture feminine but it is accompanied by the rigorously analytical right-hand 
column which enables Kristeva to avoid what she suggests is the ‘Manichean position 
which consists in designating as feminine’ the kind of language that is characterised by 
the ‘imprecise…with impulses, perhaps with primary processes’ and which results in 
‘maintaining women in a position of inferiority, and, in any case, of marginality’ 
(1985:122–123).  
The right-hand column analyses three main themes in the ‘incredible construct 
of the Maternal that the West elaborated by means of the Virgin’ (1987b:256). Kristeva 
begins by examining the social context in which the Church came to present Mary’s 
immaculate conception (an idea that became dogma in 1854) and suggests that it was a 
way of asserting her sexlessness which could then be extended to link her to sinlessness 
and therefore to deathlessness. Noting that the doctrine of Mary’s Assumption was 
                                                           
14 See Iris Marion Young (1990: 73–91) for an assessment of the benefits and problems with 
gynocentric feminism.  
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proclaimed dogma in 1950, she suggests that it may have served as a consoling fiction, 
and asks rhetorically ‘What death anguish was it intended to soothe after the conclusion 
of the deadliest of wars?’ (1987b:244). The second theme is the representation of Mary as 
queen of heaven, again linked to social exigencies, particularly the attempt by the 
Church to legitimise its earthly power. Finally, she examines the symbol of Mary as a 
‘prototype of love’, and associates this idea with courtly love where ‘Mary and the Lady 
shared one common trait: they are the focal point of men’s desires and aspirations’ 
(1987b:245). The purpose of the analysis is to suggest that while in some ways the 
various constructs of the Virgin Mary may have served ‘women’s wishes for 
identification’ insofar as they include a symbol of femininity in an otherwise masculine 
religious paradigm, they more obviously functioned to stabilise society by mediating 
between the ‘unconscious needs of primary narcissism’ and the social requirement of 
‘the contribution of the…symbolic paternal agency’ (1987b:259). But Kristeva is more 
interested in the needs that the construct of Mary does not resolve, at least for most 
twentieth-century women. Her intention is to redress the balance, to offer a narrative of 
maternality, of women’s relationships to their own mothers and to their children. 
Further, although she appears to derive the impetus for her work from psychoanalysis, 
she wants to address the Freudian omission of a theory of motherhood:  
The fact remains, as far as the complexities and pitfalls of maternal experience are 
involved, that Freud offers only a massive nothing which…is punctuated with this 
or that remark on the part of Freud’s mother, proving to him in the kitchen that his 
own body is anything but immortal and will crumble away like dough; or the sour 
photograph of Marthe Freud, the wife, a whole mute story… 
(1987b:255) 
It is precisely at the point in the right-hand column where the word ‘maternal’ is 
first invoked that the left-column appears. Here Kristeva begins to write of the mother’s 
own desire—her jouissance—the intensely sensual pleasure of mothering, but also of her 
pain, alluding to the lack of separation between the mother’s body and the child’s:  
My body is no longer mine, it doubles up, suffers, bleeds, catches cold, puts its 
teeth in, slobbers, coughs, is covered with pimples, and it laughs. And yet, when 
its own joy, my child’s, returns, its smile washes only my eyes. But the pain, its 
pain—it comes from inside, never remains apart, other, it inflames me at once, 
without a second’s respite. As if it was what I had given birth to and, not willing 
to part from me, insisted on coming back, dwelled in me permanently. One does 
not give birth in pain, one gives birth to pain: the child represents it and 
henceforth it settles in, it is continuous….But a mother is always branded by 
pain, she yields to it. 
(1987b:240–241) 
Several important ideas are expressed in this passage, and are repeated throughout the 
text, all of which seem to confirm that the left-hand column can be read as 
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representative of the semiotic: it stresses doubling; describes the continuous oscillation 
between unity and separation that constitutes the relationship between the mother and 
child; references somatic experiences; and suggests the ambivalence between inside and 
outside. Moreover, and significantly, it seems that it is the mother, rather than the child, 
who will henceforth struggle with the experience of separation and thus with a clear and 
singular identity. Edelstein points out that ‘the first two lyrical, “personal” 
passages…include no personal pronouns; the first “my”, “I”, and even “his”…don’t 
occur until the third paragraph’ and that it is at that point in the text that gender identity 
and difference appear (1992:35). Kristeva later establishes a connection between the lack 
of identificatory pronouns and motherhood when she remarks that ‘the languages of 
the great formerly matriarchal civilizations must avoid, do avoid, personal pronouns’ 
and that they rely instead on ‘trans-verbal communication between bodies….A 
woman’s discourse, would that be it?’ (1987b:259). This statement does seem to 
essentialise not only women but also mothers and one might therefore be justified in 
suggesting—as several of her critics have—that the left-hand column, as a ‘woman’s 
discourse’ is reduced to a biological, essentially inarticulable, form of communication. 
However, the column does not remain in this register. The dialogue between the two 
columns increasingly overlaps in terms of both style and content, suggesting that the 
ostensible ‘woman’s discourse’ is inseparable from the more ‘symbolic’ discourse of the 
right-hand column.  
The right-hand column dominates the text and seems to be ‘the master text, 
interrupted by the repressed “voice” of the semiotic, of what’s left’, but the two columns 
‘do not remain alien to each other; in their dialogue they often mingle and overlap, echo 
and anticipate’ (Edelstein 1992:35–36). The semiotic elements of the text appear in the 
right-hand column too, for example, towards the end of the essay when Kristeva 
requests her readers to ‘listen to the Stabat Mater, and the music, all the music…it 
swallows up the goddesses and removes their necessity’ (1987b:263). Here, in my view, 
Kristeva alludes both to the maternal (‘Stabat Mater’) and to the musicality15 of the 
semiotic elements of signification, suggesting that a recognition of the disruptive force 
of the semiotic removes the necessity for impossible representations of femininity such 
as the Virgin Mary.  
                                                           
15 The structure of the text appears to mimic the hymn ‘Stabat Mater’ by Giovanni Battista 
Pergolesi (1710–1736) from which the title is taken, and to which several allusions are made, 
which alternates between a solo voice and a counterpoint duet and to which the essay makes 
several allusions (1987b:245; 251–252; 263). 
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Taken all together, the text is resolutely transgressive; as words, images, and 
ideas cross back and forth between the columns the essays seems visually to perform the 
‘confounding the limits of the symbolic through the incursions of the semiotic’ (1992:31). 
The notion that the text represents the dialogical relationship between the semiotic and 
symbolic is, in my view, the key to its understanding and it aids reflection on Kristeva’s 
ideas of the subject-in-process and of maternality as an exemplar of the split subject. The 
text is also transgressive in terms of its content insofar as it moves between philosophy 
and literature, the abstract and the personal, the social and the subjective. Amongst the 
many commentators on ‘Stabat Mater’, Edelstein alone appears to have recognised the 
importance of the essay’s typography, suggesting that the essay’s ‘narrative strategies 
and construction of both its speaking and reading subject(s) are as much part of its 
meaning—and inseparable from—its prepositional statements or theses’ (1992:29). I see 
the essay as an enactment or embodiment of the subject-in-process, the split subject, 
insofar as it appears visibly to require the reader to cross back and forth between the 
two columns and negotiate the space between, in the process experiencing the 
disruptive and vertigo-inducing dialogical tension that Kristeva suggests is the nature of 
signification discussed above.  
The structuring of the text forces the reader not just to read about the dialogic 
tension between the semiotic and the symbolic, but also to experience it. As Drucilla 
Cornell and Adam Thurschwell suggest ‘Ultimately, the “truth” of non-identity can only 
be shown, not told’ (1987:160). The reader, unable to ‘master the duelling/dualling 
voices’ of ‘Stabat Mater’ (Edelstein 1992:40), has to realise a dialogic situationality within 
connected (though possibly competing) discourses. It is a situationality where the 
production of stable, linear meaning is disrupted through encounter with an other 
meaning—allusive, fragmentary, and maternal. The typography thus also hints at an 
analogy with the maternal body which Kristeva elsewhere suggests is ‘the place of 
splitting’ (Kristeva 1986:238) and that ‘a woman or mother is a conflict—the incarnation 
of the split of the complete subject, a passion’ (Kristeva 1986:297). In ‘Stabat Mater’ she 
remarks that ‘A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very self, and 
consequently a division of language—and it has always been so’ (Kristeva 1987b:254). 
The text appears to me an attempt to embody the mother’s body (as Kristeva 
understands it) as a metaphor for the subject-in-process and, in my view, largely 
succeeds in doing so. 
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The significance of the maternal body, specifically the pregnant body, in 
Kristeva’s work, and as exemplified by ‘Stabat Mater’, is that it cannot be neatly divided 
into subject and object, self and other. For Kristeva, 
A woman or mother is a conflict—the incarnation of the split of the complete 
subject, a passion….Pregnancy… is an identity that splits, turns in on itself, and 
changes without becoming other. The threshold between nature and culture, 
biology and language….If pregnancy is a threshold between nature and culture, 
maternity is a bridge between singularity and ethics. 
(1986:297) 
What does Kristeva mean when she talks of the maternal as a site of splitting? It only 
makes sense in the context of her other work if we consider that she is employing it as a 
metaphorical device to illustrate the temporary constitution of the subject dialogically. 
Making a connection between the Virgin Mary’s pain and that of her son’s, and between 
his pleasures and hers, she suggests that mothers are ‘crossroads beings, crucified 
beings’ (1987b:254). This indicates, as Edelstein notes, that, ‘all (split) subjects exist at 
such crossroads between pain and pleasure, lack and plenitude, sameness and 
difference’ (Edelstein 1992:33). When Kristeva talks of the maternal as a site of splitting, 
therefore, I believe she employs it as a metaphorical device, rather than a literal 
description of a mother’s body, to illustrate the temporary constitution of the subject, a 
subject-in-process. Metaphor (from the Greek metapherein meaning ‘to carry or transfer’, 
or ‘to carry beyond’), is etymologically connected to the root ‘to bear children’ or ‘to give 
birth to’ as well as ‘to transgress’, and thus to māter. Metaphor, like the subject-in-
process and the maternal body, is always other to itself—it does not provide meaning as 
purely present but rather gestures to a space beyond itself, leaving meaning deferred. It 
is a space of suspension, and one that suggests a model of identity radically at odds with 
that of the self-same. Subjectivity, for Kristeva, appears to reside in a gap, and so the 
dialogue between the two columns in ‘Stabat Mater’ gestures towards—orients the 
reader towards—the space in between, recalling Bakhtin’s notion of the constitution of 
the self as a form of intertextuality in the dialogue between self and other discussed 
above.16  
Reading ‘Stabat Mater’ poses an immediate problem: what strategy does one 
employ to access its meaning? Does one read the right column first and then the left? 
                                                           
16 The structure of the text echoes that of Derrida’s novel Glas (1974) and his two-columned essay 
‘The Double Session’ in Dissemination (2004). As Barbara Johnson argues in her introduction to 
Dissemination, this type of double typography suggests ‘that an effort is being made to call the 
reader’s attention to the syntactical function of spacing in the act of reading’ (2004:xxviii). 
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Does one attempt a complicated synthesis of both columns at once? How does the text 
position the reader? Edelstein suggests that 
A reader’s specific relation to, and experience of, this challenging text depends on 
who that reader is—whether a woman, man, another mother, a woman not a 
mother, a Christian, etc. For those readers not mothers, the discourse by the mother 
may be alien, exotic, spoken by a sort of ‘native informant from the land of mothers. 
For non-Christian readers, the discourse about the Virgin Mary may seem merely a 
description of a quaint or peripheral phenomenon, not a powerful cultural myth or 
religious symbol. Perhaps this text’s ideal imagined reader would be a heterosexual 
Christian woman who has borne at least one son and who knows something about 
theoretical and literary avant gardes. If one doesn’t match this description on any or 
all counts, then perhaps one becomes the very other, even the other woman, of 
whom this text speaks. Does this text love or exclude and marginalise such an 
other? 
(1992:39) 
It is a good question. Edelstein wonders whether Kristeva is speaking in both columns 
as a ‘subject who knows’ in order to employ an exclusionary textual strategy. She 
concludes, however, and I agree with her, that the ‘other reader’ could ‘decide to read 
the maternal as metaphorical in order not to be excluded’ (1992:39). She argues 
persuasively that the text ‘makes us all mothers metaphorically, as split-subjects, or 
reveals that we are already both [other and mother]’ (1992:40).17 
Many critics of Kristeva, Domna Stanton in particular (1989), accuse her of 
trying to sever the connection between the maternal as metaphor and its biological 
referent, of essentialising an equation of femininity with maternality, or of alternately 
prioritising the semiotic over the symbolic or vice versa. Paul Smith, for example, accuses 
Kristeva of turning ‘her emphasis away from the mutually constraining dialectic 
between the semiotic and the symbolic, and toward a revindication of a putative priority 
and primacy of the semiotic’ (1988:126). On the other hand, Butler contends that the very 
fact that Kristeva theorises the semiotic as a subversive force reifies the hegemonic 
power of the symbolic in view of the fact that the paternal law is what imposes the 
illusion that femininity is somehow outside of the symbolic. For Butler there can be no 
‘true body beyond the law’ (1990:82, 93). However Kristeva’s theorisation of the 
coincidence of the semiotic and the symbolic—both temporally and spatially—suggests 
that Butler’s work and her own are less opposed than Butler would have it. Kristeva has 
suggested, for example, that ‘bio-psychological processes’ are ‘already inescapably part 
of the signifying process’ (1986:28). When ‘Stabat Mater’ is read in the context of 
Kristeva’s broader theoretical arguments regarding the dialogic relationship between 
                                                           
17 See Edelstein 1992:40–44 for a very persuasive discussion of how the maternal for Kristeva 
becomes a ‘metaphor for metaphor itself. 
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self and other, inside and outside, the semiotic and the symbolic, it becomes clear that 
neither the semiotic or the symbolic take priority but are in fact dependent on each 
other. To suggest otherwise goes against the transgressive subjectivity that is 
represented by Kristeva’s figuration of the subject-in-process; her critics cannot have it 
both ways.  
In my view, Kristeva’s critics read her work very selectively, and their critiques 
almost always concentrate on one column of the essay, usually the right-hand one, and 
confuse it with Kristeva’s own position on motherhood rather than recognising that it is 
instead a description and analysis of what motherhood has signified within patrilineal 
systems such as the Judeo-Christian tradition and Freudian psychoanalysis. Grosz, for 
example, singles out the right-hand column as the subject of her critique and suggests 
that ‘Kristeva focuses her analysis of maternity, not on the experience of motherhood, 
nor on women’s representations of maternity, but on phallocentric textual images, most 
particularly those of the Virgin Mother presented in Christian theology’ (1990:162–163). 
This claim is only sustainable if one reads only the right-hand column, and then rather 
cursorily at that. Kristeva herself resists such a reading when, in ‘Stabat Mater’, she 
critiques the ‘resorption of femininity within the Maternal’, calling it a ‘masculine 
appropriation…which is only a fantasy masking primary narcissism’ (1987a:236). When 
commentators emphasise the right-hand column they accuse her of conflating 
motherhood with femininity and reducing it to a marginal corporeal domain (Stanton 
1989:158–159; 160).18 However, while she does maintain a link to the experiences of 
actual mothers (indeed, she must in order for the metaphor to have any resonance), I 
think a dialogic reading of the texts demonstrates that these experiences are open to 
others too, once the interweaving of the text is employed to understand subjectivity as 
processual and dialogic. Edelstein, too, argues that ‘there’s something to be gained by 
(plural) theories or metaphors of the maternal that allow mothers, child-free women, 
and even men to become (rather than be) “maternal”‘ (1992:43-4). In an echo of my earlier 
concern to provide a viable alternative to the motif of patrilinearity, Edelstein, 
remarking that theoretical discourse is ‘irremediably metaphorical’, suggests that ‘we 
need better (or at least different) metaphors’ and asks ‘why not dethrone the phallus, 
even if the maternal is crowned only transitionally?’ (1992:44). 
                                                           
18 See Moi 2002:149–172 and 1989a:117–132 for a defence of Kristeva against the charge of 
essentialism. 
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What is required to effect such a transition? Michel Foucault (1982:216) has 
suggested that ‘[w]e have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of 
[the] kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries’. Kristeva 
similarly believes that ‘there can be no socio-political transformation without a 
transformation of subjects: in other words, in our relationship to social constraints, to 
pleasure, and more deeply, to language’ (Kristeva 1981:141). Coinciding with the 
original title of the essay, she advocates a neologistic ‘hèrethique’ (‘a heretical ethics…and 
herethics’; 1987b:263) based on the conception of the mother who relates to the other 
through and with love rather than the Law. Kristeva presents maternity as a model, 
founded on the ambiguity of pregnancy and birth that oscillates between the inside and 
the outside, between subject and object (Oliver 1993a:5; 1991) and she proposes an ethics 
that proceeds from the divided subject rather than that of the autonomous agent of 
western post-Enlightenment metaphysics. Generally speaking, the metaphysics that has 
proposed an ethical orientation towards others has postulated an autonomous agent, 
routinely inscribed as normatively masculine, whose obligations to the other come from 
‘his’ realisation that the other must be the same, or at least equivalent to, ‘himself’.19 The 
autonomous subject of this ethics does not have a relation to any other; rather it always 
and only has a relationship to the self-same, that is a selfhood posited as the same 
against an other as representative of difference. Kristeva, in contrast, as I have 
suggested, conceives of a notion of difference that does not operate according to a 
dualist logic of opposition and she develops a series of ethical models that present an 
assumption of the other as inherent within oneself rather than as exterior. These models 
enable Kristeva to imagine an otherness at the very core of the subject, all of which 
indicate a ‘subject-in-process/on trial’. She proposes that models of alterity can inform a 
new way to conceive of the structure of the relation to others and thereby produce a new 
way to conceive of ethics, or ‘herethics’, a term which well conveys the sense in which 
such an ethics goes against conventional, binary understandings of the self. As such it is 
                                                           
19 Within the history of western philosophy, ethics or phronesis (practical wisdom) has been 
understood to rely on higher-order principles about the goals of human life, which themselves 
were based on claims about the nature of reality and reason that constituted western metaphysics. 
Thus, in the Christian era, how one was supposed to act was dependent on what one understood 
God to be, that is, on one’s basic metaphysical commitments. In the aftermath of the 
Enlightenment, God became more distant and more abstract and so the confessional basis for 
ethical judgement that justified moral rules in terms of duty or salvation receded. In its place, 
ethics moved to the empirical realm and was transformed into a descriptive utilitarianism, as 
explained by David Hume in terms of what is ‘useful, or agreeable to a man himself, or to others’ 
(Hume 1975:336). The basis of ethics thus shifted from a pre-ordained religious soteriology to one 
founded on human autonomy. See Chapter 1.  
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an ‘outlaw ethics’ (Oliver 1993a:5). Kristeva’s work on language, borderline patients, 
literary limit-texts, the maternal, the abject, and faith is brought together by an interest 
in what exists at and beyond the boundaries of human experience. It is an ethics that 
challenges rather than presupposes the autonomous ethical agent that sets up  
obligations to the other as obligations to the self, and furthermore it binds the subject to 
the other through love and not through the ‘Law-of-the-Father’. The model of ethical 
love is the mother’s love for her child, but also, by implication, for herself, and for her 
own mother. This is an ethics which is predicated on a reaching out to, rather than 
overcoming, the other and is thus a sacrifice of singular, unitary identity. It offers an 
alternative to the individualism of patrilinearity that seeks, as I have argued, to establish 
the primacy of the knowing subject at the expense of the other through the distillation of 
duality into a self-same singularity. The motif of patrilinearity emphasises combat with 
one’s forefathers in a dialectic encounter, whereas the stress in Kristeva’s presentation of 
maternality is on connection, love, nurture, and dialogue.  
It could be argued, of course, that the efficacy of a maternal model of ontology 
might only apply to women who are mothers, much as ‘Stabat Mater’ might be seen to 
be addressed solely to mothers, and that its value for constructing a new theory of 
identity is consequently limited. However, in my view, maternality is not simply a 
model of ontology for women, nor indeed specifically for mothers. Patrilinearity has 
been a hegemonic framework of identity operating without regard to an individual’s 
gender (even though it assumes a male father as a universal metaphor and underlying 
organising principle) in that both men and women are expected to align themselves 
with its values and logic. Thus, women’s (and also men’s) participation in the field of 
culture has been predicated on their relative ability or inability to conform to the 
prerequisites of normative subjectivity construed as paternal and masculine, a practice 
made explicit in psychoanalytic theory but which has been a foundational assumption of 
identity in western metaphysics in general, as Genevieve Lloyd (1993) has demonstrated 
so convincingly. Further, as I suggested in Chapter 8, patrilinearity is predicated on a 
dualistic and dialectical framework of self and other that seeks to distil the essence of 
subjectivity into singularity through an agonistic encounter that ensures the triumph of 
the self-same over the other by means of the erasure or marginalisation of otherness as 
difference. In contrast, maternality provides a dialogical understanding of identity, open 
to both men and women as a metaphor—an image which aids the imagination of a 
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different economy of being—that seeks a non-agonistic relationship between self and 
other. 
I believe Kristeva offers a solid ethical framework for posing the self as multiple, 
transgressive, and unable logically to resolve its paradoxical strands of singularity and 
multiplicity. Rather than a weakness, Kristeva’s failure to provide a resolution to the 
paradox of subject formation is a strength in that it enables identities to be plotted in a 
dialogic mode which, contra Ricœur and the Cartesian self, questions the singularity or 
unity of selves by posing them as always already fragmented and divided. Her 
conception of the abject and her examination of the creative potential offered by 
foreignness and difference, and of otherness as constitutive of the self, suggests an 
alternative basis for subjectivity, rather than one that establishes (singular) place or 
origin as the guarantors of identity. The transgressive and fluid nature of maternality as 
suggested by Kristeva, I believe, suggests process, movement, and ambiguity rather 
than fixed origin as conventionally construed within a patrilineal framework of identity, 
and is thus an intervention that does not seek a fixed destination or original source for 
subjectivity, signified in her insistence on a ‘subject-in-process’. Further, maternality, as 
an ontological metaphor derived from the perspective of mothers, traverses the 
boundaries between past, present, and future and enables a radical—although possibly 
counter-intuitive—conception of origins as unfixed in time. 
In my view, therefore, maternality as reconceived by Kristeva offers a 
transitional ontological metaphor that offers the potential to dismantle and dethrone the 
singular power of patrilinearity in the western metaphysical tradition. It must be 
transitional rather than final because to inaugurate maternality as a single or dominant 
site of origin would be to replicate the patrilineal logic that I am opposing. The concept 
of ‘natality’, suggested by Grace Jantzen (1999), amongst others (Cavarero 1995; Arendt 
1958; Bowen-Moore 1989) may indicate one future direction for a new model of identity, 
but such a model, in passing too quickly over and failing fully to explore the significance 
and potential of the maternal metaphor, continues to align motherhood with the ‘death 
drive’ (see Jantzen 2003:121–127) and thus marks it as a site of negativity—although 
Jantzen criticises Kristeva for doing just this. The model of motherhood that Kristeva 
suggests in ‘Stabat Mater’ resists the alignment of the maternal with death and pushes it 
towards life for and in the other. Jantzen's concept of natality, while it opposes the 
patriarchal underpinnings of psychoanalytic theory, assumes the psychoanalytic 
practice of taking the perspective of the infant as the source of identity work and so 
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remains only a partial reworking of patrilineal logic, in my view. I believe that 
understandings of ‘the mother’ in psychoanalytic theory as a site of negativity need to 
be subject to a rigorous reinterpretation and reconfiguration before a model of natality 
can be asserted as a preferable alternative to a patrilineal model. Reconsidering the 
mother-child dyad from the perspective of the mother may well open up a means to 
think natally but the hard work of dismantling conventional narratives of motherhood 
as presented by psychoanalysis must first be confronted.  
Kristeva has insisted throughout her work that rethinking the maternal body 
has to be inseparable from rethinking language. Maternality consequently is not 
reduced to mute biologism, or a naïve mystification of the prelinguistic unity between 
mother and child. Rather, as Ziarek notes, Kristeva’s realignment of the relationship 
between the maternal body and language is ‘a displacement of natural primacy by a 
strategic redistribution of positions, a departure from natural origins’ (1992:93; my 
emphasis). Her complex and rich body of writing implies that the question of the 
maternal is necessarily intertwined with the reconfiguration of language as a social 
practice rather than merely a nostalgic return to what is, in patriarchal discourse, a 
prelinguistic phantasy of maternal emptiness. Her representations of maternality, the 
semiotic, and the chora implies a prioritisation of heterogeneity over homogeneity, and 
this heterogeneity must be taken in a double sense: not only as the intersection of 
corporeality and language, but also as the intersection of two signifying economies. It is 
by focusing on the disruptive and heterogeneous elements of signification that Kristeva 
is able to theorise the forms of otherness and pluralities that are excluded by unifying 
orders of discourse. And it anticipates an alternative, ‘other’ understanding of language 
that welcomes and celebrates its heterogeneous elements. Such an attitude suggests an 
approach to narrative that opens it up to variant and various readings, and perhaps 
suggests a way to conceive of a feminist practice of narrativity, as Hite indicates: 
The notion that stories inevitably both obscure and encode other stories has been 
axiomatic to our understanding of narrative….When construed as repressed or 
suppressed stories of the Other, these other stories become the enabling conditions 
for the writing and reading of feminist narrative. 
(1989:4) 
In what follows, I want to conclude the thesis by extending Kristeva’s work on 
maternality in two ways. Firstly I want to consider how her work might suggest a 
different reading of origins as multiple and transgressive of temporality and spatiality. 
Secondly, I want to use her work, read alongside Derrida’s deconstruction of 
philosophy, as a way of anticipating a feminist philosophy of myth (and mythology of 
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philosophy) that questions the clarity of the boundaries between myth and philosophy, 
one that might place mythology as dialogically intertextual rather than dialectically 
constituted. 
II. Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Myth 
Throughout this thesis I have sought to establish that the search for origins within the 
western metaphysical tradition, of which the German case was one example, reveals a 
preoccupation with singularity as the legitimating source of identity. I have further 
suggested that singularity is a motif of patrilinearity—one that can be tracked through 
the German example, but which is also a feature of Ricœur’s theorisation of narrative 
identity, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the field of mythology—insofar as 
it locates the father as a non-transcendable origin that founds a discourse of causality 
and continuity, ruthlessly erasing otherness from the scene of its creation. Kristeva’s 
work, in contrast, proposes a model of maternality that asserts a very different logic of 
origins which is able to accomplish a displacement of paternal originality, not by placing 
the mother as the sole origin of human subjectivity but by suggesting that motherhood 
functions in dialogue with the paternal law, disrupting its singularity and its 
temporal/spatial clarity. I noted above that Kristeva’s own work has returned repeatedly 
to the question of the ‘Beginning’ as an attempt to rethink symbolic signification as 
centred on the Logos, (which has characterised both Johannine theology and Platonic 
thought and is repeated in psychoanalysis). She suggests that rather than ignoring these 
traditions, it is necessary to confront their powerful logic, interrogating them ‘lucidly 
and without complacency’ (in Pollock 1998:10). I have attempted to pursue a similar 
project in this thesis, demonstrating how the motif of patrilinearity has saturated 
western metaphysics, and in particular its theorisation of ontology, to the point that it 
appears natural and unassailable. Patrilinearity as such, I have argued, has served as the 
condition of western metaphysics’ possibility and the difficulty, therefore, of 
dismantling its logic should not be underestimated. Butler has claimed, for example, 
that ‘the masculine sex’ necessarily ‘appears to originate meanings and thereby to signify’ 
those meanings as an effect with ideological ends (1990:45). Within patrilineal 
discourses, therefore, it would seem that women will always and only be, and only be 
presented as, ‘the masculine sex encore (and en corps) parading in the mode of otherness’ 
(1990:12). However, Kristeva defies this logic to the extent that she demonstrates that 
this ‘mode of otherness’ is in fact the real basis from which discourse and signification 
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proceeds—everyone is a ‘stranger to themselves’—and provides models of alterity that 
query the singularity of self-same, paternally originated subjectivity. In so doing she is 
able to demonstrate that the symbolic ordering that has been presented as characteristic 
of signification is more porous and unstable than it appears. 
Perhaps this is the reason that Kristeva ‘chooses’ to undertake her own project 
from within the paternal signifying system (insofar as rational critique appears to 
reiterate the terms of patrilinear signification) because the poststructuralist analyses of 
signification which Kristeva herself has been so influential in developing suggest the 
difficulties of speaking outside of and without reference to the dimensions of this 
encompassing order. As Peggy Kamuf has argued,  
If one concludes that…there is nothing beyond oppositional modes of thought and 
being, no outside from which something else can intervene which is not already 
programmed by the dialectical machine, then indeed one’s oppositional strategy 
must fully espouse the logic of change (of history) made possible there and in those 
terms. 
(Kamuf and Miller 1990:125) 
Kamuf’s stance bears a similarity to that of Kristeva insofar as Kamuf suggests that 
while ‘one cannot take up a position against [the idea of ideological] positions’, effective 
‘oppositional tactics’ must necessarily keep ‘open a space for possible 
dislocation…giving the traces of the non-opposable other a chance to make their mark 
before they are too quickly reduced to recognizable positions and thereby made 
available to dialectical reason and its institutions’ (Kamuf and Miller 1990:125–126). 
Kamuf here alludes to the double gesture that I argued in the Introduction was a feature 
of feminist theory and practice, one that is helpfully clarified by Diane Fuss’ argument 
that feminist discourse is situated within cultural values that it must nonetheless 
critique: ‘“essentially speaking”…we need both to speak and, simultaneously to 
deconstruct these spaces [of discourse] to keep them from solidifying’. ‘Such a double 
gesture’, she suggests, ‘involves once again the responsibility to historicize, to examine 
each deployment of essence, each appeal to experience, each claim to identity in the 
complicated contextual frame in which it is made’ (1989:118). The poststructural model 
of feminist (and indeed any and all radical forms of) critique presented by Kristeva 
recognises and enacts this double gesture—the requirement to critique and deconstruct 
paternal modes of signification while risking their reification in one’s choice of strategies 
in order to speak at all. As Gayatri Spivak puts it, the deconstructive philosophical 
position consists in saying an ‘impossible “no” to a structure, which one critiques, yet 
intimately inhabits’ (1990a:28), a form of critique she terms ‘catachresis’, ‘reversing, 
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displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding’ (1990b:228). Thus to examine and 
critique a history of origins—to trace the origin of the concept of origins—such as I have 
tried to do in this thesis, does to some degree acquiesce in patrilineal logic but at the 
same time, by demonstrating the ways in which this logic has pursued its course, I have 
also sought to dismantle its hegemonic power, to suggest that it operates through 
exclusion and amnesia, the forgetting or effacing of its ‘other’ scene. In reading 
Kristeva’s work on dialogic subjectivity-in-process into this paternal economy, and the 
ongoing interchange between the semiotic and symbolic, metaphorically represented by 
the maternal body, I have tried to suggest a herethical theorisation of origins that 
retrieves this other scene, suggesting that the origin myths of western metaphysics are 
not in fact singular, linear and causal but are rather sites of irresolvable (and thus 
dynamic) disparity, difference, and dialogue. Origins in this frame are imagined as 
necessarily plural and fluid, traversing time and space and preserving identity as 
multiple rather than singular. Thus I agree with Foucault when he suggests that 
If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, 
he finds that there is ‘Something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless 
and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence 
was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms….What is found at the 
historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the 
dissension of other things. It is disparity. 
(Foucault 1984:78–79) 
Kristeva’s assertion of the dynamic play between the semiotic and the symbolic 
elements of signification points also towards the possibility of reimagining the 
oppositional relationship (at least within the history of western metaphysics) of myth 
and philosophy—muthos and logos. In the remainder of this chapter, therefore, I want to 
reflect briefly on the possibilities of thinking this relationship differently with regard to 
the model of dialogism developed by Kristeva and Derrida’s deconstruction of 
philosophy. I suggested in the Introduction that the fields of mythology and philosophy 
locate their origins in the Platonic prioritisation of logos over muthos. What is generally 
forgotten in these accounts, however, is that Plato’s rejection of poetic and rhetorical 
uses of language in The Republic and The Sophist was dialectically enabled through 
recourse to metaphor and myth. Plato’s prioritisation of reason (logos) sought 
discursively to inscribe its authority through what Foucault suggests was a ‘delimitation 
of a field of objects’—that is, the exclusion of muthos from the scene of reason—by 
defining a singularly ‘legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge and the fixing of 
norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories’, namely logos (in Bouchard 1977:199). 
Plato did this by aligning logos with truth and muthos with superstition and falsity, in the 
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process effectively asserting the authority and agency of the philosopher. However, 
because he used myth to do so, it would appear that reason was in fact more dependent 
on its ‘other’ than Plato could admit and one could recall here that Kristeva’s 
theorisation of paternal interdiction as being reliant on maternal regulation reveals a 
similar dynamic.  
This same dependence—of logos on muthos—marks the post-Enlightenment 
development of mythology as discussed in Chapter 1 (with the key difference that it was 
much more firmly intertwined with ontological preoccupations) insofar as myth as a 
category was wielded by rationalist philosophers to assert the truthfulness of their own 
discourses and of the autonomous, rational individual. In the romantic variant, while 
myth was not asserted as fabrication but rather as essential truth, this was nonetheless 
done with reference to, and to some extent against reason. Thus, the very term 
‘mythology’ as represented by the rationalist and romantic approaches, both of which 
are current in the contemporary field, seems to enact a conflict, where logos and muthos 
are set in opposition but derive their coherency and value through their respective 
other. It is a conflict which goes to the heart of western metaphysics in its promotion of 
the economy of the self-same, always excluding its other but only through an act of 
deliberate forgetfulness or erasure. Derrida puts this profoundly when he brings 
together many of the themes that I have examined in this thesis, suggesting that 
Metaphysics [is] the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of 
the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his 
own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still 
wish to call Reason….White mythology—metaphysics has erased within itself the 
fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and 
stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest. 
(Derrida 1982:213) 
Here Derrida demonstrates that the structures of signification that have informed the 
opposition between myth and reason have effected their closure through strategies of 
(racial and cultural) exclusion and hierarchisation that erase, suppress, and marginalise 
anything that threatens their ‘founding’ values, strategies which the German search for 
origins exemplified. The German example achieved a coherent model of German 
identity through a series of exclusions, most pointedly between Germans and Jews, 
Germans and other Europeans, masculinity and femininity, fathers and mothers, past 
and present, authenticity and cosmopolitanism. For all the ostensible acts of 
remembrance that constituted the search for origins pursued by the German romantics 
and their descendants, it was in actual fact collective forgetfulness—the invention rather 
than the retrieval of traditions—that enabled these origins to be asserted. However, the 
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Germans were not unique in this regard; rather, they used identification strategies 
embedded within western metaphysics more generally. Derrida characterises the 
assertion of ‘founding’ values achieved through acts of suppression as having been the 
conditions of possibility for philosophy’s articulation but demonstrates that these acts 
have also figured its death: 
That philosophy died yesterday, since Hegel or Marx, Nietzsche, or Heidegger—
and philosophy should still wander toward the meaning of its death—or that it has 
always lived knowing itself to be dying…; that philosophy died one day, within 
history, or that it has always fed on its own agony, on the violent way it opens 
history by opposing itself to nonphilosophy, which is its past and its concern, its 
death and wellspring; that beyond the death, or dying nature, of philosophy, 
perhaps even because of it, thought still has a future, or even, as is said today, is still 
entirely to come because of what philosophy has held in store; or, more strangely 
still, that the future itself has a future—all these are unanswerable questions. By 
right of birth, and for one time at least, these are problems put to philosophy as 
problems philosophy cannot resolve. 
(2001:97–98) 
The self-presentation of philosophy as a singularity is here brought into question by 
gesturing towards its birth and its death which might be read as sites of différance. The 
concept of différance, as such, suggests a means of undoing the implacable oppositions of 
western metaphysics that philosophy encodes by indicating their interdependence, the 
forms of deferral and difference that underlie all signification and mark its instability. 
And Kristeva’s model of dialogic subjectivity signals a similar rearticulation of 
signification that can be extended to query the distinction between myth and 
philosophy. Further, if these oppositions aim relentlessly to suppress the other as 
inferior and threatening to the coherency of the self-same, then their structures of 
signification can also be rearticulated differently.  
The value of Kristeva’s and Derrida’s insights in this regard lies in the fact that 
oppositions of the kind which myth and philosophy represent can be undone by 
rearticulating—or re-membering—the structure of their difference, the very structure 
that the positing of ‘foundational’ origins seeks to repress. Moreover, it is through this 
structure that the strategies for challenging authority and power that are derived from 
these origins can be shown to lie inside, rather than outside, the ambivalence and 
heterogeneity that foundational origins, such as that of patriliny, seek to suppress. 
Instead, one can assert différance, or the metaphor of the maternal body as a 
heterogeneity rather than a singularity, as an ‘origin’ for myth and philosophy in 
dialogue and also, therefore, mythology’s future horizon. As Derrida suggests, 
To say that différance is originary is…to erase the myth of a present origin. Which is 
why “originary” must be understood as having been crossed out, without which 
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différance would be derived from an original plenitude. It is a non-origin which is 
originary. 
(2001:255) 
I want to suggest finally, therefore, that maternality, myth, and philosophy, may 
be connected in such a way that mythology can be rearticulated as a dialogue (‘that is 
still to come’) rather than an agonistic struggle to privilege one side of the muthos-logos 
equation over the other. In a recent documentary film about Derrida, Derrida is asked 
‘which philosopher would you like to have been your mother?’ His response opens up a 
series of interesting possibilities, all of which bear on the gendered—paternal and 
maternal—dimensions of philosophy, and of myth: 
…it’s impossible for me to have any philosopher as a mother. That’s the problem. 
My mother couldn’t be a philosopher….[This] means that for me, the figure of the 
philosopher—which is also why I deconstruct philosophy—is always masculine. 
This is one reason I undertook the deconstruction of phallogocentrism. It’s the 
deconstruction of what one calls philosophy which, since its inception, has been 
linked to a masculine, paternal figure….A philosopher is a father, not a mother. So 
the philosopher who would be my mother would be a post-deconstructive 
philosopher….My mother as a philosopher would be my granddaughter, for 
example, an inheritor. A woman philosopher who would reaffirm deconstruction 
and consequently would be a woman who thinks. Not a philosopher. I always 
distinguish thought from philosophy. A thinking mother, that’s what I basically try 
to create. It’s what I both love and try to bring to life, to give birth to, to project. 
(in Dick and Kofman 2002) 
Clearly Derrida’s response could be interpreted as repeating the patrilineal 
fiction of male parturition insofar as he suggests that he tries to ‘give birth’ to the 
‘thinking mother’. However, it is the maternal body as figured by Kristeva that suggests 
a different reading in its interweaving of time and space, inside and outside, self and 
other, father and mother. It suggests, as Derrida affirms, that ‘thought has a future’ one 
very different from the death-dealing enterprise of philosophy’s closures and amnesias. 
To place philosophy and myth in dialogue on the model of the maternal body, points to 
the future horizon of mythology, by substituting the violence of the self-same with a 
recognition and joyous celebration of the heterogeneity that lies at the origin of 
signification, disrupts its claim to singular presence, and takes it into an unknowable 
future. The maternal body as a metaphor of origins, of the future of mythology enacts, 
therefore, a (herethical) feminist reading of myth and philosophy as a double gesture, of 
a division but not a separation, not a site of transcendence but one of immanence. In the 
end, then, as in the beginning, there is no pure origin, only différance, the mother’s body 
as a sign of the heterogeneity of discourse and of selves, myth and philosophy in an 
ongoing dialogue—impure, transgressive, plural…an impossible possibility.
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p. 91: These barbarians are our fathers, their language the source of our language, and 
their unrefined songs the mirror of the ancient German soul [reflected] in the simplicity 
of our character. 
 
Diese Barbaren sind unser Väter, ihre Sprache die Quelle unserer Sprache, und ihre 
rohen Gesänge der Spiegel uralter Deutschen Seelen in ihrer Einfalt des Charakters. 
 
p. 91: Read Tacitus, because there you will find our character; the German tribes who 
themselves have not degenerated through intermixture with others, they are a distinct, 
unadulterated original nation which is the archetype of itself. Even the breeding of their 
bodies is still the same in a large number of the people. 
 
Lies Tacitus, da findest du ihren Charakter: die Völker Deutschlands, die sich durch 
keine Vermischung mit anderen entadelt, sind eine eigne, unverfälschte Originale 
Nation, die von sich selbst das Urbild ist. Selbst die Bildung ihres Körpers ist in einer 
so großen Menge Volks noch bei allen gleich. 
Chapter Six 
p. 159: Our poetry, I claim, is missing a centre in the way that mythology was, for the 
ancients, completely necessary, so much so that modern poetry is inferior to that of the 
ancient, and can be summarised in the words: We do not have a mythology.  
 
Es fehlt, behaupte ich, unsrer Poesie an einem Mittelpunkt, wie es die Mythologie für 
die der Alten war, und alles Wesentliche, worin die moderne Dichtkunst der antiken 
nachsteht, läßt sich in die Worte zusammenfassen: Wir haben keine Mythologie. 
 
p. 161: …follow the example which Goethe constructed, to investigate the forms of art as 
far as their origin in order to be able to revive or connect them, and [to] trace back to the 
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sources of their own language and literature, [in order] to set the ancient vitality and 
high spirit free again which currently slumbers unrecognised in the ancient national 
documents from the Nibelungenlieder [Song of the Nibelungen] up to Flamming and 
Weckherlin. 
 
…Vorbilde folgen, was Goethe aufgestellt hat, die Formen der Kunst überall bis auf 
den Ursprung erforschen, um sie neu beleben oder verbinden zu können, und daß sie 
auf die Quellen ihrer eignen Sprache und Dichtung zurückgehn, und die alte Kraft, 
den hohen Geist wieder frey machen, der noch in den Urkunden der vaterländischen 
Vorzeit vom Liede der Niblungen bis zum Flamming und Weckherlin bis jetzt 
verkannt schlummert. 
 
p. 162: chivalric and Christian mythology 
 
ritterliche und christliche Mythologie. 
 
p. 162: nothing other than the primordial German manliness (bravery, courage) tamed 
by Christendom. 
 
Nichts andres…als die ursprüngliche Deutsche Tapferkeit, durch das Christenthum 
gezähmt. 
Chapter Seven 
p. 173: It is perhaps the right time to collect these fairy tales since those who have been 
preserving them are becoming invariably rarer…for the custom of telling tales is ever 
more on the wane, just as all the homely places in dwellings and gardens are yielding to 
empty splendour. 
 
Es war vielleicht gerade Zeit, diese Märchen festzuhalten, da diejenigen, die sie 
bewahren sollen, immer seltner werdern…denn die Sitte darin nimmt selber immer 
mehr ab, wie alle heimlichen Plätze in Wohmungen und Gärten einer leeren 
Prächtigkeit weichen. 
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p. 175: I think, however, if all goes well, God willing, then reading and writing in 
Germany will become gradually less political and so forth—instead, pious work, sowing 
and ploughing will once again be satisfyingly calm, which is indubitably better suited to 
us than the shrieking, irascible manner that the cursed French brought us.  
 
Dennoch meine ich, daß des Lesens und Schriebens in Deutschland, wenn es gut 
geht, was der liebe Gott gebe, nach und nach weniger werden soll, politisch und 
sonst—dagegen das fromme Arbeiten, Säen und Pflüfen in zufriedener Stille wieder 
mehr angehe, was unstreitig uns angemessener ist, denn die verfluchten Franzosen 
haben uns gebracht in ihr kreischendes, auffahrendes Wesen. 
 
p. 175: The eagerness with which studies of old German culture were pursued also 
helped to overcome the oppressiveness of those times. Without doubt, world events and 
the need to withdraw into the peace of scholarship had contributed to the reawakening 
of that long forgotten literature; one sought in the past not only consolation but also the 
hope was natural that this direction would contribute to the return of another time.  
 
Das Drückende jener Zeiten zu überwinden half denn auch der Eifer, womit die 
altdeutschen Studien getrieben wurden. Ohne Zweifel hatten die Weltereignisse und 
das Bedürfnis, sich in den Frieden der Wissenschaft zurückzuziehen, beigetragen, 
daß jene lange vergessene Literatur wieder erweckt wurde; allein man suchte nicht 
bloß in der Vergangenheit einen Trost, auch die Hoffnung war natürlich, daß diese 
Richtung zu der Rückkehr einer anderen Zeit etwas beitragen könne. 
 
p. 175: Distrust and antipathy towards the French will remain firmly impressed upon 
those of us who belong to this generation, although we see things much more mildly 
than we did in 1813-15. As far as I am concerned, the feeling[s] will pass and proceed to 
the strengthened and secure awareness of our own German virtue without any 
resentment; then we [will] have nothing to fear. Such an awareness depends upon 
political unity which one day must again be achieved and there are many paths to this 
end, even though things appear gloomy.  
 
Die Generation zu welcher wir gehören, wird Mißtrauen und Abneigung gegen die 
Franzosen unauslöslich eingeprägt bleiben, obwohl wir freilich vieles milder sehen, 
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also wir 1813-15 taten. Das Gefühl möchte aber meinethalben ganz übergehen in das 
gestärkte und sichere Bewußtsein unserer eigenen deutschen Kraft, ohne alle 
Feindseligkeit; dann hätten wir nichts zu fürchten. Ein solches Bewußtsein hängt 
aber ab von politischer Einheit, die einmal wieder über Deutschland kommen muß 
und dazu kann es mehrere Wege geben, obgleich Dunkel über sie gebreitet ist. 
 
p. 189: Women know nothing of social conditions—altogether they are only connected 
to the State, Church, and the public, etc. by means of their husbands. They live in a 
literally natural state. 
 
De Frauen wissen nichts von Verhältnissen der Gemeinschaft—Nur durch ihren 
Mann hängen sie mit Staat, Kirche, Publikum etc. zusammen. Sie leben im 
eigentlichen Naturstande. 
Chapter Nine 
p. 297: The mother is no parent of that which is called her child, but only nurse of the 
new-planted seed that grows. The parent is he who mounts. A stranger she preserves a 
strangers seed, if no god interfere….And of this truth, that father without mother may 
beget, we have present, as proof, the daughter of Olympian Zeus: one never nursed in 
the dark cradle of the womb 
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